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In the period between the end of the Second Punic War and the early 
Principate, several sources of evidence combine to indicate that the Roman 
economy experienced some measure of (probably real) growth. At the same 
time, this was also the period during which Rome’s legal institutions were most 
radically developed. The question that arises is, what part (if any) did the 
development of Roman law play in the city’s economic history during this 
period? This is a big question, which it is outside of the scope of this thesis to 
answer. Rather, the aim of this study is to take a first step in this direction, by 
providing an evidential foundation upon which to base hypotheses about the 
relationship between changes in the intensity of transactional activity and legal 
development in the context of the Roman world. 
One of the pillars for the case for growth is the observation that the evidence 
for the chronological distribution of shipwrecks located in the Mediterranean 
Basin indicates that there was a steep increase in maritime traffic in the second 
and first centuries BCE. In the first place, by studying the chronological 
development of Roman legal institutions relevant to the conduct of long-
distance trade, this investigation shows that these developed in parallel with 
the increase in the intensity of maritime commercial activity. In the second, by 
constructing a model of the process by which long-distance trade was typically 
conducted, I demonstrate that the legal remedies that arose were specific to 
the relationships typically entered into by merchants in the course of 
transporting goods to their intended market. In this way, the pattern of legal 
change that emerges from the evidence is best understood as the 
development of Roman ‘merchant law’, even if the Romans themselves did not 








The late Roman Republic and early Principate was a period of tumultuous 
change. Besides the dramatic military and political events that led to the 
expansion of Rome’s empire and the transition of the state from a Republic to 
the Principate, Rome’s economy and society were also transforming. New 
evidence from archaeological and natural science research has shown that 
certain kinds of economic activity – such as long-distance trade – intensified 
greatly during this period. At the same time, the textual evidence for the 
development of Roman law demonstrates that this was also the period during 
which Rome’s legal institutions were most radically developed. 
The circumstances surrounding these two parallel processes gives rise to a 
number of exciting questions: To what extent were they connected? Did 
changes in patterns of economic activity stimulate legal change? And 
conversely, did legal change stimulate economic activity? Finally, how does 
the relation between legal and economic change in this period compare to the 
relation observed in others? This thesis takes a first step towards answering 
these questions. By focussing on the conduct of maritime trade, I show that 
not only did Roman legal institutions develop in parallel with the economy, but 
that they emerged as a coherent cluster of remedies best characterised as a 
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The immediate context of this study is that, in the period between the end of 
the Second Punic War and the early Principate, several sources of evidence 
combine to indicate that the Roman economy experienced some measure of 
(probably real) growth. At the same time, this was also the period during which 
Rome’s legal institutions were most radically developed. The question that 
arises is, what part (if any) did the development of Roman law play in the city’s 
economic history during this period? This is a big question, which it is outside 
of the scope of this thesis to answer. Rather, the aim of this study is to take a 
first step in this direction, by providing an evidential foundation upon which to 
base hypotheses about the relationship between changes in the intensity of 
transactional activity and legal development in the context of the Roman world. 
The case for the growth of the Roman economy is founded on two 
complementary approaches. One approach has been to construct an 
‘argument from convergence’, which proceeds from the observation that 
several archaeological data sets – including, for example, shipwrecks located 
in the Mediterranean basin, deposits of domestic animal bones at Italian sites, 
and samples of lead and copper pollution derived from Arctic ice cores and 
lake sediments – all show an increase in their chronological distribution during 
the late Republic and early Principate.1 If these data sets are taken as proxies 
for the volume and intensity of exchange, consumption, and production 
respectively, then, as Scheidel has argued, ‘we may reasonably assume that 
they indicate at least the general direction of economic development’.2 Wilson 
is right, however, to acknowledge that uncertainty about the value of these 
proxies means that although they are consistent with the idea that the Roman 
economy experienced both extensive and intensive growth during this period, 
                                            
1 Walter Scheidel, ‘In Search of Roman Economic Growth’, JRA 22 (2009): 47. 
2 Walter Scheidel, ‘Approaching the Roman Economy’, in The Cambridge Companion to the 
Roman Economy, ed. Walter Scheidel (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 3. 
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they cannot be relied upon to argue for either of these eventualities in their 
own right.3 
A second approach has been to attempt to quantify the GDP of the Roman 
economy. Again, the limitations of the evidence mean that the exercise is 
necessarily conjectural. Nevertheless, where such estimates are possible they 
provide an insight into the trajectory of economic development, if only by giving 
a rough indication of the rate at which the economy was likely to have grown 
or contracted over a given period.4 The most significant study from our 
perspective is Kay’s ‘probabilistic quantification’ of the GDP of Roman Italy for 
the second and early first centuries BCE.5 In brief, Kay concludes that the 
economy experienced nominal growth, and probably also real growth, not least 
because the rate of inflation remained at a relatively low level throughout the 
period.6 Kay’s estimate that prices rose by 95% between 150 – 50 BCE. (i.e., 
at an annual compound rate of 0.67% per annum) accords with the broadly 
similar conclusions reached by, among others, Rathbone, Hollander, Scheidel, 
and Temin.7 Although, as Kay warns, ‘the estimates we have produced are 
assumptions, not facts’, the results are both plausible and credible from a 
comparative perspective.8 
The conclusion that the Roman economy experienced some measure of (real) 
growth over the course of the last few centuries BCE has given rise to a 
profusion of alleged causes.9 These range variously from environmental and 
climatic change, to technological developments, the rapid increase in the 
supply of coinage, military conquest, the suppression of piracy, and the 
political transformation of the Roman state. In addition, several scholars have 
sought to locate Roman economic development within the context of the 
                                            
3 Andrew I. Wilson, ‘Quantifying Roman Economic Performance by Means of Proxies: Pitfalls 
and Potential’, in Quantifying the Greco-Roman Economy and Beyond, ed. François de 
Callataÿ (Bari: Edipuglia, 2014), 155. 
4 Scheidel, ‘Approaching the Roman Economy’, 4. 
5 Philip Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 278. 
6 Kay, 324. 
7 Kay, 284. For a summary of the literature on this point, Peter Temin, ‘Price Behaviour in the 
Roman Empire’, in Quantifying the Greco-Roman Economy and Beyond, ed. François de 
Callataÿ (Bari: Edipuglia, 2014), 191–92. 
8 Kay, Revolution, 325. 
9 Scheidel, ‘Approaching the Roman Economy’, 13. 
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longue durée, sometimes with an emphasis on institutional change.10 From 
time to time, the development of Roman law has been touted as a potential 
contributor to Roman economic development, though sometimes with the 
qualification that it ought not to be considered a ‘prime mover’.11 
While the increased attention paid to the historical significance of Roman law 
by ancient historians is heartening, it has also given rise to cross-disciplinary 
tensions. In a recent contribution made to the Oxford Handbook of European 
Legal History, James Whitman wrote that ‘European legal historians ought to 
overcome their reticence… and engage frankly with claims about the world 
historical significance of their subject’.12 He continued: 
It is a great loss if the grand theories about European legal history are 
debated by outsiders, and not by specialists who know the sources and 
understand how to think about law. It goes without saying that the sorts of 
grand claims about European legal history that non-specialists make may 
turn out to be foolish on close inspection. Nevertheless they deserve 
informed responses; and there is good reason to hope that the field will 
profit intellectually from debating them seriously. 
In the past two decades, an increasing number of Roman legal scholars have 
engaged with economic historians to this effect.13 The approach has been 
pioneered by, among others, Dennis Kehoe, who has applied the framework 
provided by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) to the study of Roman 
                                            
10 E.g., Taco T. Terpstra, Trade in the Ancient Mediterranean: Private Order and Public 
Institutions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2019); also, Joseph G. Manning, 
The Open Sea: The Economic Life of the Ancient Mediterranean World from the Iron Age 
to the Rise of Rome (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2018); and The Economy 
of the Ancient Mediterranean World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
Forthcoming). 
11 E.g., by William V. Harris, ‘Roman Governments and Commerce, 300 B.C. - A.D. 300’, in 
Mercanti e politica nel mondo antico, ed. Carlo Zaccagnini (Rome: L’Erma di Bretschneider, 
2003), 285; Koenraad Verboven, ‘The Knights Who Say NIE. Can Neo-Institutional 
Economics Live up to Its Expectation in Ancient History Research?’, in Structure and 
Performance in the Roman Economy: Models, Methods and Case Studies, ed. Paul 
Erdkamp and Koenraad Verboven (Brussels: Éditions Latomus, 2015), 53; and Luuk de 
Ligt, ‘Law-Making and Economic Change during the Republic and Early Empire’, in Roman 
Law and Economics, ed. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Dennis P. Kehoe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, Forthcoming). 
12 James Q. Whitman, ‘The World Historical Significance of European Legal History: An Interim 
Report’, in The Oxford Handbook of European Legal History, ed. Heikki Pihlajamäki, 
Markus D. Dubber, and Mark Godfrey, 2018, 5. 
13 For a survey of the literature, Lauretta Manganzani, ‘“Law and Economics” e diritto romano’, 
in Antologia giuridica romanstica ed antiquaria, ed. Lorenzo Gagliardi, vol. 2 (Milan: Giuffrè 
Francis Lefebvre, 2018), 407–53. 
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property rights and aspects of the law of agency.14 However, significant gaps 
in coverage remain, and Lo Cascio was right to point out just over a decade 
ago that:15 
…there is still ample room for studying in more detail, and through an 
analysis specifically oriented by the conceptualizations of the New 
Institutionalism, both the emergence and diffusion of what we may call 
Roman commercial law: the sheer richness of the documentary basis 
provided by the jurists but also by such epigraphic evidence as the 
Murecine tablets or more generally the Campanian archives can allow the 
drawing of a fairly detailed and concrete picture of the working of the 
Roman economy in a crucial sector of it. 
The gap that this thesis will address is the historical development of Roman 
maritime law. An immediate caveat, however, is necessary: when I say, ‘the 
historical development of Roman maritime law’, what I really mean is the 
historical development of a subset of Roman legal institutions relevant to the 
conduct of long-distance trade. The expression ‘Roman maritime law’ is 
therefore used as a convenient way of referring to a set of institutions relevant 
to carriage by sea, which was just one aspect of the broader process by which 
overseas trade was conducted. As I shall argue at the conclusion of this study, 
those institutions that I have grouped together under the heading of Roman 
maritime law are better understood as part of a wider body of institutions 
                                            
14 See, generally, Bruce W. Frier and Dennis P. Kehoe, ‘Law and Economic Institutions’, in 
The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, ed. Walter Scheidel, Ian 
Morris, and Richard P. Saller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 113–43. On 
property rights, most significantly: Dennis P. Kehoe, Investment, Profit, and Tenancy: The 
Jurists and the Roman Agrarian Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); 
and Law and the Rural Economy in the Roman Empire (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2007). Recent contributions on the law of agency include: ‘Roman Economic Policy 
and the Law of Contracts’, in Obligations in Roman Law: Past, Present, and Future, ed. 
Thomas A. J. McGinn (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012), 189–214; ‘Law, 
Agency and Growth in the Roman Economy’, in New Frontiers: Law and Society in the 
Roman World, ed. Paul J. du Plessis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 177–
91; ‘Contracts, Agency, and Transaction Costs in the Roman Economy’, in Law and 
Transaction Costs in the Ancient Economy, ed. Dennis P. Kehoe, David M. Ratzan, and 
Uri Yiftach (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015), 231–52; and ‘Agency, Roman 
Law, and Roman Social Values’, in Ancient Law, Ancient Society, ed. Dennis P. Kehoe and 
Thomas A. J. McGinn (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017), 105–32. 
15 Elio Lo Cascio, ‘The Role of the State in the Roman Economy: Making Use of the New 
Institutional Economics’, in Ancient Economies, Modern Methodologies: Archaeology, 
Comparative History, Models and Institutions, ed. Peter F. Bang, Mamoru Ikeguchi, and 
Harmut G. Ziche (Bari: Edipuglia, 2006), 223. 
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comprising Roman ‘merchant law’, even if the Romans themselves did not 
conceive of it as such. 
The reader may fairly point out that several studies of Roman maritime law 
have already been conducted.16 Moreover, there is a strong tradition in Roman 
legal scholarship of examining the conduct of long-distance trade from an 
interdisciplinary perspective.17 The novel contribution of this thesis, however, 
will be to produce an interpretation of the evidence upon which future studies 
informed by NIE can be based. To be useful for this purpose, the study must 
bring together the evidence for changes in the intensity of transactional activity 
and legal development with a view to establishing: first, the chronology of legal 
institutional change; and second, the substantive content of the changes that 
took place. In short, the specific focus must be on the interpretation of the 
evidence from the dual perspectives of chronology and change. 
This will be achieved by means of a two-pronged approach. First, in chapter 2, 
I shall isolate one of the archaeological proxies identified above – the 
shipwreck data – with a view to establishing the period during which Roman 
maritime trading activity intensified at its greatest rate. In the second part of 
that chapter, I will situate this change within the context of the broader 
economic history of the period. In the third and final part, I will use a case study 
to construct a model of the process by which Roman long-distance trade was 
                                            
16 Comprehensive treatments include (at century intervals): Jean-Marie Pardessus, Collection 
de lois maritimes antérieures au XVIII siècle, vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1828); Paul 
Huvelin, Études d’histoire du droit commercial romain (histoire externe-droit maritime) 
(Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1929); and Dominique Gaurier, Le droit maritime romain (Rennes: 
Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2004). See, also, Pietro Cerami and Aldo Petrucci, 
Diritto commerciale romano: profilo storico, 3rd ed. (Turin: G. Giappichelli, 2010), 247–94. 
17 See, e.g., Christoph H. Brecht, Zur Haftung der Schiffer im antiken Recht (Munich: C.H. 
Beck, 1962); Apollonia J. M. Meyer-Termeer, Die Haftung der Schiffer im griechischen und 
römischen Recht (Zutphen: Terra, 1978); Arnaldo Biscardi, ‘Introduction à l’étude des 
pratiques commerciales dans l’histoire des droits de l’Antiquité’, RIDA 29 (1982): 21–44; 
Alfons Bürge, ‘Der Witz im antiken Seefrachtvertrag: Beobachtungen zur Vertragspraxis im 
antiken Mittelmeerraum’, Index 22 (1994): 389–407; Gianfranco Purpura, Studi romanistici 
in tema di diritto commerciale marittimo (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 1996); Éva Jakab, 
‘Risikomanagement bei den naukleroi’, in Antike - Recht - Geschichte. Symposion zu Ehren 
von Peter E. Pieler, ed. Nikolaus Benke and Franz-Stefan Meissel, vol. 4 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Lang, 2009), 73–88; and Roberto Fiori, ‘L’allocazione del rischio nei contratti relativi 
al trasporto’, in Diritto romano e economia. Due modi di pensare e organizzare il mondo 
(nei primi tre secoli dell’Impero), ed. Elio Lo Cascio and Dario Mantovani (Pavia: Pavia 
University Press, 2018), 507–67. 
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typically conducted. The second prong (chapters 3 and 4) will consist of an 
analysis of the legal evidence from the dual perspectives of chronology and 
change. In chapter 3, the relationship between merchants and financiers will 
be considered, with a particular focus on the practice of lending pecunia 
traiecticia. In chapter 4, the attention will turn to the remedies that governed 
the relationship between merchants and exercitores: sc., the actio exercitoria; 
the actiones locati and conducti (including the lex Rhodia); the decretal actio 
oneris aversi; and the actiones in factum (de recepto; furti and damni adversus 
nautas). In the final chapter, I draw some conclusions about the chronological 
and substantive relationship between the conduct of long-distance trade and 
the development of legal institutions at Rome. 
Before proceeding, however, it is important to say a few words about method. 
With respect to chapter 2, the approach has been to set out the evidence with 
the support of secondary literature in order to construct a model of a typical 
overseas trading enterprise. I have not offered any new interpretations of the 
evidence, archaeological or otherwise, except insofar as I have interpreted it 
to demonstrate that long-distance enterprises tended towards a typical socio-
economic structure. In addition, since the study concerns the development of 
institutions of private law, the focus has been on the evidence for the conduct 
of private enterprise. This has necessarily led to certain omissions (such as a 
thorough treatment of the annona), principally in the interests of clarity and 
concision.18 
Turning to the legal evidence, an historical question demands an historical 
method. In the context of the study of Roman law, the approach I have taken 
may be broadly understood as ‘contextual’ and ‘neo-humanist’ in character.19 
In brief, this means that I have sought to treat each text first and foremost as 
evidence. In the first place, this involves considerations about the transmission 
                                            
18 On which, e.g., Adriaan J. B. Sirks, Food for Rome: The Legal Structure of the 
Transportation and Processing of Supplies for the Imperial Distributions in Rome and 
Constantinople (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1991). 
19 Laurens C. Winkel, ‘Roman Law and Its Intellectual Context’, in The Cambridge Companion 




of the text (e.g., its manuscript tradition) and possible alterations made to its 
substance by the compilers and their postclassical forbears. With respect to 
interpolations, my approach is aligned with that of Kaser and Johnston, who 
have both advocated a rigorous and critical exegetical technique.20 In those 
cases where questions concerning the form of the text arise, these have been 
indicated and, where appropriate, addressed. Where a text does not appear to 
have been substantially altered, or good arguments have already been made 
against allegations of interpolation, I have indicated this as well. 
Once the text has been established, the next aim is to interpret its intended 
meaning. In this pursuit I follow Skinner, who has argued that:21 
The essential question which we… confront in studying any given text, is 
what its author, in writing at the time he did write for the audience he 
intended to address, could in practice have been intending to 
communicate by the utterance of this given utterance. It follows that the 
essential aim, in any attempt to understand the utterances themselves, 
must be to recover this complex intention on the part of the author. 
This raises the question as to how we are to recover the author’s intention. In 
this connection, I follow Collingwood’s thesis that the historian’s basic method 
is ‘the re-enactment of past thought in the historian’s own mind’.22 Thus, to give 
an example:23 
…suppose he is reading a passage of an ancient philosopher. Once more, 
he must know the language in a philological sense and be able to construe; 
but by doing that he has not yet understood the passage as an historian 
of philosophy must understand it. In order to see that, he must see what 
the philosophical problem was, of which his author is here stating his 
solution. He must think that problem out for himself, see what possible 
solutions of it might be offered, and see why this particular philosopher 
chose that solution instead of another. This means re-thinking for himself 
                                            
20 Generally, Max Kaser, Zur Methodologie der römischen Rechtsquellenforschung (Cologne, 
Graz, and Vienna: Böhlaus, 1972); also, David Johnston, ‘Justinian’s Digest: The 
Interpretation of Interpolation’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 9, no. 2 (1989): 149–66. 
21 Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History and Theory 
8 (1969): 48–49. 
22 Robin G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 215. Despite 
the criticisms that have been levelled against the doctrine, I agree with Dray that ‘the idea 
itself is basically sound’: History as Re-Enactment: R. G. Collingwood’s Idea of History 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 32. 
23 Collingwood, Idea of History, 283. 
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the thought of his author, and nothing short of that will make him the 
historian of that author’s philosophy. 
It is not difficult to see that, for the legal historian, one only has to substitute 
the word ‘philosophical’ for the word ‘legal’ to be confronted with a viable 
method for the interpretation of juristic texts. 
All this brings us back to the importance of context. In the first instance, if 
recovering the intention of an author means the re-enactment of their thought, 
this necessarily requires an awareness and knowledge on the part of the 
historian of their subject’s way of thinking (i.e., their intellectual context). In 
addition, Skinner was also right to argue that the wider socio-economic context 
within which a certain text was produced can bear on its interpretation. In this 
way, context becomes the ‘ultimate framework’ that delimits the range of 
possible meanings that someone who belonged to a society of the kind in 
question can have intended to communicate.24 
In Roman legal scholarship, the acknowledgment that contextualisation can 
yield important insights into the meaning of juristic texts can be traced through 
two complementary lines of inquiry. On the one hand, studies conducted into 
the intellectual context of juristic thought has led to an increasing recognition 
of the influence of ancient philosophy and rhetoric on Roman legal thinking.25 
On the other hand, the location of juristic activity in its political and socio-
economic context has led to a deeper understanding of the assumptions that 
formed the background to legal interpretation.26 In both respects, however, the 
relationship between Roman legal thought and the context of its expression 
                                            
24 Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding’, 49. 
25 See, e.g., the scholars cited by Winkel: ‘Roman Law’, 11–12; and the recent doctoral thesis 
by Graeme Cunningham: ‘Law, Rhetoric and Science: Historical Narratives in Roman Law’ 
(University of Glasgow, 2018). 
26 The tradition can be traced (at least in its present form) to Crook’s seminal work, Law and 
Life of Rome (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967); and through David Johnston, 
Roman Law in Context (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For 
a survey and discussion of the literature since the late 1960s, John W. Cairns and Paul J. 
du Plessis, eds., ‘Introduction: Themes and Literature’, in Beyond Dogmatics: Law and 
Society in the Roman World (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 3–8; Paul J. 
du Plessis, ed., ‘Introduction’, in New Frontiers: Law and Society in the Roman World 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 1–5; and Paul J. du Plessis, Clifford Ando, 
and Kaius Tuori, eds., ‘A Word from the Editors’, in The Oxford Handbook of Roman Law 
and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 3–7. 
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remains controversial. As Winkel has pointed out, addressing these problems 
requires ‘intensive interdisciplinary collaboration’, and it is against the 
backdrop of this tradition that the present contribution may be assessed.27 
                                            




THE CONDUCT OF LONG-DISTANCE TRADE 
The development of Roman legal institutions relevant to the conduct of long-
distance cannot be understood without an appreciation of the socio-economic 
context within which that development took place. To this end, the aim will be 
to construct a model of a typical Roman maritime trading enterprise from the 
period in question. The chapter will be divided into three sections. In the first, 
the quantitative evidence for changes in the intensity of Mediterranean long-
distance trade will be introduced. In the second, the context within which these 
changes took place will be considered in more detail, including the location of 
points of supply and demand, and the trade networks that connected them. 
Third, and finally, a specific trade route between the Italian peninsula and 
southern Gaul will be analysed with a view to constructing a model of a typical 
maritime trading enterprise. 
 
Section 2.1: The Shipwreck Evidence. 
The evidence for the distribution of ancient shipwrecks provides an 
unparalleled insight into changes in the intensity of Mediterranean long-
distance trade over time. The shipwreck data for the Mediterranean basin was 
originally brought together by Anthony Parker in 1992 and has subsequently 
been updated and refined by Andrew Wilson and Julia Strauss as part of the 
Oxford Roman Economy Project (OXREP).1 The current database, which was 
last updated in 2013, contains a record of all the known shipwrecks within the 
Mediterranean basin that can be dated to before 1500 CE. The graph 
reproduced in Fig. 1 (see Appendix) represents the chronological distribution 
of the whole dataset. 
 
1 Anthony J. Parker, Ancient Shipwrecks of the Mediterranean and the Roman Provinces 
(Oxford: Tempus Reparatum, 1992). For the OXREP database, Julia Strauss, Shipwrecks 
Database, version 1, 2013, oxrep.classics.ox.ac.uk/databases/shipwrecks_database/. 
Many shipwrecks have been discovered since the release of the database. The effect that 
these have on the overall distribution has yet to be seen. 
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The interpretation of the data must be handled with some care. First, it is 
important to acknowledge the geographical biases concealed by the 
chronological representation of the data. These come out strongly when the 
locations of the shipwreck sites are charted cartographically (Appendix: Fig. 
2). The map clearly shows that the majority of known wrecks are located along 
the French Riviera and the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic coasts. This is due, at least 
in part, to the greater intensity of archaeological work that has been undertaken 
along the western seaboard. Consequently, the eastern and North African 
Mediterranean littoral, as well as areas of deep water out to sea, are 
underrepresented in the present sample. While the data, therefore, may be 
broadly indicative of changes in the volume of maritime traffic along coastal 
routes in the north-western quarter of the basin, it is less securely 
representative of conditions elsewhere. 
With this in mind, the changes in the volume of maritime traffic in the western 
Mediterranean during our period can be more accurately represented by 
isolating a subset of the data that only includes wrecks located in the West 
Mediterranean, Tyrrhenian, and Adriatic Seas (Appendix: Fig. 3).2 Within this 
subset, it is notable that of approximately 600 wrecks, almost 400 are located 
in the West Mediterranean Sea, of which more than three-quarters sank off the 
French and Italian coastline. In contrast, the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic coastlines 
are each home to just over 100 wrecks each.3 This suggests that the 
observable increase in the volume of maritime traffic that occurred during the 
late Republic was driven to a large extent by long-distance trade between the 
Italian peninsula and Gaul: a conclusion that is corroborated by the scale of 
terrestrial amphora deposits in Gaul from the same period. The intensity of the 
trade conducted along this route is indicated by the number of findspots of 
 
2 Long-dated wrecks – that is, wrecks with long date ranges – have been left in the data set 
because, as Wilson suggests, their removal does not have any significant impact on the 
shape of the graph: ‘Developments in Mediterranean Shipping and Maritime Trade from 
the Hellenistic Period to AD 1000’, in Maritime Archaeology and Ancient Trade in the 
Mediterranean, ed. Damian Robinson and Andrew I. Wilson (Oxford: Oxford Centre for 
Maritime Archaeology, 2011), 35. 
3 The OXREP database records the remains of 606 wrecks in these three sea areas: 392 in 
the West Mediterranean Sea, 101 in the Tyrrhenian, and 113 in the Adriatic. 
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Republican amphorae recorded in France, which stood at 1,975 in 2003,4 
amounting to a total quantity of c. 70 million containers.5 Drawing upon the 
shipwrecks known in the 1980s, Tchernia attempted to quantify the volume of 
Italian wine exports to Gaul during the period for which Dressel 1 amphorae 
were in use and came to an estimate of 6 million litres per annum.6 Separately, 
Rosenstein reached the conclusion that exports amounted to between 6 and 
15 million litres per year.7 Whatever the true figure, there is little doubt that the 
volume of trade conducted was substantial. All this is consistent with the shape 
of the graph presented in Fig. 3, which indicates a sharp increase in traffic in 
the last quarter of the second and first quarter of the first centuries BCE, 
followed by a decrease in the quarter century during which the demand from 
Gaul is thought to have abated (i.e., 75 – 50 BCE).8 
In addition, before we can argue that the graph is representative of changes in 
the volume of maritime traffic that traversed the Mediterranean during any 
given period, we must be prepared to recognise that the pattern contained 
within it is underpinned by two fundamental assumptions.9 First, it is assumed 
that the probability of a ship becoming wrecked was the same in all periods. 
This, however, is a factor that depends on a number of variables, such as, 
among other things, changes in climate, sailing routes, the propensity for 
winter sailing, and, perhaps above all, shipping technology. It is probable, for 
example, that the introduction of a new design of bilge pump around 100 BCE 
made ships equipped with this technology less likely to sink, and also facilitated 
the construction of larger ships which were more capable of withstanding 
 
4 Matthew E. Loughton, ‘The Distribution of Republican Amphorae in France’, Oxford Journal 
of Archaeology 22, no. 2 (2003): 177. 
5 André Tchernia, ‘The Economic Crisis in Imperial Italy and Competition from the Provinces’, 
in The Romans and Trade, trans. James Grieve and Elizabeth Minchin (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 302; Fabienne Olmer, ‘Amphores en Gaule aux IIe et Ier siècles 
avant notre ère. Aspects épigraphiques, quantitatifs et économiques’, Bollettino di 
Archaeologia On Line 1 (2010): 67–68. 
6 André Tchernia, Le vin de l’Italie romaine. Essai d’histoire économique d’après les amphores 
(Paris and Rome: École française de Rome, 1986). 
7 Nathan Rosenstein, ‘Aristocrats and Agriculture in the Middle and Late Republic’, JRS 98 
(2008): 17. 
8 André Tchernia, ‘Wine Exporting and the Exception of Gaul’, in The Romans and Trade, 
trans. James Grieve and Elizabeth Minchin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 292. 
9 Wilson, ‘Developments’, 36. 
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adverse sailing conditions.10 It is hard to assess the extent that this causes us 
to underestimate the increase in the volume of traffic following the introduction 
of the pump, however, since the effect of better technology may have been 
offset by, for example, a greater willingness to sail in inclement weather and 
along more dangerous routes. 
Second, it is assumed that the archaeological remains of wrecks are equally 
visible across all periods. Clearly this is not the case, and it is vital to 
acknowledge that the majority of known wrecks have only remained visible 
because their cargoes consisted of durable materials, such as clay (for 
amphorae) or stone.11 In contrast, any soft commodities that were freely 
transported, or contained in sacks or wooden barrels, have perished and are 
therefore not traceable in the archaeological record.12 The interpretation of the 
data becomes especially problematic once the transition in container 
preference from amphorae to barrels, which began in earnest from the first 
century CE, is factored in.13 It is likely, therefore, that the apparent decline in 
the number of shipwrecks attributable to the second century CE and beyond 
is, in part, a reflection of changes in the use of containers.14 On the other hand, 
because this change in preference appears to have only become significant 
by the first century CE at the earliest, it does not affect our assessment of the 
 
10 Wilson, 42–44. 
11 For research into stone cargoes, Ben Russell, ‘Lapis Transmarinus: Stone-Carrying Ships 
and the Maritime Distribution of Stone in the Roman Empire’, in Maritime Archaeology and 
Ancient Trade in the Mediterranean, ed. Damian Robinson and Andrew I. Wilson (Oxford: 
Oxford Centre for Maritime Archaeology, 2011), 139–55; Ben Russell, ‘Roman and Late-
Antique Shipwrecks with Stone Cargoes: A New Inventory’, JRA 26 (2013): 331–61. 
12 Tchernia has remarked that, had slaves been transported in amphorae, we would detect a 
peak in their export from both Gaul and Delos to the Italian peninsula in the second and 
first centuries BCE: ‘Wine Exporting’, 295; also, Michele Stefanile, ‘The Development of 
Roman Maritime Trade after the Second Punic War’, in The Sea in History - The Ancient 
World, ed. Pascal Arnaud and Philip de Souza (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell & Brewer, 2017), 
261–62. 
13 For the use of barrels as containers, Élise Marlière, ‘Le tonneau en Gaule romaine’, Gallia: 
Archéologie de la France antique 58 (2001): 181–201; also, L’outre et le tonneau dans 
l’Occident romain (Montagnac: Éditions monique mergoil, 2002). 
14 Andrew I. Wilson, ‘Approaches to Quantifying Roman Trade’, in Quantifying the Roman 
Economy: Methods and Problems, ed. Alan K. Bowman and Andrew I. Wilson (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 219–21. 
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rate of increase in the intensity of maritime traffic that occurred before this time 
(e.g., during the late Republic).15 
One final issue concerning the interpretation of the shipwreck evidence 
requires to be addressed. So far, we have only taken the evidence to be 
representative of the volume of maritime traffic within a given period, subject 
to the two assumptions outlined above. If, however, we are prepared to 
interpret the data as an indicator of the number of transactions taking place in 
connection with long-distance trade within a given timeframe, then we must 
acknowledge the additional assumption that the average size of vessels was 
the same in all periods. It should be kept in mind that smaller ships of less than 
75 tons capacity (approximately 1,500 amphorae) were common throughout 
the Roman period, and probably made up the great majority of vessels in the 
merchant fleet at any given time.16 However, the period between 100 BCE and 
300 CE is exceptional for the increase in the number of wrecks of vessels with 
a capacity of over 100 tons, some of which exceeded 350 tons.17 
Consequently, we are likely to underestimate the increase in the volume of 
trade which can be attributed to the use of larger vessels within this timeframe, 
particularly between the end of the second and the beginning of the first 
centuries BCE. Kay, for example, suggests that this factor alone can be 
assumed to account for an uplift in the volume of trade of somewhere in the 
order of 20% between the latter half of the second and the first half of the first 
centuries BCE.18 Altogether, we may conclude that there was a steep increase 
in traffic in the last quarter of the second and first quarter of the first centuries 
BCE, followed by a period of stagnation (or even slight decline) in the latter 





15 Wilson, ‘Developments’, 221. 
16 Wilson, 39. 
17 Wilson, 39. 
18 Philip Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 281. 
15 
 
Section 2.2: Context: Traders, Supply, and Demand. 
The shipwreck evidence alone indicates that long-distance trading activity 
intensified in the Mediterranean basin between the end of the Second Punic 
War (218 – 210 BCE) and early Principate, particularly in its western part. The 
questions that arise concern the identity of the persons conducting that trade 
and the points of supply and demand between which products were 
transported. 
2.2.1 The Spread of Italian Trading Networks. 
Both literary and epigraphic sources indicate that the size, number, and 
geographical spread of communities of Roman negotiatores resident abroad 
rose markedly following the conclusion of the Second Punic War.19 In the East, 
the most well documented community of Italian traders were resident on the 
island of Delos, which rapidly became a thriving commercial centre following 
the decision of the Roman Senate to grant it the status of a duty-free port in 
167.20 This, among other measures, contributed to the decline of the 
hegemony of Rhodes in the region, and, if Strabo is reliable, the position of the 
island was strengthened still further by the relocation of merchants from 
Corinth following the city’s conquest and destruction in 146.21 Delos functioned 
principally as an entrepôt, at which goods imported from the Eastern littoral 
could be brought together and sold to Italian merchants for re-export to 
markets further west. Two of the most significant kinds of merchandise to pass 
through the port in this respect were slaves and luxury items, both of which 
were increasingly in demand on the Italian peninsula.22 
Beyond Delos, Roman traders also appear in Macedonia following the 
establishment of Roman rule there in 146, as well as in Athenian inscriptions 
from about 150. Elsewhere in Greece, Italian traders are attested to have been 
active in Argos, as well as on this islands of Chios, Cos, and Crete. In Asia, 
 
19 Kay, 206–10. 
20 Véronique Chankowski, ‘Delos’, in The Encyclopedia of Ancient History (Chichester, West 
Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2012); also, Kay, Revolution, 197–202. 
21 Strab. Geog. 10.5.4. 
22 Kay, Revolution, 202–6. 
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too, the conversion of the region into a Roman province in 133 encouraged the 
activities of Roman traders who, if reports of their massacre in the Mithridatic 
revolt of 88 are to be trusted, were a significant presence in places such as 
Ephesus, Pergamum, and Caunos.23 The effects of the revolt, however, 
appear only to have been temporary, such that by c. 60 BCE a group of ‘Italicei 
quei Ephesi negotiantur’ are attested erecting a statue in honour of a certain 
L. Agrius Publeianus.24 
In the West, communities of Italian traders are known to have been established 
in Sicily and North Africa, where Sallust reported the presence of Roman 
merchants in Utica, Vaga, and Cirta during the Jugurthine War (112 – 106 
BCE).25 Although the literary and epigraphic evidence for Spain is sparse, Kay 
notes that the extent of the Roman mining operations on the peninsula and the 
archaeological evidence for the export of wine and olive oil to the Iberian 
provinces suggests an ongoing Roman presence.26 Lastly, Gaul increasingly 
became a hotbed of Roman trading activity, especially following the completion 
of the Via Domitia to Spain and the establishment of the colony at Narbo in 
118. By the first half of the first century BCE Cicero could state that Gaul was 
packed with Roman negotiatores and that not a coin could change hands there 
without the transaction being recorded in their account books.27 Although the 
scope of the word negotiator during the Republic has been debated,28 it is 
likely, as Tchernia suggests, that a number of these businessmen were 
involved in the wine and slave trade.29 
 
 
23 Appian reported the murder of thousands of Romans at Tralles, Ephesus, Pergamum, 
Adramyttium, and Caunos: Mith. 22-3. For further references, Kay, 209.  
24 IvE 6 2058: on which, Candace Rice, ‘Mercantile Specialization and Trading Communities: 
Economic Strategies in Roman Maritime Trade’, in Urban Craftsmen and Traders in the 
Roman World, ed. Andrew I. Wilson and Miko Flohr (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 106. 
25 Sall. Iug. 64.5, 47.1, and 26.3 respectively: on which, Kay, Revolution, 209–10. 
26 Kay, 210. 
27 Cic. Font. 11. 
28 See, e.g., Koenraad Verboven, ‘Ce que negotiari et ses dérivés veulent dire’, in Vocabulaire 
et expression de l’économie dans le monde antique, ed. Jean Andreau and Véronique 
Chankowski (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2007), 102. 
29 Tchernia, ‘Wine Exporting’, 289 and 295. 
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2.2.2 Supply: Production on the Italian Peninsula. 
Turning to the second question, one of the defining features of Rome’s 
economic transformation following the conclusion of the Second Punic War 
was the development of the villa estate as a mode of production. These were 
plots of land organised around a villa, which characteristically made use of 
slave and free labour to exploit the estate’s natural resources with a view to 
profit.30 In the second century BCE, villa estates – like the kind described in 
Cato’s de agri cultura – were predominantly of a small-to-medium size and 
tended to be located in the central-western part of the Italian peninsula, 
particularly along the Tiber and the Tyrrhenian coast.31 In the succeeding 
centuries the number of new occupations in Latium, Tuscany, and Umbria 
reached a peak in the first century BCE, while the total number of occupied 
villas reached a maximum in the early first century CE.32 
In addition to greater frequency, villas also began to furnish a dual purpose for 
their owners, with an increasing number exhibiting both a pars rustica, for the 
exploitation of the estate’s natural resources, and a pars urbana, intended for 
recreational use.33 Estates also grew in size, and the literary sources leave 
little doubt that some properties grew to be extremely large, particularly over 
the course of the first century BCE.34 Whether these properties were 
continuous or fragmented into smaller landholdings, however, is not always 
clear, and the evidence suggests that there remained a considerable class of 
absentee landlords who owned multiple small-to-medium size estates 
dispersed across several locations.35 In addition, as Harper notes, the model 
of the progressive accumulation of land into ever-larger estates was not 
 
30 Neville Morley, Metropolis and Hinterland: The City of Rome and the Italian Economy 200 
B.C. - A.D. 200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 142. 
31 Annalisa Marzano, Roman Villas in Central Italy: A Social and Economic History (Leiden 
and Boston: Brill, 2007), 125. 
32 Marzano, 9. 
33 Marzano, 125. 
34 E.g., Pliny the Elder’s claim that latifundia had ruined Italy: HN. 18.35. Further, Marzano, 
127. 
35 Kay, Revolution, 135. 
18 
 
unidirectional: there was, however imperfect, a market for land, and villa 
estates were not immune from diseconomies of scale.36 
The methods by which a landowner could extract a profitable yield from his 
estate were discussed by the Roman agronomists, who emphasised the 
intensive exploitation of the land’s natural resources.37 The most common way 
to exploit the productive potential of the land was to engage in agriculture. One 
strategy was to practise ‘polyculture’, which is the name given to the combined 
cultivation of the so-called ‘Mediterranean triad’ – olive trees (for olive oil), 
vines (for wine), and cereals (mostly grain) – each element of which required 
different soil conditions and harvesting at different times of the year.38 Besides 
cultivating the soil, landowners also engaged in livestock rearing, the operation 
of clay-pits, mines, and quarries, and, for those estates benefiting from a 
coastal location, reaping the fruits of the sea.39 In the suburbium of Italian cities 
market gardening was also a viable enterprise,40 and for estates adjacent to 
busy roads tabernae deversoriae (that is, inns, which sometimes doubled up 
as brothels) were a potential source of profit.41 
The productivity of all these forms of exploitation – and of agriculture in 
particular – was gradually enhanced by technological innovations. These 
included, for example, the development of techniques to harness water 
 
36 Kyle Harper, ‘Landed Wealth in the Long Term: Patterns, Possibilities, and Evidence’, in 
Ownership and Exploitation of Land and Natural Resources in the Roman World, ed. Paul 
Erdkamp, Koenraad Verboven, and Arjan Zuiderhoek (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 60. 
37 The seminal treatises in this respect are Cato’s De agri cultura, Varro’s Rerum rusticarum, 
and Columella’s De re rustica (also, by the same author, De arboribus, which concentrated 
in part on the cultivation of olive trees and vines): on which, Kenneth D. White, ‘Roman 
Agricultural Writers I: Varro and His Predecessors’, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der 
römischen Welt, ed. Hildegard Temporini, vol. I:4 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1973), 439–97. 
38 Kevin Greene, The Archaeology of the Roman Economy (London: Batsford, 1986), 72–73; 
also, Kay, Revolution, 148. 
39 Annalisa Marzano, Harvesting the Sea: The Exploitation of Marine Resources in the Roman 
Mediterranean (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); also, ‘The Variety 
of Villa Production: From Agriculture to Aquaculture’, in Ownership and Exploitation of Land 
and Natural Resources in the Roman World, ed. Paul Erdkamp, Koenraad Verboven, and 
Arjan Zuiderhoek (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 187–206. 
40 Kay, Revolution, 148. 
41 For Varro’s observations on inns, Rust. 1.2.22-3. Ulpian mentioned the proceeds of brothels 
as a common source of income for ‘many respectable men’ (D.5.3.27.1 (Ulp. 15 ad ed.)), 
which Tchernia suggests was also the case in the time of Varro: The Romans and Trade, 
trans. James Grieve and Elizabeth Minchin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 11. 
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resources to power lifting machines and provide irrigation, as well as the 
design of presses for the more efficient processing of olives and grapes.42 
Perhaps the most significant development, however, was the systematic 
exploitation of slave labour as a mode of production.43 Over the course of the 
last two centuries BCE, Scheidel has estimated that the slave population of 
Italy rose from between 130,000 and 270,000 in 200, to between 850,000 and 
1.86 million in 1 BCE.44 Extrapolating from these figures, Kay suggests that 
between 1.7 and 4.4 million slaves were imported during this time.45 Not all of 
these slaves worked in agriculture, and the figures cover all ages and 
genders.46 Nevertheless, the scale and pace of the import of forced labour was 
integral to the development of the villa economy, which thrived on the 
exploitation a servile workforce. This is not to say that villa estates only relied 
on slave labour: the seasonal nature of agriculture had the potential to leave 
an enslaved workforce underemployed at some times of the year and 
overstretched at others. Consequently, villa estates also resorted to the 
employment of external (waged) labour to augment the slave workforce where 
required.47 
2.2.3 Demand: Growing Urban Centres and Gaul. 
The growth in the number and size of villa estates in Latium, Campania, and 
Etruria in the second and first centuries BCE coincided with growing sources 
 
42 Dennis P. Kehoe, ‘The Early Roman Empire: Production’, in The Cambridge Economic 
History of the Greco-Roman World, ed. Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris, and Richard P. Saller 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 552–53; also, the table of innovations 
displayed in William V. Harris, ‘The Late Republic’, in The Cambridge Economic History of 
the Greco-Roman World, ed. Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris, and Richard P. Saller 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 536; and Kay, Revolution, 155–60. 
43 Morley, Metropolis and Hinterland, 123–24. 
44 Walter Scheidel, ‘Human Mobility in Roman Italy, II: The Slave Population’, JRS 95 (2005): 
77, table 2. 
45 Kay, Revolution, 181. 
46 Scheidel’s schedule suggests that some 60% of these slaves were urban: ‘Slave 
Population’, 77, table 2. 
47 Alessandro Launaro, ‘The Nature of the Villa Economy’, in Ownership and Exploitation of 
Land and Natural Resources in the Roman World, ed. Paul Erdkamp, Koenraad Verboven, 
and Arjan Zuiderhoek (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 177–78; Kehoe, 
‘Production’, 554. Max Weber suggested that, following the Carthaginian writer Mago, the 
Roman agronomists took it for granted that free labourers would only be employed during 
the harvest: The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, trans. R. I. Frank (London and 
New York: Verso, 2013), 318. 
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of demand. These largely consisted of the urbanising population centres of the 
Italian peninsula and markets overseas. Turning first to Italian urban 
populations, Rome was by far the most significant settlement on the peninsula, 
and whereas the population of the metropolis had been somewhere in the 
region of 500,000 in 130 BCE, it had reached between 850,000 and one million 
by the time of Augustus, and had stabilised at one million by the middle of the 
first century CE.48 In addition to offering high prices, the conurbation was also 
accessible by means of river transport along the Tiber, which opened onto the 
Tyrrhenian Sea through the river port of Ostia.49 Although necessarily 
speculative, Morley has estimated that the volume of wine consumed at Rome 
in c. 100 BCE outstripped the volume exported to Gaul – Italy’s largest 
overseas market at the time – by at least four times.50 Panella and Tchernia, 
for example, show that in c. 50 BCE almost half the amphorae imported 
through Ostia to Rome were carrying Italian wine, of which approximately three 
in every five containers came from villas with access to the Tyrrhenian coast.51 
City-dwellers also needed to be fed, and for the duration of the second century 
at least, Campania, northern Etruria, and Latium all contributed heavily to the 
Roman grain supply.52 In fact, no agricultural products appear to have been 
imported from beyond the Italian peninsula on a regular basis before the 
120s.53 By the time of the high empire, Virlouvet has estimated that between 
one-fifth and one-quarter of the Italian population resided in cities, and that the 
inhabitants of Rome consumed c. 420,000 tonnes of cereals, 150,000 
 
48 Morley, Metropolis and Hinterland, 38–39. 
49 Generally, Steven L. Tuck, ‘The Tiber and River Transport’, in The Cambridge Companion 
to Ancient Rome, ed. Paul Erdkamp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 229–
45. 
50 Morley, Metropolis and Hinterland, 113. 
51 Clementina Panella and André Tchernia, ‘Produits agricoles transportés en amphores: 
l’huile et surtout le vin’, in L’Italie d’Auguste à Dioclétien. Actes du colloque de Rome (25-
28 mars 1992) (Rome: École française de Rome, 1994), 154–56, graphs 2 and 3. 
52 Morley, Metropolis and Hinterland, 114. 
53 Paul Erdkamp, The Grain Market in the Roman Empire: A Social, Political and Economic 
Study (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 112–13. 
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hectolitres of oil, and between 1.5 and 2.2 million hectolitres of wine each 
year.54 
The increasing demands of the growing Italian urban population coincided with 
an expanding export demand for certain commodities and products overseas. 
The terrestrial distribution of Italian amphorae shows that wine produced in 
central Italy was already being transported to Mediterranean coastal regions 
during the third century BCE.55 This scattered distribution, from Carthage and 
the Iberian Peninsula to the southern coast of Gaul, transformed in the first half 
of the second century BCE, when large numbers of Greco-Italic amphorae 
began to be exported from Tyrrhenian Italy to the innermost regions of Gaul.56 
By 130 BCE, the Greco-Italic style had been replaced by Dressel 1s,57 which 
begin to be found in vast numbers from the last decades of the second century, 
until the demand finally abated at or around the time of Caesar’s conquest (58 
– 51 BCE).58 
A plausible explanation for this ‘revolution in demand’ has been offered by 
Poux, who argues that the vast shipments of wine that were transported to 
inland Gaul were intended for mass consumption at ritual banquets.59 To this 
end, Tchernia has suggested that these feasts, which could involve a gathering 
of several thousand people and the consumption of thousands of litres of 
 
54 Catherine Virlouvet, ‘La mer et l'approvisionnement de la ville de Rome’, in The Sea in 
History - The Ancient World, ed. Pascal Arnaud and Philip de Souza (Woodbridge, UK: 
Boydell & Brewer, 2017), 269–70. 
55 Tchernia, ‘Wine Exporting’, 277–79. 
56 Tchernia, 279. 
57 For 130 BCE as the likely transition date from Greco-Italic amphorae to Dressel 1s, André 
Tchernia, ‘Italian Wine in Gaul at the End of the Republic’, in Trade in the Ancient Economy, 
ed. Peter Garnsey, Keith Hopkins, and Charles R. Whittaker (London: Chatto & Windus, 
1983), 87–104. Identifying the period during which Dressel 1s (particularly, Dressel 1As) 
ceased to be produced has proved controversial, although a date around the middle part 
of the first century BCE seems likely: Loughton, ‘Republican Amphorae’, 180–82. 
58 Tchernia, ‘Wine Exporting’, 292. 
59 This is indicated by observation that, at a number of sites, the amphorae were distributed in 
such a way as to suggest purposeful ritual deposition: Matthieu Poux, L’âge du vin. Rites 
de boisson, festins et libations en Gaule indépendante (Montagnac: M. Mergoil, 2004), 211; 
‘De Midas à Luern: le vin des banquets’, in Le Vin, nectar des Dieux, génie des hommes, 
ed. Jean-Pierre Brun, Matthieu Poux, and André Tchernia (Gollion: Infolio, 2004), 68–95. 
For a review of the literature, Fanette Laubenheimer, ‘Amphoras and Shipwrecks’, in A 
Companion to the Archaeology of the Roman Republic, ed. Jane DeRose Evans (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 104–6. 
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wine,60 were planned ahead of time and supplied by purchasing consignments 
from Italian traders, who were well placed to organise it’s delivery.61 The 
archaeological evidence suggests that the wine, once delivered, was not 
exchanged for coin, but rather for slaves and precious metals, which were then 
exported back to Italy.62 Finally, the abatement of the demand for wine in Gaul 
around the middle part of the first century BCE probably reflects, among other 
things, the disruption to this process caused by the reduction of the remainder 
of Gaul to a province, which likely restricted the ability of chieftains to enslave 
populations for the purpose of exchange as well as to convene the potentially 
seditious gatherings for which the wine was intended in the first place.63 
 
Section 2.3: A Case Study: Cosa – Narbo – Ostia – Rome. 
The aim of this section is to build as full a picture as possible of the 
infrastructure and human processes that shaped the conduct of Roman long-
distance trade. The most complete chain of evidence for the process by which 
long-distance trade was conducted in the late Republic exists in connection 
with the trade route between Italy and Gaul. Again, notwithstanding the biases 
inherent in the shipwreck data, it is also clear that this route was among the 
most active in the Mediterranean during this period, perhaps only to be 
compared in magnitude with the route connecting Delos with the Italian 
peninsula. It therefore serves to focus attention on the evidence yielded by this 
route in order to construct a model for the process by which goods were 
produced and distributed overseas. This is further made possible by the 
thorough excavations that have taken place at the ports of Cosa (in southern 
 
60 Poux, L’âge du vin, 393. 
61 Tchernia, ‘Wine Exporting’, 286. 
62 The discovery of superimposable slave fetters, suitable for creating chain gangs, on the bed 
of the Saône, indicates that these were being mass produced in the area: Tchernia, 290–
92; also, ‘Italian Wine in Gaul’. This is consistent with Nash’s conclusion that coinage was 
not normally used in Central Gaul in the second and early first centuries BCE: Settlement 
and Coinage in Central Gaul c.200-50 B.C. (Oxford: British Archaeological Reports, 1978), 
6. For barter in Roman law, Jean-Jacques Aubert, ‘For Swap or Sale? The Roman Law of 
Barter’, in Les affaires de Monsieur Andreau: Économie et société du monde romain, ed. 
Catherine Apicella, Marie-Laurence Haack, and François Lerouxel (Bordeaux and Paris: 
De Boccard, 2014), 109–22. 
63 Tchernia, ‘Wine Exporting’, 292. 
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Etruria), Narbo (modern Narbonne), Ostia, and Rome. All these sites thrived 
on late Republican overseas trade and can therefore serve as a template from 
which the distribution process can be reconstructed. To this end, we can 
illustrate this process by tracing the route along which merchandise produced 
in the ager Cosanus was typically transported to the south coast of Gaul (e.g., 
Narbo); as well as the route along which those goods acquired in Gaul were 
carried to Rome via Ostia. 
2.3.1 Production in the ager Cosanus. 
The ager Cosanus broadly refers to the area now known as Maremma in 
modern Tuscany, which fronts onto the Tyrrhenian Sea and was connected to 
Rome 140 km to the south-east by the Via Aurelia. The town of Cosa and its 
hinterland were served by the portus Cosanus, which thrived off the growth of 
the villa economy in the region in the late second and first centuries BCE.64 
Besides the town and port, which were the object of excavations carried out 
by the American Academy in Rome in the 1960s and 1970s, a number of villa 
estates in the ager Cosanus have also been examined. Chief among these are 
the villas at Settefinestre and Le Colonne, both of which lie just a short distance 
from Cosa in the fertile Valle d’Oro.65 Both villas were first occupied in the late 
second century BCE,66 and their occupation history appears to reflect the 
fortunes of Cosa more broadly: namely, phases of more intense activity in the 
 
64 The harbour area at Cosa was 2.5 ha. To put this in perspective, the enormous harbour at 
Portus constructed in the first century CE covered 234 ha and had a wharfage length of c. 
13,890 m: Katia Schörle, ‘Constructing Port Hierarchies: Harbours of the Central 
Tyrrhenian Coast’, in Maritime Archaeology and Ancient Trade in the Mediterranean, ed. 
Damian Robinson and Andrew I. Wilson (Oxford: Oxford Centre for Maritime Archaeology, 
2011), 96; also, Stephen L. Dyson, ‘Cosa’, in A Companion to the Archaeology of the 
Roman Republic, ed. Jane DeRose Evans (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 480. 
65 The estate at Settefinestre was excavated by an Anglo-Italian team under the direction of 
Andrea Carandini up to 1984: ‘Il vigneto e la villa del fondo di Settefinestre nel Cosano: un 
caso di produzione Agricola per il mercato transmarino’, MAAR 36 (1980): 1–10; also, 
Settefinestre: una villa schiavistica nell’Etruria romana (Modena: Panini, 1985). The 
excavations at Le Colonne were conducted by, inter alios, Stephen L. Dyson: ‘The 
Excavations at Le Colonne and the Villa Culture of the Ager Cosanus’, MAAR 47 (2002): 
209–28. 
66 Dyson, ‘Le Colonne’, 224–25; also, Marzano, Roman Villas, 138. 
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late second and first half of the first centuries BCE, the early Principate, and 
the Antonine period, interspersed by quieter spells.67 
The best known of these two villas is the one located at Settefinestre, which 
has been held up as a model of the kind of villa estate described and theorised 
by the Roman agronomists.68 In its earliest configuration, the villa consisted of 
a modest pars urbana and a pars rustica, the latter part of which contained a 
series of processing rooms equipped with olive and grape presses, and a mill 
for cereals. Beneath the villa was a cryptoportico, used partly for storage and 
partly as a lacus vinarium into which grape juice could drain from the wine 
presses. A kitchen was located in the adjacent service courtyard, opposite 
which stood two rows of six cellae, capable of being used for storage or as 
housing units for approximately 45 slaves.69 The whole setup demonstrates 
that the villa was intended as a centre for the cultivation and production of the 
three staples of the Mediterranean triad; sc., wine, olive oil, and grain.70 
2.3.2 The Separation of Production and Distribution. 
Owing to stamps imprinted on the amphorae in which many agricultural 
products such as wine, olive oil, and garum were transported, it is sometimes 
possible to trace both the provenance and distribution of containers originating 
from particular kilns.71 This is of special interest for Cosa, because 86% of the 
amphorae bearing stamps discovered in the town’s port had been marked with 
the letters SES (99 of 115), of which all but one belonged to styles produced 
 
67 Marzano, Roman Villas, 217; cf. Anna M. McCann, ‘Chapter I. The History and Topography’, 
in The Roman Port and Fishery of Cosa: A Center of Ancient Trade, ed. Anna M. McCann 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 28. 
68 For a description of the layout of Settefinestre during its various phases, Marzano, Roman 
Villas, 655–57. 
69 The original excavators of the site interpreted the cellae in the service courtyard as slaves’ 
quarters (ergastula). This, however, has been doubted by Marzano: 129–53. 
70 Daniele Manacorda, ‘Produzione agricola, produzione ceramica e proprietari nell’ager 
Cosanus nel I secolo a.C.’, in Società romana e produzione schiavistica. Merci, mercato e 
scambi nel Mediterraneo, ed. Andrea Giardina and Aldo Schiavone, vol. 2 (Bari and Rome: 
Laterza, 1981), 3–54 and 263–73; also, Greene, The Archaeology of the Roman Economy, 
91. 
71 David P. S. Peacock and David F. Williams, Amphorae and the Roman Economy: An 
Introductory Guide (London and New York: Longman, 1986), 9–10; Jonathan Edmondson, 
‘Economic Life in the Roman Empire’, in The Oxford Handbook of Roman Epigraphy, ed. 




in the late second and first centuries BCE (variants of Dressel 1s).72 In addition, 
amphorae bearing the same stamp have been found in large quantities at 
some fifty sites stretching along the Italian and Gallic coasts, as well as at 
inland locations in Gaul and northern Spain.73 An amphora bearing an SES 
stamp has been found, for example, at the site of the ‘Titan’ wreck at the Île du 
Levant. At the site of the Grand Congloué B wreck, which sank near Marseilles 
between 110 – 80 BCE, as many as 1,200 amphorae have been found, of 
which the great majority bore the same stamp.74 
The SES stamp has been linked to the Sestii, a senatorial family of whom three 
members have been connected prosopographically: L. Sestius, tribune of the 
plebs between 100 – 90 BCE; his son Publius, who was defended by Cicero 
in 56 and had occupied the praetorship by 54; and his son L. Sestius 
Albanianus Quirilinus (‘Albanianus’), suffect consul in 23 BCE.75 The 
connection of the Sestii with Cosa is attested by Cicero, who referred to 
Publius Sestius as ‘Cosianus’ and mentioned his association with the colony.76 
Although the earliest of the amphorae marked SES at Cosa date to the first 
half of the second century BCE, the discovery of a stamp bearing the initials 
]ES at Pech-Maho (near to Narbonne), which was destroyed at the end of that 
century, suggests that production may have started earlier.77 Since, however, 
 
72 Will type 4s (= Dressel 1As): Elizabeth L. Will, ‘Chapter IX. The Roman Amphoras’, in The 
Roman Port and Fishery of Cosa: A Center of Ancient Trade, ed. Anna M. McCann 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 174. 
73 For a listing, Fabienne Olmer, Les amphores de Bibracte, 2. Le Commerce du vin chez les 
Éduens d’après les timbres d’amphores (Glux-en-Glenne: Centre archéologique du Mont 
Beuvray, 2003), 310–13. For older literature and the publication record of the earliest 
stamps, John H. D’Arms, Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), 56–57, notes 32-34. 
74 Luc Long, ‘Appendix 1. The Grand Congloué Site: A Reassessment’, in The Roman Port 
and Fishery of Cosa: A Center of Ancient Trade, ed. Anna M. McCann (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), 165; also, ‘Les épaves du Grand Congloué. Étude du 
journal de fouille de Fernand Benoît’, Archaeonautica 7 (1987): 9–36; and Fabienne Olmer 
et al., ‘Histoire d’épave. Origine, destin et fonction de la cargaison d’amphores du Grand 
Congloué 2’, in Les Gaulois au fil de l’eau. Actes du 37e colloque international de 
l’Association Française pour l’Étude de l’Âge du Fer (Montpellier, 8-11 mai 2013), ed. 
Fabienne Olmer and Réjane Roure, vol. 1-Communications (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2015), 
175–216. 
75 Clementina Panella, ‘Roma, il suburbio e l’Italia in età medio- e tardo-repubblicana: cultura 
materiale, territori, economie’, Facta: A Journal of Roman Material Culture Studies, 2010, 
51. 
76 Cic. Att. 15.27.1; 29.1: D’Arms, Commerce, 55–56. 
77 Will, ‘The Roman Amphoras’, 172–73. 
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70% of the amphora material at the port belongs to Will type 4 (= variants of 
Dressel 1s), it is clear that the most prolific period of production was the late 
second and first centuries BCE.78 This suggests the agency of L. Sestius,79 
although stamped amphorae likely continued to be produced by both his son 
and grandson (in the manner of a family business carried on through 
generations). The connection of the Sestii with Cosa in the literary sources and 
the density of SES stamps in the port has led scholars to believe that the family 
owned a number of villas in the ager Cosanus, not least the site at 
Settefinestre, where brick tiles bearing the initials of Albanianus have been 
found.80 
Two aspects of the distribution of amphorae bearing the SES stamp inform our 
understanding of the conduct of long-distance trade. First, it is notable that only 
a handful of the amphorae are found on routes south of Cosa (exceptionally, 
a few have been found at Athens and on the island of Delos), suggesting that 
the produce of the estates owned by the Sestii in the area was intended for 
markets in the western Mediterranean.81 Second, the wide distribution of 
amphorae bearing SES stamps suggests their dispersal among numerous 
traders exploiting different routes, rather than distribution by the Sestii 
themselves.82 This latter observation is strengthened by the additional marks 
that are sometimes found on amphorae stoppers. Several of the amphorae 
that made up the cargo of the Grand Congloué B wreck, for example, bear two 
marks: that of the Sestii on the body of the amphora itself (of which there are 
over 1,000 examples in this wreck alone), and that of a trader identified as 
Lucius Titius C.f. on the amphora’s stopper (‘L TITI C.F’).83 This situation is 
repeated elsewhere, for example on amphorae recovered from the Dramont A 
wreck (near to modern Fréjus, 75 – 25 BCE), which bear the marks of both a 
 
78 Will, 174. 
79 D’Arms, Commerce, 59–61. 
80 Greene, The Archaeology of the Roman Economy, 91–92. 
81 Olmer, ‘Amphores en Gaule’, 76. 
82 Peacock and Williams, Amphorae, 63. 
83 Fernand Benoît, Fouilles sous marine. L’Épave du Grand Congloué à Marseille (Paris: 
CNRS, 1961), 52–56; Antoinette Hesnard and Piero A. Gianfrotta, ‘Les bouchons 
d’amphore en pouzzolane’, Publications de l’École française de Rome 114 (1989): 427, no. 
B 36; Tchernia, Trade, 17. 
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producer, ‘L LENTV P [F]’ (most likely L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus, consul in 49 
BCE and a major landowner near Minturnae) and a trader called Sextus 
Arrius.84 Since the name Sex. Arrius was also inscribed on the ship’s anchor, 
it is very likely that he, and therefore not Lentulus, was also the owner of the 
vessel. 
The dual marking of these amphorae suggests that it was traders, rather than 
the producers themselves, who were engaged in long-distance distribution. 
This observation is corroborated by the literary sources. Varro, for instance, 
spoke of ‘the merchants who transport on pack asses from the region of 
Brundisium or Apulia to the sea oil or wine, and grain or other products’,85 while 
Columella recommends ‘properly cleaning the dolia as soon as they have been 
emptied by traders’.86 The many Digest texts dealing with the sale of wine also 
concentrate on purchase by traders to the exclusion of direct sales to 
consumers.87 
The point at which traders took over the process, however, could vary. So far 
as wine was concerned, the evidence suggests that one possibility was for the 
landowner to both produce and store the vintage, which was then sold to 
traders at the estate after the vinalia in April (sometimes by auction), either in 
bulk or in amphorae.88 A second option, which was alluded to by Cato and 
Pliny the Younger and also discussed in the Digest, was for the landowner to 
sell the standing crop and pass over the responsibility for making the wine to 
the trader, who could either make use of the equipment at the estate or, 
 
84 Tchernia, Le vin de l’Italie romaine, 118–19; also, Trade, 16. 
85 Varro, Rust. 2.6.5. 
86 Columella, Rust. 12.52.14. 
87 Jeremy Paterson, ‘“Salvation from the Sea”: Amphorae and Trade in the Roman West’, JRS 
72 (1982): 155; also, ‘Trade and Traders in the Roman World: Scale, Structure and 
Organization’, in Trade, Traders and the Ancient City, ed. Helen M. Parkins and Christopher 
J. Smith (London: Routledge, 1998), 159–60. On the juridical aspects of the sale of wine, 
Bruce W. Frier, ‘Roman Law and the Wine Trade: The Problem of “Vinegar Sold as Wine”’, 
ZSS 100 (1983): 257–95; Éva Jakab, ‘Periculum und Praxis: Vertragliche Abreden beim 
Verkauf von Wein’, ZSS 121 (2004): 189–232; and Risikomanagement beim Weinkauf: 
Periculum und Praxis im Imperium Romanum (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009). 
88 André Tchernia, ‘La vente du vin’, in Mercati permanenti e mercati periodici nel mondo 
romano: atti degli Incontri capresi di storia dell’economia antica (Capri, 13-15 ottobre 1997), 
ed. Elio Lo Cascio (Bari: Edipuglia, 2000), 201–2. 
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possibly, facilities located elsewhere.89 Third, and finally, the producer could 
transport his own wine, though this was usually undertaken with a view to 
supplying the landowner’s townhouse or nearby settlements, and not with the 
intention of engaging in long-distance trade.90 Altogether, Tchernia concludes 
that ‘the screen that trading interposed between producers and consumers 
was pretty solid and diverse, and that the producing activity was as a rule quite 
separate from any level of trade that went beyond local sales’.91 
A number of reasons for this separation have been proposed, not least by 
D’Arms, who argued that the evidence for social and legal sanctions directed 
against elite involvement in long-distance trade indicates the disapproval with 
which it was viewed.92 The ‘legal sanction’ to which D’Arms principally referred 
was the lex Claudia, which prohibited senators and their sons from possessing 
seagoing ships with a capacity of more than 300 amphorae (approximately 
12.5 tons).93 The plebiscite, according to Townshend, was most likely enacted 
between the censorship and second consulship of the law’s promoter – C. 
Flaminius –  and so most plausibly in 218 BCE.94 The same prohibition was 
re-enacted in the lex Iulia de repetundis (59 BCE), though the size limit was 
replaced by a clause that prohibited senators from owning a ship for the 
purpose of making money (navem in quaestum habere).95 By creating a legal 
restriction on the senatorial ownership of seagoing vessels, the plebiscite 
theoretically impeded members of the order from directly engaging in maritime 
trade. Even so, it did not circumscribe indirect involvement, and various 
sources indicate that senators did seek to profit from long-distance commerce, 
often by using their sons-in-power, slaves, and freedmen as agents.96 Since, 
however, landowners were not averse to transporting their produce locally, 
 
89 Tchernia, 143–46. 
90 Tchernia, 146–47; also, Luuk de Ligt, Fairs and Markets in the Roman Empire: Economic 
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91 Tchernia, ‘La vente du vin’, 147. 
92 Generally, D’Arms, Commerce, 20–47. 
93 D’Arms, 5. 
94 James R. Townshend, ‘Lex Claudia’, in Oxford Classical Dictionary, ed. Sander M. Goldberg 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
95 Paul., sent. Leiden fr. 3.5-6. 
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Tchernia’s argument that the separation of production and distribution in the 
context long-distance trade ‘was not about ideology, but about an economic 
arrangement’ remains compelling.97 
2.3.3 Traders and Networks. 
Despite the routine separation of the production of goods at villa estates from 
the process of their distribution to distant markets, landowners continued to be 
involved in their capacity as fathers, slave owners, and patrons. As Tchernia 
has shown, landowners frequently used their dependants (often freedmen) as 
‘seedbeds for businesses to which advances of start-up capital were made’.98 
The relative abundance of evidence for the involvement of freedmen in 
business during the first two centuries CE can give the impression that the 
socio-economic environment of the Principate was more dynamic than that of 
the late Republic. In the tablets of the Sulpicii archive (first century CE), for 
example, just over half of the recorded cognomina are Greek (a good indicator 
of freed status), and a significant number of the Latin remainder of servile origin 
(e.g., Fortunatus, Felix, etc.).99 In the tablets discovered in the Iucundus 
archive, 42% of the 370 individuals possessed Greek names,100 and Jongman 
has suggested that 77% of the witnesses named in the tablets may have been 
freed.101 The collegia inscriptions at Ostia are also revealing, since they list 
hundreds of members of (mostly) professional associations, of which 26 – 30% 
had Greek names.102 
Despite the scarcity of earlier sources, however, Mouritsen has argued that 
the evidence shows no sign of structural change in the use of freedmen by 
their patrons between the late Republic and the Principate.103 On Delos, for 
example, estimates based on the nomenclature recorded in inscriptions 
 
97 Tchernia, Trade, 26; also, Kay, Revolution, 134. 
98 Tchernia, Trade, 37. 
99 Henrik Mouritsen, The Freedman in the Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 207; also, Taco T. Terpstra, Trading Communities in the Roman World: A 
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indicate that the majority of Romaioi resident on the island were slaves or 
freedmen working for Roman-Italian patrons.104 The impression of a ‘freedman 
milieu’ also emerges from the literary evidence, where a number of ex-slaves 
are recorded acting as agents and managers on behalf of their patrons. 
Plutarch, for instance, recorded that Cato the Elder despatched his freedman 
Quinctio to safeguard his business interests in relation to a maritime 
enterprise.105 Cicero, too, mentioned three freedmen who were tasked with 
overseeing the interests of Cn. Otacilius Naso in Sicily, as well as a freedman 
of L. Titius Strabo, who had been sent to settle a business and collect money 
overseas.106 Cicero also reports that he called P. Granius, from Puteoli, as a 
witness against Verres, because the latter had allegedly taken possession of 
Granius’ boat and executed the freedmen that were stationed on board (which 
suggests they were acting as his agents).107 
Where these patrons had multiple dependants performing trading activities in 
different locations, the result could be a commercial network with far-reaching 
interests. Here, the archaeological evidence provides an insight. An amphora 
stopper recovered at Carthage, for instance, records a partnership (societas) 
between two freedmen (liberti), Titus and Lucius, who were both dependants 
of the gens Lucceii.108 The Lucceii were also active in the Gallic wine trade, 
where the name of the freeborn M. Luc(ci) M. f(ili) has been found imprinted 
on a stopper found in the Grand Ribaud A wreck (off the southern coast of 
France, 120 – 110 BCE), which consisted only of Dressel 1A and 1C 
amphorae.109 In addition, a stopper sealing a Lamboglia 2 oil amphora 
recovered from the Punta de Algas wreck off the Spanish coast (100 – 50 BCE) 
identifies a freedman, previously held as a servus communis by a L. Lucceius 
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and L. Vibius, who appears to have continued trading under the auspices of 
his patrons.110 Epigraphic evidence also indicates that the Lucceii had 
commercial interests on the island of Delos, where a certain Nicephoros, the 
slave of a Roman legatus, L. Lucceius M. f., who was present in Samothrace 
in 92, is named on a dedicatory inscription at the agora of the 
Competaliastes.111 The senator L. Lucceius Q. f. owned a villa near Puteoli in 
the late Republic;112 a Q. Lucceius L. f. is known through Cicero to have acted 
as an argentarius in Rhegium in 72 BCE;113 and the family kept warehouses 
and other buildings on the banks of the Tiber near to the forum boarium in 
Rome.114 In addition to all this, the network could extend yet further, insofar as 
each dependant might have his own agents, who were no doubt required to 
operate trade routes between different locations effectively.115 
The familial networks described above intersected with the networks formed 
by traders, both as members of diaspora communities and commercial or 
religious associations (e.g., collegia). The communities of Italians that 
established themselves at, among other places, Delos, Ephesus, and Narbo, 
became long-standing groups that facilitated trade by bringing together 
individuals with similar ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Moreover, the traders 
belonging to these communities frequently organised themselves into 
commercial and religious associations according to their specialisations and 
beliefs. At Delos, for instance, inscriptions record the existence of associations 
of Italian bankers, olive oil merchants, and wine traders.116 Meanwhile, 
Roman-Italians also formed religious collegia with followers known as, for 
example, the Poseidoniastai, Apolloniastai, and Compitaliastai.117 To this end, 
successful repeat dealing between members of the same, or connected, 
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communities, could cultivate trust and ongoing relationships founded on 
reputation and shared values.118 
2.3.4 Distribution. 
Once a product had been acquired by a trader, the next stage was to transport 
it to its intended market. The distribution networks that developed in the Roman 
period were an integrated system that combined complementary forms of land, 
fluvial, and seaborne transport.119 Within this system, ports acted as nodal 
points, through which both overland and waterborne routes were connected.120 
As Rickman has suggested, ports may be thought of as ‘great clusters of 
facilities’, connecting the terrestrial areas they served (their ‘hinterland’) with 
the maritime distribution network (their ‘foreland’).121 For the purpose of this 
subsection, it therefore serves to treat the hinterland and foreland in turn. In 
addition, it is useful to distinguish between the infrastructure and technology 
that served the purposes of distribution and the human processes by which 
long-distance trade was carried out. Within each stage (hinterland/ foreland), I 
will therefore treat each of these categories separately. 
2.3.4.1 Ports and their Hinterland. 
2.3.4.1.1 Infrastructure. 
2.3.4.1.1.1 Roads. 
In most cases, goods intended for a distant market would begin their journey 
by land, unless the villa in question had a private riverine or coastal frontage.122 
By the early to mid-second century BCE the road system of Roman Italy had 
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been established from the River Po to the southern end of the peninsula, and 
had likely become, as Laurence has observed, the principal means by which 
goods were moved from place to place.123 In the view of the agronomists, the 
strategic location of a villa on, or near to, a point of access to the distribution 
network was a primary consideration. Columella, for instance, reported Cato’s 
view that access to a good road facilitated the import of goods and resources 
into a property and the transport of produce away from it.124 Varro, too, was 
adamant that access to a good road was essential, for ‘farms which have 
suitable means of transporting their products to market nearby and convenient 
means of bringing in those things needed on the farm are profitable for that 
reason’.125 From this perspective, the villa at Settefinestre appears to have been 
ideally located. The villa itself was situated less than 2.5 km from the Via Aurelia 
and connected to it by means of a side-road (diverticulum). In addition, it was 
under 5 km from the colony at Cosa and its port, and less than a day’s journey 
by land from a number of other settlements.126 Varro’s depiction of merchants 
who used mules to carry produce to the coast indicates that pack animals were 
a popular mode of transport for this purpose.127 
2.3.4.1.1.2 Waterways and Ports. 
The success of a port as a transport hub depended upon two main factors: 
first, its geographical location; and second, its natural harbour facilities. The 
first of these factors was by far the most significant, since the second could be 
improved upon by adapting the port to the natural environment and 
constructing facilities as required.128 For this reason, it makes sense to treat 
ports and waterways together, for many ports acted as gateways to important 
fluvial networks extending deep into their hinterland. 
 
123 Ray Laurence, ‘Land Transport in Roman Italy: Costs, Practice and the Economy’, in Trade, 
Traders and the Ancient City, ed. Helen M. Parkins and Christopher J. Smith (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 143–44. On the development of the road network in Roman Italy during 
the second century BCE, Kay, Revolution, 218. 
124 Columella, Rust. 1.3. 
125 Varro, Rust. 1.16.2-3. 
126 Laurence, ‘Land Transport in Roman Italy’, 142–43. 
127 Varro, Rust. 2.6.5. 
128 Schörle, ‘Constructing Port Hierarchies’, 93. 
34 
 
The portus Cosanus: 
The portus Cosanus was situated below the eponymous fortified hilltop town, 
which had been established as a Latin maritime colony in 273 BCE.129 The 
port was a day’s sail from Rome and had the protection of a promontory that 
acted as an important reference point for vessels sailing westward along the 
coast from the Italian peninsula to Gaul and Spain.130 Besides providing the 
best anchorage between Portus Lunae to the north and Portus Gaeta to the 
south, the attractiveness of the site was enhanced by the wealth of natural 
resources possessed by its hinterland, which included minerals from volcanic 
mountain ranges, timber, fertile agricultural land, and fishing both along the 
coast and in coastal lagoons.131 
The expansion of the harbour facilities at Cosa accelerated greatly in the final 
quarter of the second century BCE.132 The concrete remains of the port, which 
include the harbour piers, a wall, bridge, and platform, the fish tanks in the 
lagoon, the foundations of the Spring House, and an aqueduct, likely date to 
this period.133 The construction of the piers inside the port provided an 
anchorage for vessels within the harbour basin, as well as the foundation for a 
lighthouse. In addition, if McCann’s dating is correct, the use of hydraulic 
concrete for some of these structures would make the portus Cosanus one of 
the earliest known sites for the use of this technology.134 It is also notable that 
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a warehouse (horreum), constructed in the mid-third century BCE, was 
situated near to the north-west gate of the town itself.135 
The development of the port facilities at Cosa coincided with a sharp increase 
in the volume of goods being shipped overseas, as shown by the proportion of 
Dressel 1 amphorae found in the harbour. These goods consisted mainly of 
products that had been produced in the ager Cosanus, including wine, olive 
oil, and garum (the latter from the fishery at the port itself). The geographical 
distribution of amphorae bearing SES stamps demonstrates that many of 
these goods were transported to the Gallic interior and northern Spain by 
means of the dual Aude/ Garonne and Rhône/ Saône river axes, which were 
accessed through the ports of Narbo and Massalia (modern Marseilles) 
respectively. Indeed, the SES stamp has been found at Narbo, and Publius 
Sestius is known to have visited Massalia – which was only ten miles distant 
from the site of the Grand Congloué B wreck – on two separate occasions.136 
All this indicates that the facilities at the portus Cosanus were developed at a 
time when the volume of maritime traffic travelling along sea lanes between 
the Tyrrhenian coast and southern Gaul was increasing. 
Narbo: 
Turning to the Gallic ports, it has frequently been observed that the take-off in 
Italian imports in the last quarter of the second century BCE coincided with the 
establishment of the Roman colony at Narbo in the penultimate decade of the 
second century BCE. Narbo’s centrality as a trading post was recognised by 
Diodorus Siculus, who described the colony as ‘the finest market’ (μέγιστον 
ἐμπόριον) in the region, and by Strabo, who stated that it was the busiest 
centre of trade in the whole of Celtica.137 These observations are corroborated 
by the concentration of Italian amphorae dating to the late Republic found at 
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the port.138 The dominance of Italian imports during this period is indicated by 
deposits at La Lagaste, an oppidum upstream from Narbonne on the Aude, 
where 85% of the amphorae dating to the first half of the first century BCE are 
of Italian origin.139 
A number of reasons for the centrality of Narbo as a commercial port have 
been proposed. Its propitious location at the mouth of the River Aude provided 
access to a system of navigable rivers that provided natural highways along 
which goods could be transported to and from the territory’s interior at relatively 
little expense.140 Strabo, commenting upon the arterial rivers of Gaul, observed 
that ‘the cargoes are transported only a short distance by land, with an easy 
transit through plains, but most of the way they are carried on the rivers – on 
some into the interior, on the others to the sea’.141 The distribution of the 
archaeological deposits bears this out, as amphorae appear to have been 
transported along two main riverine axes.142 The first, which could be accessed 
through Narbo, followed the channels of the Aude and the Garonne. The 
second followed the paths of the Rhône and the Saône (and their tributaries), 
which enabled the transport of large numbers of amphorae into central and 
northern Gaul. 
The colony also lay at the junction of the Via Domitia, which connected Gaul 
with northern Spain along the Mediterranean Riviera, and the Via Aquitania, 
which ran across the Gallic Isthmus to the Atlantic coast.143 Two other more 
minor roads also passed through the colony: the Via Corbaniensis and the Via 
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Mercaderia.144 Narbo’s hinterland was connected to the wider maritime 
network by means of its harbour facilities. Although the Republican port system 
remains obscure on account of environmental change, it seems very probable 
that the colony had an urban port from the time of its foundation.145 Whether 
this could be reached from deep water, however, is far from certain, and 
various hypotheses have been advanced about the location of harbours further 
out in the lagoon, at which goods could be transferred into flat-bottomed boats 
for transhipment to the settlement itself.146 The first attested outer harbour at 
Narbo was situated 4 km south of the settlement at La Port Nautique, where 
archaeological remains suggest that the facilities there were used in 
connection with the specialised trade of goods shipped in bulk, such as wine 
and ceramics, between c. 40 BCE and 70 CE. In the colony itself a 
cryptoportico has been discovered, but there is some doubt as to whether it 
was used as a horreum or for some other purpose.147 
The development of the transport infrastructure both at Narbo and throughout 
its hinterland undoubtedly helped to reduce costs for traders seeking to exploit 
the potential of the region. On the other hand, it is important to recognise that 
this infrastructure was not created ex nihilo. Near to the site of Narbo, for 
example, there is firm archaeological evidence for the existence of a 
settlement at Montlaurès which continued to be occupied throughout the 
second half of the second century.148 Moreover, the construction of the Via 
Domitia at around the same time as the foundation of the colony likely traced 
the path of a pre-existing route.149 
Besides Narbo’s propitious location, its success was likely enhanced by its 
status as a Roman colony. The political circumstances surrounding the 
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settlement’s colonisation shed some light on the issue. Having responded to a 
request made by their Massiliote allies for military assistance, the Roman 
Senate despatched a string of consular commanders in the latter half of the 
120s to defend their interests east of the Rhône. The discovery of a milestone 
bearing the name of one of these commanders – Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus 
– at Treilles indicates that the construction of the Via Domitia began under his 
stewardship,150 and it is almost certain that he fortified the site at Narbo before 
his return to Italy.151 A few years later, a combination of literary and numismatic 
evidence indicates that L. Licinius Crassus was sent in or shortly after 118 to 
establish a colony at Narbo Martius,152 despite the opposition of the Senate.153 
As Badian has argued, the transformation of Gallia Transalpina into a regular 
provincia took place after the Cimbric Wars, but no later than the mid-90s.154 
The foundation of the colony and the organisation of the region into a provincia 
was institutionally significant for several reasons. No doubt the colony, which 
Cicero described as ‘a watch-tower and bulwark of the Roman people’, fulfilled 
an important military function.155 As Ebel has argued, the Romans also had 
commercial interests in the region, which were enhanced by Narbo’s status as 
a ‘colonia nostrorum civium’.156 Once the provincia had been established, the 
availability of the governor in his capacity as a magistrate with jurisdictional 
competence would also have been significant. Caesar, for example, held 
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assizes in the campaigning off-season during the Gallic Wars.157 By as early 
as the late 90s, Cicero provides evidence that Roman citizens were forming 
partnerships for the management of grazing farms (pecuaria) in Gaul, and that 
Narbo was considered the appropriate place to conduct sales of land.158 
Judging by the archaeological record, the colony certainly flourished during the 
first half of the first century BCE. 
Rome and Ostia: 
Rome was connected to the Tyrrhenian Sea by means of the Tiber. Cicero was 
effusive about the river’s role in connecting Rome to the Mediterranean,159 and 
for Pliny the Elder it was both accessible to vessels of all sizes and ‘a most 
calm conveyor (mercator placidissimus) in the produce of all the earth, with 
perhaps more villas on its banks and overlooking it than all the other rivers in 
the whole world’.160 Until the construction of the massive harbour at Portus by 
the emperor Claudius in the first century CE, however, the port of Ostia, which 
was located at the mouth of the Tiber, was the nearest coastal facility to 
Rome.161 As Rickman has observed, the rebuilding of much of the settlement 
during the Principate has meant that the town plan is largely a reflection of its 
organisation from the first century CE onwards.162 Nonetheless, both Rickman 
and Meiggs supported the view that facilities must have been developed during 
the Republic, particularly in relation to the provision of storage.163 According to 
Coarelli, the Horrea di Hortensius can be traced to the first century BCE; and it 
is possible that the close association of the Forum Vinarium with the Republican 
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sanctuary on the Via della Foce indicates that there may have been facilities in 
this area as well.164 On the other hand, Coarelli’s view that the Grandi Horrea 
also had Republican origins has been doubted, not least by Rickman and 
Boetto.165 
Turning to the docking facilities, geoarchaeological analysis has shown that 
Ostia originally possessed a harbour basin with an area of roughly 2 ha and a 
depth of 6 m.166 Despite its small size, the basin was deep enough to 
accommodate even the largest vessels, which seldom had a draft of more than 
3.5 m at full load. At some point between c. 160 BCE and 25 CE, however, the 
basin was abandoned due to widespread silting.167 By the time of Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, only vessels with a capacity of less than 3,000 amphorae/ 
20,000 modii had a sufficiently shallow draft (2.2 – 2.3 m) to enter the river; and 
by the early Principate Strabo reported that the settlement was ‘harbourless’ and 
that only light merchant vessels could run inland as far as the metropolis.168 As 
Tuck has pointed out, the situation can only have been exacerbated by the 
explosion in bridge-building along the river during the second half of the first 
century BCE, which probably made it necessary to resort to transhipment on a 
more frequent basis.169 
Between the abandonment of the basin and the commencement of construction 
at Portus by Claudius in 40 CE, ships arriving at Ostia were only served by a 
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linear fluvial harbour. Those merchantmen that were either too large to navigate 
the shallows at the river’s mouth or solely dependent on the wind for propulsion 
therefore had to make alternative arrangements. One option was to put in at the 
port of Puteoli, in the bay of Naples, with a view to transhipping the cargo to 
lighter coastal craft that could then make the three-day journey north to Ostia 
before travelling up-river to Rome.170 Alternatively, both Dionysius and Strabo 
state that some merchantmen chose to anchor at the mouth of the river with the 
intention of transferring their cargo to lighters, which could either unload 
merchandise at Ostia or be towed upstream directly to Rome.171 These lighters 
were supplemented by naves caudicariae, which were specialised river barges 
designed for towing upstream by teams of men and oxen along paths on the 
river’s banks.172 Tugs, too, helped larger ships to manoeuvre in the shallows of 
the river’s mouth and the narrow confines of the harbour.173 
The earliest commercial port facilities at Rome were located at the Portus 
Tiberinus, which occupied a low-lying area of approximately 8,000 m2 between 
the Tiber and the hills nearest to the river (Capitoline, Palatine, and 
Aventine).174 The situation of the port at the heart of the city meant that, 
besides the river frontage to the west, it was hemmed in on all sides by 
buildings. Despite the lack of space in which to expand, there is some evidence 
that the port’s facilities continued to be developed. As censor in 179 BCE, L. 
Aemilius Lepidus, with his colleague M. Fulvius Nobilior, completed 
construction of the Pons Aemilius across to the opposite bank, the arches of 
which were added by the censors L. Mummius and Scipio Aemilianus in 142.175 
The road that ran through the Porta Flumentana to the bridge’s western end 
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was the Vicus Lucceius, which was paved at the expense of the gens Lucceii, 
whose business interests have already been discussed above.176 A Trajanic 
complex of warehouses has also been discovered on the site, though they 
were likely an imperial reconstruction of the Horrea Aemiliana, a grain 
storehouse thought to have been erected by Scipio Aemilianus in 142 BCE.177 
After the Second Punic War, however, the demand for more facilities led to the 
development of the plain further downstream to the south-west of the Aventine. 
According to Livy, the aediles of 193, L. Aemilius Lepidus and L. Aemilius 
Paullus, built a new port in the area (the Emporium) in addition to two new 
porticoes.178 One of these porticoes appears to have been the so-called Porticus 
Aemilia, which flanked the wharf of the Emporium and was divided into a series 
of rooms, arranged seven rows deep along fifty separate aisles.179 Although it 
has been suggested that the building functioned as a navalia,180 Coarelli has 
argued that it functioned as a depot for incoming merchandise.181 Later, Livy 
reports that the censors of 174, Q. Fulvius Flaccus and A. Postumius Albinus, 
made repairs to the Porticus Aemilia, paved the 500 m length of the Emporium 
in stone, and installed staircases along the banks of the river.182 
More warehouses were added in the latter half of the second and first centuries 
BCE. Festus and Plutarch both attest that the subsidised distribution of grain 
instituted during the tribunate of C. Gracchus was accompanied by the 
construction of storage facilities known as the Horrea Sempronia.183 The 
Severan Marble Plan shows that the Horrea Galbana (known as the Horrea 
Sulpicia before the emperor Galba’s restoration of the buildings) were 
constructed immediately behind the Porticus Aemilia, where they covered an 
area of c. 24,000 m2, with 140 storerooms located on the ground floor alone.184 
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Their Republican origins are indicated by the facing of the concrete walls with 
opus reticulatum;185 and the siting of the tomb of Ser. Sulpicius Galba, most 
likely the consul of 108, dates the warehouses to c. 100 BCE.186 A number of 
other storage facilities are likely to have been constructed during the first 
century. The Horrea Seiana, supposedly connected with the gens Seia, may 
have been founded by M. Seius, a friend of Cicero’s.187 The Marble Plan also 
indicates the existence of the Horrea Lolliana: a warehouse of at least 80 
storage rooms (2,500 m2) situated on the banks of the Tiber to the south-west 
of the Horrea Galbana,188 which may have been constructed by M. Lollius 
Palicanus (tr. pl. 71 BCE).189 It is also possible that the Horrea Volusiana were 
founded at around the same time by Q. Volusius (Saturninus), whose 
involvement in financial dealings were described in detail by Cicero.190 As 
Rickman suggests, the ground plans for the commercial quarters on the 
opposite bank of the Tiber also indicate that these, like a number of other 
warehouses located in the Emporium, were probably developed during the latter 
years of the Republic.191 
2.3.4.1.2 Human Processes: Port Administration. 
Although the evidence for the civil administration of ports during the late 
Republic is scarce, the extant sources provide some limited insights. Cicero 
mentions that a quaestorship existed for Ostia, the allotment of which was often 
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greeted with uproar because it was a provincia that promised ‘more trouble and 
anxiety than fame and popularity’.192 Rougé suggested that, among other duties, 
this quaestor would have been tasked with the administration of the annona and 
the oversight of the port.193 It is possible, too, that a quaestorship existed for 
Puteoli as well, since a certain Vatinius was sent there in 63 BCE to oversee the 
trade in gold and silver.194 For the early Principate, Houston concluded that ‘the 
ordinary administration of Italian ports outside of Ostia and Puteoli was left in 
the hands of local officials, and that there was, so far as we can tell, almost no 
interest in such ports on the part of the central administration’.195 There is no 
evidence to suggest that the position was any different during the late 
Republic. 
The major practical operation undertaken at ports was the loading and unloading 
of cargoes. If the merchandise was fungible (i.e., of a kind that could be stored 
in bulk), then it was usual to measure the quantity taken on and off the ship to 
ensure that the process of loading and unloading had been executed 
correctly.196 The standard Roman dry measure for this purpose was the modius 
(c. 9 litres), though the measuring vessels used as standards could vary in 
capacity from anywhere between 8.5 and 13 litres.197 The physical task of 
transferring goods was usually achieved manually by stevedores and 
longshoremen. The epigraphic evidence from Ostia indicates that, at least from 
the time of the Principate, a number of guilds dedicated to specialised tasks 
formed at the port. Besides saccarii, or stevedores, these included groups of 
‘ballast-men’ (saburrarii), divers (urinatores), and even crane operators 
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(professionarii de ciconiis).198 The use of pulley systems and cranes during the 
late Republic is attested by Vitruvius, who described their use for drawing ships 
ashore and loading and unloading cargo.199 Although there is only fragmentary 
evidence for the formation of guilds such as these during the Republic, the 
organisation of the process at Ostia gives a good indication of the kinds of 
activities that were taking place in Roman ports. 
Goods being transported over long distances were subject to a whole slew of 
duties bearing on mobility, usually connected with the use harbour 
infrastructure.200 Chief among these were portoria, or customs duties, levied on 
the movement of goods. These were either collected by the state or, if the 
settlement was a free city or had been granted special privileges, by the city 
itself.201 During the Republican period, the right to collect taxes on behalf of the 
state was usually contracted out to tax farmers (publicani), who collected the 
dues at stationes.202 From the time of the Principate, the trend was away from 
the collection of duties by individual cities and toward external customs levied 
on goods moving in and out of the empire and between provinces.203 The rate 
for goods crossing into the empire from outside was relatively high: often 
12.5% or even 25%. For those goods moving between provinces the rate was 
lower: usually between 1% and 5%, and frequently 2% or 2.5%. Duties were 
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normally payable immediately in coin, either on the value of the merchandise 
or else at a fixed rate.204 
Both literary and epigraphic sources show that the collection of portoria was 
widespread by the late Republic. Putting aside the belief of the Roman historians 
that customs duties were levied in archaic Rome, the first evidence for the 
collection of portoria is provided by Livy, who states that the taxes were 
introduced after the appropriation of the Bay of Naples in the wake of the Second 
Punic War.205 Cicero refers to port duties being collected in Italy, Asia, 
Macedonia, and Sicily, where Verres was accused of evading the 5% harbour 
duty on exports from Syracuse.206 At Ephesus, the lex portorii Asiae (probably 
first promulgated in during the 120s BCE), set out the rules for the collection 
of portoria on both imports and exports to and from the province of Asia by 
both land and sea.207 Indeed, Cicero considered Asian customs dues as 
among the most significant of Rome’s sources of revenue.208 Stationes are 
also attested in Gaul, where they are known through epigraphic sources to 
have been established at Narbonne, Arles, and (later) Marseilles.209 Equally, 
Cicero accused one provincial governor, L. Calpurnius Piso, of setting up a 
private customs-house in Dyrrachium (Macedonia);210 and defended another, 
M. Fonteius, governor of Transalpine Gaul in the late 70s, from allegations that 
he had raised extortionate taxes on the import of Italian wine into the 
province.211 
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The valuation of goods for the purpose of taxation appears to have been 
intimately connected to the process by which cargoes were bought and sold. 
According to Bresson, the Greek procedure known as the deigma involved the 
seller unloading his goods, declaring the price at which he intended to sell, and 
the payment of duties in relation to their declared value and quantity.212 As 
Arnaud has pointed out, this interpretation is consistent with a passage from 
Cicero, which indicates that the procedure of unloading, exposition, and herald 
proclamation was also followed in Puteoli in the first century BCE.213 Again, a 
customs law set up at Caunos during the first century CE indicates that the 
normal practice was to unload the vessel, pay the import tax ad valorem, and 
then to reload any unsold merchandise after paying the export duty.214 
Deigmata, or samples, may have played a role in this process, though they 
might equally have been used for other purposes.215 
Goods that had been unloaded and taxed were often stored in warehouses 
awaiting the next stage of their distribution. Warehouses fulfilled multiple 
functions: they could be used to conserve products, to store goods in 
anticipation of transport to another location, or as storage units for merchandise 
intended for sale, loan, or use as security.216 The slender evidence that we have 
for the late Republic suggests that warehouses during this period – and even 
those connected with the grain supply – were privately operated.217 Cicero, for 
example, implies that the horrea at Puteoli were owned by private individuals 
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and of considerable rental value.218 With respect to their layout, they generally 
involved the construction of buildings divided into rectangular units surrounding 
either a central courtyard or corridor. The epigraphic evidence from the early 
Principate indicates that they tended to be operated by the freedmen and slaves 
of wealthy individuals, who could then let individual storage units for profit.219 
So far as they were lucrative, the agreements entered into by warehousemen 
and the owners of goods were contracts of letting and hiring. The epigraphic 
evidence suggests that, at least from the time of the early Principate, the terms 
of these agreements were spread across several different documents. In the 
archive of the Sulpicii, for example, a number of chirographa record private 
arrangements between horrearii and conductores.220 These, however, only 
contained information about those aspects of the arrangement that were 
essential to the formation of the contract: the more detailed terms and conditions 
which the warehouseman intended to apply to all the agreements he concluded 
appear to have been set out in ‘charters’ (leges horreorum), two of which have 
survived as inscriptions dating to the second century CE.221 Together, these 
comprised the lex contractus governing the agreement between the parties.222 
2.3.4.2 Traversing the Foreland: Shipping. 
2.3.4.2.1 Infrastructure: Technology, Routes, and Hazards. 
Besides the insights gained from the shipwreck evidence concerning changes 
in the volume of maritime traffic over time, archaeological remains have also 
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made it possible to reconstruct its technological aspects. The shipwreck data 
indicates that the average size of vessels between the fifth century BCE and 
the twelfth century CE remained broadly constant, and that ships with a 
capacity of less than 75 tons (c. 1,500 amphorae) were the most common in 
all periods. The dataset also reveals, however, that ships with a capacity of 
between 75 and 200 tons (1,500 – 3,000 amphorae) were used frequently 
between the first century BCE and the third century CE. Excepting the heavy 
stone cargoes traversing the Mediterranean during the Principate, the wrecks 
of carriers exceeding 250 tons belong almost exclusively to the late 
Republic.223 Two of these larger wrecks are particularly noteworthy, since they 
were both involved in the export trade from Italy to Gaul. The Albenga wreck, 
for example, sank in c. 100 – 80 BCE with a total cargo of between 500 – 600 
tons, comprised of c. 11,500 – 13,000 Dressel 1B wine amphorae together 
with sacks of hazelnuts and grain. At the Madrague de Giens, off the southern 
coast of Gaul, a ship of 375 – 400 tons sank in c. 75 – 60 BCE laden with 
between 6,000 – 7,000 Dressel 1 amphorae, apparently stowed underneath 
crates of black gloss wares, as well as coarse and cooking pottery.224 It is 
possible, if not likely, that even larger ships were involved in the grain run 
between Alexandria and Rome during the Principate, but no wrecks have yet 
been found, probably on account of the perishable nature of their cargoes.225 
Shipbuilders in the ancient Mediterranean predominantly followed the shell-
based method of construction.226 A typical Roman merchant vessel was 
equipped with a square sail and could achieve speeds of between 4 – 6 knots 
with a calm sea and favourable winds, and at best 1.5 – 2 knots in the intended 
direction if it was tacking or gybing into the wind.227 In terms of equipment, a 
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papyrus dated to 212 CE records the long-term lease of a ship with a capacity 
of c. 400 artabas together with: ‘mast, yard, linen sail, ropes, jars, rings, blocks, 
two steering oars with tiller bars and brackets, four oars, five boat poles tipped 
with iron, companionway ladder, landing plank, winch, two iron anchors with 
iron stocks, one one-armed anchor, ropes of palm fibre, tow rope, mooring 
lines, three grain chutes, one measure, one balance yard, Cilician cloth, cup-
shaped two-oared skiff fitted with all appropriate gear and an iron spike’.228 It 
is likely that this inventory was fairly typical. 
Although the assembly of a cargo was primarily influenced by economic 
concerns, its safety in transit was partly dependent upon how carefully it had 
been stowed.229 Usually, heavy materials were loaded first (such as metal 
ingots), amphorae next, and the lightest goods last of all. Amphorae were 
stowed in intercalated layers which, at the Albenga wreck, could have 
numbered as many as nine.230 In general, amphorae do not appear to have 
been padded or wedged in place, except for the bottom layer, where the 
pointed tips of the containers were sometimes set in sand or pebbles, which 
doubled up as ballast at the bottom of the hold.231 Residues recovered from 
the interior of amphorae show that they were commonly used to transport 
liquids, such as wine, olive oil, and garum.232 Cereals and other foodstuffs 
could be loaded into sacks or crates, or, as in the case of Saufeius’ ship, shot 
loose into the hold.233 Slaves, too, must have been held below deck. 
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Virtually all the maritime traffic traversing the Mediterranean during the Roman 
period carried cargoes and only provided passenger transport incidentally.234 
The evidence for increasingly larger ships carrying low-value cargo in bulk 
points towards a trade-pattern characterised by direct pendular movements 
between predetermined destinations.235 Even if, as Beresford has argued, 
sailing continued through the winter months, the majority of enterprises 
operated during the traditional sailing season between April and September.236 
While larger vessels could brave longer distances over open seas, the majority 
of vessels, which were of a small-to-medium size, are more likely to have 
preferred coastal routes. Even so, this does not mean that they were reduced 
to tramping from port to port in search of uncertain profits. Rather, these 
smaller vessels may have still been engaged in direct, purposeful, long-
distance ventures.237 The epitaph of Flavius Zeuxis, dated most recently to c. 
100 CE, provides a good example of this tendency:238 he recorded that in his 
career as a trader he had rounded the Cape of Malea on his way to and from 
Hierapolis in Phrygia seventy-two times.239 
Looking specifically at the trade between Italy and Gaul, Warnking has 
identified the three likely routes taken by traders based on a journey between 
Ostia and Forum Iulii (modern Fréjus): the first, through the Strait of Bonifacio; 
the second, around the Corsican Cape; and the third, through the Gulf of 
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Genoa.240 The Elder Pliny stated that the trip could be completed in three 
days.241 Although this may have been ambitious, it was not outside the realms 
of possibility if the ship was sailing with the Mistral. More commonly, as 
Warnking has shown, the voyage passing through the Strait of Bonifacio or 
north of the Corsican Cape probably took about five days, while the journey 
along the Gulf of Genoa could take about one week.242 
Navigating ships safely, both at sea and in the tight confines of a river or 
harbour, required specialist knowledge and experience. Without the benefit of 
navigation by chart and compass, or indeed the barometer, ancient sailors 
were heavily dependent upon their ability to interpret the natural 
environment.243 The direction and strength of winds and swells, the perception 
of features on the visible coastline, and – when there was a clear night – the 
stars, were all useful guides for the experienced seaman. Manmade 
navigational aids, such as lighthouses and poles protruding from submerged 
rocks and shallows, created additional features that helped to steer vessels to 
safety.244 Despite the lack of practical charts, navigators may also have had 
periploi at their disposal: that is, written sailing directions containing 
information about sailing routes, landmarks, hazards, harbours, and stop-ins 
where supplies could be taken on board.245 In addition, vessels could be 
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equipped with sounding rods and, more exceptionally, sounding weights, with 
which to gauge depths and avoid becoming stranded.246 
Even the most experienced sailors could not avoid some of the perils 
associated with travel by sea, the most serious of which were piracy and 
shipwreck. The threat posed by Cilician pirates, who famously took Caesar 
captive in the mid-70s, is well known.247 Over the course of the first century 
BCE, however, a series of campaigns, the last of which was conducted by 
Pompeius Magnus in the mid-60s, led to the almost complete suppression of 
the problem across the Mediterranean.248 As Ferrary has suggested, a 
decisive factor in pursuing this policy was the protection of Roman and Italian 
commercial interests in the eastern half of the basin.249 Although piracy 
continued to disrupt maritime trade after this time, Roman naval dominance 
ensured that it persisted at a much lower level than before.250 
One threat that could not be avoided was the danger of adverse weather. 
Besides factors such as size and technical equipment, the fate of a vessel 
depended heavily upon the skill of its pilot (gubernator). Not only could the 
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L. Hohlfelder (Ann Arbor, MI.: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 139; also, generally, 
John P. Oleson, ‘Ancient Sounding-Weights: A Contribution to the History of Mediterranean 
Navigation’, JRA 13 (2000): 293–310. 
247 For a discussion of the evidence for Caesar’s capture, Allen M. Ward, ‘Caesar and the 
Pirates’, Classical Philology 70, no. 4 (1975): 267–68. On the Cilician pirates, Philip de 
Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 97–148. 
248 de Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World, 149–78. 
249 Jean-Louis Ferrary, ‘La création de la province d’Asie et la présence italienne en Asie 
Mineure’, in Les Italiens dans le monde grec, IIe siècle av. J.-C. - Ier siècle ap. J.-C. 
Circulation, activités, intégration (actes de la table ronde, École normale supérieure, Paris, 
14-16 Mai 1998), ed. Christel Müller and Claire Hasenohr (Athens and Paris: De Boccard, 
2002), 135; also, Kay, Revolution, 202–3. 
250 David C. Braund, ‘Piracy under the Principate and the Ideology of Imperial Eradication’, in 
War and Society in the Roman World, ed. John Rich and Graham Shipley (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 204–7. 
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pilot’s expertise keep the ship afloat in stormy weather, but the experience of 
the crew could also count when making decisions about which goods and 
equipment to jettison at the appropriate moment.251 The famous story of the 
apostle Paul’s shipwreck en route from Caesarea to Rome includes a 
description of the crew’s efforts to save the ship by throwing the cargo, and 
then the ship’s tackle, overboard.252 Sallust, too, indicated that the extra cargo 
(supervacuanea onera) on a large ship was usually the first to be jettisoned 
because it was of the least value.253 Nor were living creatures spared the horror 
of being cast out of an imperilled boat: in a military setting, Tacitus included 
pack-horses among the items jettisoned from a sinking ship,254 and Cicero 
posed the dilemma between sacrificing an expensive horse or an inexpensive 
slave.255 
2.3.4.2.2 Human Processes: Crews and Commerce. 
Crews 
The composition of a ship’s crew depended upon its navigational requirements 
and commercial purposes.256 The most senior officer responsible for the 
vessel’s navigation was the gubernator (pilot), who had a team of nautae 
(sailors) at his command. Specific roles were also taken up by carpenters, who 
were responsible for the ship’s repairs, as well as rowers for the ship’s boat 
and lookouts. The commercial exploitation of the ship was in the hands of its 
exercitor, who was the person entitled to all the revenue generated by the 
asset.257 Frequently exercitores were either the owner of the vessel or a person 
 
251 Generally, Jean Rougé, ‘Droit romain et navigation: autour des problèmes du jet’, in 
L’exploitation de la mer de l’Antiquité, II: La mer comme lieu d’échanges et de 
communication. VIe Rencontres internationales d’archéologie et d’histoire d’Antibes, 24, 
25, 26 Octobre 1985 (Valbonne: APDCA, 1986), 31–45. 
252 Acts, 27.14-20: on which, Patrice Pomey, ‘Le voyage de saint Paul’, in La navigation dans 
l’Antiquité, ed. Patrice Pomey (Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1997), 10–17. 
253 Sall. Ad Caes. sen. 2.9.4. 
254 Tac. Ann. 2.23. 
255 Cic. Off. 3.23.89. The famous case of the Zong, a slave ship from which 133 African slaves 
were jettisoned in 1781, resulted in a case before the King’s Bench decided by Lord 
Mansfield according to the principles of insurance law. The case inspired the famous 
painting, The Slave Ship, by William Turner. 
256 For the composition of ship’s crews, Rougé, Recherches, 213–27; also, Casson, Ships and 
Seamanship, 314–28. 
257 D.14.1.1.15 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). C.4.25.4 (Diocl./Maxim. AA. et CC. Antigonae) demonstrates 
that female exercitores were a reality by the late third century CE. Suetonius’ account of 
55 
 
engaged in a recognised legal relationship with the owner, such as a contract 
of letting and hiring.258 Equally, the exercitor could be sui iuris or a dependant, 
in which case the ship would be held as part of a peculium. If the exercitor 
chose, he or she could appoint a magister navis (shipmaster) to oversee the 
commercial management of the ship on a day-to-day basis.259 To assist with 
the administration of the vessel, the shipmaster might also delegate the 
responsibility for its maintenance to a proreus and the care of the cargo and 
passengers to a toicharchos. This latter officer might have several assistants, 
among them a perineos for administering the cargo, as well as naustologoi for 
the supervision of the passengers. Ship’s guards (nauphylakes) and valets 
(diaetarii) are also attested. 
Carriers and Merchants: 
Turning to the commercial organisation of shipping enterprises, again the 
shipwreck evidence provides an insight. We have already seen that consistent 
differences between the names stamped on amphorae and those imprinted on 
their mortar stoppers lends support to the view that there was a separation 
between production and distribution in long-distance trade. Likewise, 
 
an edict issued in 51 CE by the emperor Claudius is evidence for the same proposition with 
respect to the early Principate. The edict granted, inter alia, the privilege of the ius quattuor 
liberorum to women who were responsible for the construction of vessels of a capacity of 
not less than 10,000 modii (about 70 metric tons) once the ship (or its replacement) had 
been put at the service of the annona for a duration of six years: Suet. Claud. 18-9; also, 
G.1.32c; and Epit. Ulp. 3.6. The date of the edict can be discovered from Tac. Ann. 12.43, 
in which the author describes the same food shortage: Patrice Pomey and André Tchernia, 
‘Le tonnage maximum des navires de commerce romains’, Archaeonautica 2 (1978): 238. 
On these texts as evidence for female participation in maritime trade, Verena Halbwachs, 
‘Women as Legal Actors’, in The Oxford Handbook of Roman Law and Society, ed. Paul J. 
du Plessis, Clifford Ando, and Kaius Tuori (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 450–
51. 
258 There are three examples of long-term misthoprasiai (literally ‘lease-sales’) in the papyri 
from Roman Egypt: on which, Rougé, Recherches, 332 and 334-35; Gianfranco Purpura, 
‘Misthoprasiai ed exercitores’, AUPA 40 (1988): 37–61; Dominic Rathbone, ‘Misthoprasia: 
The Lease-Sale of Ships’, in Akten des 23. Internationalen Papyrologenkongresses (Wien, 
22.-28. Juli 2001), ed. Bernhard Palme (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 2007), 587–93; Éva Jakab, ‘Risikomanagement bei den naukleroi’, in 
Antike - Recht - Geschichte. Symposion zu Ehren von Peter E. Pieler, ed. Nikolaus Benke 
and Franz-Stefan Meissel, vol. 4 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2009), 73–88. 
259 Priamus, a servile magister, is attested in an undated inscription from Vettona (CIL XI 
5183): on which,  Aubert, ‘Les Institores’, 157; also, Broekaert, Navicularii et Negotiantes, 
500 no. 1308. See, also, Hor. Carm. 3.6.13-6 and the depiction of the magister Farnaces 
in the image of the Isis Geminiana (infra, 194). 
56 
 
comparing the names on those same stoppers with the name, if any, inscribed 
on the ship’s anchor can shed light on the relationship between the person in 
control of the ship  and the cargo on board.260 In most cases the anchors bear 
no inscription whatsoever, which Broekaert takes to indicate that the 
shipowner was also the person using the ship.261 In this situation, it is possible 
that the shipowner was only transporting his own goods, in which case we 
would not expect to find any marks on the amphora stoppers either. This 
appears to have been the case in the Mahon wreck, which sank in the first 
century CE off the island of Menorca, where neither the amphorae nor the 
anchor had been inscribed.262 Alternatively, a shipowner could elect to 
transport other merchants’ goods, either exclusively or alongside his own 
merchandise. At the site of the Dramont A wreck, which sank in the mid-first 
century BCE, for example, both an anchor and amphorae stoppers inscribed 
with the name of a Sex. Arrius have been recovered, along with amphora 
stoppers bearing the names of other traders.263 This indicates that Arrius was 
both the owner of the ship and a trader, besides transporting the goods of other 
merchants. 
Marking anchors appears to have been a way of identifying who held property 
in the ship where the vessel was likely to be placed in the hands of someone 
who was not the owner. The name of L. Ferranius Celer, for example, has 
been found on no fewer than three anchors at different late Republican sites, 
which indicates that he was either extremely unlucky or the owner of a 
considerable fleet of ships (or, indeed, both).264 The discovery of a stopper 
belonging to a Ti. Claudius Ti. f. at the Foce Verde wreck, which sank in the 
 
260 Usually, the name of the anchor’s manufacturer is given in the nominative case, the name 
of the owner in the genitive: Piero A. Gianfrotta, ‘Note di epigrafia “marittima.” 
Aggiornamento su tappi d’anfora, ceppi d’ancora e altro’, in Epigrafia della produzione e 
della distribuzione. Actes de la VIIe Rencontre franco-italienne sur l’épigraphie du monde 
romain (Rome, 5-6 juin 1992) (Rome: École française de Rome, 1994), 599–600. 
261 Broekaert, Navicularii et Negotiantes, 438. 
262 Broekaert, 438; Hesnard and Gianfrotta, ‘Les bouchons’, 431. 
263 Hesnard and Gianfrotta, ‘Les bouchons’, 411, no. B.6 and 434, no. A.8; Broekaert, 
Navicularii et Negotiantes, 440, no. 1145 and 454, no. 1198. 
264 The discovery of the wrecks at Populonia, Latina, and Valencia suggest that Celer was 
exploiting the route between Italy and the Iberian Peninsula: Hesnard and Gianfrotta, ‘Les 
bouchons’, 435, no. A.15; Broekaert, Navicularii et Negotiantes, 455, no. 1206. 
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mid-first century BCE off the coast of Latium, suggests that Celer was making 
his vessel available to traders.265 The names of senatorial families, such as 
the Ahenobarbi, also appear on anchors, in which case the ship in question 
would almost certainly have been administered by agents or leased to other 
traders and carriers.266 Alternatively, the name of the agent could be inscribed 
on the anchor, as in the case of the slave Nicia (‘Nicia Villi L. s[ervus]’), whose 
name appears on two anchors retrieved at Palermo (Sicily) and Sassari 
(Sardinia) respectively.267 Again, it is possible to distinguish between cargoes 
belonging to a single merchant and those belonging to several traders. At the 
La Chrétienne C wreck (175 – 150 BCE), for example, six stoppers belonging 
to a solitary freedman-trader have been found, suggesting that the 
merchandise belonged to him alone.268 In contrast, amphora stoppers marked 
with the names of different merchants have been recovered from the Planier 3 
wreck, indicating that consignments belonging to multiple traders were on 
board.269 
The evidence for the contents of chartering contracts demonstrates that these 
matched the potential complexity of maritime enterprises. As Fiori has argued, 
the papyrological and juristic evidence suggests that there were four preferred 
 
265 Piero A. Gianfrotta, ‘Nuovi rinvenimenti subacquei por lo studio del commercio marittimo 
del vino (I sec. a.C.-l sec. d.C.)’, in El Vi a l’antiguitat: economia, producció i comerç al 
Mediterrani occidental. II colloqui internacional d’arqueologia romana (Barcelona 6-9 de 
maig de 1998) (Barcelona: Museu de Badalona, 1998), 106; Broekaert, Navicularii et 
Negotiantes, 441–42, no. 1151. 
266 Hesnard and Gianfrotta, ‘Les bouchons’, 433, no. A.6; Broekaert, Navicularii et 
Negotiantes, 457, no. 1217. It is also notable that the name of a Sex. Domitius has also 
been recorded as a stamp on amphorae dating to the late first century BCE recovered at 
Cosa: Will, ‘The Roman Amphoras’, 214–15. On the shipping interests of the Ahenobarbi, 
Piero A. Gianfrotta, ‘Ancore “romane.” Nuovi materiali per lo studio dei traffici marittimi’, 
MAAR 36 (1980): 111; also, Olmer, ‘Amphores en Gaule’, 76. 
267 Hesnard and Gianfrotta, ‘Les bouchons’, 437, no. A.24; Broekaert, Navicularii et 
Negotiantes, 458, no. 1222; Piero A. Gianfrotta, ‘Il commercio marittimo in età tardo-
republicana: merci, mercanti, infrastrutture’, in Comercio, redistribución y fondeadores: la 
navegación a vela en el Mediterráneo. Actas V Jornadas de Arqueología Subacuática, ed. 
José Pérez Ballester and Guillermo Pascual Berlanga (Valencia: Jornadas Internacionales 
de Arqueología Subacuática, 2007), 65–66. 
268 C. Teren(ti) M(arci) l(iberti): Hesnard and Gianfrotta, ‘Les bouchons’, 426, no. B.35; 
Broekaert, Navicularii et Negotiantes, 438 and 449, no. 1182. 
269 M. Alfi. M. f. Ung[uentarius] and M. Enni C. f.: Hesnard and Gianfrotta, ‘Les bouchons’, 409, 
no. B.3 and 415, B.12; Broekaert, Navicularii et Negotiantes, 439–40, no. 1142 and 442, 
no. 1153. The same is true of, inter alia, the wrecks at San Andrea A and La Jaumegarde 
Amay: Broekaert, 438. 
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contractual configurations, corresponding broadly with modern bareboat 
charters, time charters, voyage charters, and contracts of carriage.270 Since 
bareboat charters are most likely to have been entered into by shipowners and 
exercitores, the latter three configurations are those which formed the basis of 
relationships between merchants and exercitores (or the persons they 
appointed). In general, chartering contracts tended to include the same 
standard information: namely, the name of the ship and the nauclerus; the 
ship’s port of departure; the port of loading; the port of destination; and the 
sailing itinerary, with the possible identification of sailing routes.271 As Arnaud 
has pointed out, voyage charters in which the destination and route were 
specified in advance would have been important where multiple independent 
charterers were engaged on the same vessel.272 
Financiers: 
The Planier 3 wreck, which was discovered near to Marseille and has been 
dated to between 55 – 45 BCE, is also instructive for the insight it provides into 
the broader structure of the entire enterprise. Besides the marks on the 
amphora stoppers, some of the amphorae themselves bore the stamp of a 
certain M. Tuccius L. f. Tro. Galeo, whose name also appears stamped on the 
necks of amphorae found in Brundisium.273 These amphorae were 
predominantly of the Lamboglia 2 type, carrying oil and wine.274 In addition, 
traces of realgar (sandacara), litharge (molybditis), and caeruleum indicate 
that colouring dyes were also among the merchandise on board.275 This was 
the part of the cargo that was presumably in the charge of the trader identified 
 
270 Roberto Fiori, ‘L’allocazione del rischio nei contratti relativi al trasporto’, in Diritto romano e 
economia. Due modi di pensare e organizzare il mondo (nei primi tre secoli dell’Impero), 
ed. Elio Lo Cascio and Dario Mantovani (Pavia: Pavia University Press, 2018), 560–61. For 
the distinction between time charters and voyage charters in the ancient evidence, 
Vélissaropoulos, Les nauclères grecs, 279–82. Also, infra, 158. 
271 Arnaud, ‘Ancient Sailing-Routes’, 68. 
272 Arnaud, 68–69. 
273 André Tchernia, ‘Les fouilles sous-marines de Planier (Bouches-du-Rhône)’, Comptes 
rendus des séances de l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres 2 (1969): 299; also, 
‘Premiers résultats des fouilles de juin 1968 sur l’épave 3 de Planier’, Études classiques 3 
(1969): 51–82. For the amphora discovered at Brundisium, CIL I2 2654: on which, Tchernia, 
‘Les fouilles sous-marines de Planier’, 299, note 3. 
274 Tchernia, ‘Les fouilles sous-marines de Planier’, 299. 
275 Tchernia, 300–303. 
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by an amphora stopper as M. Alfi. M. f. Ung[uentarius]. These substances are 
known to have been available in Puteoli during this period, and it is possible 
that the producer was a certain C. Vestorius, who is attested by Vitruvius to 
have manufactured dyes in the port town using Alexandrian methods.276 The 
same Vestorius, who was a vir municipalis and friend of both Cicero and 
Atticus, was described by the former as a man ignorant of philosophy but 
shrewd in accounting.277 Cicero also records that Vestorius helped him to 
resolve the details of a legacy in 44, which included some tabernae for which 
the latter appears to have made efforts to find a suitable lessee.278 Altogether, 
it appears that the cargo of the wreck at Planier 3 was being shipped from 
Campania to southern Gaul, had been produced by at least two 
manufacturers, and was split into consignments belonging to at least two 
traders.279 
The literary sources provide several other tantalising hints at the structure of 
the arrangement. A letter composed by Cicero to Atticus places Vestorius in 
Apulia in late 54; and if, as D’Arms suggests, the M. Tuccius attested in the 
literary sources is the same M. Tuccius Galeo whose name appears on the 
amphorae, then it is possible that Vestorius was visiting the producer at 
Brundisium.280 In May 51, Cicero wrote to Atticus that he had guests at his villa 
in Cumae, including Vestorius and a certain C. Sempronius Rufus, over whom 
the former was keeping a watchful eye.281 Later in the same letter, Cicero 
reveals that Rufus was often to be seen in the emporium at Puteoli, and 
Shackleton-Bailey has conjectured that, all things considered, Sempronius 
 
276 Vitr. De arch. 7.11.1. The elder Pliny also reports that Vestorius pioneered a ‘Vestorian 
blue’, composed of the finest elements of Egyptian blue: HN. 33.57.162. 
277 Cic. Att. 14.2.3: ‘in arithmeticis satis exercitatum’. 
278 Cic. Att. 14.9.1, 10.3, 11.2, etc.: on which, Bruce W. Frier, ‘Cicero’s Management of His 
Urban Properties’, The Classical Journal 74, no. 1 (1978): 2; also, D’Arms, Commerce, 49–
50. 
279 For a proposed itinerary, beginning in Apulia, before stopping at Puteoli and then on to 
Gaul, Tchernia, ‘Les fouilles sous-marines de Planier’, 303. 
280 Cic. Att. 4.19.1: on which, D’Arms, Commerce, 54. 
281 Cic. Att. 5.2.2: ‘cum interim Rufio noster, quod se a Vestorio observari videbat, 
στρατηγηματíῳ hominem percussit; nam ad me non accessit’. The use of ‘στρατηγηματí’ 
(‘little ruse’) to describe Rufus’ evasion of Vestorius suggests that the two were in conflict. 
For the gathering, Wiseman, New Men, 48. 
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owed Vestorius money.282 By October the matter appears to have come to a 
head: in a letter received by Cicero from M. Caelius Rufus, the latter explained 
how M. Tuccius had brought charges against C. Sempronius Rufus, to which 
he responded by launching a counter-indictment against his accuser under the 
lex Plotia de vi.283 Caelius goes on to report that he successfully defended 
Tuccius, in part by ‘bringing in the matter of Vestorius’, and that Sempronius 
was subsequently convicted for calumnia and exiled.284 In the following year, 
while en route to Cilicia, Cicero remarked in a letter to Atticus that Sempronius’ 
conduct had been naïve, and that he was jealous of Vestorius’ potentia.285 
The common business interests of both men and their united opposition to C. 
Sempronius Rufus has led D’Arms to suppose that the latter had at one time 
provided finance for their shipping operations.286 It may even have been the 
case, as D’Arms conjectured, that the lawsuit launched by Tuccius against 
Sempronius was part of a strategy to provoke the latter into paying money 
owed in lieu of a shipwreck, which may plausibly have been the one located at 
Planier 3.287 Whatever the case, it is reasonable to suppose, in line with 
D’Arms, that ‘these men (and possibly others) had entered into an agreement 
to combine their capital, merchandise, maritime expertise, and knowledge of 
foreign markets, in order to pursue profits over a long term’.288 
The provision of finance by wealthy individuals is attested elsewhere in the 
literary sources. In Petronius’ Satyricon (first century CE), the fictional 
Trimalchio used the profits earned from a successful long-distance enterprise 
as loan capital to fund entrepreneurial freedmen.289 Plutarch also described 
how Cato the Elder, nearer to the end of his life, lent money to, and entered 
into a partnership with, fifty shipowners, taking their vessels as security and 
 
282 Cic. Att. 5.2.2: on which, David R. Shackleton-Bailey, Cicero: Letters to Atticus, vol. 3 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 192. 
283 Cic. Fam. 8.8.1. 
284 Gordon P. Kelly, A History of Exile in the Roman Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 202–3. 
285 Cic. Att. 6.2.10. 
286 D’Arms, Commerce, 54–55. 
287 D’Arms, 55. The more recent dating of the wreck to between 55 and 45 only increases this 
likelihood. 
288 D’Arms, 55. 
289 Petron. Sat. 75-6. 
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sending his freedman Quintio to oversee the affair.290 The practice of sending 
a representative (χερμαχόλουθος) to safeguard the lender’s interests is 
attested elsewhere, not least in the terms of a maritime loan agreement 
reported by the jurist Q. Cervidius Scaevola (second century CE).291 
Besides wealthy individuals, professional bankers and moneylenders – who 
were typically of lower status – were instrumental in facilitating transactions. 
As Andreau has shown, bankers, moneychangers, and cashiers performed a 
wide range of activities, including the assaying of coins; foreign exchange; the 
advancing of credit and the collection of money at auctions; the receipt of 
deposits and the facilitation of payments; and the advancing of loans.292 In the 
papyri, several Italian bankers are attested acting as creditors or 
intermediaries in transactions concerning maritime enterprises.293 The most 
complete set of evidence for the activities of bankers and moneylenders 
operating in a maritime trading environment is contained in the archive of the 
Sulpicii, which consists of  over one hundred tabulae recovered near to the site 
of Pompeii in 1959.294 The tablets, which were kept by a business operating in 
the port town of Puteoli, date to the period 26 – 61 CE, with almost 90% from 
between 35 – 55 CE. The main protagonists were three successive 
generations of freedmen (the C. Sulpicii) who, amongst other things, looked 
after documents, kept debt-claims safe in a strongbox, and acted as 
 
290 Plut. Cat. mai. 21.6: on which, Ulrich von Lübtow, ‘Catos Seedarlehen’, in Festschrift für 
Erwin Seidl zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Heinz Hübner, Ernst Klingmüller, and Andreas Wacke 
(Cologne: Hanstein, 1975), 103–17; also, Vittoria Silvestre and Mario Valentino, ‘L’affare 
di Catone e la sua funzione obiettiva’, Labeo 48 (2002): 189–207. 
291 D.45.1.122.1 (Scaev. 28 dig.); also, D.22.2.4.1 (Pap. 3 resp.) and D.44.7.23 (Afr. 7 quaest.). 
For discussion, Ivano Pontoriero, Il prestito marittimo in diritto romano (Bologna: Bononia 
University Press, 2011), 43, note 12. 
292 Jean Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman World, trans. Janet Lloyd 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 36. 
293 E.g., SB VI 9571 (the Fayyum, second century CE) and SB III 7169 (Ptolemaic Alexandria, 
second century BCE): on which, infra, 71 et seq. and 85 et seq. respectively. 
294 Andreau, Banking and Business, 71–79; Koenraad Verboven, ‘The Sulpicii from Puteoli, 
Argentarii or Faeneratores?’, in Hommages à Carl Deroux, ed. Pol Defosse (Brussels: 
Latomus, 2003), 442–43. 
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creditors.295 There is little doubt that many of their clients were either directly 
or indirectly engaged in long-distance trade.296 
Section 2.4: Modelling Long-Distance Trade. 
The aim of this chapter was to construct a model of a typical late Republican 
long-distance enterprise. From the survey of the evidence provided above, a 
typical enterprise could involve as many as seven (groups of) actors: 1) 
Producers; 2) Merchants; 3) Warehousemen; 4) exercitores; 5) Financiers; 6) 
Bankers/ Moneylenders; and 7) Consumers (taken broadly to include 
businesses). Their relation to one another can be roughly sketched by placing 
them along the path that an amphora of wine exported from the ager Cosanus 
may have taken: 
 
Fig. 4: Plan showing the site of Cosa, Le Colonne, and Settefinestre, overlaid with the 
hypothetical route taken by goods from their production to their distribution overseas. Source: 
Illustration by Amy Yandek as reproduced in Dyson (2013, 482). 
 
295 Andreau, Banking and Business, 73–74. For the role of women in the transactions 
documented in the archive, Éva Jakab, ‘Financial Transactions by Women in Puteoli’, in 
New Frontiers: Law and Society in the Roman World, ed. Paul J. du Plessis (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 124–50. 
296 Andreau, Banking and Business, 74; also, Koenraad Verboven, ‘Faeneratores, 
Negotiatores and Financial Intermediation in the Roman World (Late Republic and Early 
Empire)’, in Pistoi dia tèn technèn: Bankers, Loans, and Archives in the Ancient World. 
Studies in Honour of Raymond Bogaert, ed. Koenraad Verboven, Katelijn Vandorpe, and 
Véronique Chankowski (Leuven: Peeters, 2008), 221–22. 
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In brief, the evidence suggests that the production of the wine and the 
amphorae in which it was contained took place at villa estates such as those 
excavated at Settefinestre and Le Colonne. The product was then sold to a 
merchant, who may have borrowed money from a financier (possibly 
themselves a producer) for the purpose of raising the capital needed to 
purchase the merchandise. Once the goods had been acquired, the merchant 
transported them overland (or by river) to a nearby port, where he could 
engage an exercitor for their carriage overseas. If the product required storage 
awaiting distribution, the merchant could come to an arrangement with a 
warehouseman for the intervening period. All of these relationships could be 
documented and/ or facilitated by professional bankers and moneylenders. 
Once the ship had reached its port of destination the whole process was, in 
effect, conducted in reverse, insofar as the goods had to be unloaded, taxed, 
stored, taken inland, and finally sold to businesses and consumers. 
From this perspective, the character at the heart of the process was the 
merchant, whose ultimate goal was to generate a profit by connecting 
producers with consumers. The relationships that he entered into along the 
way – principally with financiers, warehousemen, and exercitores – were all 
subservient to this objective. In the remaining chapters of this thesis, the legal 
institutions that developed in the context of two of these relationships – namely 
those that merchants entertained with financiers and exercitores – will be 




MERCHANT AND FINANCIER 
The main legal institution directly concerned with the financing of maritime 
trade was the maritime loan. As Rathbone has observed, the value of cargoes 
often far exceeded that of the vessels that carried them, which makes it likely 
that merchants often required a source of credit.1 The sources for the Roman 
period are thinly spread, both geographically and chronologically. So far as 
contractual practice is concerned, the evidence consists of three papyri, a 
juristic text authored by Q. Cervidius Scaevola, and (possibly) a tablet 
belonging to the archive of the Sulpicii.2 However, the evidence for the terms 
of these contracts is somewhat limited, since two of the papyri only refer to the 
existence of a maritime loan, the details of which were recorded in separate 
documents which have not survived. 
Turning to the legal sources, these consist chiefly of the texts collected in 
D.22.2 (de nautico faenore) and those scattered elsewhere in the compilation; 
a handful of fragments in the Pauli Sententiae; four imperial constitutions 
attributed to Diocletian; two Justinianic Novels; and a single text in the Basilica. 
The interpretation of these materials poses a particular challenge because, 
unlike juristic interpretations of leges or edicta, the opinions contained within 
them refer directly to contractual practice through the lens of basic institutions 
such as mutuum and stipulatio. Before attempting to interpret these sources, 
it is therefore necessary to understand the content and structure of contracts 
that typically formed the basis of maritime trading enterprises. Despite the 
fragmentary state of the evidence, it is my submission that it is possible to gain 
an insight into the way in which these arrangements were structured from both 
a commercial and legal perspective. To this end, the chapter will be divided 
 
1 Dominic Rathbone, ‘The Financing of Maritime Commerce in the Roman Empire I-II AD’, in 
Credito e moneta nel mondo romano: atti degli Incontri capresi di storia dell’economia 
antica (Capri 12-14 ottobre 2000), ed. Elio Lo Cascio (Bari: Edipuglia, 2003), 211–12. 
2 The papyri are: SB III 7169 (second century BCE); SB VI 9571 (second century CE); and SB 
XVIII 13167 (second century CE). The tablet is TPSulp. 78. The juristic text that refers to 
contractual practice most directly is D.45.1.122.1 (Scaev. 28 dig.). 
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into two sections: the first, setting out the legal and financial structure of 
maritime loan contracts during the Roman period; and the second, focussing 
on two particular issues of legal interpretation. 
 
Section 3.1: The Legal and Financial Structure of Maritime Loans from the 
Second Century BCE to Justinian. 
In this section, I will argue that the evidence from the Roman period shows that 
there were two main ways in which the yield was typically demanded on a 
maritime loan. The argument proceeds in three parts. First, I will examine a 
Novel issued by Justinian in which a gathering of shippers testified to the two 
customary methods for giving maritime loans. Then, in the second and third 
parts, I will show that all the evidence for contractual practice during the Roman 
period is consistent with the lending techniques described in the Novel. I 
conclude that the two methods spoken to by the shippers complemented one 
another and demonstrate a high level of integration between the provision of 
finance and other relationships essential to the conduct of maritime trade. 
3.1.1 The Two Types of Yield on a Maritime Loan. 
Nov. 106: 
In the year 540 CE two moneylenders – Petros and Eulogetos – submitted a 
petition to Justinian’s praetorian prefect, Iohannes (John the Cappadocian). 
The moneylenders claimed that they were fearful because disputes had arisen 
in connection with the customs surrounding maritime loans, which they were 
accustomed to give to merchants (emporoi) and carriers (naukleroi) as a 
source of income.3 Consequently, they asked the praetorian prefect for 
clarification concerning the customs governing loans of this kind and for the 
law to be settled by imperial decree. Justinian, who received John’s report, 
therefore instructed his subordinate to inquire into the matter, prompting John 
 
3 On this text and the connected Nov. 110, Ivano Pontoriero, Il prestito marittimo in diritto 
romano (Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2011), 164–78, with literature. 
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to convene a conference of naukleroi so that they could testify to the antiqua 
consuetudo under oath. Their response was as follows: 
...οἷς δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν δανεισμάτων μέλει, χαὶ πυθέσθαι ποῖόν ποτε τὸ 
ἀρχαῖον ἔθος ἦν τοὺς δὲ χαὶ ὅρχον προσεπιτιθέντας μαρτυρεῖν τρόφους 
εἶναι ποιχίλους τῶν τοιούτων δανεισμάτων, χαὶ εἰ μὲν δόξειε τοῖς 
δανεισταῖς, ἐφ' ἑχάστῳ νομίσματι τῶν χρημάτων ἅπερ ἂν δοῖεν ἕνα σίτου 
μόδιον ἢ χριφῆς ἐμβαλεῖν τῇ νητ, χαὶ μηδὲ μίσθωμα τοῖς δεμοσίοις 
παρέχειν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τελώναις, ἀλλὰ τό γε ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἀτελώνητα πλέειν τὰ 
σχάφη, χαὶ τοῦτον χατὰ δέχα χρυσοῦς ἕνα χομίζεσθαι μόνον ὑπὲρ τόχων 
[χαθ' ἑνάστην δεχάδα χρυσίου], αὐτοὺς δὲ τοὺς δανειστὰς ὁρᾶν τὸν ἐχ τῶν 
ἀποβησομένων χίνδυνον. εἰ δὲ οὐχ ἕλοιντο τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην οἱ 
δανειζοντες, τὴν ὀδόην μοῖραν λαμβάναιν ὑπὲρ ἑχάστου νομίσματος 
ὀνόματι τόχων οὐχ εἰς χρόνον τινὰ ῥητὸν ἀριθμουμένων, ἀλλ' ἕως ἂν ἡ 
ναῦς ἐπανέλθοι σεσωσμένη χατα τοῦτο δὲ τὸ σχὴμα συμβαίνειν ἴσως χαὶ 
εἰς ἐναιυτὸν ἐχταθῆναι τὸν χρόνον, εἴπερ τοσοῦτον ἔξω διατρίφειεν ἡ ναῦς 
ὡς χαὶ τὸν ἐπιαυτὸν ἢ πέρας λαβεῖν ἢ χαὶ ὑπερβῆναι, θᾶττόν γε μὴν 
ἐπανιούσες αὐτῆς τὸν χρόνον εἰς ἕνα μόνον ἢ δύο παρελχυσθῆναι μῆνας, 
χαὶ ἐχ τῶν τριῶν χερατίων ὠφέλειαν ἔχειν, χἂν οὕτως βραχὺς διαγένηται 
χρόνος χἂν εἰ περαιτέρω παρὰ τῷ δανεισαμένῳ μένοι τὸ χρέος. ταὐτὸ δὲ 
τοῦτο χρατεῖν ἑτέραν πάλιν τῶν ἐμπορευομένων ἀποδεμιαν αἱρουμένων, 
ὥςτε χαθ' ἕχαστον πόρτον ὁριζεσθαι τὸ σχῆμα χαθ' ὃ προςήχει τὸ 
δάνεισμα ἢ μένειν ἢ ἐναλλάττεσθαι χατὰ τὸ περὶ τούτου συνδοχοῦν τοῖς 
μέρεσι σύμφωνον. εἰ μέντοι μετὰ τὴν ἐπάνοδον τῆς νηὸς σωθείσης χαὶ 
μηχέτι πλεῖν διὰ τὸν χαιρὸν δυναμέσης ἐπανέλθοιεν, εἴχοσι χαὶ μόνων 
ἡμερῶν προθεσμίαν δίδοσθαι παρὰ τῶν δανεισάντων τοῖς δανεισαμένοις, 
χαὶ μηδὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀφλημάτων τόχου ἕνεχεν ἀπαιτεῖν, ἕως πραθῆναι 
συμβαίν τὸν φόρτον. εἰ δὲ μένοι περαιτέρω τὸ χρέος οὐχ ἀποδιδόμενον, 
τόν ἐχ διμοίρου τῆς ἑχατοστῆς τοῖς χυρίοις τῶν χρεμάτων διδόναι τόχον, 
χαὶ μεταβάλλειν εὐφὺς τὸ δάναισμα χαὶ εἰς τὸν τῶν ἐγγείων μεταχωρεῖν 
τρόφον, οὐχέτι τῶν θαλλαττίων χινδύνων τὸν δανειστὴν ἐνοχλούντων… 
The carriers began by explaining that there were a variety of ways in which 
maritime loans could be made. On the one hand, the creditor, having assumed 
the risk, could require the borrower to carry and pay duties on one modius of 
grain or barley per solidus lent, in addition to paying one aureus for each ten 
modii received. On the other hand, the creditor could simply demand a yield 
equivalent to an eighth part of the amount given, not calculated with reference 
to a definite due date, but owing instead on the ship’s safe return. The 
uncertain due date meant that the yield demanded on the loan bore no relation 
to the time taken to complete the enterprise; rather, the creditor was entitled to 
a fixed sum notwithstanding the duration of the voyage. The parties could also 
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agree to repeat the transaction multiple times during a sailing season, thereby 
building up a debt which became due when no more shipments could be made. 
Once the final journey of the season had been completed it was customary – 
so the carriers claimed – for the borrower to be allowed a twenty-day grace 
period to sell the last freight and repay what was owed, after which time the 
loan would be placed on a landed (ἔγγεια) footing and accrue interest at the 
maximum rate for business loans of two-thirds of a one hundredth part per 
month (i.e., 8.33% per annum).4 
The text provides several insights into the customary structure of maritime 
finance. Most straightforwardly, the naukleroi were clear from the outset that 
there was no uniform way of making maritime loans. This has an influence on 
our treatment of the evidence in two respects: first, so far as the few surviving 
documents that either contain or refer to the details of a maritime loan 
agreement are concerned, we should not expect their financial and legal 
structures to be entirely uniform; and second, with respect to literature written 
about such agreements, whether juristic or otherwise, we must be sensitive to 
the possibility that an opinion may turn depending upon the author’s underlying 
assumptions about the way in which the loan was structured. 
 
4 This interest rate limit had been established by a constitution of Justinian in 528: C.4.32.26.2 
(Iust., 528). The unusual fraction arose as a result of the currency reforms of Constantine, 
after which the centesimae usurae of classical Roman law, which had amounted to 1% per 
month or 12% per annum, ceased to be an absolute rate and was set at one-eighth of a 
nomisma (aureus/ solidus), or 12.5% per annum: Demetrios Gofas, ‘The Byzantine Law of 
Interest’, in The Economic History of Byzantium from the Seventh through to the Fifteenth 
Century, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2002), 1095–97; cf. 
Geoffrey E. M. De Ste. Croix, ‘Ancient Greek and Roman Maritime Loans’, in Debits, 
Credits, Finance and Profits, ed. Harold C. Edey and Basil S. Yamey (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1974), 56. This explains why, in Nov. 106.1, Justinian felt able to exclaim that his 
ruling ‘was not in conflict with already enacted laws’, since the rates set in each of the 
constitutions were the same. It is therefore not true, as Cosentino has stated, that Nov. 106 
elevated the rate of legal interest that could be demanded on these contracts to 12.5%, 
impliedly per annum: ‘Banking in Early Byzantine Ravenna’, Cahiers de Recherches 
Médiévales et Humanistes 28 (2014): 252; also, David J. D. Miller and Peter Sarris, eds., 
The Novels of Justinian: A Complete Annotated English Translation, vol. 2 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), 697, note 1; and Mariagrazia Bianchini, ‘La disciplina 
degli interessi convenzionali nella legislazione giustinianea’, in Studi in onore di Arnaldo 
Biscardi, ed. Franco Pastori, vol. 2 (Milan: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, La Goliardica, 1982), 
418–22. This interpretation misses both the impact of Constantine’s currency reforms and 
the fundamental distinction between yields calculated by time and as a fixed proportion of 
the sum lent. 
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Diversity of practice notwithstanding, the naukleroi were content to single out 
two methods by which maritime finance was customarily provided: in the first, 
the creditor assumed the risk that the ship did not return for a reward that 
involved a combination of a financial yield and a quid pro quo; and in the 
second, the loan was extended on the same terms, except that the quid pro 
quo was foregone in favour of a more generous financial yield. In both 
instances the yield was figured as a fixed proportion of the sum lent that 
became due on the safe return of the vessel, irrespective of the voyage’s 
duration. 
The question that arises is the extent to which the loan structures described 
by the carriers in Nov. 106 were as deeply rooted in custom as they made out. 
On the one hand, as Humfress has illustrated, the late Roman emperors 
frequently showcased their power and authority by ‘confirming’ the established 
customs of institutions and individuals alike. Consequently, petitioners seeking 
to enhance their likelihood of success were incentivised to make rhetorical 
claims about the customary origins of the rules they sought to rely upon.5 What 
is telling here, however, is that John’s inquiry did not take evidence from the 
petitioners themselves, but rather from a group of naukleroi; that is, the people 
to whom the petitioners claimed to be lending. They therefore did not have the 
same direct incentive to appeal to the legislator as the petitioners themselves. 
The text also contains several indications that the customs spoken to by the 
carriers were every bit as ancient as they claimed. In the first place, the feature 
of a yield that was calculated as a fixed proportion of the sum lent reveals the 
persistence, even by the time of Justinian, of a categorical distinction that was 
fundamental to Hellenic commercial usage and thought: namely, between 
‘maritime’ (ναυτικά) arrangements on the one hand and ‘landed’ (ἔγγεια) 
arrangements on the other. More specifically, as Cohen has shown with 
respect to the evidence from fourth-century BCE Athens (almost a millennium 
before Justinian), the antithesis between maritime and landed loans turned on 
 
5 Caroline Humfress, ‘Law and Custom under Rome’, in Law, Custom, and Justice in Late 
Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages: Proceedings of the 2008 Byzantine Colloquium, ed. 
Alice Rio (London: Centre for Hellenic Studies, 2011), 32 and 46-7. 
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the method by which the financial returns of each kind were calculated.6 Thus, 
in classical Athens, a loan was considered ‘maritime’ if the calculation of its 
yield (τόχος) bore no relation to time-denominated interest; and conversely 
‘landed’ if the yield was figured on the basis of the passage of time. Exactly 
the same distinction is drawn in Nov. 106, in which the maritime loan – 
described as τοῖς θαλαττίοις... δανείσματα and understood as subject to the 
governance of the ‘νόμος traiecticia’ – was conceived as one for which the 
yield was calculated as a proportion of the sum lent, in juxtaposition to a loan 
given on a landed footing (δανείσματα ἔγγεια), to which a maritime loan would 
convert once the grace period for its repayment had expired. Again, the same 
distinction emerges from a text in the Basilica, which concerns the legal 
position of a creditor who had given a maritime loan (δανεῑον ναυτικὸν) secured 
using a hypothec over ‘landed’ property (ἐγγείων πραγμάτων).7 
It is also worth drawing attention to two more specific details. First, the 
naukleroi testified that in the absence of any agreement to provide a quid pro 
quo, creditors were accustomed to demand a yield equivalent to one-eighth of 
the principal. This, as it happens, was also the yield reported by (Ps.-) 
Demosthenes in relation to a maritime loan given for a short one-way journey 
between Sestos and Athens in the fourth century BCE, and by Athenaeus 
(second century CE) in the context of a story about a loan given for a two-day 
voyage from the Hellespont to Athens.8 To these may be added a fragment 
contained in the philogelos (literally, the ‘the laughter-lover’), which was a 





6 Edward E. Cohen, ‘Athenian Finance: Maritime and Landed Yields’, Classical Antiquity 8, no. 
2 (1989): 208. 
7 Bas. 53.5.16: on which, Pontoriero, Il prestito marittimo, 53–55.  
8 Dem. Or. 50.17: on which, Cohen, ‘Athenian Finance’, 215 and 219-20. Also, Ath. 7.292b: 
on which, Karl G. Billeter, Geschichte des Zinsfusses im griechisch-römischen Altertum bis 




Σχολαστικὸς δανειστής ναυκλήρῳ χρεώστῃ ἐνετέλλετο σοφὸν αὐτῷ 
κομίσαι καὶ δύο παιδικὰς τοῖς ὀκταέτεσι παιδίοις αὐτοῦ, δικαίου μέτρου ὡς 
εἰς αὔξησιν. 
A scholastikos (smart alec) who had lent money to a naukleros demanded in 
return a cinerary urn for himself and one for each of his two eight-year-old 
children in proportion to the size of the yield on the debt. As Tarwacka has 
pointed out, the use of the past tense indicates that the debt had become due 
and the urns were demanded in lieu of a financial return.9 In this connection, 
the adult-sized urn represented the principal, and the childrens’ urns the yield. 
The ages of the children cannot be a coincidence: their smaller urns were 
intended to represent the customary yield of one-eighth on a maritime loan.10 
The urns were a clever substitute for repayment of the loan because even 
though the children might grow in the future, their ashes would still fit in the 
containers, which remained fixed in proportion to the adult-sized principal. The 
joke therefore consists in a play on the idea of growth: just as the yield in a 
maritime loans was conceived as growing out of the principal (i.e., faenus), but 
fixed in proportion to the sum lent, so too the children were their father’s 
offspring, but would fit into the urns provided for them even if they grew in the 
future. In any case, the ages of the children add to the evidence that a yield of 
one-eighth was customary in maritime loans.11 
Second, as De Romanis has recognised, allowing the borrower a grace period 
after the ship’s return to sell the cargo and repay the loan appears to have 
been standard practice long before the time of Justinian. Thus, not only does 
a maritime loan contract from second-century BCE Ptolemaic Egypt show that, 
under certain circumstances, the borrowers were entitled to a grace period to 
make repayment (either 50, 70, 80 or 90 days, thereby taking account of the 
time required to tranship the goods from the Red Sea coast to Alexandria), but 
a syngraphe recording the details of a maritime loan in the Demosthenic 
 
9 Anna Tarwacka, European Legal Culture through the Prism of Jokes. The Example of the 
Philogelos (Wrocław: Europe of Nations and Freedom, 2018), 99–100. 
10 Cf. Jean Rougé, ‘Le Philogélôs et la navigation’, Journal des Savants, no. 1–2 (1987): 11–
12. 
11 One hopes, for evidentiary purposes, that the joke was funny because it was true. 
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corpus also records that the grace period was, as reported in Nov. 106, twenty 
days.12 Altogether, there are several indications that the customs attested by 
the Constantinopolitan naukleroi were deeply embedded in Hellenic and 
Roman commercial practice. 
3.1.1.1 ‘Financial’ Maritime Loans. 
SB VI 9571:13 
recto 
ἀπὸ τῆς Μάρκου Κλαυδίου Σαβείνου [δημοσ]ί̣[ας τραπέζη]ς 
Ζωίλῳ Ζωι̣γ[ᾶ]τ̣ο̣ς καὶ Κ̣αλ̣λ̣ιμ̣ή̣[δει] Δ̣ι̣ογ[έν]ο̣υ̣ς̣ [Ἀσκα]λωνε(ίταις) 
(ἔτους(;)) ι̣β̣ Α̣ὐ̣τ̣οκ(ράτορος) Καίσαρο(ς) Τίτο(υ) Αἰλίο(υ) Ἁδριανο(ῦ) 
 Ἀντων[ε(ίνου)] Σεβ(αστοῦ) Εὐσεβοῦς Μεχεὶρ 
[ι]θ̣. Γάιος Λονγεῖνος Κέλερ καὶ Τιβέριος Κλαύδιος Χάρης ἃς ἐπέστειλαν 
5 ὑμεῖν(*) σὺν Σωστράτῳ κα̣ὶ̣ Σώσῳ ἀμφοτέροις Διοπ̣είθους Ἀσκαλωνε(ίταις) 
συνναυκλήροις ὑμῶν πλοίου ἀκάτο(υ) ᾧ ἐπιγραφ\ὴ/ Ἀντίνοο(ς) Φιλοσάραπ(ις) 
 Σώζων ἀλ- 
λ̣ηλενγύοις̣ εἰς ἔκτεισιν δά̣νι̣ον(*) ναυτικὸ(ν) κατὰ ναυτικὴν συνγραφὴν ἧς ἡ ἔν- 
γ̣ειος παρʼ ἐμ̣οὶ τῷ τραπ(εζίτῃ) ἐπι  ̣(  )ω[   ̣ ]̣κ̣η̣  (̣  )ω ̣προγεγραμμένῳ πλοίῳ 
 καὶ τοῖς τούτο(υ) 
σκεύεσι    ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ἐσχάτῳ ναύ[λ]ῳ ὥστε ἔχε(ιν) ὑμ̣ᾶς τοὺς τέσσαρας ἀργυρίο(υ) 
 (τάλαντα) ζ (δραχμὰς) Ερξ 
10 σὺν οἷς ἔχ̣ε̣τ̣[ε] δ̣ι̣ὰ χειρὸς (τάλαντα) ζ (δραχμὰς) [  ]̣ρ̣ξ τὰς λοιπὰς μ̣ὴ 
 ἐλαττουμένου το̣ῦ̣ ἑνὸς αὐτῶν 
Γαίου Λονγε̣ί̣νο[υ] Κ̣έ̣λερος περ̣ὶ̣ ὧν ἄλλων ὀφείλε[ι αὐτῷ Καλλιμ̣ήδης(;)] 
Διογένους    ̣  ̣ [̣   ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣  ̣  [̣   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣   ̣ ̣   ̣κ̣ατʼ ἔνγ[ραφον ἀσφάλειαν (;) -κα.;- ] 
τοκ[ -κα.;- ] 
(ταλαντ ) [ -κα.;- ] 
15 . [̣ -κα.;- ] 
 
verso 
(hand 2) ἔχι(*) Γά̣̣ι̣ο̣ς̣ Λ[ονγεῖ]ν̣ο̣ς̣ πιττάκιον 
   προανα(  )    ̣ κ̣λ  σ̣τ(  )ο̣ των π   ̣  ̣  ̣ ω̣ν̣ ̣
SB VI 9571, though not itself a maritime loan contract, contains a reference to 
such an agreement and reproduces some of its clauses.14 The document, 
 
12 SB III 7169 and Dem. Or. 35.11: on both of which, Federico De Romanis, ‘Time to Repay a 
Maritime Loan: A Note on SB III 7169 and SB XVIII 13167 Recto’, Sileno: Rivista 
semestrale di studi classici e cristiani fondata da quintino cataudella 40 (2014): 73–78. 
13 = SB XIV 11850; P. Vindob. G. 19792. 
14 First published by Lionel Casson in: ‘New Light on Maritime Loans’, in Symbolae Raphaeli 
Taubenschlag dedicatae, ed. Isabella Bieżuńska-Małowist and Henryk Kupiszewski, vol. 2 
(Warsaw: Ossolineum, 1956), 89–93. A reproduction of the original can be seen in Arnaldo 
Biscardi, Actio pecuniae traiecticiae: contributo alla dottrina delle clausole penali (Turin: 
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which comes from the Fayyum (probably the village of Karanis), is dated to 13 
February 149 CE and belonged to the archive of a bank run by a certain M. 
Claudius Sabinus.15 In the document, two creditors – C. Longinus Celer and 
Ti. Claudius Chares – are described as having ordered a payment of the 
balance on a maritime loan to four borrowers from Ascalon in Palestine. The 
four borrowers – Zoilos, Callimedes, and the brothers Sostratos and Sozon – 
were co-owners of a light merchant vessel (akatos) bearing the name 
‘Antinoos Philosarapis Sozon’.16 Zoilos and Callimedes received the funds 
(probably from Sabinus’ bank in Alexandria) and the two brothers stood as 
surety for repayment.17 
The document states that the money paid over by the bank was advanced as 
a ‘maritime loan, in accordance with a maritime agreement’. A copy of the 
agreement was left on land with the bank, and security taken over the ship, its 
gear, and the ‘last freight’.18 The total amount of the loan is given as 7 talents 
and 5,160 drachmas (i.e., 47,160 drachmas, which Rathbone says was 
enough to buy c. 150 tonnes of wheat in the province at the time).19 7 talents 
is recorded as already having been paid out in cash. A figure – ]60 or ]160 – is 
then given below, and it is reasonable to assume that it records the receipt by 
the borrowers of the remaining 5,160 dr.20 The document ends with a 
 
Giappichelli, 1974), 212. Seidl argued that the loan recorded in the papyrus was one for 
which two shipmasters had made their exercitores liable on the basis of the actio 
exercitoria: ‘Review of Symbolae Raphaeli Taubenschlag dedicatae, 2 (=Eos, 48/2 (1956)), 
Ossolineum, Vratislaviae-Varsaviae’, SDHI 23 (1957): 360; ‘Juristische Papyruskunde’, 
Studia et documenta historiae et iuris 24 (1958): 439. 
15 For Karanis, Rathbone, ‘Financing’, 217. 
16 On akatos-type vessels and the ship’s name, Lionel Casson, ‘New Light on Maritime Loans: 
P. Vindob. G 19792’, in Studies in Roman Law in Memory of A. Arthur Schiller, ed. Roger 
S. Bagnall and William V. Harris (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 13; also, Ships and Seamanship in 
the Ancient World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 159–60. 
17 According to Rathbone, SB III 6291 (= P.Freib. II 8) shows that Sabinus’ bank was located 
in Alexandria: ‘Financing’, 218. 
18 This is the only piece of evidence from the Roman period to attest to security being taken 
over the vessel itself: Casson, ‘New Light (1986)’, 16. The ‘last freight’ likely refers to the 
lender’s right in security over the merchandise possessed by the borrowers at any given 
moment, somewhat in the character of a floating charge. In this connection, Julia 
Vélissaropoulos-Karakostas, Les nauclères grecs: recherches sur les institutions 
maritimes en Grèce et dans l’Orient hellénisé (Geneva and Paris: Droz, Minard, 1980), 
311. 
19 Rathbone, ‘Financing’, 218. 
20 Biscardi, Actio pecuniae traiecticiae, 205. 
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statement that the rights of one of the lenders, Celer, were not to be prejudiced 
in relation to other debts owed to him by one of the borrowers, Callimedes. 
There is, in line 13, an unmistakable reference to a ‘yield’ (τοκ[), though I agree 
with Casson that whatever was said here was likely connected to the 
arrangement between Celer and Callimedes discussed immediately above.21 
Rathbone’s prosopographical research into the background of the actors 
designed in the papyrus has shed light upon the context of the loan.22 The tria 
nomina of both the banker (Sabinus) and lenders (Celer and Chares) indicate 
that they were Roman citizens, and possibly (in the case of the lenders) 
Romanised Greeks. Sabinus looks to have run a bank that served the 
Romanised Egyptian elite, and Celer (and probably also Chares) appears to 
have been involved variously in landowning, tax-collecting, state supply 
contracts, and lending.23 As Thür has suggested, the lenders likely anticipated 
that any dispute would ultimately end up in front of the Prefect of the province, 
which is precisely what happened in 142 when the adjudication of a lawsuit in 
which Celer was involved in some capacity was delegated by the magistrate 
to the Prefect of the (Alexandrian) Fleet.24 Roman law was therefore a relevant 
consideration. 
The papyrus provides important insights into the legal and financial structure 
of maritime loans during the Roman period. Some scholars have taken the 
document at face value and supposed that the 5,160 dr. was the second 
instalment payable on a loan totalling 47,160 dr.25 Certainly, as Youtie has 
shown, the language used is similar to that in other loan documents in which 
the money was paid in instalments.26 The unusual sum has drawn attention in 
this connection: as Jones has suggested, for example, the original loan may 
 
21 Casson, ‘New Light (1986)’, 14. 
22 Rathbone, ‘Financing’, 218–20. 
23 Rathbone, 219. 
24 Gerhard Thür, ‘Arnaldo Biscardi e il diritto greco: (riflessioni sul prestito marittimo SB VI 
9571)’, Dike 3 (2000): 185. For the case in 142, P. Stras. IV 281: on which, Rathbone, 
‘Financing’, 219. 
25 E.g., Casson, ‘New Light (1986)’, 14; Rathbone, ‘Financing’, 218; David F. Jones, The 
Bankers of Puteoli: Finance, Trade and Industry in the Roman World (Stroud: Tempus, 
2006), 183. 
26 Herbert C. Youtie, ‘Notes on Papyri’, Transactions and Proceedings of the American 
Philological Association 91 (1960): 260–63. 
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have amounted to 8 t., the 7 t. and 5,160 representing this sum less a handling 
fee charged by the bank.27 
A better explanation, however, has been provided by Thür, who has contended 
that the actual sum of the loan was 7 t. (i.e., 42,000 dr.), and the 5,160 dr. – 
roughly 12% of the principal – was the amount to be owed by the borrowers 
as the yield.28 This interpretation is consistent with the second loan structure 
reported in Nov. 106: 
However, should the lenders not choose that method, they would receive 
interest at one-eighth on each coin. This would not be counted as due on 
any definite date, but only on the ship’s safe return; and under that 
arrangement, it might happen that the time extended up to even a year, 
should the ship have spent so long away that the year had actually come 
to an end, or even been exceeded – whereas, if she had returned sooner, 
and the time only lasted a month or two, they still had the benefit of the 
three carats [i.e., one-eighth of a 24-carat solidus] whether the elapsed 
time was as short as that, or whether the loan had remained with the 
borrower for longer (trans. Miller and Sarris 2018, 2:698-9). 
First, as Cohen has pointed out, the same antithesis between ‘maritime’ and 
‘landed’ arrangements that comes out so strongly in the evidence from fourth-
century BCE Athens is also evident here: the maritime loan (δά̣νι̣ον ναυτικὸ(ν)) 
was given in accordance with a maritime agreement (ναυτικὴν συνγραφὴν), a 
copy of which was left on land (ἔνγε̣ιος).29 If, as Cohen argued, the appellation 
of an agreement as ‘maritime’ signalled that the yield would be due as a fixed 
proportion of the sum lent and therefore not calculated by time, then the 
language used here indicates that the 5,160 dr. could well represent the yield. 
More striking is the fact that the sum given in the document – which Thür 
reckoned at 12% of the principal – is actually closer to 12.5%, or one-eighth, 
which is exactly the proportion that the naukleroi in Nov. 106 testified was the 
customary yield demanded on a maritime loan.30 If, as is possible, the loan 
 
27 Jones, The Bankers of Puteoli, 183. 
28 Thür conjectures that a bank charge of 120 dr. would explain the difference between the 
lower amount of 12% of the principal (i.e., 5,040 dr.) and the higher sum of 5,160 
documented here: ‘Arnaldo Biscardi’, 283; also, Éva Jakab and Ulrich Manthe, ‘Recht in 
der römischen Antike’, in Rechtskulturen der Antike, ed. Ulrich Manthe (Munich: C.H. Beck, 
2003), 280. 
29 Cohen, ‘Athenian Finance’, 212. 
30 12.5% of 42,000 is 5,250; i.e., 90 dr. more than the sum of 5,160 attested here. 
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given here was for the short three-day trip (without stops) from Alexandria to 
Ascalon, then a yield of one-eighth would be consistent with the other short 
voyages attested in the evidence for which a similar yield was demanded. It is 
therefore my submission, with Thür, that the 5,160 dr. recorded in SB VI 9571 
was intended to represent the yield demanded by the lender and was 
calculated as a fixed proportion of the sum lent. 
The problem, which Thür has recognised, is as follows: why does the 
document appear to show the borrowers receiving the yield from the lenders? 
Thür has rightly suggested that by recording the receipt by the borrowers of a 
sum equivalent to the negotiated yield, the document was good evidence of 
an obligation ex re that could be sued upon by the lender using a condictio.31 
On the other hand, if the sum lent had not in fact been paid over, the borrowers 
would be able to defend a claim by raising the exceptio doli. In my view, the 
solution to this problem resides jointly in the archive of the Sulpicii and the 
juristic literature, to which we now turn. 
The loans in the archive of the Sulpicii and SB VI 9571: 
The Sulpiciii archive, which was discovered near the site of Pompeii in 1959, 
consists of wax tablets encased in wood (tabulae), which were kept by a 
money-lending business operating in the port town of Puteoli.32 Verboven has 
calculated that the documents preserved in the archive record 61 payments or 
acknowledgments of debt amounting to a total value of HS 1,022,000.33 One 
of the mysteries surrounding the tablets, however, is that very few of the loan 
documents contain due dates for repayments and none make any mention of 
interest. It is, of course, hardly plausible that the Sulpicii and their clients, who 
were operating at the heart of a thriving business community, lent their money 
 
31 Thür, ‘Arnaldo Biscardi’, 185–86. 
32 Jean Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman World, trans. Janet Lloyd 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 71–79; Koenraad 
Verboven, ‘The Sulpicii from Puteoli, Argentarii or Faeneratores?’, in Hommages à Carl 
Deroux, ed. Pol Defosse (Brussels: Latomus, 2003), 442–43. 
33 Koenraad Verboven, ‘Currency and Credit in the Bay of Naples in the First Century AD’, in 
The Economy of Pompeii, ed. Miko Flohr and Andrew I. Wilson (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), 372. 
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gratuitously. Several explanations for these absences have therefore been put 
forward. 
According to Purpura and Andreau, who have been followed by Wolf, 
stipulations for interest were recorded in the loan dossiers for each transaction, 
but in cautiones that have not survived.34 In my view, the reason for the 
absence of these documents in the archive can be explained as a matter of 
practice. In the Greek world, transactional documents were of such strong 
probative value that they were sometimes perceived as having a dispositive 
effect.35 Consequently, the evidence of the agreement was sometimes 
destroyed on its completion, an act that was at once symbolic and tantamount 
to extinguishing the obligation permanently.36 The same perception appears 
to have persisted in the Roman period, except that rather than destroying the 
document, the practice was for the creditor to hand over the cautio to the 
debtor.37 Ulpian, in a discussion of the theft of financial documents, noted that 
debtors frequently sought to recover tabulae on completion of the transaction 
so that they could rebut any allegation that they had failed to repay.38 Equally, 
it was Paul’s view that the return of the cautio was evidence of the creditor’s 
tacit agreement not to sue, which could be relied upon in the debtor’s 
defence.39 It is therefore no surprise that none of the surviving tabulae in the 
Sulpician archive were cautiones of this kind: the clients of moneylenders 
would have expected the return of the document once repayment had been 
made. 
 
34 Gianfranco Purpura, ‘Tabulae pompeianae 13 e 34; duo documenti relativi al prestito 
marittimo’, in Atti del xvii congresso internazionale di papirologia (Napoli, 19-26 maggio 
1983) (Naples: Centro internazionale per lo studio dei papiri ercolanesi, 1984), 1245–66; 
Andreau, Banking and Business, 98–99; also, Joseph G. Wolf, ‘Documents in Roman 
Practice’, in The Cambridge Companion to Roman Law, ed. David Johnston (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 78. 
35 Elizabeth A. Meyer, Legitimacy and Law in the Roman World: Tabulae in Roman Belief and 
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 19; Hans Julius Wolff, Das Recht 
der griechischen Papyri Ägyptens in der Zeit der Ptolemäer und des Prinzipats Bd. 2: 
Organisation und Kontrolle des privaten Rechtsverkehrs (Handbuch der 
Altertumswissenschaft 10.5.2) (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1978), 144, note 9. 
36 Walter Ashburner, ΝΟΜΟΣ ΡΟΔΙΩΝ ΝΑΥΤΙΚΟΣ. The Rhodian Sea-Law (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1909), 216. 
37 Meyer, Legitimacy and Law, 119–20. 
38 D.47.2.27 pr. (Ulp. 41 ad Sab.). 
39 D.2.14.2.1 (Paul. 3 ad ed.). 
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To return to the apparent absence of interest clauses, Guarino and Gröschler 
have proposed that it was paid monthly on the basis of pacts.40 Bove and 
Camodeca, on the other hand, have cited a passage in Plutarch in support of 
the position that creditors deducted interest in advance from the sum paid out 
to the debtor, so that the amount of the principal was effectively overstated.41 
Finally, Verboven has argued that the lenders in the Sulpician archive made a 
practice of paying out the principal to the borrower, a portion of which was 
immediately and voluntarily paid back in the name of ‘future interest’.42 On this 
account, while the handing over of the money to the borrower obliged him to 
repay, for example, 100, in fact he only took away 80 with him, having agreed 
to pay back 20 immediately as the yield. To satisfy the obligation to repay the 
debt he would therefore need to find a further 20 (that is, the difference 
between that which he owed and that which he had taken away) before it 
became due. As Verboven has explained, the technique was legally secure 
because once the future interest was handed over the debtor could not reclaim 
the sum as indebitum, while the mutuum cum stipulatione recorded in the 
chirographum remained valid and enforceable.43 
Verboven’s account has much to commend it, and for the reasons I shall set 
out below I believe that it may have been the method used by the lenders Celer 
and Chares in SB VI 9571. The starting point here is that, as Pestman has 
 
40 Antonio Guarino, Giusromanistica elementare, 2nd ed. (Naples: Jovene, 1989), 205. 
Gröschler has argued that although the method proposed by Verboven is possible for those 
loans for which there was a specified date for repayment, interest was likely demanded on 
a monthly basis in those loans without a certain due date: ‘Darlehensvalutierung und 
Darlehenszins in den Urkunden aus dem Archiv der Sulpizier’, in Festschrift für Rolf Knütel 
zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Holger Altmeppen, Ingo Reichard, and Martin J. Schermaier 
(Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2009), 398–99; also, Die Tabellae-Urkunden aus den 
pompejanischen und herkulanensischen Urkundenfunden (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 
1997), 165–77. This hypothesis assumes that the interest in all these loans was calculated 
by time, and not as a fixed proportion of the sum lent. 
41 Plut. De vitando. 5; also, Ps.-Asc. in Cic. Verr. II 1.36.91: on which, Lucio Bove, Documenti 
di operazioni finanziarie dall’archivio dei Sulpici: Tabulae Pompeianae di Murécine (Naples: 
Liguori, 1984), 41–42 and 47–48; Giuseppe Camodeca, L’archivio puteolano dei Sulpicii 
(Naples: Università Napoli Federico II, 1992), 174–77; also, Tabulae Pompeianae 
Sulpiciorum (TPSulp.). Edizione critica dell’archivio puteolano dei Sulpicii, vol. 2 (Rome: 
Quasar, 1999), 134; and now, Peter Gröschler, ‘Die Konzeption des Mutuum cum 
Stipulatione’, TvR 74 (2006): 267–69. 
42 Koenraad Verboven, ‘The Sulpicii from Puteoli and Usury in the Early Roman Empire’, TvR 
71 (2003): 17–19. 
43 Verboven, 18. 
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shown, it is common in the papyrological evidence from Ptolemaic and Roman 
Egypt to find loan documents in which the stated sum was intended to 
represent the total amount that the debtor was obliged to repay.44 From here, 
as Pestman says, it may be that the debtor had either: i) simply received a 
gratuitous loan; ii) received the sum stated, but owed interest in some other 
form (e.g., as a quid pro quo); or iii) received less than the sum stated since 
the interest was already included in the amount represented as the principal.45 
If, as I have argued, the 5,160 drachmas in SB VI 9571 represents the yield of 
c. one-eighth on a loan of 7 talents, then this acknowledgment appears to be 
an example of Pestman’s third type. 
SB VI 9571 is similar to the mutua cum stipulatione in the Sulpician archive for 
the reason that all were intended as acknowledgments of debt. It is, however, 
also different in two important respects: first, no stipulations were concluded; 
and second, the sum to be owed as interest was stated separately from the 
amount of the principal.46 This latter feature allows us to rule out the possibility 
that there was a clause in the syngraphe responsible for the addition of 
interest, since the obligation to pay the yield was already established alongside 
the principal. The Guarino–Gröschler thesis can also be discounted, because 
the yield on maritime loans was calculated as a proportion of the sum lent, and 
not by time. This leaves the structures proposed by Bove–Camodeca and 
Verboven: either the four borrowers never received the 5,160 dr. as stated, or 
they did in fact receive it, only to hand it (or an equivalent sum) back to the 
lender as ‘future interest’. It is not possible on the evidence presented thus far 
to say which technique was used here. It is my submission, however, that the 




44 Pieter W. Pestman, ‘Loans Bearing No Interest?’, Journal of Juristic Papyrology 16–17 
(1971): 24. 
45 Pestman, 24–26. 
46 Thür has pointed out the lack of verbal formalities: ‘Arnaldo Biscardi’, 185. 
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The payment of future interest, Q. Cervidius Scaevola, and the Callimachus 
Loan: 
In support of the argument that the lenders in the Sulpician archive demanded 
payment of interest up front when the loan was given, Verboven has pointed 
to the awareness of the practice on the part of the Roman jurists. In this 
connection, Florentinus opined that a person who accepted ‘future interest’ 
(qui in futurum usuras a debitore acceperat) appeared to have tacitly agreed 
that he would not seek the capital until the period for which he had accepted 
the interest had elapsed.47 Ulpian confirmed this view, adding that the exceptio 
doli would lie if a creditor brought forward a claim during the interval.48 The 
reasoning behind these opinions appears to have been that, since usura was 
conceived as the creditor’s reward for furnishing the borrower with the use 
(usus) of the money, it would only be due once the latter had had the use of 
the funds for a period of time commensurate to the amount of interest paid.49 
The structure was also known to Q. Cervidius Scaevola (second century CE), 
who depicted its operation in D.45.1.122 pr. (Scaev. 28 dig.): 
[pr.] Qui Romae mutuam pecuniam acceperat solvendam in longinqua 
provincia per menses tres eamque ibi dari stipulanti spopondisset, post 
paucos dies Romae testato creditori dixit paratum se esse Romae eam 
numerare detracta ea summa, quam creditori suo usurarum nomine 
dederat. quaesitum est, cum in integrum summam, qua stipulatione 
obligatus est, optulerit, an eo loco, in quo solvenda promissa est, sua die 
integra peti posset. respondit posse stipulatorem sua die ibi, ubi 
solvendam stipulatus est, petere. 
In this text, Scaevola began by describing a situation in which a borrower had 
received money in Rome having promised to repay an equivalent sum in a 
distant province three months later (in longinqua provincia; hereafter, the 
‘Distant Province loan’). Having changed his mind, however, the borrower 
attempted to tender repayment in Rome just a few days later, ‘after deducting 
 
47 D.2.14.57 pr. (Flor. 8 inst.). 
48 D.44.4.2.6 (Ulp. 76 ad ed.): ‘…si creditor usuras in futurum acceperit…’ The possibility that 
interest could be paid in advance was also countenanced by Justinian: C.4.32.28.1 (Iust., 
529). 
49 E.g., D.36.1.60(58).6 (Pap. 9 resp.); also, D.22.1.16.1 (Paul. 1 decr.). Ambrose put the issue 
in de Tobia, 5 with chiastic brevity: ‘usum requirit, ut adquirit usuram’. 
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the sum he had given to his creditor in the name of interest’ (detracta ea 
summa, quam creditori suo usurarum nomine dederat).50 Scaevola decided 
that the lender was entitled to refuse the borrower’s offer and could still sue for 
repayment at the agreed place and time.51 
Samter, following Mitteis, supposed that this was a case in which the interest 
had been deducted in advance, so that the principal had in effect been 
overstated.52 However, as Cherchi’s exegesis has made clear, it is more likely 
that this was a loan in which the borrower had paid interest upfront.53 This 
interpretation is strengthened by another reply given by Scaevola, in which the 
jurist held that interest that was owed every thirty days was due from the 
moment the stipulation for the loan was concluded, and not from the time at 





50 Mommsen (nec integram) and Cohn (non integram) both suggested emending in integrum 
summam to resolve the fact that the borrower appeared to be offering less in Rome than 
he would have owed in the distant province: Max Cohn, Die sogenannte actio de eo quod 
certo loco: Eine Untersuchung aus dem römischen Recht (Leipzig, 1877), 98. Cf. Alice 
Cherchi, Ricerche sulle ‘usurae’ convenzionali nel diritto romano classico (Naples: Jovene, 
2012), 31–32. 
51 This is consistent with Ulpian’s decision in D.13.4.9 (Ulp. 47 ad Sab.), that a person who 
had stipulated performance in a certain place was entitled to refuse it elsewhere. If the 
person who owed the money failed to perform in the agreed place, the pursuer could rely 
upon the praetorian actio de eo quod certo loco, which empowered the judge to increase 
the sum due to reflect the pursuer’s interesse in performance at that place. This would be 
relevant if, for example, the pursuer had lent pecunia traiecticia to the borrower on terms 
that it be repaid at Ephesus. If the borrower failed to repay at Ephesus, so that the pursuer 
incurred a loss (e.g., because he was forced to default on a debt, so that a penalty became 
due, or his goods were sold as security), he would have the action to increase the obligation 
of the borrower in order to recover: D.13.4.2.8 (Ulp. 27 ad ed.). 
52 Richard Samter, ‘Das Verhältnis zwischen Scaevolas Digesten und Responsen’, ZSS 27 
(1906): 163. 
53 Cherchi, Ricerche, 29–34; also, Camodeca, L’archivio puteolano, 175–76; Tabulae 
Pompeianae Sulpiciorum, 2:133–34; ‘La prassi giuridica municipale: il problema 
dell’effettività del diritto romano’, in Gli statuti municipali, ed. Luigi Capogrossi Colognesi 
and Emilio Gabba (Pavia: IUSS Press, 2006), 541; cf. Gröschler, Die Tabellae-Urkunden, 
158–59; ‘Darlehensvalutierung’, 392–94; ‘Il “mutuum cum stipulatione” e il problema degli 
interessi’, in Quaderni lupiensi di storia e diritto, ed. Francesca Lamberti (Lecce: Edizioni 
del Grifo, 2009), 120–22. 
54 D.45.1.135 pr. (Scaev. 28 dig.): on which, Cherchi, Ricerche, 35–37. 
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We now turn to the text immediately following the Distant Province loan, 
D.45.1.122.1 (Scaev. 28 dig.):55 
[1] Callimachus mutuam pecuniam nauticam accepit a Sticho servo Seii 
in provincia Syria civitate Beryto usque Brentesium: idque creditum esse 
in omnes navigii dies ducentos, sub pignoribus et hypothecis mercibus a 
Beryto comparatis et Brentesium perferendis et quas Brentesio empturus 
esset et per navem Beryto invecturus: convenitque inter eos, uti, cum 
Callimachus Brentesium pervenisset, inde intra idus Septembres, quae 
tunc proximae futurae essent, aliis mercibus emptis et in navem mercis 
ipse in Syriam per navigium proficiscatur, aut, si intra diem supra scriptam 
non reparasset merces nec enavigasset de ea civitate, redderet 
universam continuo pecuniam quasi perfecto navigio et praestaret 
sumptus omnes prosequentibus eam pecuniam, ut in urbem Romam eam 
deportarent: eaque sic recte dari fieri fide roganti Sticho servo Lucii Titii 
promisit Callimachus. et cum ante idus supra scriptas secundum 
conventionem mercibus in navem impositis cum Erote conservo Stichi 
quasi in provinciam Syriam perventurus enavigavit: quaesitum est nave 
submersa, cum secundum cautionem Callimachus merces debito 
perferendas in nave mansisset eo tempore, quo iam pecuniam Brentesio 
reddere Romae perferendam deberet, an nihil prosit Erotis consensus, qui 
cum eo missus erat, cuique nihil amplius de pecunia supra scripta post 
diem conventionis permissum vel mandatum erat, quam ut eam receptam 
Romam perferret, et nihilo minus actione ex stipulatu Callimachus de 
pecunia domino Stichi teneatur. respondit secundum ea quae 
proponerentur teneri. item quaero, si Callimacho post diem supra scriptam 
naviganti Eros supra scriptus servus consenserit, an actionem domino suo 
semel adquisitam adimere potuerit. respondit non potuisse, sed fore 
exceptioni locum, si servo arbitrium datum esset eam pecuniam 
quocumque tempore in quemvis locum reddi. 
In the so-called ‘Callimachus loan’, Stichus, the slave of Seius (later referred 
to as Lucius Titius), agreed to lend ‘maritime money’ (pecunia nautica) to a 
merchant called Callimachus for a maximum term of two hundred days.56 
 
55 I have given Mommsen’s edition of the text, notwithstanding the emendations suggested by 
both von Lübtow and Biscardi, as these do not bear upon the interpretation of the text 
offered here: Ulrich von Lübtow, ‘Das Seedarlehen des Callimachus’, in Festschrift für Max 
Kaser zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Dieter Medicus and Hans H. Seiler (Munich: Beck, 1976), 
329; Arnaldo Biscardi, ‘Pecunia traiecticia e stipulatio poenae’, Labeo 24 (1978): 298–300. 
56 The time limit reflected the lender’s unwillingness to bear the risk beyond the end of the 
sailing season: Adriaan J. B. Sirks, ‘Sailing in the Off-Season with Reduced Financial Risk’, 
in Speculum Iuris: Roman Law as a Reflection of Social and Economic Life in Antiquity, ed. 
Jean-Jacques Aubert and Adriaan J. B. Sirks (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
2002), 142–43. Cf. the view that this was the time required for the completion of the 
enterprise: Richard Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 21; Christoph Krampe, ‘Der 
Seedarlehensstreit des Callimachus - D. 45,1,122,1 Scaevola 28 digestorum’, in Collatio 
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Under the terms of the agreement Callimachus was bound to purchase goods 
at Berytus (modern Beirut), his port of departure, and to transport them to 
Brentesium, where he would sell them. Eros, a fellow slave of Stichus, was to 
accompany him on the journey, and the revenue from the sale of the original 
cargo would be used to acquire new merchandise. Callimachus would then 
ship the goods back to Berytus where, once sold, he could repay the sum he 
had borrowed out of the proceeds. If, however, Callimachus failed to depart 
Brentesium with a fresh cargo before 13 September, he would be obliged to 
make repayment to Eros, who would take the money to Rome. Security was 
taken over both the outward and return cargoes by means of pledge and 
hypothec.57 Once the terms had been agreed, they were made binding by way 
of stipulation and recorded in a cautio. 
Some scholars have described the case as hypothetical, and it is true that the 
jurist uses stock names (Stichus, Eros, Seius, and Lucius Titius) which he 
employs elsewhere in his writing.58 However, the specific details included by 
Scaevola suggest that the scenario had a firm basis in reality.59 In particular, 
the timeframes explicitly take account of the sailing season and the increased 
hazards associated with seafaring in winter, while the spelling of Brentesium 
(for Brundisium, modern Brindisi) lends credence to the view that the text was 
 
iuris Romani: études dédiées à Hans Ankum à l’occasion de son 65e anniversaire, ed. 
Robert Feenstra et al. (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1995), 221–22. Sirks calculates that the trip 
ought not to have taken more than three weeks sailing time each way: ‘Sailing in the Off-
Season’, 148. This accords with the sailing times over coastal and open waters calculated 
using the Orbis modelling software (orbis.stanford.edu): the trip from Berytus to Brentesium 
(approximately 2400 km) is estimated to have taken 17 days in April, or 21 in July; and from 
Brentesium to Berytus 13 days in July, or 14 in September. 
57 The reference to both types of security raises suspicions of interpolation: cf., e.g., Ludwig 
Mitteis, Ernst Levy, and Ernst Rabel, eds., Index interpolationum quae in Iustiniani Digestis 
inesse dicuntur, vol. 3 (Weimar: Böhlaus, 1929), 392. 
58 Jean Rougé, Recherches sur l’organisation du commerce maritime en Méditerranée sous 
l’Empire romain (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1966), 350; De Ste. Croix, ‘Ancient Greek and 
Roman Maritime Loans’, 55; Pascal Arnaud, ‘Ancient Sailing-Routes and Trade Patterns: 
The Impact of Human Factors’, in Maritime Archaeology and Ancient Trade in the 
Mediterranean, ed. Damian Robinson and Andrew I. Wilson (Oxford: Oxford Centre for 
Maritime Archaeology, Institute of Archaeology, 2011), 69. 
59 Fritz Pringsheim, Der Kauf mit fremdem Geld: Studien über die Bedeutung der Preiszahlung 
für den Eigentumserwerb nach griechischem und römischem Recht (Leipzig: Veit, 1916), 
147; Biscardi, Actio pecuniae traiecticiae, 200; Gianfranco Purpura, ‘Ricerche in tema di 




based upon a set of documents written in Greek.60 This possibility is made all 
the more likely by the fact that Scaevola frequently reproduced Greek 
documents elsewhere in his work.61 
The jurist’s account of the agreement itself is even more telling. The opening 
phrase, ‘Callimachus mutuam pecuniam nauticam accepit’, echoes the 
language used in chirographa to describe the act giving rise to the principal 
obligation to repay a certain sum (e.g., scripsi me accipisse mutua et debere, 
or the like). He then proceeds to enumerate the terms of the agreement: first 
an expiry date, then provisions for the taking of security, and finally a stipulation 
for the services of the lender’s representative, which included a (crypto-)penalty 
for delayed repayment. These, we are told later, were recorded in a cautio 
(secundum cautionem). The account finishes with the conclusion of the whole 
agreement as a stipulation, and again the author replicates the technical 
language found in typical mutua cum stipulatione: ‘eaque sic recte dari fieri fide 
roganti Sticho servo Lucii Titii promisit Callimachus’. 
Scaevola’s account of the agreement between Stichus and Callimachus was 
very likely based upon a real loan dossier similar to those in the Sulpician 
archive which included a nautika syngraphe of the kind referred to in SB VI 
9571. In my view, several features indicate that Callimachus had paid the yield 
up front according to the method suggested by Verboven. In the first place, the 
jurist’s detailed description of the terms of the loan – most of which form no part 
in his juridical reasoning at the end of the text – leaves little doubt that the 
absence of an explicit interest clause was a deliberate omission. It is therefore 
probable, as in the case of the Sulpician loans and SB VI 9571, that the 
chirograph accompanying the syngraphe was an acknowledgment of the whole 
debt including both principal and yield. 
 
60 Jones, The Bankers of Puteoli, 181; also, Paul Huvelin, Études d’histoire du droit 
commercial romain (histoire externe-droit maritime) (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1929), 203. 
61 Especially, D.44.7.61 pr. (Scaev. 28 dig.); also, D.17.1.60.4 (Scaev. 1 resp.); D.20.1.34.1 
(Scaev. 27 dig.); D.26.7.47 pr. (Scaev. 2 resp.); D.31.88.15 (Scaev. 3 resp.); D.32.37.5, 6 
(Scaev. 18 dig.); D.32.39.1 (Scaev. 20 dig.); D.32.101 pr. (Scaev. 16 dig.); D.33.4.14 
(Scaev. 15 dig.); D.33.8.23.2 (Scaev. 15 dig.); D.34.1.16.1 (Scaev. 18 dig.); D.34.4.30.1, 3 
(Scaev. 20 dig.); D.40.4.60 (Scaev. 24 dig.); D.40.5.41.4 (Scaev. 4 resp.); and D.50.9.6 
(Scaev. 1 dig.). 
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This inference alone merely suggests that the yield was capitalised, which is 
consistent with the loan structures proposed by both Bove–Camodeca and 
Verboven. There is, however, one critical feature that suggests that Verboven’s 
thesis ought to be preferred. In the passage immediately preceding the 
Callimachus loan – that is, D.45.1.122 pr., the Distant Province loan – the 
borrower received his money as a mutuum – ‘qui Romae mutuam pecuniam 
acceperat’ – and then immediately repaid a portion of it to the lender. In the 
following text, Callimachus received his loan on the same basis – ‘Callimachus 
mutuam pecuniam nauticam accepit’ – the only difference being that the money 
was understood to be ‘nautica’. In my view, Scaevola’s use of the word was 
intended to invoke the Hellenic meaning traced by Cohen of money lent for a 
fixed yield with an uncertain due date. Although we are not explicitly told that 
Callimachus paid ‘future interest’ upfront, both the context supplied by the 
previous text and the telling absence of an interest clause suggest that he did. 
Finally, the condition that required Callimachus to leave Brentesium with a new 
cargo before 13 September makes sense in light of this structure. If he failed 
to leave by this date, he was obliged to pay everything he owed to Eros at 
Brentesium, as if the voyage had come to an end (redderet universam continuo 
pecuniam quasi perfecto navigio). Clearly the borrower owed a fixed sum; and 
in the context of the structure of the loan, this meant an equivalent amount to 
that originally transferred by the lender, notwithstanding Callimachus’ 
voluntary repayment of a portion of the proceeds upfront. The condition was 
therefore penal in character: since the yield had been paid in advance and 
negotiated in the context of a round trip during which two lots of cargo were 
intended to be bought and sold, repayment at the half-way stage would have 
required Callimachus to find the difference between what he had taken away 
and what he owed before having enjoyed the benefit of selling two lots of 
cargo. 
Summary of 3.1.1.1: 
It is my submission that the 5,160 dr. recorded in SB VI 9571 represents the 
yield demanded by Celer and Chares on a maritime loan. Like the loans in the 
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Sulpician archive, the yield was ‘capitalised’ to create an acknowledgment by 
the borrowers for the whole amount of the debt. It is possible that this was 
achieved according to the method of paying the yield upfront, which is attested 
elsewhere in the juristic sources. There are several indications that this was 
also the technique used in the Callimachus loan. In sum, the evidence adduced 
in this part is consistent with the second method described by the naukleroi in 
Nov. 106: of money advanced in return for a fixed financial yield calculated as 
a proportion of the sum lent. 
3.1.1.2 ‘Quid pro quo’ Loans. 
SB III 7169:62 
1       [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣ε̣ντα ἀπὸ τῆς προκειμένης ἡμ[έ]ρ[ας] 
    ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣δημος μὲν πρὸς χαλκὸ[ν ]-ca.?-] 
2       [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣σ̣ι, Μηνοδώραι(*) δὲ ὡσαύτως πρὸς ἀρ[γύριον] 
    ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣ας πεντήκοντα καὶ τῶν  [̣-ca.?-] 
3     [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣ε   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ὑπάρχων τ\ῆς/ αὐτῆς(*) ἡμέρας ἁγνευτικὰς 
 [   ̣ ̣   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ̣  ̣]  ι̣ καὶ οὐθενὸς αὐτῶν ἐλατ[τουμένου ]-ca.?-] 
4     [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣υτου πάλιν παρ[α]διδόναι αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τῶν προκ[ειμένων] 
    ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣τοὺς] ἐσομένους τόκους. [-ca.?-] 
5     [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣ ϛ ἐδάνεισεν Ἄρχιπ[π]ος Δη[μητρίωι ]   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ̣   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ̣] vac. ? [-ca.?-] 
6     [ἐδάνει]σεν Ἄρχιππος Εὐδή[μου ]   ̣  ̣  ̣ ̣   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣τ̣ι 
 [   ̣ ̣   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ̣  ̣   ̣  ̣ ̣   ̣ ]̣  [̣   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣  α̣̣ ὡς ἐ[τῶν ]-ca.?-] 
7     [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣ς οὐλὴ μετώπωι ἐ[ξ ἀρισ]τ[ε]ρ[ᾶ]ς [Δημητρίωι] 
    ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣  [̣   ̣  ̣ ̣   ̣ ]̣ξεως ὡς ἐ[τῶν ]-ca.?-] 
8     [   ̣  ̣  ̣προ]σώπωι οὐλὴ μετώπωι μέσωι καὶ Ἱππ[άρχωι Ἱ]ππ̣άρ[χου] 
    ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣ε̣  ρ̣̣   ̣  ̣ [̣-ca.?-] 
9     [   ̣  ̣  ̣ἀνα]φαλάντωι μακροπροσώπωι οὐλὴ μ[ετώπ]ωι καὶ 
 Δ̣[   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ τῆς] ἐπι̣γ[ον]ῆς ὡς ἐ[τῶν ]-ca.?-] 
10     [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣[γ]ενειον(*) καὶ Σ̣   ̣  ̣ ̣χ̣ωι Λ[υ]σιμάχου [Λακε]δαιμονίωι [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ὡς 
 ἐτῶν ]   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣κον]τα πέντε μέσωι [-ca.?-] 
11     [οὐλὴ μετ]ώπωι ἐ[κ] δεξιῶν καὶ Τρ   ̣  ̣ ω̣ι Τρε̣   ̣ [̣   ̣  ̣Μεσ]σαλιώτηι 
 [   ̣ ̣   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣  ο̣υπ̣   ̣  ̣ [̣   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣  [̣   ̣  ̣  ̣ ̣]  ε̣  [̣-ca.?-] 
12     [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣κλαστωι μακροπροσώπωι οὐλὴ χ[ειρὶ ἀ]ριστερᾶι το[ῖς ε τοῖς εἰς] τὴν 
 Ἀρω[ματο]φ[όρον συ]νπλοῖς διὰ Γναίου ἐξ[-ca.?-] 
13     [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣κα εἰς ἐ[νι]α[υ]τ[ὸ]ν [ἀπὸ το]ῦ πρ[ο]κει[μένου] μηνός. [ἀποδότωσαν δὲ] 
 οἱ δεδα[νεισ]μέ[νοι τῶ]ι δεδανεικότι τ[ὸ δάνειον ]-ca.?-] 
14     [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣   ̣ τ̣α. ἐὰν δʼ ἐκπε[σ]ό[ν]τ[ε]ς τοῦ χρόν[ου] παραγένω[νται ἀπὸ τῆς 
 Ἀ]ρ[ω]μα[το]φόρ[ο]υ [εἰς] τὴν χώραν, ὁμοίως   ̣ [̣-ca.?-] 
15      [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣ηε̣  ,̣ ἀφʼ ἧς ἂν ἡμέρας παραγένωνται [ε]ἰς τὴν χώραν [ἡμερῶν] 
 
62 = P. Berol. 5883 + 5853. 
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    ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣ήκοντα. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀποδῶσιν ἐν τ[ῶι ὡρισμένωι χρόνωι, 
 ἀποτεισάτωσαν παραχρῆμα τὸ δάνειον ἡμιό]- 
16     [λιον καὶ] τοῦ ὑπ[ε]ρπεσόντος χρόνου τοὺς κατὰ τὸ διάγραμ[μα τόκους 
 διδ]ράχμους τῆι μνᾶι τὸν μῆνα ἕκασ[τον. ἔγγυοι εἰς ἔκτεισιν ]-ca.?-] 
17     [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣Θ]εσσαλονικεὺς ἡγεμὼν ἔξω τάξεων ὡς ἐτῶν [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ἑπ]τὰ μέσος, 
 μ[ε]λίχρως, τετανὸς, στρ[ογγυλοπρόσωπος, οὐλὴ ]-ca.?- καὶ ]-ca.?-] 
18     [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣του Ἐλεάτης τῶν μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως καταπε 
 [   ̣ ̣   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ δ̣(?)]ευτέρων  ἐπιλέκτων ὡς ἐτῶν τεσσ[αράκοντα ]- ca.?-] 
19     [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣ δεξιᾶι καὶ Κίντος   ̣  ̣  ̣ ν̣ιος Μεσσαλιώτηι(*) τῶν αὐ[τῶν ὡς ἐτῶν 
 τ]εσσαράκοντα εὐμεγεθηι(*)μελίχρο[υς ]-ca.?-] 
20     [ἀριστε]ρὰν καὶ Δημήτριος Ἀπολλωνίου Καρ[χη]δόνιος [τῶν τὴν ἔξω 
 θάλ(?)]ασσαν  πλοιζομένων ὡς ἐτῶν τρία[κοντα ]-ca.?-] 
21      [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣ σύνοφρυς ἡσυχῆ καὶ Κίντος Κιντο[   ̣  ̣ ]̣   ̣
 [   ̣ ̣   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣τ]ακτόμισθος ὡς ἐτῶν τεσσαράκον[τα ]-ca.?-] 
22     [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣  σ̣η καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις ἔστω Ἀρχίππωι ἐ[ξ αὐτῶν τε τῶν δεδανεισμ]ένων 
 \καὶ τῶν ἐγγύων/ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντ[ω]ν αὐτοῖς π[άντων καθάπερ ἐκ 
 δίκης. ἐπιθέτωσαν δὲ  ]   ̣ ̣  ̣   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ὁ] 
23     [προγεγρ]αμμένος Δημήτριος καὶ Ἵππαρχος 
 ἀπ̣[   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣  ι̣ώματα τῶν ἐκ τῆς π[ρογ]εγραμ[μένης]-ca.?-] 
24     [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣, οὗ ἂν ἡ ἐξαίρεσις γένηται τῶν ἀρω[μάτων (?)]   ̣  ̣ ̣   ̣  ̣  ̣κατὰ τὰ 
 ἐ]πιβάλλοντʼ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πλόο[υ ]-ca.?-] 
25     [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣  ι̣ τὰ παρασταθησόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀρ[χίππου(?)] 
    ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣  ς̣ ὥστε ἀποκαταστῆσαι εἰς τὴν χώρ[αν ]-ca.?-] 
26      [   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣ ὁ̣λκῆς τῶν ἀρωμάτων παραγενομ[εν ]   ̣  ̣  ̣ ̣   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ̣   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ]̣ε. ἐὰν 
 δὲ μὴ {ἐὰν δὲ μὴ} ἐπιθῶσιν, καθ[ὼς πρόκειται ]-ca.?-] 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
SB III 7169, first edited by Wilcken in 1925, contains the fragmentary contents 
of an acknowledgment of debt made at Alexandria about the middle of the 
second century BCE.63 The capital for the loan was provided by a certain 
Archippos, son of Eudemos, to five synploi, or associates, for a journey to the 
Aromatophoros, which was probably located on the Horn of Africa.64 Two of 
the associates, Demetrios and Hipparchos (one a Lacaedemonian, the other 
a Massiliote), are specifically designed as naukleroi, the other three simply as 
socii.65 Archippos does not appear to have taken security over the cargo or 
 
63 Ulrich Wilcken, ‘Punt-Fahrten in der Ptolemäerzeit’, Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und 
Altertumskunde 60 (1925): 86–102. 
64 On the location, Matthew A. Cobb, Rome and the Indian Ocean Trade from Augustus to the 
Early Third Century CE (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2018), 32; also, Steven E. Sidebotham, 
Berenike and the Ancient Maritime Spice Route (Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press, 2011), 34. 
65 Rafał Taubenschlag, ‘Die societas negotiationis im Rechte der Papyri’, ZSS 52 (1932): 64–
77. Heichelheim has pointed out the similarities between this enterprise and the maritime 
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ship; instead, three Ptolemaic army officers – a Thessalonican, an Elean, and 
a third with a celtic name – and two merchants – a Massiliote and a 
Carthaginian – stood as surety for the loan (ll. 17-21).66 To add to the 
international character of the arrangement, the loan was given διὰ Γναίου 
(l.12); that is, through an Italian called Cnaeus, who was probably a banker.67 
The five associates had a year to complete the enterprise, after which they 
would be liable to pay a penalty (ἡμιόλιον) equal to one-and-a-half times 
amount of the debt (i.e., a 50% uplift) in addition to interest at the rate of 2% 
per month (24% per annum) (l.16).68 Even if the traders were delayed, 
however, they would still be allowed a grace period of either 50, 70, 80, or 90 
days to tranship the goods from the Red Sea coast to Alexandria for sale 
before interest began to run.69 Most scholars have assumed that the loan was 
‘maritime’, in the sense that the lender shouldered the risk until the vessel’s 
safe return. As Thür has rightly said, however, there is no explicit evidence of 
such a clause in the document, even if the nature of the enterprise suggests 
this possibility.70 
The most interesting feature of the loan from our perspective is that it was 
given [ἄτο]κα (l.13).71 As in the case of the Sulpician archive, it is hardly likely 
that Archippos was content to lend gratuitously. Several scholars have 
followed Wilcken’s suggestion that the parties negotiated a profit-sharing 
 
loan reported to have been negotiated by Cato in Plut., Cat. mai. 21.5-6: ‘Zu Pap. Berol. 
5883 + 5853’, Aegyptus 13, no. 1/2 (1933): 187–92. 
66 Michael I. Rostovtzeff, ‘Foreign Commerce of Ptolemaic Egypt’, Journal of Economic and 
Business History 4, no. 4 (1932): 756; Peter M. Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria, vol. 2 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 275, note 216. On the military personnel, Louis Robert, 
Études épigraphiques et philologiques (Paris: Champion, 1938), 206; also, Hans Hauben, 
‘“Ceux qui naviguent sur la mer extérieure” (“SB” III 7169)’, ZPE 59 (1985): 135–36. 
67 Raymond Bogaert, ‘Banquiers, courtiers et prêts maritimes à Athènes et à Alexandrie’, 
Chronique d’Égypte 40 (1965): 146–54; also, Pierre Jouguet, ‘Dédicace grecque de 
Médamoud’, Le Bulletin de l’Institut français d’archéologie orientale 31 (1931): 22 and 25. 
68 Wilcken, ‘Punt-Fahrten’, 95–96; Bogaert, ‘Banquiers’, 148. 
69 De Romanis, ‘Time to Repay’, 76. 
70 Gerhard Thür, ‘Hypotheken-Urkunde eines Seedarlehens für eine Reise nach Muziris und 
Apographe für die Tetarte in Alexandria: (zu P. Vindob.G. 40.822)’, Tyche 2 (1987): 243; 
also urging caution, Claire Préaux, L’économie royale des Lagides (Brussels: Éditions de 
la Fondation Égyptologique Reine Élisabeth, 1939), 364; Bogaert, ‘Banquiers’, 149–51. 
71 Wilcken confidently supplies the reconstruction: ‘Punt-Fahrten’, 95; also, Paul M. Meyer, 
‘Juristischer Papyrusbericht IV’, ZSS 46 (1926): 330; Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz, Lineamenti 
del sistema contrattuale nel diritto dei papiri (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1928), 83–84. 
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arrangement in lieu of interest, according to which Archippos would participate 
in the gains from the sale of the merchandise on the traders’ return.72 Even 
more intriguing is Wilhelm’s hypothesis that the words τὰ παρασταθησόμενα 
ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀρ[χίππου refer to articles supplied by the creditor and entrusted for 
transport and sale to the traders receiving the loan.73 According to him, the 
clauses in lines 22-26 are governed by the verb ἐπιθέναι, so that, if l.25 were 
to be restored ἐπιθεῖναι δὲ χα]ὶ τὰ παρασταθησόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀρ[χίππου, the 
meaning of the verb, otherwise unattested, could be something like ‘to put a 
load upon another load or upon a ship’. Archippos, he concludes, appears to 
have been a partner in the whole business, the contract obliging Demetrios 
and Hipparchos (the two naukleroi) to ship the creditor’s goods and imposing 
a fine on them should they fail. The creditor may well therefore have negotiated 
a quid pro quo in return for extending the loan, either wholly or partly in place 
of interest. As Pestman’s study has shown, however, ἄτοκα loans need not 
have been given in return for a quid pro quo but could also involve the 
capitalisation of the interest.74 This is Thür’s preferred interpretation of the 
structure employed here: the (unknown) sum of the debt acknowledged by the 
borrowers included both the principal and the yield.75 In truth, neither technique 
for profiting from the loan can be ruled out. 
It is not possible to say beyond doubt which of these two structures was used 
to facilitate the loan documented in SB III 7169. We should not discount the 
possibility, however, that the creditor’s anticipated return was achieved by 
demanding both a financial yield and a quid pro quo, as was reported to be 
customary by the naukleroi in Nov. 106. Certainly, in a venture of this scale 
and complexity, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that Archippos 
discounted a portion of the yield in return for the carriers and traders providing 
their services as both conveyors and purveyors of his goods. 
 
 
72 Wilcken, ‘Punt-Fahrten’, 96; Meyer, ‘Juristischer Papyrusbericht’, 330; Arangio-Ruiz, 
Lineamenti, 84; Jouguet, ‘Dédicace grecque’, 22. 
73 Adolf Wilhelm, ‘Papyrus Tebtunis 33’, JRS 27 (1937): 149; also, Sidebotham, Berenike, 34. 
74 Pestman, ‘Loans’, 24–26. 




 p. 1 Ἐπὶ ὑπάτων Μάρκου Ἀκύλα Ἰουλι– 
  ανοῦ καὶ Ποπλίου Νωνίου Ἀσ– 
  πρήνα πρὸ τριῶν εἰδῶν 
  Ἀπριλίων ἐν Δικαρχήα. 
5 Μενέλαος Εἰρηναίου Κερα– 
  μιήτης ἔγραψα ἀπέχιν μαι 
  παρὰ Πρίμου Ποπλίου Ἀττίου Σεβή– 
  ρου δούλου{λου} δηνάρια χίλια 
  ἐκ ναυλωτικῆς ἐκσφραγισμένης, 
10 ἃ καὶ ἀποδώσω ἀκ{ου}λούθως 
τῆ ναυλωτικῆ, ἣ<ν> πεποίημαι πρὸς 
αὐτόν. Κατέστησα δὲ ἔνγυον 
p. 2 εἰς ἔκτισιν τὼν προγεγραμμένων 
δηναρίων χιλίων Μάρκον Βαρ– 
βάτιον Κέλερα. 
Q(uintus) Aelius Romanus scripsi rogatu et 
5 mandatu M(arci) Barbati Celeris coram 
ipso, quod is litteris nesciret, eum 
sua fide iubere eos * ∞, q(ui) s(upra) s(cripti) sunt, 
Primo P(ublii) Atti Severi ser(vo) pro Menela– 
uo Irenaei f(ilio) Ceramietae, ita 
10 uti supra scriptum es[t]. (S) (S) (S) 
 
TPSulp. 78 consists of a diptych of wax tablets containing two chirographa 
dated to 11 April 38 CE.77 The first chirograph, which was written in Greek, 
contained declarations made by a peregrine shipper called Menelaos, son of 
Irenaos, who hailed from Keramos in Caria (Asia Minor). In the document 
Menelaos declared: first (p.1, ll. 5-9), that he had received 1000 denarii (=HS 
4000) from a certain Primus, slave of P. Attius Severus, ‘arising from’ a sealed 
naulotike (ἐκ ναυλωτικῆς ἐκσφραγισμένης); second (p.1, ll. 10-12), that he 
would willingly repay the loan ‘according to’ the naulotike concluded between 
them; and third (p. 1, l. 12 – p.2, l. 3), that a certain M. Barbatius Celer would 
stand as surety in his stead. The second chirograph, which was composed in 
Latin, contained a declaration made by a certain Q. Aelius Romanus that, 
 
76 = Tab. Pomp. 13. 
77 The presence of two chirographa in the same document is unusual, but not unique: 
Camodeca, Tabulae Pompeianae Sulpiciorum, 2:178; also, Joseph G. Wolf, ‘Aus dem 
neuen pompejanischen Urkundenfund: Die “naulotike” des Menelaos – Seedarlehen oder 




because M. Barbatius Celer was illiterate, he was acting on his behalf, and that 
the latter agreed to stand as surety for Menelaos for the 1000 d. constituting 
the loan. 
Since the proposed interpretation of the tablet put forward by Joseph G. Wolf 
in 1979, numerous competing theories concerning the character of the 
transaction have been advanced. According to him, the naulotike was a 
Seefrachtvertrag (maritime freight agreement).78  Wolf also claimed that, 
because Menelaos had not received the 1000 d. as a payment on the contract, 
but rather with a commitment to return the money (ἀποδώσω, i.e., reddam), 
the intention behind the transaction was that the shipper would transport the 
money itself as cargo and pass it on at the port of destination.79 As Jakab has 
pointed out, however, the use of the verb ἀποδώσω in the Graeco-Egyptian 
papyri tends to indicate the repayment of money given intendedly as a loan, 
and not the return of property handed over for transport.80 In addition, although 
it is true that the format of the both chirographs diverges from that of other 
chirographa documenting loans in the archive (for example, no stipulations are 
concluded), the translation of the formulaic ‘scripsi me accipisse’ into the 
Greek phrase ‘ἔγραψα ἀπέχιν μαι’ does suggest that the parties intended the 
document as evidence of the receipt of a mutuum.81 
In contrast to Wolf’s thesis, Ankum argued that the naulotike was not a 
shipping contract, but rather a maritime loan agreement. In support of this 
position, Ankum cited a constitution of Justinian from 528 (already referred to 
above in connection with Nov. 106) in which the expression contractus 
traiecticius was used.82 This expression, Ankum concluded, was already in use 
by the late Republican or classical period and was translated into Greek by the 
scribe responsible for writing the tablet as ‘ναυλοτικῆ (συγγραφῆ)’.83 Although 
 
78 Joseph G. Wolf, ‘Aus dem neuen pompejanischen Urkundenfund. Der Seefrachtvertrag des 
Menelaos’, Freiburger Universitätsblätter 65 (1979): 23–36. 
79 Wolf, 34. 
80 Éva Jakab, ‘Vectura pro mutua: Überlegungen zu TP 13 und Ulp. D. 19, 2, 15, 61’, ZSS 117 
(2000): 250. 
81 Camodeca, Tabulae Pompeianae Sulpiciorum, 2:179. 
82 C.4.32.26.2 (Iust., 528): on which, supra, 67, nt. 4. 
83 Hans Ankum, ‘Tabula Pompeiana 13: ein Seefrachtvertrag oder ein Seedarlehen?’, IURA 
29 (1978): 168–69; also, ‘Minima de Tabula Pompeiana 13’, Cahiers d’histoire. Navires et 
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Ankum has been followed by a number of scholars, his reliance upon a sixth-
century constitution as evidence for the meaning of a phrase used in a 
document from 500 years earlier has drawn criticism.84 In addition, as both 
Jakab and Rathbone have suggested, the sum of 1000 d. appears at first sight 
to have been too low to constitute a maritime loan, when during the same 
period a skilled slave could sell for twice that amount.85 
Next, a new interpretation was offered by Gofas in 1993, according to which 
the naulotike was considered, in line with Wolf, a maritime freight agreement, 
but configured as a ‘Versicherungsdarlehen’ (‘insurance loan’).86 Relying upon 
comparative evidence, Gofas explained how carriers in later periods were 
accustomed to give loans equivalent to the value of the cargo they had agreed 
to transport, the repayment of which was conditional upon the ship’s safe 
arrival. If the ship sank in transit the merchants whose goods had perished 
would have no obligation to repay, so that the proceeds of the loan which they 
were entitled to retain functioned as a kind of insurance. However, as Jakab 
has rightly observed, in TPSulp. 78 the roles of the parties are reversed: 
Menelaos, the carrier, is the person receiving the money, not the person 
dispensing it.87 In order to remedy this inconsistency Gofas was compelled to 
argue that the loan given by Primus was fictitious, which steers the 
interpretation yet further away from the sources.88 
 
commerces de la Méditerranée Antique. Homage à Jean Rougé 33 (1988): 282; and 
‘Observations sur le prêt maritime romain, sujet cher à Henryk Kupiszewski’, in Le droit 
romain et le monde contemporain: Melanges à la mémoire de Henryk Kupiszewski, ed. 
Witold Wołodkiewicz and Maria Zabłocka (Warsaw: Université de Varsovie, 1996), 67–68. 
84 Following Ankum, Jean Macqueron, Contractus scripturae. Contrats et quittances dans la 
pratique romaine (Camerino: Facoltà di giurisprudenza dell’Università di Camerino, 1982), 
173–75; Arnaldo Biscardi, ‘Minima de iura civili’, in Sodalitas: scritti in onore di Antonio 
Guarino, ed. Vincenzo Giuffrè, vol. 4 (Naples: Jovene, 1984), 1534–36; Purpura, ‘Tabulae 
Pompeianae 13 e 34’, 1252–53; also, ‘Ricerche’, 233–34; Gröschler, Die Tabellae-
Urkunden, 160–61. For criticism, Jakab, ‘Vectura pro mutua’, 252. 
85 Jakab, ‘Vectura pro mutua’, 251–52; also, Rathbone, ‘Financing’, 209, note 46. 
86 Dimitri Gofas, ‘Encore une fois sur la Tabula Pompeiana 13 (essai d’une interprétation 
nouvelle)’, in Symposion 1993. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen 
Rechtsgeschichte (Graz-Andritz, 12-16 September 1993), ed. Gerhard Thür (Cologne and 
Vienna: Böhlau, 1994), 251–66; followed by Arnaud, ‘Ancient Sailing-Routes’, 68. 
87 Jakab, ‘Vectura pro mutua’, 253. 
88 Gofas, ‘Encore une fois’, 265. 
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Building on Gofas’ thesis, Thür argued that the 1000 d. that Menelaos claimed 
to have received was intended as an ‘Aestimationsabrede’.89 On this account, 
the sum stated in the chirograph was a valuation of the cargo received by 
Menelaos under the freight agreement, for which Menelaos as carrier had 
assumed the risk during transport. According to Thür, the valuation was 
dressed as a loan so that, in the event the ship did not return, the lender could 
sue using a simple condictio. In this way, the loan was just an ‘empty form’, 
such that in return for assuming the risk for the merchandise the carrier 
charged an increased amount on the freight.90 Again, however, as Jakab has 
observed, the papyrological evidence tends to show that estimations of this 
kind could be included in the main body of agreements without difficulty and 
need not have been framed as a separate transaction.91 
Jakab, in turn, has provided an altogether different explanation. According to 
her, the transaction documented in TPSulp. 78 is an example of vectura paid 
pro mutua; that is, a freight charge paid in the form of a loan.92 Having 
confirmed that the chirograph was intended as evidence of the receipt of a 
loan, Jakab also shows that the word ‘naulotike’ invariably carries the meaning 
of a maritime freight agreement in the Ptolemaic and Graeco-Egyptian papyri. 
She then argues that the transaction executed by Primus and Menelaos was 
analogous to one described by Ulpian in D.19.2.15.6 (Ulp. 32 ad ed.), in which 
the jurist reported a rescript of Caracalla to the effect that a person who had 
paid for the transport of his goods in advance could seek a remission of the 
merces if the ship was lost in transit. Consequently, Jakab maintains that the 
 
89 Gerhard Thür, ‘Die Aestimationsabrede im Seefrachtvertrag: Diskussionsbeitrag zum 
Referat Dimitri C. Gofas’, in Symposion 1993. Vorträge zur griechischen und 
hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Graz-Andritz, 12-16 September 1993), 267–71. 
Camodeca has expressed his support for this view: Tabulae Pompeianae Sulpiciorum, 
2:178–79; also, ‘Il credito negli archivi campani: il caso di Puteoli e di Herculaneum’, in 
Credito e moneta nel mondo romano: atti degli Incontri capresi di storia dell’economia 
antica (Capri 12-14 ottobre 2000), ed. Elio Lo Cascio (Bari: Edipuglia, 2003), 88–89. 
90 Thür, ‘Die Aestimationsabrede’, 271. 
91 Jakab, ‘Vectura pro mutua’, 253–54. 
92 Jakab, ‘Vectura pro mutua’; also, Jakab and Manthe, ‘Recht’, 295–300. This interpretation 
has been accepted by, among others, Stephan Schuster, Das Seedarlehen in den 
Gerichtsreden des Demosthenes: mit einem Ausblick auf die weitere historische 
Entwicklung des Rechtsinstitutes: dáneion nautikón, fenus nauticum und Bodmerei (Berlin: 
Duncker und Humblot, 2005), 178, note 10. 
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1000 d. received by Menelaos was an advanced freight payment made on 
condition that the ship reached its destination.  
Finally, Dominic Rathbone has suggested that the money was lent for the 
purpose of paying customs duties on the cargo that Menelaos had agreed to 
transport, though this view is offered without substantiation.93 
In contrast to all these theories, it is my submission that Nov. 106 provides 
evidence of a loan structure that is consistent with the transaction documented 
by TPSulp. 78. For the purpose of this argument, I accept the claims of Jakab 
and others that: i) Menelaos received the 1000 d. as a loan; and ii) the 
naulotike refers to a maritime freight agreement. In Nov. 106, the first 
customary loan structure attested to by the shippers was described as follows: 
Should the lenders have so chosen, they would load one modius of wheat 
or barley aboard the ship for each coin of whatever sum they lent, without 
making any payment on it to the public tax-collectors; as far as they were 
concerned, the vessels would sail tax-free, and they would have that as 
profit on what they had lent. Additionally, they would receive interest at just 
one gold piece in ten, with the risk of the venture being the regard of the 
lenders themselves (trans. Miller and Sarris 2018, 2:698). 
According to this method, the creditor lent a sum of money for which he 
assumed the risk. As a reward, the lender demanded not only a yield 
equivalent to the value of one-tenth of the sum lent, but also that the shipper 
carry his goods and pay duties on them during transit. In other words, the 
lender negotiated that part of the yield due on the loan was to consist of 
services performed by the carrier. 
 
93 Initially Rathbone sought to develop Jakab’s thesis by suggesting that the loan was fictive: 
‘Financing’, 208–9; but subsequently, in favour of a (possibly fictive) loan for the purpose 
of paying duties, ‘Merchant Networks in the Greek World: The Impact of Rome’, 




Fig. 5: Reconstruction of the first loan structure reported in Nov. 106. 
In light of the loan structure described in Nov. 106, an alternative 
reconstruction of the transaction documented in TPSulp. 78 comes into view. 
Menelaos (the carrier) received 1000 d. as a loan and agreed in the naulotike 
to render his services partly or wholly in place of paying interest. We cannot 
tell if Primus assumed the risk for the loan: if the 1000 d. had been given sine 
periculo creditoris Menelaos would have had to repay it under all 
circumstances; if at the risk of the lender (as described in Nov. 106), only if the 
voyage was successfully completed. The structure is different to the one 
proposed by Jakab: according to her, Menelaos did not have to repay the 
money unless the ship went down; on the account given here, Menelaos did 
have to repay the loan, either come what may or, if the lender assumed the 
risk, unless the ship went down. 
Why did Primus and Menelaos not simply enter into a freight agreement? The 
answer to this question is that the arrangement described above was 
commercially beneficial for both parties. It is highly likely, as Camodeca has 
pointed out, that Primus’ master – P. Attius Severus – is the same P. Attius 
Severus whose name is attested on tituli picti dating to the Julio-Claudian 
period which show that he was a trader in garum.94 We also know from the 
archaeological evidence discovered at numerous wreck sites from the same 
period that merchant vessels frequently carried consignments owned by 
 




multiple traders at the same time as carrying goods belonging to the carrier 
himself.95 
Let us therefore suppose not only that Primus was a lender and Menelaos a 
carrier, but that both were traders at the same time. Primus had capital to lend 
and goods to transport; Menelaos had his services as a carrier to offer and 
sought to raise capital to invest in merchandise to convey and sell himself. One 
way of meeting their needs would have been for Menelaos to borrow money 
from Primus at interest, and for Primus to pay Menelaos to ship his goods: that 
is, two separate transactions, the first a loan, the second a contract of hire. 
What appears to have happened here is that these arrangements were rolled 
into one: instead of Primus paying freight, and Menelaos paying interest, these 
two obligations were offset so that what remained was a sum of money lent by 
Primus in return for services rendered by Menelaos. 
As Gordley has argued in relation to barter, there are sound social and 
economic reasons why the parties might prefer an ‘innominate’ bargain to one 
that conformed with the orthodox contractual categories.96 In this case, it is 
likely that both Primus and Menelaos were taking advantage of the fact that 
each happened to be able to provide the very goods and services that the other 
required. From Primus’ point of view, instead of paying away money for freight 
that could not be recouped, he could pay for the carrier’s services by putting 
capital at his disposal. From Menelaos’ perspective, he raised a greater sum 
of money than he could earn on a straightforward contract of hire, which could 
then be invested in goods to be sold on at a profit. Crucially, by combining 
these arrangements the parties avoided the need to reach consensus on the 
financial value of the loan to Menelaos and, conversely, the value of the 
shipping contract to Primus. It was enough that the bargain was mutually 
beneficial, and at the same time convenient that the cost of reaching valuations 
 
95 For example, the wreck at Dramont A (mid-first century BCE), where both an anchor and 
amphorae stoppers inscribed with the name of a certain Sex. Arrius have been recovered, 
along with amphora stoppers bearing the names of other traders: on which, supra, 26 et 
seq. and 56. 
96 James Gordley, ‘In Defense of Roman Contract Law’, in Comparative Contract Law, ed. Pier 
Giuseppe Monateri (Cheltenham and Northampton, MA.: Edward Elgar, 2017), 23–26. 
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could be avoided. In the uncertain environment of maritime trade, it may also 
have been attractive that neither party could enforce the agreement until they 
had made performance themselves. 
 
Fig. 6: Hypothetical structure of the loan documented in TPSulp. 78. 
Finally, the receipt of a quid pro quo in place of interest is not wholly without 
precedent elsewhere in the sources. Under the arrangement called 
antichresis, the creditor lent money on security of a res and, having taken 
possession, agreed to receive the fruits of the property in place of interest.97 
In a papyrus recovered at Oxyrhynchus dating to 44 CE, for example, a certain 
Lucius – apparently a Roman citizen – borrowed 400 drachmas for a period of 
13(?) years from a lady, Didyme, who in return received ‘ἀντὶ τῶν τούτων 
τόκων’ the right to live in the borrower’s house.98 Two imperial constitutions, 
issued in the first half of the third century CE by the emperors Philip and 
Alexander Severus respectively, also indicate that the fruits received under 
such an agreement would not be deemed to exceed the legal limit on the rate 
of interest: in the case of rental income, because its receipt was subject to 
uncertainty; and in the event that the creditor inhabited the property and a 
higher rental income could have been obtained, because the creditor was 
 
97 D.20.1.11.1 (Marcian. l. s. ad form. hypoth.); D.20.2.8 (Paul. 2 sent.). 
98 P. Fouad. 44; also, P. Cairo Masp. III 67.309 (6th century CE), in which part of the loan bore 
ordinary interest, the remainder being ἀτοχί on the understanding that the creditor had the 
right to live in the borrower’s house. Pestman also identified three loans in which the debtor 
appears to have been expected to provide some quid pro quo in place of interest: Stud. 
Pal. 4, p. 117 (2nd century CE); BGU III 725 (7th century CE); and P. Mon. 3 (6th century 
CE) (though the latter two involve arrangements between husbands and wives): ‘Loans’, 
24–25, note 69.  
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deemed to be living in the property at a low rent.99 Though not an exact parallel 
with our case, antichresis arrangements show that it was not unusual for 
lenders and borrowers to find innovative ways to configure their relationships 
to their mutual benefit. 
To sum up, the question concerning the identity of the transaction documented 
in TPSulp. 78 has frequently been framed as an alternative between, as Wolf 
put it, ein Seedarlehen oder Seefrachtvertrag. From the perspective of Nov. 
106, there is no reason why it should not have combined elements of both: 
Menelaos received the 1000 denarii as a loan and offered his services as a 
carrier either wholly or partly in the place of the yield. This is consistent with 
the view of both Gofas and Jakab, that (maritime) loan agreements likely often 
featured as part of more wide-ranging arrangements, such as contracts for 
warehousing and freight.100 
D.22.2.5 (Scaev. 6 resp.): 
[pr.] Periculi pretium est et si condicione quamvis poenali non exsistente 
recepturus sis quod dederis et insuper aliquid praeter pecuniam, si modo 
in <aleae> speciem non cadat: veluti ea, ex quibus <condictiones> nasci 
solent, ut "si <non> manumittas", "si non illud facias", "si non convaluero" 
et cetera. nec dubitabis, si piscatori erogaturo in apparatum plurimum 
pecuniae dederim, ut, si cepisset, redderet, et athletae, unde se exhiberet 
exerceretque, ut, si vicisset, redderet. [1] In his autem omnibus et pactum 
sine stipulatione ad augendam obligationem prodest. 
This text will be considered in more detail below.101 For the purpose of this 
section, I wish only to focus on the structure of the arrangements described in 
the second half of the principium; namely, those involving the fisherman and 
the athlete. In the first, a fisherman is given money to purchase equipment on 
condition that if he makes a catch he will repay it. In the second, a sponsor 
funds an athlete’s training, subject to the condition that the athlete will only 
repay the money if he is victorious. It is almost certain that these examples are 
authentic Scaevola, not least because the language used by the author to 
 
99 C.4.32.17 (Philipp. A. et Philipp. C. Aurelio Euxeno); C.4.32.14 (Alex. A. Aurelio Arcasiani). 
100 Gofas, ‘Encore une fois’, 261; Éva Jakab, ‘Horrea, sûretés et commerce maritime dans les 
archives des Sulpicii’, in Inter cives necnon peregrinos: Essays in Honour of Boudewijn 
Sirks, ed. Jan Hallebeek et al. (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2014), 338. 
101 Infra, 105 et seq. 
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describe the activities of the athlete is almost identical to that used by Quintilian 
on the same subject.102 Both these arrangements are analogous to 
agreements involving pecunia traiecticia: a person had been given money to 
fund an enterprise, on condition that he would be obliged to make a return if 
the venture was successful. 
As with several of the other loans we have seen those given to the fisherman 
and the athlete appear to be gratuitous. In light of the loan structures examined 
above, however, there are two likely possibilities. In the first place, it is possible 
that the yield was capitalised and therefore concealed in the obligation to pay 
the principal. The other possibility, which has been suggested by Arangio-Ruiz, 
is that the fisherman and the athlete provided the creditor with a quid pro quo, 
either wholly or partly in place of the yield.103 In my view, this is the more likely 
structure for the examples given here. As Marzano has shown, there is ample 
evidence for fishing activity on a substantial scale in the Roman world. 
Moreover, the significant capital investment required to finance the purchase 
of nets, traps, and other equipment was probably provided by wealthy 
individuals.104 Though we do not have any direct evidence of how these 
arrangements were structured, it is certainly possible that, rather than 
demanding a fixed yield on the sum lent, the creditor might have agreed, for 
example, to share in the catch or the profits made from any fish that were sold. 
Turning to the athlete, again it appears likely that a quid pro quo was involved. 
As Jakab has suggested, it was common in the Hellenic and Roman period for 
 
102 Quint. Inst. 12.10. According to Noodt, exhibere in this context is synonymous with alere, 
i.e., to nourish oneself with a healthy diet: De foenore et usuris libri tres: in quibus multa 
juris civilis, aliorumque veterum scriptorum loca, aut illustrantur aut emendantur 
(Lugdunum Batavorum: Fredericum Haaring, 1698), II.7. On the financing of sport and its 
legal implications in ancient Rome, Andreas Wacke, ‘Athleten als Darlehensnehmer nach 
römischen Recht’, SDHI 44 (1978): 439–52; Eugenia Franciosi, ‘Gloriae et virtutis causa: 
status sociale e giuridico degli atleti nel mondo romano’, in Studi per Giovanni Nicosia, vol. 
3 (Milan: Giuffrè, 2007), 437–68; and Éva Jakab, ‘Sponsoren und Athleten im römischen 
Recht: Das “Ausbildungsdarlehen” der Athleten?’, in Sport und Recht in der Antike, ed. 
Kaja Harter-Uibopou and Thomas Kruse (Vienna: Holzhausen Verlag, 2014), 249–73. 
103 Arangio-Ruiz, Lineamenti, 85. 
104 Annalisa Marzano, Harvesting the Sea: The Exploitation of Marine Resources in the Roman 
Mediterranean (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 266; and on fishing 
equipment, Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen, ‘Nets, Boats and Fishing in the Roman World’, 
Classica et Mediaevalia: Revue Danoise de Philologie et d’histoire 53 (2002): 215–33. 
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wealthy citizens to sponsor athletes in competitions and events.105 In return for 
the loan, the athlete performed under the name of his (or her) sponsor, whose 
association with a winning competitor enhanced their social prestige. Perhaps 
in some cases the sponsor might also have claimed a share of the winnings. 
Summary of 3.1.1.2: 
It is my submission that all or part of the yield in SB III 7169 is likely to have 
been offered in the form of a quid pro quo. It is also my view that the 
arrangement documented in TPSulp. 78 involved the replacement, either 
whole or in part, of a financial yield by the provision of services. Finally, there 
are good reasons to believe that the loans described by Q. Cervidius Scaevola 
in D.22.2.5 contained an element of quid pro quo. In sum, these arrangements 
are consistent with the first maritime loan structure spoken to by the naukleroi 
in Nov. 106: i.e., of money lent in return for the combination of a financial yield 
and the provision of a quid pro quo. This second type of loan demonstrates a 
high degree of integration between financing arrangements and the other 
relationships that were essential to the conduct of a maritime enterprise. 
3.1.2 Conclusion. 
In Part I, I argued that Nov. 106 is good evidence for the proposition that there 
were customarily two ways structuring maritime loan agreements during the 
Roman period. According to one method, the money was lent at the creditor’s 
risk in return for a fixed yield, typically of one-eighth of the sum lent. According 
to the other method, part of the financial yield was forgone in favour of a quid 
pro quo, which ordinarily consisted of services offered by the carrier in addition 
to his payment of duties on the lender’s goods. 
In Part II, I examined the typical structure of maritime loans in which the yield 
was purely financial. In SB VI 9571 (second century CE), I argued that a 
maritime loan for 7 talents had been given on the expectation of a yield of 
almost precisely one-eighth of the principal (i.e., 5,160 drachmas). I also 
suggested, as appears to have been the case in the Sulpician loans (first 
 
105 Jakab, ‘Sponsoren und Athleten’, 267. 
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century CE), that the yield was ‘capitalised’ to create a single obligation on the 
part of the borrower to return the whole amount of the debt. Turning to the 
juristic sources, I relied upon Verboven’s hypothesis to argue that this was 
sometimes achieved by the method of paying the yield upfront (i.e., as ‘future 
interest’). I then demonstrated that there is evidence to suggest that this was 
also the method used in the so-called Callimachus loan (second century CE). 
In Part III, I examined the structure of (maritime) loans in which all or part of 
the yield was demanded in the form of a quid pro quo. In SB III 7169 (Ptolemaic 
Alexandria, second century BCE), I set out the reasons for believing that the 
yield at least partly consisted of either a share in the profits of the enterprise 
and/ or the provision of services by the borrowers. Again, in TPSulp. 78 I 
argued that the carrier (Menelaos) offered his services either wholly or partly 
in place of the financial yield. Finally, in D.22.2.5 I suggested that the 
analogous cases of the fisherman and the athlete were probably also 
examples of loans given in return for a quid pro quo. 
I conclude this section with an observation made by Arangio-Ruiz in 1928. 
Shortly after the publication of SB III 7169 by Wilcken, the jurist wrote that 
Archippos’ loan was:106 
…the paradigm of a second type of contract, practiced equally by the 
navigators of the Mediterranean basin and received, together with the 
more usual type, into the ius gentium of the Romans. If some fortunate 
Egyptian discovery, or – better yet – one made in the marvellous Vesuvian 
region… sheds new light on the maritime law of the ancients, we will be 
able to mark in more precise and lasting terms the structure of the 
business arrangements of which the Alexandrian papyrus [SB III 7169] 
and the passage authored by Scaevola [D.22.2.5] give us some glimpses. 
Arangio-Ruiz died in 1964, shortly after the discovery of the archive of the 
Sulpicii. It is my submission that the great Italian glimpsed what, I suggest, can 
now be more firmly established in light of TPSulp. 78: that there were 
customarily two ways of structuring a maritime loan, just as the 
Constantinopolitan naukleroi attested. 
 
106 Arangio-Ruiz, Lineamenti, 85. 
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Section 3.2: Pecunia traiecticia: The Legal Sources. 
From the survey of the evidence conducted in the last section, it is apparent 
that contracts involving loans of travelling money typically possessed some or 
all of the following features: 
i) One party putting loan capital at the disposal of another; 
ii) A return that was either financial, a quid pro quo, or a combination of 
both; 
iii) If all or part of the return was financial, a yield that was capitalised or 
expressed as a stipulation (or pact) for interest. Equally, if the return was 
a quid pro quo, the terms of performance could be set out in the freight 
contract; 
iv) A condition that repayment of the whole debt was contingent upon the 
safe arrival of the ship at its destination. If this was agreed, it followed 
that: a) the due date was uncertain, so that the yield would be calculated 
as a fixed proportion of the sum lent; and b) the risk would be shouldered 
by the lender for the duration of the voyage; 
v) An itinerary with instructions for the borrower to perform either a single or 
return trip. There might also be time limits within which he was expected 
to complete certain legs of the journey; 
vi) A stipulation for the services of the lender’s representative, which usually 
included a penalty for delayed repayment; and, 
vii) Security over the cargo, and possibly also over the ship or landed 
property. 
Owing to Pontoriero’s recent and thorough study of the subject, a complete 
exegesis of all the legal sources bearing upon loans of pecunia traiecticia will 
not be attempted here.107 Rather, the aim of this section will be limited to an 
analysis of the juristic treatment of penalties and interest in light of the 
structures argued for above. 
 
 
107 Pontoriero, Il prestito marittimo. 
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3.2.1 Penalties: Function, Structure, and Operation. 
In general, the Republican and high-classical sources focussed on questions 
arising in connection with stipulations and the debtor’s default (i.e., questions 
of enforcement).108 Both Labeo and Africanus state that it was usual (uti solet/ 
uti adsolet) for the debtor to promise a penalty in connection with a maritime 
loan.109 According to the latter, the penalty was normally introduced into the 
stipulation for the services of the lender’s representative for failing to perform 
by a certain date. This, as it happens, is how the (crypto-)penalty was framed 
in Scaevola’s account of the loan agreement in D.45.1.122.1: if Callimachus 
failed to leave Brindisi by 13 September he promised to repay the whole 
amount of the debt early and pay for Eros to take the money to Rome.110 
So far as the opinions of the earlier jurists have survived, they concentrated 
on the circumstances in which the debtor would be held in default. Ulpian, for 
example, reported an opinion of Servius that the creditor would be refused an 
action for the payment of a penalty if it was his fault that repayment of the loan 
was not accepted within the prescribed time.111 Two opinions attributed to 
Labeo also bear on the matter.112 In the first, the Augustan jurist considered 
the legal mechanisms by which a debtor could be formally placed in mora, after 
 
108 Arnaldo Biscardi, ‘La double configuration de la clause pénale en droit romain’, in De iustitia 
et iure. Festgabe für Ulrich von Lübtow zum 80. Geburtstag, ed. Manfred Harder and Georg 
Thielmann (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980), 261. 
109 D.22.2.9 (Lab. 5 pith. a Paulo epit.); D.44.7.23 (Afr. 7 quaest.). 
110 D.45.1.122.1 (Scaev. 28 dig.); also D.22.2.4.1 (Pap. 3 resp.). 
111 D.22.2.8 (Ulp. 77 ad ed.); also, D.4.8.40 (Pomp. 11 ex var. lect.), which contains a general 
restatement of the rule. On both texts, David Daube, ‘Condition Prevented from 
Materializing’, TvR 28 (1960): 280; Salvatore Riccobono Jr., ‘Profilo storico della dottrina 
della mora nel diritto romano’, AUPA 29 (1962): 154–62; Alan Watson, The Law of 
Obligations in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 2; Amalia 
Sicari, Pena convenzionale e responsabilità (Bari: Cacucci, 2001), 337–45; Massimo 
Miglietta, ‘Servius respondit’. Studi intorno a metodo e interpretazione nella scuola giuridica 
serviana. Prolegomena I (Trento: Universita degli Studi di Trento, 2010), 449–50; 
Pontoriero, Il prestito marittimo, 107–8. 
112 D.22.2.9 (Lab. 5 pith. a Paulo epit.); also, D.22.2.2 (Pomp. 3 ex Plaut.). Some scholars 
have argued that the texts originally belonged to the same passage: Arnaldo Biscardi, ‘La 
struttura classica del “fenus nauticum”’, in Studi in memoria di Aldo Albertoni, ed. Pietro 
Ciapessoni, vol. 2 (Padua: CEDAM, 1937), 359; also, Actio pecuniae traiecticiae, 30–31, 
note 1; Purpura, ‘Ricerche’, 312; Vincenzo Giuffrè, ‘“Faenus” e intraprese commerciali’, 
Seminarios complutenses de derecho romano 7 (1995): 152 and note 49; though cf. Sicari, 
Pena convenzionale e responsabilità, 251 and 268, note 69; and Jan Dirk Harke, Mora 
debitoris und mora creditoris im klassischen römischen Recht (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
2005), 53–54, note 11. 
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which time he would be liable to pay all the stipulated penalties and costs.113 
Ordinarily, the creditor would be able to serve notice (an interpellatio) on the 
debtor that (notwithstanding any customary grace period) his time for 
repayment had expired. If, however, there was no one to whom notice could 
be served (for example, if the borrower was still at sea after the term of the 
loan had passed), it was Labeo’s view that a testatio – i.e., a ceremony 
performed in front of witnesses – would have the same legal effect. It was also 
his ‘plausible view’ that even if no one was alive who owed the money at the 
time agreed for its repayment, the penalty would fall due as if there was an heir 
(ac si fuisset heres debitoris).114 The interpretation of this ‘fiction’ depends 
upon whether Labeo considered the heriditas to be vacans or iacens. If, as 
Pontoriero has observed, the majority view that the inheritance should be 
interpreted as iacens is correct, then the fiction was that the debtor’s heir had 
already accepted the inheritance on the date the loan fell due, which meant 
that the penalty could run from that time.115 
How were these penalties structured? The starting point here is that in several 
juristic texts penal stipulations made in connection with loans of pecunia 
traiecticia are considered alongside penalties promised by the parties to an 
arbitration for failure to abide by the award.116 As Biscardi pointed out, this 
indicates that the stipulatio poenae traiecticiae pecuniae causa was typically – 
to use the modern terminology – a non-genuine, or independent, penalty, like 
its counterpart the poena ex compromisso.117 In short, this meant that the 
obligation it generated was not in any way connected to the principal obligation 
 
113 D.22.2.2 (Pomp. 3 ex Plaut.): on which, Heinrich Siber, ‘Interpellatio und Mora’, ZSS 29 
(1908): 98–99; Hans Ankum, ‘Some Aspects of Maritime Loans in Old-Greek and in Roman 
Law’, in Timai Iōannou Triantaphyllopoulou (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoula, 2000), 304; 
Pontoriero, Il prestito marittimo, 119–21. Cf. Bas. 53.5.2, in which the rule is restated. 
114 D.22.2.9 (Lab. 5 pith. a Paulo epit.). For a similar line of reasoning, D.4.8.27.1 (Ulp. 13 ad 
ed.): on which, Peter Stein, ‘Roman Arbitration: An English Perspective’, Israel Law Review 
29 (1995): 223–24. 
115 On the whole question, Pontoriero, Il prestito marittimo, 115–19; cf. Sicari, Pena 
convenzionale e responsabilità, 254–55. 
116 D.3.5.12 (Paul. 9 ad ed.); D.15.1.3.8 (Ulp. 29 ad ed.); D.44.7.23 (Afr. 7 quaest.). 
117 Biscardi, ‘La double configuration’, 263. 
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of the debtor to perform. Paul, for example, described the operation of 
independent penalties as follows:118 
Si ita stipulatus sim: ‘si fundum non dederis, centum dare spondes?’ sola 
centum in stipulatione sunt, in exsolutione fundus. 
If a person promised to pay 100 if he did not transfer a fundus, only the penalty 
was owed, there being no obligation to perform the act upon which the penalty 
was conditional. If, however, the debtor did hand over the estate, this would 
be sufficient to discharge the obligation to pay the penalty. With this in mind, 
Biscardi suggested that penal stipulations in loans of pecunia traiecticia may 
have taken the following form:119 
si ad diem pecunia, ut inter eos convenit, salva nave soluta non erit, 
sestertium tot milia poenae nomine dari stipulatus est L. Titius promisit C. 
Seius. 
The question that arises concerns the functions that these penalties served in 
relation to each of the loan structures argued for above. In general, as 
Zimmermann has outlined, penal stipulations served three main functions.120 
First, they provided for the straightforward assessment of damages. This was 
especially important where the principal obligation was for the debtor to do 
something for the creditor (facere) or to hand over certa res. In both these 
cases the assessment of damages – which had to be pecuniary – was at the 
judge’s discretion. The existence of a penal clause, however, established the 
value of performance and therefore obviated the need to adduce evidence, 
enabling the creditor to recover more safely, swiftly, and completely. 
The second main function of penal stipulations was to place the debtor in 
terrorem, and so to create an incentive for him to perform according to the 
terms of the agreement. Recalling the Callimachus loan, for instance, the 
borrower’s promise to pay back the whole debt early if he failed to leave 
Brindisi by a certain date was partly intended to incentivise him to do so. 
 
118 D.44.7.44.5 (Paul. 74 ad ed.). On the distinction between genuine and non-genuine 
penalties, Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Stipulatio Poenae’, South African Law Journal 104, no. 
3 (1987): 401–6; also, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 
(Cape Town: Juta, 1990), 98–102. 
119 Biscardi, ‘La double configuration’, 262. 
120 Zimmermann, ‘Stipulatio Poenae’, 399–401; The Law of Obligations, 95–97. 
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Finally, the third main function was to provide for the indirect enforcement of 
unenforceable acts. The problem here was that, owing to the omnia 
condemnatio pecunia rule, it was not possible to condemn the defender if the 
value of his performance to the pursuer was not financially quantifiable. It was 
therefore common for the person seeking to secure the other party’s 
performance to circumvent this issue by stipulating for a penalty that specified 
its value in pecuniary terms. Q. Cervidius Scaevola, in the fragment 
immediately following the Callimachus loan, gave an example of stipulations 
of this kind: 
D.45.1.122.2 (Scaev. 28 dig.): 
Flavius Hermes hominem Stichum manumissionis causa donavit et ita de 
eo stipulatus est: "si hominem Stichum, de quo agitur, quem hac die tibi 
donationis causa manumissionisque dedi, a te heredeque tuo 
manumissus vindictaque liberatus non erit, quod dolo malo meo non fiat, 
poenae nomine quinquaginta dari stipulatus est Flavius Hermes, 
spopondit Claudius". quaero, an Flavius Hermes Claudium de libertate 
Stichi convenire potest. respondit nihil proponi, cur non potest… 
In this case, Scaevola described how a certain Flavius Hermes had gifted a 
slave to Claudius for the purpose of manumission and had stipulated for a 
penalty of fifty if he or his heirs failed to manumit. When asked about the 
enforceability of the stipulation, Scaevola apparently responded that there was 
nothing in the facts to suggest that Flavius Hermes could not collect the penalty 
if Claudius (or his heirs) neglected to free the slave.121 
Exegesis of D.22.2.5 (Scaev. 6 resp.): 
The operation of penal stipulations performing this third function was further 
explored by Scaevola in a text included by the compilers in the Digest title on 
faenus nauticum: 
[pr.] Periculi pretium est et si condicione quamvis poenali non exsistente 
recepturus sis quod dederis et insuper aliquid praeter pecuniam, si modo 
 
121 This response was considered interpolated by Michel Alliot: ‘D., XLV, 1, 122, § 2, et la date 
des Digesta de Cervidius Scævola’, RHD 30 (1953): 561–62; cf. Rolf Knütel, Stipulatio 




in <aleae>122 speciem non cadat: veluti ea, ex quibus <condictiones>123 
nasci solent, ut ‘si <non>124 manumittas’, ‘si non illud facias’, ‘si non 
convaluero’ et cetera. nec dubitabis, si piscatori erogaturo in apparatum 
plurimum pecuniae dederim, ut, si cepisset, redderet, et athletae, unde se 
exhiberet exerceretque, ut, si vicisset, redderet. [1] In his autem omnibus 
et pactum sine stipulatione ad augendam obligationem prodest. 
Before anything can be said about this text at all, it will be evident from the 
reproduction given above that it suffers from considerable uncertainty about its 
form.125 I have therefore indicated those words on the identity of which the 
manuscript tradition differs, notwithstanding that one of the emendations 
depends upon a suggestion made by Cujas on the basis of a manuscript now 
lost.126 To compound this uncertainty, the text has been considered heavily 
interpolated, and it is possible that it is not in its original form.127 This may be 
due not only to interventions made by the compilers, but also by postclassical 
editors of the text. According to Schulz, Scaevola’s responsa were first edited 
and published in the third century CE, probably under the title digesta, only to 
be abridged again in the fourth century and published as the responsorum libri 
vi.128 It therefore makes little difference whether a text was attributed by the 
compilers to Scaevola’s digesta or responsa: both were edited collections of 
 
122 aleae] FVa, alie Pa, aliam PbVbU: μόνον μέντοι μὴ ἐπὶ ϰόττῳ B. 
123 condictiones] ἐξ ὧν ἁρμόξει condicticios B, condiciones F.: following Pontoriero, Il prestito 
marittimo, 81–82 and notes 25-27. Noodt observed that the subject of nasci is more likely 
to be a condictio than a condicio: De foenore et usuris libri tres, 134. Litewski suggested 
that condiciones was a copyist’s error: ‘Römisches Seedarlehen’, IURA 24 (1973): 161, 
note 224. This may be correct in light of D.39.6.35.3 (Paul. 6 ad l. Iul. et Pap.), for which 
the Florentine ms. also has condicio where Mommsen prefers condictio. 
124 si non manumittas] Cuiacius: ἵνα μὴ ἐλεγθερώσῃς B, si manumittas libri nostri. 
125 The Dutch jurist Cornelis van Eck (1662-1732) included the text in his doctoral work De 
septem damnatis legibus Pandectarum seu crucibus jurisconsultorum: on which, G. C. J. 
J. Van den Bergh, Die holländische elegante Schule: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte von 
Humanismus und Rechtswissenschaft in den Niederlanden 1500-1800 (Frankfurt: 
Klostermann, 2002), 178–79. 
126 On this, Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 99. 
127 Salvatore Riccobono, ‘Stipulatio ed instrumentum nel Diritto giustinianeo’, ZSS 43 (1922): 
358; also, Corso di diritto romano: stipulationes, contractus, pacta (Milan: Giuffrè, 1935), 
411–13; Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 107; Arangio-Ruiz, Lineamenti, 85, note 2; Fritz 
Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassischen römischen Recht (Münster: Böhlau, 
1952), 263. Litewski maintained the examples as genuine, while suggesting that they were 
originally placed in a different context: ‘Römisches Seedarlehen’, 163. 
128 Fritz Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 
232–33; also, ‘Überlieferungsgeschichte der Responsa des Cervidius Scaevola’, in 




replies given, but not published, by the jurist during the second century CE. 
Finally, to complicate matters yet further, several scholars have argued that 
the fragment was probably derived from a book of the Scaevola’s quaestiones, 
and that its attribution to his responsa was an error.129 However, the attribution 
is probably correct, not least on account of its palingenetic environment. 
Among the four other excerpts from the same book grouped by Lenel, some 
address the common theme of financial transactions, of which a few are 
directly concerned with either conditions or pacts.130 
In light of all this, the most effective way to proceed is to treat the text as it 
stands, and to leave any conclusions about its likely classical content to the 
end. This is best achieved by treating the passage in parts: 
Periculi pretium est… et cetera… 
The construction periculi pretium est is a possessive genitive, so that the 
phrase literally translates as ‘the price is of the risk’, or, to rephrase, ‘the risk 
has a price’. Two questions arise: first, what is the ‘risk’? And second, what is 
the ‘price’? On the first point, as MacCormack has shown, the word ‘periculum’ 
generally carries the meaning of ‘chance of loss’ in Roman juristic writing.131 
Here, it emerges that the chance of loss is an inherent feature of the kind of 
transactions under discussion. These, says Scaevola, are those from which 
condictiones usually arise, which are characterised by the inclusion of 
conditions such as ‘if you do not manumit’, ‘if you do not do that’, and ‘if I do 
not get well’. 
To take the first example, the expression ‘ut… manumittas’ appears in fifteen 
different texts in the Digest.132 According to Paul, an agreement to manumit a 
 
129 Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 98, note 1 and 107-8; also, Julia Maria Gokel, 
Sprachliche Indizien für inneres System bei Q. Cervidius Scaevola (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 2014), 305–6. 
130 Otto Lenel, Palingenesia iuris civilis, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1889), 315–16, nos. 310-
14. D.35.2.27 (Scaev. 6 resp.) and D.46.1.63 (Scaev. 6 resp.) are concerned with pacts 
and conditions: Jakab, ‘Sponsoren und Athleten’, 261–62. 
131 Geoffrey MacCormack, ‘Periculum’, ZSS 96 (1979): 129–72; also, ‘Further on “Periculum”’, 
BIDR 82 (1979): 11–37. 
132 In the titles de pactis – D.2.14.7.2 (Ulp. 4 ad ed.); de condictione causa data causa non 
secuta – D.12.4.3.1, 2, and 3 (Ulp. 26 ad ed.); de praescriptis verbis et in factum actionibus 
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slave could not give rise to a locatio conductio, and instead fell to be classified 
as a transaction of the kind ‘do ut facias’ (‘I give so that you may do’).133 The 
second example – ‘if you do not do that’ – is simply a generalisation of the first. 
If we interpret the third – ‘if I do not get well’ – as consistent with the two 
preceding examples, then the arrangement seems to be one in which a person 
had agreed to help another recover from ill health.134 If the sick person did not 
get better, then the helper would be obliged to pay a penalty. 
The orthodox position at civil law was that such an agreement was not directly 
enforceable because the pursuer’s interesse in the debtor’s performance was 
unquantifiable.135 In other words, these were the kinds of agreements for which 
penal stipulations serving the third of Zimmermann’s functions were 
indispensable. It gradually came to be recognised, however, that agreements 
that fell outside the boundaries of the contractual system were nevertheless 
enforceable in their own right.136 A glance across the fifteen texts in which 
agreements to manumit are discussed indicates that there is, superficially at 
least, a connection between conditions of the kind ‘ut… manumittas’ and 
recovery by means of both the condictio ob rem dati and the agere praescriptis 
verbis.137 Indeed, it is clear from the texts in book 12 of the Digest that an 
agreement in which one person paid another to manumit a slave would be a 
 
– D.19.5.5.2 (Paul. 5 quaest.) and D.19.5.7 (Pap. 2 quaest.); and de nautico faenore – 
D.22.2.5 (Scaev. 6 resp.): Jakab, ‘Sponsoren und Athleten’, 264. 
133 D.19.5.5.2 (Paul. 5 quaest.). Schwarz alleged that the text was probably transmitted in a 
revised form: Condictio, 139; cf. Geoffrey MacCormack, ‘Contractual Theory and the 
Innominate Contracts’, SDHI 51 (1985): 146. Lenel placed the text under the proposed 
heading ‘Empti venditi’ and immediately after D.2.14.43 (Paul. 5 quaest.), which introduces 
the problem of contracts where the role of the parties is not instantly apparent: Palingenesia 
iuris civilis, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1889), 1194–95, no. 1322. 
134 Jacques Cujas, Praeclarissimi, observationum et emendationum libri XXVIII: quibus multa 
in Iure corrupta et non intellecta restituuntur (Coloniae Agrippinae: Gymnicus, 1598), 386. 
Cf. Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 101; Litewski, ‘Römisches Seedarlehen’, 162; 
Biscardi, Actio pecuniae traiecticiae, 88; Pontoriero, Il prestito marittimo, 86. 
135 Zimmermann, ‘Stipulatio Poenae’, 401–2. 
136 For the course of this development, Roberto Fiori, ‘Rise and Fall of the Specificity of 
Contracts’, in Nova Ratione: Change of Paradigms in Roman Law, ed. Adriaan J. B. Sirks 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2014), 46–48. 
137 According to Schwarz, the expressions causa data causa non secuta and ob causam 
datorum, which are used for the titles of D.12.4 and C.4.6 respectively, are Justinianic. The 
classical jurists used expressions such as ‘ob rem dare’, ‘dare ob causam’, and condictio 
‘re non secuta’: Condictio, 117. 
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valid ground for bringing the condictio ob rem dati.138 Papinian clarified when 
each of these actions might be used, again in the context of a payment made 
for the manumission of a slave.139 In these circumstances, the agere 
praescriptis verbis would be appropriate if the pursuer wished to recover his 
interesse (i.e., damages to the extent of his interest in the other party’s 
performance); the condictio when the objective was simply to recover the 
original object or payment.140 
The problem settled upon by Scaevola was therefore the relationship between 
the agere praescriptis verbis and any penalties that had been agreed upon by 
the parties. His reply is best set against the backdrop of another text, in which 
Julian reported an opinion of Urseius Ferox (first century CE): 
D.19.1.28 (Iul. 3 ad Urs. Ferocem): 
Praedia mihi vendidisti et convenit, ut aliquid facerem: quod si non 
fecissem, poenam promisi. respondit: venditor antequam poenam ex 
stipulatu petat, ex vendito agere potest: si consecutus fuerit, quantum 
poenae nomine stipulatus esset, agentem ex stipulatu doli mali exceptio 
summovebit: si ex stipulatu poenam consecutus fueris, ipso iure ex 
vendito agere non poteris nisi in id, quod pluris eius interfuerit id fieri. 
Although the text has frequently been assailed, I agree with Thomas that its 
substance is authentic.141 The facts were that land had been sold in return for 
the buyer’s undertaking to perform some act (aliquid facere), failing which he 
had promised to pay a penalty (quod si… poenam promisi). According to 
Julian, Urseius Ferox held that the seller could proceed both ex stipulatu (for 
the penalty) and ex vendito.142 If, inter alia, he proceeded ex stipulatu first, he 
was only entitled to recover ex vendito to the extent that his interesse 
 
138 D.12.1.19 pr. (Iul. 10 dig.); D.12.4.1 pr. (Ulp. 26 ad ed.); D.12.4.3.2-4 (Ulp. 26 ad ed.); 
D.12.4.5.1-4 (Ulp. 2 disp.): on which, Detlef Liebs, ‘Bereicherungsanspruch wegen 
Mißerfolgs und Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage’, JuristenZeitung 33, no. 21 (1978): 698; 
also, Geoffrey MacCormack, ‘The condictio causa data causa non secuta’, in The Civil Law 
Tradition in Scotland, ed. Robin Evans-Jones (Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1995), 253–
76. 
139 D.19.5.7 (Pap. 2 quaest.). 
140 MacCormack, ‘Condictio causa data’, 254; Robin Evans-Jones, ‘The Claim to Recover what 
was Transferred for a Lawful Purpose Outwith Contract (condictio causa data causa non 
secuta)’, Acta Juridica, 1997, 139, note 2. 
141 J. A. C. Thomas, ‘Concurrence of Actions with Actio Pro Socio’, Irish Jurist 7 (1972): 153. 
142 David Daube, ‘Certainty of Price’, in Studies in the Roman Law of Sale, ed. David Daube 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 33–34. 
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exceeded the sum already obtained. In other words, as Mackintosh observed, 
the penalty was not considered conclusive of the measure of damages, and 
any deficiency in the amount recovered could be sought by resorting to the 
bonae fidei iudicium.143 
In this light, Scaevola’s response was as follows. The periculum to which he 
referred was precisely the chance of loss inherent to agreements do ut facias; 
sc., that the person who gave would not be able to enforce performance 
because he could not establish the extent of his pecuniary interest. 
Correspondingly, the pretium was the penalty that the other party typically 
promised to pay if he failed to perform. Scaevola’s opinion was therefore that: 
where the risk (i.e., of the debtor’s non-performance) had a price (i.e., a penalty 
attached), and provided the agreement was not aleatory (and therefore contra 
legem), the person who gave could recover what he had given as well as his 
interesse, notwithstanding the (non-)fulfilment of any penal condition.144 In 
other words, Scaevola considered the applicability of the condictio ob rem dati 
and agere praesciptis verbis to be independent of the fulfilment or otherwise 
of any connected penalties, in the same way that Urseius Ferox considered 
the actio venditi to lie independently from the actio ex stipulatu. 
nec dubitabis… redderet. 
The connection of the reply to loans of pecunia traiecticia emerges from the 
second part of the principium. The words ‘nec dubitabis’ connect this section 
with the last and indicate that the examples involving the fisherman and the 
athlete are also arrangements from which condictiones arise.145 In the first, a 
fisherman is given money to purchase equipment on condition that if he makes 
a catch he will repay it. In the second, a sponsor funds an athlete’s training, 
 
143 James Mackintosh, The Roman Law of Sale (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1892), 198–99. 
144 Paul reports that aleatory agreements had been forbidden by a senatusconsultum: 
D.11.5.2.1 (Paul. 19 ad ed.). For a short definition, Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary 
of Roman Law (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1953), 359, s.v. ‘alea’. 
145 Gokel, Sprachliche Indizien, 317, note 1412. For debates concerning the authenticity of the 
expression ‘nec dubitabis’ and the classicity of the whole section, Litewski, ‘Römisches 
Seedarlehen’, 163–64, note 236. Riccobono considered nec dubitabis to be interpolated 
for the reason that the classical jurists seldom address the reader in the second person 
singular: ‘Stipulatio ed instrumentum’, 358. 
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subject to the condition that the athlete will only repay the money if he is 
victorious. Both these arrangements are analogous to agreements involving 
pecunia traiecticia: a person had been given money to fund an enterprise, on 
condition that he would be obliged to make a return if the venture was 
successful. 
These arrangements are a development on those addressed in the first part of 
the passage. At base, they are agreements do ut facias insofar as they involve 
money being transferred on the expectation that the debtor will apply it to an 
agreed purpose (e.g., buying fishing equipment). In these examples, however, 
the money was intended as a loan, the return of which was conditional on the 
success of the enterprise. This raised the problem that, because the debtor’s 
obligation to repay was contingent upon the occurrence of an uncertain event, 
it was not possible to establish the interesse of the person giving the loan in 
the debtor’s performance. The problem that remained was therefore precisely 
the one that marked out these bargains from the start; namely, that because 
the first party’s interesse was unquantifiable the recipient’s performance could 
not be enforced, so that in the absence of a penal stipulation the lender did not 
have an effective remedy. Scaevola therefore extended the opinion put 
forward in the first part of the principium to these transactions as well by 
interpreting them as innominate contracts of the kind do ut facias. 
in his autem… obligationem prodest. 
In light of the foregoing, the final part of the fragment can be dealt with briefly. 
Here, Scaevola asserted that in all these cases a pact would be sufficient to 
add to the obligation without the need for a stipulation. In other words, if a 
person brought the agere praescriptis verbis, the intentio of which was framed 
incerta and ex fide bona,146 the amount agreed upon by way of a penalty could 
supplement the pursuer’s interesse. This was especially crucial if his interesse 
was otherwise unquantifiable, so that the penalty effectively defined the value 
of the obligation to the parties. Turning back finally to the documentary 
 
146 Lihong Zhang, Contratti innominati nel diritto romano: impostazioni di Labeone e di Aristone 
(Milan: Giuffrè, 2007), 207; Fiori, ‘Rise and Fall’, 36–37. 
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evidence, the relevance of this legal discussion is clear: neither SB VI 9571 
nor TPSulp. 78 show any evidence of a stipulation having been concluded, 
despite the parties to both transactions operating in the shadow of Roman legal 
institutions. 
3.2.2 Interest and periculum creditoris. 
One question that has attracted the attention of Romanists for some 
considerable time has been whether the assumption of the risk by the lender 
was essential to the formation of a maritime loan.147 The prevailing opinion until 
the middle of the first half of the twentieth century was that the assumption of 
the risk by the creditor was essential.148 De Martino, however, challenged this 
view, and sought to demonstrate that periculum creditoris was – in Roman law 
– incidental to the contract.149 Following De Martino, a number of authors 
offered variations of this position: Kupiszewski argued that the obligation of the 
borrower to pay interest was essential while the assumption of risk by the 
lender was not;150 Litewski, meanwhile, proposed that the sources diverge 
according to the cultural background of the jurist who authored the text.151 
Others straightforwardly agreed that the assumption of risk by the lender was 
incidental rather than essential.152 On the other hand, the majority of scholars 
have continued to assert that periculum creditoris was essential to the Roman 
maritime loan, and this has again become the dominant view.153 
 
147 For a review of the literature, Pontoriero, Il prestito marittimo, 37–38. 
148 See, e.g., Hermann Kleinschmidt, Das Foenus Nauticum und dessen Bedeutung im 
römischen Rechte (Heidelberg: J. Hörning, 1878), 23; and F. Klingmüller, ‘Fenus’, in Paulys 
Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. August F. Pauly and Georg 
Wissowa, vol. 6.2 (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1909), 2202–3. 
149 Francesco De Martino, ‘Sul foenus nauticum’, RDN 1, no. 3 (1935): 217–47; reaffirmed in 
‘Ancora sul foenus nauticum’, RDN 2, no. 4 (1936): 433–45. 
150 Henryk Kupiszewski, ‘Sul prestito marittimo nel diritto romano classico: profili sostanziali e 
processuali’, Index 3 (1972): 378. 
151 Litewski suggested that Ulpian, Cervidius Scaevola and Modestinus considered periculum 
creditoris to be essential on account of their personal connections to the eastern 
Mediterranean; whereas Paul, Papinian and Diocletian (or his chancery) did not: 
‘Römisches Seedarlehen’, 135; also, ‘Bemerkungen zum Romischen Seedarlehen’, in 
Studi in onore di Cesare Sanfilippo, vol. 4 (Milan: Giuffrè, 1983), 381–97. 
152 Vittorio De Villa, Le ‘usurae ex pacto’ nel diritto romano (Rome: Foro italiano, 1937), 105; 
Ankum, ‘Some Aspects of Maritime Loans’, 299; though cf. ‘Observations’, 62. See, also, 
Sicari, Pena convenzionale e responsabilità, 231–49. 
153 Biscardi, ‘La struttura classica’; also, Actio pecuniae traiecticiae, 119–28; Ulrich von 
Lübtow, ‘Catos Seedarlehen’, in Festschrift für Erwin Seidl zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Heinz 
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The question, however, is predicated on the idea that the Roman jurists 
conceived of the maritime loan as a contractual type, the terms of which could 
be separated out into those that were essentialia, naturalia and accidentalia 
negotii.154 It is important to acknowledge that this way of breaking down a 
contract into its elements is not classical in origin. The juristic texts – as Coing 
pointed out in relation to the law of sale, but in a way that rings true here – 
consist largely of practical rules for the decision of cases, connected by their 
association with particular edicts and formulae.155 It was the Byzantine jurists 
who, in the absence of a system based on actions, developed the concept of 
the natura contractus, which united individual rules under the umbrella of 
contractual types.156 Moreover, the demarcation of rules according to whether 
they were essential, natural, or incidental to a particular contract was the work 
of the glossators and commentators during the medieval period.157 They freely 
adapted the Aristotelian distinction between those features of an object which 
were essentiale, proprium (or naturale), and accidens into a legal context.158 
The question posed by the scholarship is therefore anachronistic; and it is no 
surprise that, after the best part of a century, the texts remain irreconcilable, 
just as the views of scholars on opposing sides of the debate. 
 
Hübner, Ernst Klingmüller, and Andreas Wacke (Cologne: Hanstein, 1975), 106; Amelia 
Castresana Herrero, El préstamo marítimo griego y la pecunia traiecticia romana 
(Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1982), 69–90; Purpura, ‘Ricerche’, 194 
and 281–318; Giuffrè, ‘Faenus’, 136, note 10 and 153–54; José Luis Zamora Manzano, 
‘Algunas notas en relación a los antecedentes romanos del seguro marítimo como 
desviación de la «pecunia traiecticia»’, BIDR 39 (1997): 673; Christoph Krampe, ‘Fenus 
nauticum’, in Der neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike, ed. Hubert Cancik, Helmuth 
Schneider, and August F. Pauly, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1998), 471; Schuster, Das 
Seedarlehen, 188; Pontoriero, Il prestito marittimo, 31 and 37–67. 
154 Essential terms are those which are required to be agreed upon for the contract to be legally 
valid. They also determine the nature of the contract, and therefore the set of background 
rules which arise for the purpose of governing the relationship between the parties (the 
naturalia negotii). The accidentalia negotii are those terms which are neither essential nor 
natural, and which must be explicitly agreed upon in order for them to form part of the 
arrangement: James Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 61. 
155 Helmut Coing, ‘A Typical Development in the Roman Law of Sale’, in Gesammelte Aufsätze 
zu Rechtsgeschichte, Rechtsphilosophie und Zivilrecht, 1947-1975, 1947-1975, vol. 1 
(Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), 71–72. 
156 Coing, 72–73. 
157 Coing, 73–74; Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, 234, note 27; Gordley, Philosophical 
Origins, 61–65. 
158 Coing, ‘A Typical Development’, 73–74; Gordley, Philosophical Origins, 61–65. 
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In my view, the texts can only be understood from the perspective of the 
problem faced by the lawyers themselves, which was how to reconcile their 
understanding of contractual practice with the state’s imposition of a maximum 
legal limit on the rate of interest. The challenge was, in short, to identify when 
a transaction qualified as exempt from the maximum legal rate. This, it 
appears, was only considered an issue from the severan period, which is 
consistent with the view that the late-classical jurists paid particular attention 
to matters with a fiscal content. 
The starting point here is to recall that, in Greek thought, a loan was considered 
‘maritime’ if the calculation of its yield bore no relation to time-denominated 
interest. Further, the reason that the interest could not be figured by time, but 
only as a fixed proportion of the sum lent, was that the loan’s due date was 
uncertain. In other words, a loan was ‘maritime’ precisely because the duty to 
repay was contingent upon the occurrence of an uncertain event (e.g., the safe 
return of the ship). In my opinion, the Roman sources invoke this tradition when 
they use expressions such as ‘nauticum faenus’, ‘usuris maritimis’, and 
‘pecunia nautica’. If this is right, then even though, for example, no mention of 
the allocation of risk is made in the Callimachus loan, its assumption by the 
lender is implied by Scaevola’s introduction of the arrangement as ‘pecunia 
nautica’. 
This leaves the expression ‘pecunia traiecticia’. By the time Nov. 106 was 
published, it is clear that the ‘νόμος traiecticia’ had entirely converged with the 
Greek tradition. Moreover, this convergence had begun as early as the mid-
third century. Modestinus, for instance, defined the meaning of the expression 
as follows: 
D.22.2.1 (Mod. 10 pand.): 
Traiecticia ea pecunia est quae trans mare vehitur: ceterum si eodem loci 
consumatur, non erit traiecticia. sed videndum, an merces ex ea pecunia 
comparatae in ea causa habentur? et interest, utrum etiam ipsae periculo 
creditoris navigent: tunc enim traiecticia pecunia fit. 
Although the text has been considered interpolated, I agree with Pontoriero 
that – some degree of epitomisation notwithstanding – the internal logic is 
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coherent and shows no clear sign of having been expanded or altered.159 This 
being accepted, the palingenetic context of the excerpt is illuminating: Lenel 
placed the fragment alongside a text concerned with the use of penal 
stipulations to evade the legal maximum rate of interest, which indicates that 
this excerpt was also intended to address the same issue.160 
The text itself sets out Modestinus’ view that money counted as traiecticia if it 
was carried across the sea, and so not if it was spent in the same place. On 
the other hand, if the money was used to purchase goods, it would count as 
traiecticia so long as the merchandise was transported at the lender’s risk. 
Modestinus therefore considered money to be traiecticia if: first, the money 
itself was carried overseas; or second, it was used to acquire goods that were 
transported at the lender’s risk.161 
Taking text and context together, the problem confronted by the jurist was that 
if money was spent at the place it was received, there was nothing to 
differentiate it from an ordinary loan and therefore no reason to exempt the 
transaction from the legal maximum rate of interest. His solution was to 
respond that only money used to acquire goods that remained at the lender’s 
risk qualified as traiecticia. This achieved the convergence of the Roman 
concept of pecunia traiecticia (that is, money carried overseas) with the Greek 
tradition, in which the designation of a loan as ‘maritime’ indicated that its 
repayment was contingent on an uncertain event. By the second half of the 
third century, a fragment from the Pauli Sententiae shows that the 
convergence between the two traditions was complete:162 
 
 
159 Pontoriero, Il prestito marittimo, 29; cf. De Martino, ‘Sul foenus nauticum’, 230; Biscardi, 
Actio pecuniae traiecticiae, 108, note 2; Giuffrè, ‘Faenus’, 147–49; also, ‘Il prestito ad 
“interessi marittimi” nel tardo impero’, in Atti dell’Accademia romanistica costantiniana: 12. 
Convegno internazionale in onore di Manlio Sargenti, ed. Giuliano Crifò and Stefano Giglio 
(Naples: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1998), 360–62. 
160 D.22.1.44 (Mod. 10 pand.): Lenel, Palingenesia, 1889, 1:725, nos. 135 and 136. 
161 Emmanuelle Chevreau, ‘La traiecticia pecunia: un mode de financement du commerce 
international’, Mémoires de la Société pour l’Histoire du Droit et des institutions des anciens 
pays bourguignons, comtois et romands 65 (2008): 45–46. 




Traiecticia pecunia propter periculum creditoris, quamdiu navigat navis, 
infinitas usuras recipere potest. 
At root, it was the assumption of the risk by the lender (as a result of the 
uncertain due date) that set ‘travelling money’ apart from an ordinary loan and 
exempted it from the legal maximum rate.163 
Two texts from the late-classical period show that this degree of convergence 
had not been achieved by the time of the severans. 
D.22.2.6 (Paul. 25 quaest.): 
Faenerator pecuniam usuris maritimis mutuam dando quasdam merces in 
nave pignori accepit, ex quibus si non potuisset totum debitum exsolvi, 
aliarum mercium aliis navibus impositarum propriisque faeneratoribus 
obligatarum si quid superfuisset, pignori accepit. quaesitum est nave 
propria perempta, ex qua totum solvi potuit, an id damnum ad creditorem 
pertineat, intra praestitutos dies amissa nave, an ad ceterarum navium 
superfluum admitti possit. respondi: alias quidem pignoris deminutio ad 
damnum debitoris, non etiam ad creditoris pertinet: sed cum traiecticia 
pecunia ita datur, ut non alias petitio eius creditori competat, quam si salva 
navis intra statuta tempora pervenerit, ipsius crediti obligatio non 
exsistente condicione defecisse videtur, et ideo pignorum quoque 
persecutio perempta est etiam eorum, quae non sunt amissa. si navis intra 
praestitutos dies perisset, et condicionem stipulationis defecisse videri, 
ideoque sine causa de pignorum persecutione, quae in aliis navibus 
fuerunt, quaeri. quando ergo ad illorum pignorum persecutionem creditor 
admitti potuerit? scilicet tunc cum condicio exstiterit obligationis et alio 
casu pignus amissum fuerit vel vilius distractum vel si navis postea perierit, 
quam dies praefinitus periculo exactus fuerit. 
In this passage, Paul responded to a question concerning the status of rights 
in security in loans of travelling money. The circumstances were that a loan 
had been given at a maritime rate of interest (usuris maritimis) and secured not 
only against the goods in the principal vessel but also over cargo in other ships 
as well. In my view, Paul’s use to the expression ‘usuris maritimis’ immediately 
indicates that the loan was given at the lender’s risk.164 The jurist was asked 
 
163 The same reasoning underpins C.4.32.17 (Philipp. A. et Philipp. C. Aurelio Euxeno): on 
which, supra, 96 et seq. 
164 See, also, D.22.2.7 (Paul. 3 ad ed.), in which the severan jurist referred to a loan received 
‘cum certis usuris’. In my view, the use of the word ‘certum’ is meant to refer to the fact that 
the yield was calculated as a fixed proportion of the sum lent. 
117 
 
whether, in the event that the principal vessel perished before the expiration of 
the time limit, the lender would be entitled to realise the security he held in the 
other ships. Paul answered that if the specified ship was lost within the time 
limit then the condition which underpinned the borrower’s obligation to repay 
was not fulfilled (non existente condicione). As a consequence, the lender was 
not entitled to realise his security – even over the goods in the other ships which 
had arrived safely – since his right to claim was accessory to the obligation of 
the borrower to repay. 
The question that arises is, what did Paul mean by the sentence beginning 
‘cum traiecticia pecunia ita datur…’? Scholars favouring the view that the 
assumption of risk by the lender was essential have argued that Paul intended 
to introduce a causal clause.165 However, it is more likely that a clause leading 
cum with the indicative was meant to be temporal.166 With this in mind, Paul’s 
opinion may be given as follows: whereas a reduction in the value of security 
normally fell on the debtor, and so did not pertain to the creditor; when pecunia 
traiecticia was given on terms that the creditor could sue for it only if the ship 
arrived safely within the prescribed time (as was the case here), it appeared 
that the failure of the condition led to the discharge of the debt itself. 
Importantly, the construction ‘ita… ut’ suggests an alternative: namely, that 
pecunia traiecticia might equally be given without a condition of this sort.167 The 
 
165 This position is maintained by Biscardi: Actio pecuniae traiecticiae, 121, note 1 and 182, 
note 57 (‘evidente il valore causale, e non temporale, del cum!’); also, ‘Pecunia traiecticia’, 
281. Castresana Herrero has claimed that Paul uses the construction sed cum with the 
indicative in a number of other instances to denote a meaning akin to a causal clause, and 
also that this usage was more common in later Latin in the type of construction employed 
in juristic literature: El préstamo marítimo, 79–80. 
166 De Martino, ‘Sul foenus nauticum’, 226–27; Litewski, ‘Römisches Seedarlehen’, 130; also, 
‘rec. A. Castresana’, IURA 34 (1983): 119. Röhle argued that Paul used the construction 
sed cum with the indicative to denote a recurring action (i.e., cum iterativum, in the sense 
of quotiens): ‘Zum Beispiel D. 22,2,6’, SDHI 45 (1979): 557. This view was rightly rejected 
by Castresana Herrero as too rigid – the usage in the texts is more flexible. However, 
Röhle’s observation that Paul frequently uses cum with the subjunctive to denote the 
meaning ‘sed si’ mitigates against the view that he intended the clause to be causal: if this 
was the case, we would expect detur rather than datur. On this point, Ph. Eduard Huschke, 
Die Lehre des römischen Rechts vom Darlehn und den dazu gehörigen Materien: eine 
civilistische Monographie (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1882), 222, note 5; also, Ankum, ‘Some 
Aspects of Maritime Loans’, 300, note 25. 
167 For suggested translations see Röhle, ‘Zum Beispiel D. 22,2,6’, 557. 
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implication is that Paul understood that the parties could decide to omit the 
clause and instead negotiate traiecticia pecunia sine periculo creditoris. 
D.22.2.4 (Pap. 3 resp.): 
[pr.] Nihil interest, traiecticia pecunia sine periculo creditoris accepta sit 
an post diem praestitutum et condicionem impletam periculum esse 
creditoris desierit. utrubique igitur maius legitima usura faenus non 
debebitur, sed in priore quidem specie semper, in altera vero discusso 
periculo: nec pignora vel hypothecae titulo maioris usurae tenebuntur. [1] 
Pro operis servi traiecticiae pecuniae gratia secuti quod in singulos dies in 
stipulatum deductum est, ad finem centesimae non ultra duplum debetur. 
in stipulatione faenoris post diem periculi separatim interposita quod in ea 
legitimae usurae deerit, per alteram stipulationem operarum supplebitur. 
Again, although the classicity of the fragment has been impugned, the 
prevailing view is in favour of its authenticity.168  In short, Papinian’s opinion 
was that unlimited interest could only be demanded for the period during which 
the lender assumed the risk; and therefore not if the money had been given 
sine periculo creditoris or once the term of the loan had expired. The second 
part of the passage develops and reinforces this point. Here, the jurist stated 
that the rate stipulated for operae servi (i.e., for the services of the slave sent 
to accompany the loan) was not permitted to exceed the legal limit. Moreover, 
for the time during which the risk was on the borrower the rate for operae servi 
and any further interest on the loan itself could not exceed double this amount 
when combined.169 The opinion therefore targeted lenders seeking to evade 
the interest rate cap by artificially inflating the amount charged for operae servi. 
Indeed, the discussion in D.22.2.4 pr. stands as a prelude to this more specific 
legal observation. 
Returning to the principium, several scholars have had difficulty accepting 
Papinian’s statement that pecunia traiecticia could be received sine periculo 
 
168 Kupiszewski, ‘Sul prestito marittimo’, 370–71; Litewski, ‘Römisches Seedarlehen’, 129–30; 
Purpura, ‘Ricerche’, 282; Sicari, Pena convenzionale e responsabilità, 240; Pontoriero, Il 
prestito marittimo, 41. Cf. De Martino, ‘Sul foenus nauticum’, 226 and 241, note 1; Biscardi, 
Actio pecuniae traiecticiae, 121–22. 
169 Billeter rightly pointed out that the phrase non ultra duplum is a Justinianic interpolation: 
Geschichte des Zinsfusses im griechisch-römischen Altertum bis auf Justinian, 249, note 
1. See, also, De Martino, ‘Sul foenus nauticum’, 227; Litewski, ‘Römisches Seedarlehen’, 
156; Purpura, ‘Ricerche’, 289, note 288; Ankum, ‘Some Aspects of Maritime Loans’, 306; 
and the literature cited by Pontoriero, Il prestito marittimo, 44, note 14. 
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creditoris.170 A plain reading of the text, however, counts against these 
interpretations. Instead of trying to reconcile the statements made by Paul, 
Papinian, and Modestinus, the solution is to seek a reason for why they held 
different views. In my opinion, what we are observing is the convergence of 
two different traditions. On the one hand, the Roman conception of pecunia 
traiecticia initially appears to have referred simply to money that was carried 
overseas. On the other, pecunia nautica, or money borrowed at ‘maritime 
interest’, invoked the Greek notion of a loan whose yield bore no relation to 
time-denominated interest. Beginning with Modestinus, these traditions were 
brought together, so that by the sixth century Justinian was able to explain that 
the δανεῑον ναυτικὸν was governed by the ‘νόμος traiecticia’. Just as Litewski 
observed, the differences in the meaning of the expressions used by different 
jurists was therefore partly due to their cultural backgrounds, but also partly 
due to the convergence of these traditions over time. 
Conclusion: 
Merchants seeking to fund the acquisition of a cargo for transport overseas 
turned to financiers as a source of credit. In the context of long-distance trade, 
there was a tradition of maritime lending in the eastern part of the 
Mediterranean that can be traced back to at least late-fifth century Athens, if 
not to ancient Mesopotamia and Babylon.171 This tradition basically consisted 
of customs to do with, among other things: the structure of the transaction 
(one-way or return); the way in which interest was demanded; the amount of 
the yield; and grace periods for repayment on arrival. These customs appear 
to have continued to be observed for the duration of the Roman period and 
right up to the sixth century CE.172 
From a juridical perspective, the absence of any praetorian intervention (pace 
Biscardi) meant that the Roman legal authorities operated directly at the 
 
170 Purpura, ‘Ricerche’, 283; also, Pontoriero, Il prestito marittimo, 47. 
171 Jean Andreau, ‘Prêt maritime’, in Dictionnaire de l’Antiquité, ed. Jean Leclant (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 2005), 1766; also, De Ste. Croix, ‘Ancient Greek and 
Roman Maritime Loans’, 59. Purpura has described a set of provisions in the Code of 
Hammurabi as ‘un remoto precedente del prestito marittimo greco’: ‘Ricerche’, 198–99. 
172 Purpura, ‘Ricerche’, 235. 
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frontier of contractual practice. During the late Republic and classical period, 
the main feature that drew the jurists’ attention was the penal stipulation. The 
early jurists (Servius and Labeo) focussed on the moment at which a debtor 
would be held in default and the consequences that followed. The classical 
jurists, most notably Q. Cervidius Scaevola, dealt with complex questions 
about the relationship between penalties and the underlying contract, which by 
the second half of the second century CE had been classified as innominate. 
Turning to interest, it is my view that the Roman conception of pecunia 
traiecticia was not coextensive with the eastern tradition of maritime lending 
until Modestinus achieved their convergence in the middle part of the third 
century CE. If this is right, then it would indicate that contractual practice in this 
area was not entirely uniform, which may explain the hybrid character of 
transactions such as the one recorded in TPSulp. 78.173 Nevertheless, there 
were certainly areas of significant overlap, so that by the sixth century Justinian 
was able to declare that maritime loans (in the Greek sense) were wholly 
subject to the ‘νόμος traiecticia’. 
 




MERCHANT AND EXERCITOR 
Once the merchant had acquired the goods his next aim was to transport them 
to his intended market. The two principal (groups of) actors who facilitated this 
objective were warehousemen and exercitores, who were involved in the 
storage and transportation of the merchandise respectively. For reasons of 
space, only the relationship between merchants and exercitores will be 
analysed here. To this end, the chapter will consist of three sections, 
concerning: i) the actio exercitoria; ii) the actiones locati and conducti 
(including a treatment of the lex Rhodia and an excursus on D.19.2.31); and 
iii) the actiones in factum (de recepto; furti and damni adversus nautas). 
 
Section 4.1: The actio exercitoria. 
4.1.1 The Terms of the Praetor’s Edict. 
The wording of the edict can be reconstructed from passages written by Gaius 
and Ulpian, the former of which said the following: 
G.4.71: 
… exercitoria locum habet, cum pater dominusve filium servumve 
magistrum navi praeposuerit et quid cum eo eius rei gratia cui praepositus 
fuerit /negotium /gestum erit. cum enim ea quoque res ex voluntate patris 
dominive contrahi videatur, aequissimum esse visum est in solidum 
actionem dari; quin etiam licet extraneum quisque magistrum navi 
praeposuerit, sive servum sive liberum, tamen ea praetoria actio in eum 
redditur… 
According to Gaius, the actio exercitoria lay against a person who had 
appointed a magister navis with whom business was conducted in connection 
with the matters for which he was appointed (cum pater… gestum erit). Ulpian 
used the same language in his treatment of the edict in the 28th book of his 
commentary ad edictum, which is excerpted and reproduced as the first text in 
D.14.1 (de exercitoria actione). In this passage, the jurist proceeds to offer an 
interpretation of the edict’s principal terms, apparently in the order in which 
they appeared. These were: magister (D.14.1.1.1-5); navis (D.14.1.1.6); 
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gestum eius rei nomine cui ibi praepositus fuerit (D.14.1.1.7-14); and in eum 
qui navem exercuerit (D.14.1.1.15-18). From this, and the preceding text by 
Gaius, Lenel was able to reconstruct the terms of the opening clause of the 
edict as follows:1 
Quod cum magistro navis gestum erit eius rei nomine, cui ibi praepositus 
fuerit, in eum, qui eam navem exercuerit, iudicium dabo. 
Where business is conducted with a shipmaster in connection with those 
matters for which he was appointed, I will grant an action against the 
person exploiting the ship. 
Having treated the opening clause of the edict, Ulpian continued by quoting 
the terms of a second part, seemingly verbatim. Huvelin reconstructed this 
clause as follows:2 
Si is, qui navem exercuerit, in aliena potestate erit eiusque voluntate 
navem exercuerit, quod cum magistro eius gestum erit, in eum, in cuius 
potestate is erit qui navem exercuerit, iudicium dabo. 
If the person exploiting the vessel is in the potestas of another and is acting 
according to their will, where business is conducted with a shipmaster, I 
will grant an action against the person in whose potestas the person 
exploiting the ship is. 
Together, these two clauses made up the edict underpinning the actio 
exercitoria, at least from the time of the compilation of the edictum perpetuum 
by Julian in about the middle of the second century CE. 
4.1.1.1 The First Part of the Edict. 
The rationale behind the edict, according to Gaius, was that just as the actio 
quod iussu made a father or master liable in solidum for bargains struck at his 
behest, so too it was entirely fair (aequissimum) that fathers or masters whose 
sons or slaves had acted ex voluntate patris dominive (i.e., according to the 
will of their father or master) should be held to the same standard.3 This, he 
 
1 Otto Lenel, Das Edictum perpetuum: ein Versuch zu dessen Wiederherstellung, 3rd ed. 
(Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1927), 257–58. 
2 D.14.1.1.19 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). The Ulpianic text is exactly the same except for the substitution 
of dabo for datur: Paul Huvelin, Études d’histoire du droit commercial romain (histoire 
externe-droit maritime) (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1929), 162; also, Lenel, EP3, 258. 
3 G.4.71. Liability in solidum may be understood as unlimited liability: András Földi, ‘Remarks 
on the Legal Structure of Enterprises in Roman Law’, RIDA 43 (1996): 188; also, Manuel 
Jesús García Garrido, ‘Responsabilidad in solidum en la casuística de la actio exercitoria’, 
in Miscelánea romanística, ed. Manuel Jesús García Garrido, Federico Fernández de 
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explained, was because in both cases the person dealing with the son or slave 
relied more on the fides of the person issuing the order (iussum) or making the 
appointment (praepositio) than on that of the son or slave actually executing 
the transaction.4 The same reasoning is at the heart of Ulpian’s explanation, in 
which the jurist held up the edict as the fair (aequum) solution to the problem 
of having to deal with shipmasters whose status and character were unknown.5 
This problem, he continued, was particularly acute in the context of maritime 
trade, where place and time did not admit of a fuller judgement about the 
standing of the shipmaster being arrived at. 
Quod cum magistro navis… 
The first question that arose with respect to the scope of the edict concerned 
the meaning of the expression magister navis. Ulpian described the magister 
navis, or shipmaster, as ‘the person who is entrusted with the care of the whole 
ship’.6 The word navis, he continued, was held to include vessels of any size 
operating on the sea, on a river, or on a lake.7 Of all the personnel employed 
on board a vessel only a magister could bind the person exploiting the ship 
(i.e., the exercitor) in contract.8 
According to Ulpian, both the shipmaster’s status and his relationship to the 
exercitor were irrelevant so far as the edict was concerned; that is, whether he 
was a free person or a slave, whether of the exercitor or someone else, and 
 
Buján Fernández, and Fernando Reinoso Barbero, vol. 3 (Madrid: Universidad Nacional 
de Educación a Distancia, 2013), 1153–64. 
4 G.4.70-71. Solazzi considered ‘in primis’ and ‘eadem ratione’ interpolated: ‘L’età dell’actio 
exercitoria’, in Scritti di diritto romano, vol. 4 (Naples: Jovene, 1963), 261–62. The passage 
was cited by Emilio Costa in support of the view that the actio quod iussu predated the 
exercitorian and institorian actions: Le azioni exercitoria e institoria nel diritto romano 
(Parma: Casa ed. L. Battei, 1891), 24; also, Jean-Jacques Aubert, Business Managers in 
Ancient Rome: A Social and Economic Study of Institores, 200 B.C. - A.D. 250 (Leiden: 
Brill, 1994), 78–84. 
5 D.14.1.1 pr. (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). Aubert has defended the authenticity of the passage: Business 
Managers, 59, note 80; cf. Giannetto Longo, ‘Actio exercitoria, actio institoria, actio quasi 
institoria’, in Studi in onore di Gaetano Scherillo, ed. Giuseppe Grosso, vol. 2 (Milan: 
Cisalpino-La Goliardica, 1972), 584–86. 
6 D.14.1.1.1 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.): ‘Magistrum navis accipere debemus, cui totius navis cura 
mandata est’. 
7 D.14.1.1.6 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). 
8 D.14.1.1.2 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). 
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no matter what age he was.9 Gaius, too, indicated that the edict applied not 
only if the magister was a dependant of the exercitor, but also if he was an 
extraneus (i.e., neither the son nor the slave of the person exploiting the 
ship):10 
G.4.69-71: 
[69] Quia tamen superius mentionem habuimus de actione, qua in 
peculium filiorum familias servorumque ageretur, opus est, ut de hac 
actione et de ceteris, quae eorundum nomine in parentes dominosve dari 
solent, diligentius admoneamus. [70] In primis itaque si iussu patris 
dominive negotium gestum erit, in solidum praetor actionem in patrem 
dominumve conparavit; et recte, quia qui ita negotium gerit, magis patris 
dominive quam filii servive fidem sequitur. [71] Eadem ratione comparavit 
duas alias actiones, exercitoriam et institoriam. tunc autem exercitoria 
locum habet, cum pater dominusve filium servumve magistrum navi 
praeposuerit et quid cum eo eius rei gratia cui praepositus fuerit /negotium 
/gestum erit. cum enim ea quoque res ex voluntate patris dominive 
contrahi videatur, aequissimum esse visum est in solidum actionem dari; 
quin etiam licet extraneum quisque magistrum navi praeposuerit, sive 
servum sive liberum, tamen ea praetoria actio in eum redditur. ideo autem 
exercitoria actio appellatur, quia exercitor vocatur is, ad quem cottidianus 
navis quaestus pervenit. institoria vero formula tum locum habet, cum quis 
tabernae aut cuilibet negotiationi filium servumve aut quemlibet 
extraneum, sive servum sive liberum, praeposuerit et quid cum eo eius rei 
gratia cui praepositus est contractum fuerit. ideo autem institoria vocatur, 
quia qui tabernae praeponitur, institor appellatur. quae et ipsa formula in 
solidum est. 
Strictly, the legal sources only indicate that by the middle of the second century 
CE the sole relationship between an exercitor and his or her magister navis 
that was of any consequence to the edict was that established by the 
praepositio. Two connected issues arise: first, whether this was the case from 
the start; and second, if this was not the case, when and under what 
circumstances the edict reached this state of development. 
Several scholars have argued, often on the strength of the treatment afforded 
to both the exercitorian and institorian actions by Gaius, that the edicts at one 
time only applied if the praepositus was a son or slave of the person making 
 
9 D.14.1.1.4 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). 
10 Cf. J.Inst.4.7.2, in which Gaius’ words are substantially repeated, except for the omission of 
any reference to fathers and sons. 
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the appointment.11 For these authors, it follows that at some point between the 
introduction of each action (which in each case could have been more than 
three centuries before the time of Gaius) and the middle of the second century 
CE, the scope of the application of each edict was extended to include cases 
in which the praepositus was neither the son nor the slave of the person 
making the appointment. I do not think, however, that Gaius’ treatment 
necessarily implies a chronological development. Rather, his discussion of the 
actions in question occurs in the context of a more general consideration of 
the actio de peculio and the other remedies that he says were usually given 
against parents or masters in connection with the activities of their dependants 
(et de ceteris, quae eorundem nomine in parentes dominosve dari solent). 
Consequently, Gaius framed all the so-called actiones adiecticiae qualitatis 
according to this common theme (namely, that they were all available against 
fathers or masters whose dependants had entered into contracts), adding that 
in the exceptional case of the exercitorian and institorian actions they were 
also available for business conducted by a praepositus who was not in the 
power of the praeponens.12 It is perfectly possible that Gaius structured his 
discussion of the so-called actiones adiecticiae qualitatis in this way for 
pedagogical reasons. 
Although this passage does not, in my view, necessarily imply a chronological 
development, neither does it rule this possibility out. If such an extension did 
take place, there are several ways in which it could have been achieved. On 
the one hand, it is possible that the exercitorian and institorian edicts initially 
contained wording similar to that in, for example, the actiones tributoria and 
quod iussu; sc., a clause that stated that the praetor would give an action 
against the person in whose power the praepositus was (i.e., in eum, in cuius 
 
11 Gustav von Mandry, Das gemeine Familiengüterrecht mit Ausschluss des ehelichen 
Güterrechtes, vol. 2 (Tübingen: Verlag der H. Laupp’schen Buchhandel, 1876), 212–15; 
André Auzoux, ‘Action exercitoire’ (Thèse pour le doctorat, Faculté de droit de Paris, 1894), 
27–28; Paulus Fabricius, Der gewaltfreie Institor im klassischen römischen Recht 
(Würzburg: Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg im Breisgau, 1926); Andrea Di Porto, 
Impresa collettiva e schiavo ‘manager’ in Roma antica (II sec. a.C. - II sec. d.C.) (Milan: 
Giuffrè, 1984), 37. 
12 Also, J.Inst.4.7.2a, in which the application of the edict to praepositi not in the power of their 
exercitor is justified with reference to its aequitas. 
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potestate erit…).13 At some point, the praetor may either have dropped this 
wording or, as Fabricius argued in the context of the actio institoria, 
circumvented it by means of an actio utilis.14 As Huvelin noted, however, there 
is no evidence for the granting of an actio utilis in relation to the actio 
exercitoria, and separately, there is no evidence for any change in the wording 
of either action before the time of Julian’s redaction. Another explanation could 
therefore be that the edicts were unrestricted from the start, though interpreted 
in light of the prevailing socio-economic conditions.15 In other words, it may 
have been ‘self-understood’ that the edicts initially applied to business 
conducted with praepositi in potestate, but that as principals began to appoint 
persons who were not in their power so too the edict was interpreted to cover 
these cases as well.16 I prefer the latter view, though the state of the evidence 
makes any position largely conjectural. 
Whatever the case, those scholars who hold that an extension of some kind 
did occur also differ as to its timing. Given the close relationship between the 
actions it is likely, as Aubert has suggested, that the extension of both edicts 
occurred within a short time of one another.17 Fabricius, Huvelin, and Di Porto 
(the first in relation to the actio institoria, the latter two the actio exercitoria), all 
argued that the extension did not occur until the middle of the second century 
CE.18 Several authors, however, have put forward the view that the institorian 
and exercitorian actions were available in cases involving extraneous 
 
13 For the likely wording of the edicts that grounded the actiones tributoria and quod iussu: 
Lenel, EP3, 270–73 and 277-78. 
14 Specifically, Fabricius argued that the praetor made use of the fiction ‘si liber esset’: Der 
gewaltfrei Institor, 18–23. 
15 Cf. Sven E. Wunner, Contractus: sein Wortgebrauch und Willensgehalt im klassischen 
römischen Recht (Cologne and Graz: Böhlau, 1964); Alfons Bürge, ‘Review of Andrea Di 
Porto, Impresa collettiva e schiavo "manager" in Roma antica (II sec. a. C. — II sec. d. C.)’, 
ZSS 105 (1988): 856; and Andreas Wacke, ‘Die adjektizischen Klagen im Überblick. Erster 
Teil: Von der Reeder- und der Betriebsleiterklage zur direkten Stellvertretung’, ZSS 111 
(1994): 296. 
16 Generally, David Daube, ‘The Self-Understood in Legal History’, in Collected Studies in 
Roman Law, ed. David Cohen and Dieter Simon, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1991), 1277–85. 
17 Aubert, Business Managers, 92, and on the whole question, 91-95. Gábor Hamza has 
argued that the actio exercitoria was likely changed first: ‘Gewillkürte Stellvertretung im 
römischen Recht’, Acta juridica Academiae Scientarum Hungaricae 25 (1983): 93–94. 
18 Fabricius, Der gewaltfrei Institor, 18–23; Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 161–62; and Di 
Porto, Impresa collettiva, 37–42. 
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praepositi from before the middle of the second century. Arguing against 
Fabricius, Watson (following Kaser) adopted this position, though neither 
Watson nor Kaser indicated if they believed that the actio institoria had this 
scope from the start or whether and when it was later extended.19 Aubert, on 
the other hand, in his survey of the literary and epigraphic sources, has 
concluded that it appears likely that vilici (including business managers) could 
be freedmen by the time of Cicero, even though the evidence suggests that 
the great majority of those holding these positions were slaves.20 Together with 
the evidence for the increased role of freedmen in trade during the late 
Republic and early Principate, and the demand this is likely to have created for 
remedies that reflected the changing socio-economic environment, it is 
plausible to suggest that both actions were available for business conducted 
with extraneous praepositi before the middle of the second century CE, and 
probably by the time of the early Principate. In this respect I am inclined to 
agree with Costa, who suggested that any extension (if indeed there was one) 
was likely to have occurred during the course of the late Republic.21 
The question as to whether a shipmaster could sub-appoint a magister also 
presents difficulty. The relevant passage is D.14.1.1.5 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.): 
Magistrum autem accipimus non solum, quem exercitor praeposuit, sed et 
eum, quem magister: et hoc consultus Iulianus in ignorante exercitore 
respondit: ceterum si scit et passus est eum in nave magisterio fungi, ipse 
eum imposuisse videtur. quae sententia mihi videtur probabilis: omnia 
enim facta magistri debeo praestare qui eum praeposui, alioquin 
contrahentes decipientur: et facilius hoc in magistro quam institore 
admittendum propter utilitatem. quid tamen si sic magistrum praeposuit, 
ne alium ei liceret praeponere? an adhuc Iuliani sententiam admittimus, 
videndum est: finge enim et nominatim eum prohibuisse, ne Titio magistro 
utaris. dicendum tamen erit eo usque producendam utilitatem 
navigantium. 
 
19 Alan Watson, The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1965), 192, note 1; Max Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, vol. 1 (Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 1971), 608, note 27; also, Wunner, Contractus, 110–11. 
20 Aubert, Business Managers, 417. 
21 Costa, Le azioni exercitoria e institoria, 42. Cf. de Ligt, who has (tentatively) connected the 
extension of both actions to the increased role of freedmen in trade during the second 




Ulpian begins by citing an opinion of Julian that a person would be considered 
a magister not only if he had been appointed by the exercitor, but also if he 
had been appointed by another shipmaster. He then proceeded to consider 
the scope of this opinion in relation to three cases: the first, in which the sub-
appointment was made with the exercitor’s knowledge and consent (sciens et 
patiens); the second, in which the exercitor was ignorant of the sub-
appointment (ignorans); and the third, in which the exercitor had expressly 
prohibited such an appointment being made (prohibens). According to Ulpian, 
Julian’s view, which he approved, was that the sub-appointment would count 
as a magister in both of the first two cases. The reason given for the first 
opinion is that an exercitor sciens et patiens was simply regarded as having 
made the sub-appointment himself. Ulpian then explained that the extension 
of the rule to cover an exercitor ignorans was required for practical reasons 
(propter utilitatem); and finally, that Julian’s opinion should also apply in the 
case of an exercitor prohibens to protect the interests of those involved in 
navigation (utilitas navigantium). 
The extent to which these opinions have been considered authentic has 
changed over time. Prior to the 1960s, the exegesis of the passage was bound 
up closely with the method of interpolation criticism.22 In particular, De Martino 
and Solazzi argued that the invocation of utilitas as a reason for widening the 
limits of the exercitor’s liability was unclassical, which in turn cast doubt on the 
classical origin of the opinions themselves.23 In the past half century, however, 
scholars have tended to affirm the authenticity of the opinions contained within 
the text, principally on the basis that utilitas was a concept familiar to classical 
 
22 Cf. Ludwig Mitteis, Ernst Levy, and Ernst Rabel, eds., Index interpolationum quae in 
Iustiniani Digestis inesse dicuntur, vol. 1 (Weimar: Böhlaus, 1929), 234. For an overview 
of the history of the criticism of the text, Aldo Petrucci, ‘Ulteriori osservazioni sulla 
protezione dei contraenti con gli institores ed i magisteri navis nel diritto romano dell’età 
commerciale’, IURA 53 (2002): 51. 
23 Francesco De Martino went so far as to argue that Julian’s opinion was the reverse of that 
reported in the text, emending it to read ‘magistrum autem accipimus [non] solum quem 
exercitor praeposuit [sed et] <non> eum quem magister’: ‘Studii sull’actio exercitoria’, RDN 
7, no. 1–2 (1941): 14–20; ‘Ancora sull’actio exercitoria’, Labeo 4 (1958): 278–83; also, F. 
Ghionda, ‘Sul magister navis’, RDN 1 (1935): 327–55; Solazzi, ‘L’età dell’actio exercitoria’, 
1963, 246–49; and Longo, ‘Actio exercitoria, actio institoria’, 588–90. Cf. Giovanni 




jurisprudential thinking.24 Even if this latter view is correct, there is no evidence 
that Julian’s opinion that a sub-appointment could bind an exercitor ignorans 
was accepted before his own time, nor that the view attributed to Ulpian 
concerning the exercitor prohibens was accepted before the early third century 
CE (at the earliest). It is therefore likely that before the time of Julian a sub-
appointment could only bind an exercitor if the latter both knew about and 
consented to his appointment as magister. 
… eius rei nomine, cui ibi praepositus fuerit… 
According to Ulpian, the praetor did not state that he would give an action on 
every ground (ex omni causa), but only ‘in connection with those matters for 
which [the magister] was appointed’.25 Typically shipmasters were appointed 
to manage the commercial operation of a vessel, which included letting out 
space on board, taking on the job of transporting cargoes and passengers, and 
keeping the ship provisioned.26 This latter task could involve purchasing 
equipment useful for navigation (such as sails), contracting for repairs, and 
paying the crew’s wages.27  
Whether borrowing money counted as an activity performed ‘in connection with 
those matters’ for which the shipmaster was appointed was a matter of juristic 
 
24 Hans Ankum’s study of the use of the concept of utilitas in juristic reasoning has been 
influential in this respect: ‘“Utilitatis Causa Receptum”. On the Pragmatic Methods of the 
Roman Lawyers’, in Symbolae iuridicae et historicae Martino David dedicatae, ed. Hans 
Ankum, Robert Feenstra, and Wilhelmus F. Leemans (Leiden: Brill, 1968), 1–31, esp. p. 
20; also, ‘The Functions of Expressions with Utilitatis Causa in the Works of the Classical 
Roman Lawyers’, Fundamina 16 (2010): 5–22; and the instructive study by Marialuisa 
Navarra: Ricerche sulla utilitas nel pensiero dei giuristi romani (Turin: Giappichelli, 2002). 
Accepting the substantial authenticity of the passage, Wacke, ‘Die adjektizischen Klagen’, 
309–11; András Földi, ‘La responsabilità dell’avente potestà per atti compiuti dall’exercitor 
suo sottoposto’, SDHI 64 (1998): 186, note 28; Pietro Cerami, ‘“Mutua pecunia a magistro 
‘navis reficiendae causa’ sumpta” e “praepositio exercitoris”: Profilo storico-comparatistici’, 
AUPA 46 (2000): 136, note 8; Petrucci, ‘Ulteriori osservazioni’, 49–54; and Maria Miceli, 
Sulla struttura formulare delle 'actiones adiecticiae qualitatis’ (Turin: Giappichelli, 2001), 
203, note 32; also, Studi sulla rappresentanza nel diritto romano (Milan: Giuffrè, 2008), 79–
80, note 102. Cf. Kirschenbaum, who considered the opinion concerning the exercitor 
ignorans to be classical, but that concerning the exercitor prohibens postclassical: Sons, 
Slaves, and Freedmen in Roman Commerce (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew 
University, 1987), 101–4; and taking the same view, Aubert, Business Managers, 60–61. 
25 D.14.1.1.7 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.): ‘Non autem ex omni causa praetor dat in exercitorem actionem, 
sed eius rei nomine, cuius ibi praepositus fuerit…’ (Mommsen corrects cuius to cui.) 
26 D.14.1.1.3 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). 
27 D.14.1.1.7 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.) and D.14.1.7 (Afr. 8 quaest.). 
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discussion.28 Ulpian’s treatment of the subject commences in D.14.1.1.8 (Ulp. 
28 ad ed.) and concludes at the beginning of D.14.1.1.12 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.): 
[8] Quid si mutuam pecuniam sumpserit, an eius rei nomine videatur 
gestum? et Pegasus existimat, si ad usum eius rei, in quam praepositus 
est, fuerit mutuatus, dandam actionem, quam sententiam puto veram: quid 
enim si ad armandam instruendamve navem vel nautas exhibendos 
mutuatus est? [9] Unde quaerit Ofilius, si ad reficiendam navem mutuatus 
nummos in suos usus converterit, an in exercitorem detur actio. et ait, si 
hac lege accepit quasi in navem impensurus, mox mutavit voluntatem, 
teneri exercitorem imputaturum sibi, cur talem praeposuerit: quod si ab 
initio consilium cepit fraudandi creditoris et hoc specialiter non expresserit, 
quod ad navis causam accipit, contra esse: quam distinctionem Pedius 
probat. [10] Sed et si in pretiis rerum emptarum fefellit magister, exercitoris 
erit damnum, non creditoris. [11] Sed si ab alio mutuatus liberavit eum, qui 
in navis refectionem crediderat, puto etiam huic dandam actionem, quasi 
in navem crediderit. [12] Igitur praepositio certam legem dat 
contrahentibus… 
Ulpian begins by approving the view of Pegasus (first century CE) that the 
exercitorian action would lie if the proceeds of a loan were used in connection 
with a matter for which the shipmaster had been appointed (si ad usum eius 
rei, in quam praepositus est).29 This is followed up by a specific question 
concerning money borrowed to fit out or equip the ship or to furnish a crew (ad 
armandam instruendamve navem vel nautas exhibendos). On this point, 
Ulpian cites a distinction made by the late Republican jurist Ofilius, which we 
are told was later approved by Pedius (second half of the first century CE).30 
The text is significant, not only because it provides a terminus ante quem for 
the introduction of the actio exercitoria, but also an indication that the 
expression eius rei nomine, cui ibi praepositus fuerit – or at least a phrase with 
the same substantive content – constituted part of the edict’s wording in the 
latter half of the first century BCE. The question Ofilius is reported to have 
posed was whether the actio exercitoria would be granted if a magister 
borrowed money for the purpose of repairing a ship (ad reficiendam navem) 
 
28 D.14.1.1.8 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). 
29 D.14.1.1.8 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). Pegasus held offices under both Vespasian and Domitian: 
Wolfgang Kunkel, Die römischen Juristen: Herkunft und soziale Stellung, 2nd ed. (Cologne, 
Weimar, and Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2001), 133–34. 
30 D.14.1.1.9 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). For Ofilius, Kunkel, 29–30; and Pedius, 168–69. 
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and subsequently turned the funds to his own use. Ulpian therefore moves 
from his approval of Pegasus’ opinion to consider the circumstances in which 
the action might lie despite the proceeds of the loan having been used for a 
purpose not in connection with the shipmaster’s appointment. 
Identifying the precise content of the distinction drawn by Ofilius, however, is 
a difficult task, not least because the text may not be in its original form and 
has been considered interpolated.31 Thus, Beseler doubted the phrases mox 
mutavit voluntatem and consilium fraudandi creditoris.32 Pringsheim, following 
Beseler, excised mox mutavit voluntatem, removed imputaturum… esse, and 
substituted sententiam for distinctionem to reflect the reality of what 
remained.33 Eisele, too, supposed that et hoc… accipit was a later addition and 
also doubted the authenticity of imputaturum… praeposuit.34 
First, it does not matter for our purposes whether the phrase imputaturum… 
praeposuit was inserted into the text by the compilers or not, since it does not 
affect the interpretation of the passage from a legal perspective. Second, I 
agree with Watson that the arguments that all or part of the section quod si… 
esse has been interpolated are not strong enough to warrant regarding it as 
inauthentic.35 This leaves the phrase mox mutavit voluntatem. According to 
Beseler the words ad reficiendam navem are ambiguous in the sense that they 
could either refer to a purpose that had been agreed upon by the parties or to 
one intended privately by the borrower. The words hac lege, he continued, can 
only refer to an agreed purpose; and since the expression mox mutavit 
voluntatem implies that hac lege carries both meanings, it cannot have been 
written by Ofilius.36 Miceli, however, has argued that the expression is 
 
31 Cf. Mitteis, Levy, and Rabel, Index, 1:235. 
32 Gerhard Beseler, Beiträge zur Kritik der römischen Rechtsquellen, vol. 2 (Tübingen: J. C. 
B. Mohr, 1911), 125. 
33 Fritz Pringsheim, ‘Beryt und Bologna’, in Gesammelte Abhandlungen, vol. 1 (Heidelberg: 
Carl Winter, 1961), 406–7. 
34 Fridolin Eisele, ‘Beiträge zur Erkenntniss der Digesteninterpolationen’, ZSS 18 (1897): 20; 
also, De Martino, ‘Studii sull’actio exercitoria’, 10; Watson, Obligations, 190; and Longo, 
‘Actio exercitoria, actio institoria’, 591–92. 
35 Watson’s critique of these arguments, which shall not be repeated here, are convincing: 
Obligations, 190–91. 
36 Beseler’s argument is quoted by Pringsheim as follows: ‘ad reficiendam navem ist 
undeutlich; kann “der Abrede nach zu dem Zwecke” oder “der wirklichen Absicht nach zu 
132 
 
genuine.37 According to her, the shipmaster’s intentions are not considered 
separately from the fact of any agreement, but rather together with it. Thus, in 
the first case, the magister’s change of mind is mentioned to underline the fact 
that the sums were not spent as stated in the lex; and in the second, his 
fraudulent intent is provided as justification for his decision not to state what 
the funds would be used for. 
Both interpretations lead to the conclusion that, for Ofilius, the only materially 
relevant consideration was whether the magister had agreed to put the 
proceeds of the loan toward a purpose in connection with his appointment. 
This is the conclusion reached not only by Pugliese, Watson, and Miceli;38 but 
also by Cerami, who has gone as far as to assert that the basis for the 
exercitor’s liability in these circumstances was the inclusion of a specific and 
explicit destination clause (clausola di destinazione) in the loan contract by the 
magister.39 The content of Ofilius’ distinction, according to this latter scholar, 
was therefore between those cases in which such a clause had been agreed, 
and those in which it had not. 
I do not find this interpretation convincing. Rather, it is my opinion that the likely 
content of Ofilius’ distinction can be established by placing the text alongside 
a response reported by African (middle part of the second century CE) in 
D.14.1.7 pr.-1 (Afr. 8 quaest.): 
[pr.] Lucius Titius Stichum magistrum navis praeposuit: is pecuniam 
mutuatus cavit se in refectionem navis eam accepisse: quaesitum est, an 
non aliter Titius exercitoria teneretur, quam si creditor probaret pecuniam 
in refectionem navis esse consumptam. respondit creditorem utiliter 
acturum, si, cum pecunia crederetur, navis in ea causa fuisset, ut refici 
deberet: etenim ut non oportet creditorem ad hoc adstringi, ut ipse 
reficiendae navis curam suscipiat et negotium domini gerat (quod certe 
 
dem Zwecke” bedeuten. Ofilius ersetzt in seiner Antwort, um den zweiten Begriff 
auszuschlieβen, jenen Ausdruck durch hac lege. Mox mutavit voluntatem tut so, als 
bedeute hac lege “der Abrede nach und auch in Wirklichkeit zu dem Zwecke”, folglich ist 
es nicht von Ofilius’: ‘Beryt und Bologna’, 406. Watson considers the argument ‘very 
strong’: Obligations, 190. 
37 Miceli, Sulla struttura formulare, 197–98, note 17. 
38 Pugliese, ‘In tema’, 317; Watson, Obligations, 191. Cf. Micele, who reaches the same 
conclusion: Sulla struttura formulare, 197–99. 
39 Cerami, ‘Mutua pecunia’, 135–36; also, Pietro Cerami and Aldo Petrucci, Diritto 
commerciale romano: profilo storico, 3rd ed. (Turin: G. Giappichelli, 2010), 278–81. 
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futurum sit, si necesse habeat probare pecuniam in refectionem erogatam 
esse), ita illud exigendum, ut sciat in hoc se credere, cui rei magister quis 
sit praepositus, quod certe aliter fieri non potest, quam si illud quoque 
scierit necessariam refectioni pecuniam esse: quare etsi in ea causa fuerit 
navis, ut refici deberet, multo tamen maior pecunia credita fuerit, quam ad 
eam rem esset necessaria, non debere in solidum adversus dominum 
navis actionem dari. [1] Interdum etiam illud aestimandum, an in eo loco 
pecunia credita sit, in quo id, propter quod credebatur, comparari potuerit: 
quid enim, inquit, si ad velum emendum in eiusmodi insula pecuniam quis 
crediderit, in qua omnino velum comparari non potest? et in summa 
aliquam diligentiam in ea creditorem debere praestare. 
The text begins with the hypothetical situation in which a magister navis had 
borrowed money for the express purpose of repairing the ship.40 The question 
that arose was whether the exercitor would only be liable if the creditor proved 
that the money had actually been spent on the vessel. The reported response, 
which probably came from Julian, was that although the creditor did not have 
to prove how the money had been spent, the actio exercitoria would only lie if 
the ship was actually in need of repair at the time the money was handed 
over.41 The justification for this opinion was that, although the creditor ought 
not to be bound to oversee the conduct of the work itself (which would be the 
consequence of expecting him to prove how the money had been spent), it 
was reasonable to require him to know that he was lending for a purpose in 
connection with those matters for which the shipmaster was appointed (ita illud 
exigendum, ut sciat in hoc se credere, cui rei magister quis sit praepositus). 
This necessarily involved knowing that the money was actually required for the 
purposes of the ship. 
 
40 De Martino argued that cavit indicates that the agreement was executed as a stipulatio 
recorded in a cautio: ‘Studii sull’actio exercitoria’, 12; ‘Ancora sull’actio exercitoria’, 283–
86. Cf. Pugliese, who suggested it should be interpreted in light of the lex referred to by 
Ofilius in D.14.1.1.9 (i.e., as though the shipmaster had not so much formally committed to 
spending the money toward a specific purpose as stated that he had received it to that 
end): ‘In tema’, 318–19, note 23; also, Cerami, ‘Mutua pecunia’, 135, note 7; Cerami and 
Petrucci, Diritto commerciale romano, 278–81; Miceli, Sulla struttura formulare, 199, note 
19; and Studi, 74–76. 
41 African was Julian’s pupil, and the extent to which the texts attributed to him contain his own 
views, as opposed to that of his mentor, is often unclear. See, Álvaro d’Ors, Las 
Quaestiones de Africano (Rome: Pontificia Università Lateranense - Mursia, 1997), 15. 
Cerami is confident in the attribution: ‘Mutua pecunia’, 138; also, Patricio Lazo, ‘La 
interpretación de la cláusula eius rei nomine de los edictos de exercitoria y de institoria 
actione’, Revista Chilena de Derecho 43, no. 3 (2016): 1094–95. 
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The reasoning here is that because the edict made the exercitor liable for 
bargains struck ‘in connection with those matters for which [the shipmaster] 
was appointed’, an agreement to borrow money could only bind the exercitor 
to the extent that there was in reality a matter (res) to which it was connected.42 
In other words, if there was no factual basis for the agreed purpose of the loan, 
the act of borrowing the money could not be said to be eius rei nomine, etc. It 
followed that the creditor could only sue the exercitor for as much as was 
required to carry out the purpose, and that it was his responsibility, for 
example, to establish whether articles for the purchase of which money had 
been lent could be acquired at the location in question. To the extent that the 
lender was sciens, therefore, he could ensure that the credit he extended was 
fully recoverable from the exercitor.43 
Returning to D.14.1.1.9, the significance of the expression mox mutavit 
voluntatem is not just in its attribution of an initial intention to the shipmaster to 
spend the loan on repairs for the ship, but crucially in the implication that there 
was actually a real purpose toward which the money could have been put. In 
fact, Ofilius’ distinction only makes sense if one infers from this phrase that the 
loan was given in the context of the ship actually needing repairs. In this light, 
the distinction drawn by the jurist was between a magister navis who had 
borrowed money both intending and agreeing to put it toward repairs that were 
actually required, but who subsequently turned the funds to his own use; and 
one who, in the context of the need for repairs, neither intended nor agreed to 
spend the money in this way. In the first scenario the exercitor would be liable, 
but not in the second. Ofilius’ opinion was therefore that the exercitor would 
only be liable in solidum if the magister navis had agreed to put the money 
toward a purpose that was both in connection with a matter for which he was 
appointed and actually existing at the time of receipt. This is entirely consistent 
with the view of the respondent in D.14.1.7 (Afr. 8 quaest.), who emphasised 
 
42 Cf. Johnston’s accurate reading of the text: ‘Limiting Liability: Roman Law and the Civil Law 
Tradition’, Chicago-Kent Law Review 70 (1995): 1520. 
43 Valiño del Río suggested that the appropriate action to raise against an exercitor whose 
shipmaster had borrowed money having made such a declaration was the condictio 
exercitoria: ‘Las relaciones básicas de las acciones adyecticias’, Anuario de Historia del 
Derecho Español 38 (1968): 420. 
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that it was up to the creditor to establish the factual basis for the loan and 
added that the exercitor would only be fully liable to the extent of the funds that 
were required. 
The text therefore does not stand for the wider proposition that, as Watson put 
it, ‘when a magister navis borrows money expressly for the purposes of the 
ship, the exercitor is liable even if the magister is completely fraudulent’.44 This 
interpretation not only negates the need for there to be a factual basis for the 
loan for the exercitor to be liable, but also renders the second part of the 
distinction, as Watson himself admits, ‘irrelevant to the question put’.45 I 
therefore submit that the substance of the text is genuine, and that Ofilius only 
sought to address the narrow situation in which a magister navis had borrowed 
money both intending and agreeing to put it toward repairs that were actually 
required, but who subsequently decided to turn the funds to his own use.46 
This interpretation is also consistent with the observation made by Ulpian 
immediately following D.14.1.1.9, which was that an exercitor would be liable 
if his or her magister navis was deceitful about the price of goods he had 
purchased with borrowed money.47 In these circumstances, although the loan 
was one that fell squarely within the ambit of Pegasus’ opinion (i.e., one in 
which the proceeds were put ad usum eius rei, in quam praepositus est), the 
shipmaster’s conduct contained an element of fraud similar to the scenario 
described in the second part of Ofilius’ distinction. Ulpian’s conclusion was 
that, unlike in Ofilius’ second scenario, a magister navis who intended to use 
the loan as agreed but was deceitful about the cost would bind his exercitor.48 
Finally, Ulpian considered that a person who lent money so that a shipmaster 
could pay off another lender who had funded repairs could sue the exercitor 
as if the money had been put toward the purpose directly (quasi in navem 
crediderit).49 
 
44 Watson, Obligations, 191. 
45 Watson, 191. 
46 Valiño del Río also doubts that the text has been interpolated: ‘Las relaciones básicas’, 420. 
47 D.14.1.1.10 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). 
48 The contrast is indicated by the expression ‘sed et si…’ 
49 D.14.1.1.11 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). 
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The whole section culminates with the statement that ‘the appointment 
therefore provides a governing framework for the contracting parties’ (igitur 
praepositio certam legem dat contrahentibus).50 This was the case because, 
as Gaius made explicit, the fact of the appointment was demonstrative of the 
exercitor’s willingness (voluntas) to be bound by contracts entered into by his 
or her magister navis; and since the praepositio was at the heart of the edict, 
defining those transactions for which the praetor was willing to grant an 
iudicium, it was the touchstone which determined whether any given act was 
one for which an exercitor was liable in solidum. 
The remainder of D.14.1.1.12 and the succeeding two texts simply set out the 
ways in which an exercitor could expand or restrict the acts for which he would 
be held liable. The appointment itself could be specific, so that, for example, a 
shipmaster could be instructed to act as either a carrier of goods or passengers 
(if not both), and, if a carrier of goods, to either let out space on the ship to 
merchants or else take on the task of transport the merchandise himself.51 In 
the event that multiple shipmasters had been appointed, each would bind the 
exercitor to the full extent of the praepositio unless their responsibilities had 
been explicitly divided.52 
 
50 D.14.1.1.12 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). Aubert translates certam legem contextually as a ‘set charter’: 
Business Managers, 10. On the documentation that probably accompanied such 
appointments, Aubert, 9–16; and more generally, Brigitte Schlösser, ‘Die Bedeutung der 
praepositio für den Handelsverkehr im antiken Rom’ (Dissertation, Humboldt-Universität, 
2008); Gérard Minaud, Les gens de commerce et le droit à Rome (Aix-en-Provence: 
Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2011), 189–93. Beseler thought the expression 
suspect: Beiträge zur Kritik der römischen Rechtsquellen, vol. 3 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 
1913), 106; cf. Longo, ‘Actio exercitoria, actio institoria’, 590. The expression is almost 
certainly genuine, as indicated by the similar phrasing used by the Ulpian in D.45.1.52 pr. 
(Ulp. 7 disp.): ‘In conventionalibus stipulationibus contractui formam contrahentes dant’. 
On the text itself, Petrucci, ‘Ulteriori osservazioni’, 47–48; Cerami and Petrucci, Diritto 
commerciale romano, 225–26. 
51 i.e., to act as either a locator or conductor in relation to the person whose merchandise was 
being transported. 
52 D.14.1.1.13 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). Casson argued that a ship could only have one magister at 
any given time, and that the references to multiple shipmasters must refer to the situation 
in which an exercitor was exploiting a fleet of ships: Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient 
World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 318; also, ‘New Light on 
Maritime Loans: P. Vindob. G 19792’, in Studies in Roman Law in Memory of A. Arthur 
Schiller, ed. Roger S. Bagnall and William V. Harris (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 15; cf., Aubert, 
Business Managers, 62; also, Gérard Minaud, ‘Accounting and Maritime Trade in Ancient 




The exercitor could extend or limit his exposure by specifying the terms on 
which the business was to be conducted. He could, for instance, impose 
conditions on the types of goods the magister was permitted to transport and 
the routes he ought to follow.53 Again, if multiple shipmasters had been 
appointed and the terms were that no single magister could conduct business 
without the involvement of the others, a bargain struck in contravention of this 
requirement would fail to bind the exercitor.54 In the case of land-based 
businesses, Ulpian indicated that these proscriptiones were only effective if 
they had been displayed on a public notice at the front of the place of business 
in clear writing, and it is likely that similar requirements applied in the case of 
maritime enterprises as well.55 
…in eum, qui eam navem exercuerit… 
In the classical edict, the praetor declared that he was willing to grant an action 
‘against the person exploiting the ship’. In the juristic sources, this person was 
routinely referred to as the ‘exercitor’, who Gaius identified as ‘the person to 
whom all the everyday earnings of the ship come in’.56 Ulpian, too, described 
him as ‘the person to whom all the revenues and returns arrive’, adding that 
he could either be the outright owner of the vessel or a person hiring it from 
the owner, whether for a temporary or unlimited duration.57 He continued that 
 
53 D.14.1.1.12 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). 
54 D.14.1.1.14 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.); also, in the context of the actio institoria, D.14.3.11.5 (Ulp. 28 
ad ed.). 
55 D.14.3.11.2-4 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). Taking the same view, Apollonia J. M. Meyer-Termeer, Die 
Haftung der Schiffer im griechischen und römischen Recht (Zutphen: Terra, 1978), 152–
53; Miceli, Sulla struttura formulare, 193; Petrucci, ‘Ulteriori osservazioni’, 48; Cerami and 
Petrucci, Diritto commerciale romano, 226; also, Jean-Jacques Aubert, ‘Dealing with the 
Abyss: The Nature and Purpose of the Rhodian Sea-Law on Jettison (Lex Rhodia de Iactu, 
D 14.2) and the Making of Justinian’s Digest’, in Beyond Dogmatics: Law and Society in 
the Roman World, ed. John W. Cairns and Paul J. du Plessis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007), 169. 
56 G.4.71: ‘…exercitor vocatur is, ad quem cottidianus navis quaestus pervenit’. Cf. 
J.Inst.4.7.2, in which Gaius’ definition is restated, though with ‘pervenit’ substituted for 
‘pertinet’. 
57 D.14.1.1.15 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.): ‘Exercitorem autem eum dicimus, ad quem obventiones et 
reditus omnes perveniunt, sive is dominus navis sit sive a domino navem per aversionem 
conduxit vel ad tempus vel in perpetuum’. I agree with Coppola Bisazza that the text is 
probably authentic: ‘Alcune riflessioni in tema di exercitor e di actio exercitoria’, in Studi in 
memoria di Elio Fanara, ed. Umberto La Torre et al., vol. 1 (Milan: Giuffrè, 2006), 189–90. 
Cf., e.g., Solazzi, who asserted that ‘obventiones’ is a gloss: ‘L’età dell’actio exercitoria’, 
1963, 261, note 68. 
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it was a matter of little importance whether the exercitor was male or female, 
a paterfamilias, son-in-power, or slave; provided that if the person exploiting 
the ship was a pupillus he or she was acting with the authority of their tutor.58 
Although the term ‘exercitor’ had a particular meaning within the context of the 
edict, it is clear from both the juristic and literary sources that the word could 
also be used to refer to other kinds of business activities.59 Moreover, as Földi 
has argued, the evidence suggests that the terminology used to refer to the 
different actors engaged in typical shipping operations changed over time. 
Thus, according to Földi:60 
The oldest configuration was simple; at first the ‘nauta’ was at the same 
time the dominus, exercitor, and magister navis. In the second phase the 
nauta was joined by a shipmaster who was in his power, who was probably 
initially known as an exercitor. In the third phase, the exercitores 
themselves became increasingly sui iuris and shipowners in their own 
right. The shipmasters that they in turn appointed became known as the 
magister navis. This is how the classical structure of the relationship 
between the exercitor and magister came into being, supplemented 
occasionally by the expression dominus navis. The word nauta was 
downgraded [to refer to a member of the crew], the word exercitor 
upgraded. 
The argument is attractive, not least because it provides an explanation for the 
incongruity between the names of the institorian and exercitorian actions, the 
first of which refers to the praepositus, the second, at least by the time of the 
classical period, to the person making the appointment.61 The relevance of 
Földi’s linguistic analysis for this study, however, consists in his conclusion that 
if the terminology changed as the evidence appears to suggest, so too it is 
likely that the original edict – which he dates to the second century BCE – was 
different to the version that appeared in the edictum perpetuum. Földi therefore 
offers the following reconstruction:62 
 
58 D.14.1.1.16 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.); also, D.14.3.7.1 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). 
59 On this, Aubert, Business Managers, 87; also, Földi, ‘La responsabilità’, 179–80. 
60 András Földi, ‘Die Entwicklung der sich auf die Schiffer beziehenden Terminologie im 
römischen Recht’, TvR 63 (1995): 7. 
61 Földi, 6; cf. Aubert, Business Managers, 87–89. 
62 Földi, ‘Die Entwicklung’, 4. 
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In nautas, quod cum exercitoribus ab eis praepositus eius rei nomine 
gestum erit, cui ibi praepositi fuerint, iudicium dabo. 
As the author himself admits, the exercise is necessarily speculative. 
Nevertheless, if his suppositions are correct, it is likely that the original edict 
will have granted an action against the nauta for contracts entered into with his 
exercitor (in the sense of the meanings attributed to the words in phase two of 
Földi’s suggested development). It is also clear that Földi believes that the rest 
of the edict remained stable between its creation and Julian’s redaction. Again, 
this is conjectural, though as I have already indicated, the distinction reported 
to have been made by Ofilius in D.14.1.1.9 suggests that the edictal 
relationship between the praepositus and the person making the appointment 
remained consistent at least from the second half of the first century BCE. 
4.1.1.2 The Second Part of the Edict. 
The edict’s second clause dealt with contracts entered into with a magister 
navis whose exercitor was in the power of another. It therefore addressed the 
complex situation in which the structure of a maritime enterprise consisted of 
multiple levels: that is, of a paterfamilias – filius familias – praepositus, or a 
dominus – servus ordinarius – praepositus:63 
Si is, qui navem exercuerit, in aliena potestate erit eiusque voluntate 
navem exercuerit, quod cum magistro eius gestum erit, in eum, in cuius 
potestate is erit qui navem exercuerit, iudicium datur. 
If the person exploiting the vessel is in the potestas of another and is acting 
according to their will, where business is conducted with a shipmaster, an 
action is granted against the person in whose potestas the person 
exploiting the ship is. 
Although a handful of scholars have considered the text interpolated, I am 
convinced by the arguments put forward by, inter alios, Pugliese and Wunner, 
that its substance is genuine.64 Ulpian’s commentary indicates that the edict 
was in existence by the time of Julian’s redaction. However, the absence of 
 
63 D.14.1.1.19 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). For a synoptic table setting out the different possible variations, 
Földi, ‘Remarks’, 192–93. 
64 Pugliese, ‘In tema’, 321–23; Wunner, Contractus, 125–32; also, Aubert, Business 
Managers, 61–62; Földi, ‘La responsabilità’, 182; and Cerami and Petrucci, Diritto 
commerciale romano, 230–31. For the previous literature, including the objections raised 
by Beseler and De Martino, Miceli, Sulla struttura formulare, 215, note 57. 
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any reference to the views of jurists before Julian and Pomponius means that 
there is no trace of its development before the first half of the second century 
CE. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, Földi has argued that the edict’s peculiar 
phrasing suggests that the version given by Ulpian was somewhat different to 
that of its earlier iterations.65 The scholar makes two observations. First, he 
regards the threefold repetition of the phrase ‘is qui navem exercuerit’ as 
suspicious and argues that it was probably used in place of the simpler 
‘exercitor’ to avoid any ambiguity arising from the changes in the meaning of 
the latter word over time. Second, he casts doubt on the expression ‘in aliena 
potestate’, which he argues was the result of a later juristic tendency towards 
generalisation. Instead, he suggests, the original edict is likely to have referred 
exclusively to servile exercitores (i.e., those in potestate domini), and later also 
to sons-in-power (i.e., those in potestate patris dominive). Földi therefore offers 
the following reconstruction of the original edict:66 
Si <nauta> in potestate <domini> erit eiusque voluntate navem exercuerit, 
quod cum <exercitore> eius gestum erit, in <dominum> iudicium dabo. 
Földi’s reconstructions must, of course, be treated with caution, for the obvious 
reason that they do not proceed from direct evidence. On the other hand, his 
arguments are reasonable, and if one accepts that the core content of the 
edicts remained relatively stable between the time of their introduction and 
their inclusion by Julian in the edictum perpetuum, then they are likely to 
reflect, at least broadly, the scope of the edict in one of its earlier forms. As I 
have already indicated, there is no evidence for the existence of the second 
part of the edict before the time of Julian; though Földi implies that it was 
introduced during the same period as the first (that is, during the second stage 
of his terminological development). 
If Földi’s argument is right, Ulpian’s commentary is based on a classical version 
of the edict. As in the case of the first part of the edict, the jurist successively 
 
65 András Földi, ‘Appunti sulla Responsabilita per l’exercitor in Potestate’, Studia Iuridica 
Auctoritate Universitatis Pecs 123 (1996): 73–76; also, ‘La responsabilità’, 182–84. 
66 Földi, ‘La responsabilità’, 184. 
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interpreted the relevant phrases. These are, in order of treatment: eiusque 
voluntate navem exercuerit; in aliena potestate; and quod cum magistro eius 
gestum erit. Since many of the considerations that arose in relation to the first 
part of the edict also applied here, the jurist’s discussion is focused exclusively 
on those aspects that were either directly or exclusively relevant to the specific 
situation addressed by the second part. 
According to Ulpian, the justification for the full liability of a father or master for 
business conducted by a magister navis appointed by a person in his power 
was that the exploitation of ships was of the greatest public importance (ad 
summam rem publicam):67 
D.14.1.1.20 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.): 
Licet autem detur ^datur^ actio in eum, cuius in potestate est qui navem 
exercet, tamen ita demum datur, si voluntate eius exerceat. ideo autem ex 
voluntate in solidum tenentur qui habent in potestate exercitorem, quia ad 
summam rem publicam navium exercitio perinet. at institorum non idem 
usus est: ea propter in tributum dumtaxat vocantur, qui contraxerunt cum 
eo, qui in merce peculiari sciente domino negotiatur. sed si sciente 
dumtaxat, non etiam volente cum magistro contractum sit, utrum quasi in 
volentem damus actionem in solidum an vero exemplo tributoriae 
dabimus? in re igitur dubia melius est verbis edicti servire et neque 
scientiam solam et nudam patris dominive in navibus onerare neque in 
peculiaribus mercibus voluntatem extendere ad solidi obligationem. et ita 
videtur et Pomponius significare, si sit in aliena potestate, si quidem 
voluntate gerat, in solidum eum obligari, si minus, in peculium. 
If this was the justification for unlimited liability in the context of the second part 
of the edict, an additional consideration concerned the circumstances in which 
that unlimited liability would apply. Here, the extent of the father or master’s 
liability was rationalised according to the degree to which he was aware of the 
enterprises being carried on by those in his power (i.e., whether he was volens, 
sciens, or ignorans). The issue that arose was a subtle one: whereas the 
exercitorian edict made a father or master liable in solidum for business 
conducted with a shipmaster who had been appointed by a son or slave who 
 
67 According to Sirks, Ulpian had the annona in mind: Food for Rome: The Legal Structure of 
the Transportation and Processing of Supplies for the Imperial Distributions in Rome and 
Constantinople (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1991), 120–21. 
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was acting according to his will (voluntas), the institorian edict made no such 
provision. Consequently, there was nothing in the institorian context to prevent 
the application of the actio tributoria, which in these circumstances would lie 
for debts incurred by an institor whose praeponens was trading out of a 
peculium with their father or master’s knowledge (scientia). The question that 
followed was therefore whether the actio tributoria should also lie in the 
exercitorian context, even though the second part of the edict specified that 
the father or master’s liability depended upon their voluntas. 
For Ulpian, extending the exercitorian edict to cover the situation in which a 
son or slave carried on a maritime enterprise against the will of his father or 
master but with his knowledge meant either extending the edictal meaning of 
voluntas to cover scientia or granting an action on the analogy of the actio 
tributoria (exemplo tributoriae). The jurist rejected the first suggestion stating 
that in cases of doubt it was better to adhere to the words of the edict. 
Correspondingly, it was his view that the meaning of voluntas should not 
extend the full liability of a father or master to maritime enterprises carried on 
by those in his power with his bare knowledge (nuda scientia). This position, 
he continued, appeared also to have been adopted by Pomponius, who 
reportedly took the view that the father or master would be fully liable for 
business conducted according to his will, but only to the extent of the peculium 
if he was anything other than volens. 
Whether Ulpian thought that an action ad exemplum tributoriae should be 
granted in the circumstances described above cannot, in my view, be 
determined from this text alone. First, as Földi has argued, the meaning of the 
expression in peculium is ambiguous, since it is not clear whether it refers to 
the father or master’s liability specifically under the actio de peculio or more 
generally to the actio tributoria as well.68 Second, since Ulpian only deals in 
this text with the scope of the meaning of voluntas, it is not clear whether he 
cites Pomponius exclusively in support of his conclusion on this point, or as an 
endorsement of the wider proposition that an action on the analogy of the actio 
 
68 Földi, ‘La responsabilità’, 189; also, ‘Appunti sulla Responsabilita’, 81. 
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tributoria should also be refused. In any case, a text taken from Ulpian’s 
commentary on the edict de recepto indicates that he did in fact take the view 
that, in the absence of voluntas, the only liability of the father or master was 
de peculio.69 Whatever the jurist’s thoughts on the matter, Paul stated his 
succinctly in the sixth book of his brevium ad edictum, in which he noted that 
a master who was sciens but not volens would be liable quasi tributoria, and 
one who was ignorans only to the actio de peculio.70 
So far as the edictal expression ‘in potestate’ was concerned, Ulpian held it to 
include people of either sex, sons or daughter, male or female slaves.71 
Moreover, in the event that the exercitor was a slave in the peculium of 
someone who was themselves a dependant (that is, part of a three level 
enterprise according to the structure pater – filius familias – servus peculiaris 
– praepositus, or, dominus – servus ordinarius – servus vicarius – 
praepositus), the degree to which both actors senior to the exercitor were 
aware of the enterprise determined the extent of their liability.72 Thus, if both 
were volens, both would be liable in full, whereas if the servus ordinarius or 
son-in-power was volens, but the father or master was not, the former would 
be fully liable, the latter only to the actio de peculio. Finally, at least with respect 
to the second part of the edict, Ulpian confirmed Julian’s view that the praetor’s 
promise to grant an action for business conducted with a shipmaster (si cum 
magistro eius gestum sit) also extended to contracts entered into with an 
exercitor who was in potestate.73 
4.1.2 The Action and its formula. 
One of the most vexing questions with respect to the actio exercitoria (and 
indeed the other so-called actiones adiecticiae qualitatis) concerns the 
 
69 D.4.9.3.3 (Ulp. 14 ad ed.); and in this connection, PS.2.6.1. In support of this position, 
Pugliese, ‘In tema’, 330–33; Di Porto, Impresa collettiva, 228; Aubert, Business Managers, 
61–62; also, Földi, ‘Remarks’, 208; though cf. ‘Appunti sulla Responsabilita’, 80–81. 
70 D.14.1.6 pr. (Paul. 6 brev.): on which, Földi, ‘La responsabilità’, 194–96; Wunner, 
Contractus, 130–31; Cerami and Petrucci, Diritto commerciale romano, 234. 
71 D.14.1.1.21 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). 
72 D.14.1.1.22 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.): on which, Földi, ‘Remarks’, 203; also, Cerami and Petrucci, 
Diritto commerciale romano, 235–36. 




structure of its formula.74 In the literature, the formulae of the actiones 
adiecticiae qualitatis are often treated together, so that conclusions drawn 
about, for example, the actiones de peculio and institoria have been readily 
extended to the actio exercitoria as well. The assumption is therefore that 
whichever technique was used to implement the declaration in these edicts 
was also used for the others as well. As we have seen, the exercitorian edict 
promised that if business was conducted with a magister navis in connection 
with the matters for which he was appointed, the praetor would grant an action 
against the person exploiting the ship (or the person in whose power he or she 
was). There are three main accounts of how this was achieved. For our 
purposes, the aim of this section will not be to argue which of these accounts 
is correct, but rather to identify their differences from a substantive point of 
view. 
The earliest and most influential account was first put forward by Keller in 1827 
and argued for again by Lenel a century later.75 In their view, the so-called 
actiones adiecticiae qualitatis (including the institorian and exercitorian 
actions) were modifications of existing formulae. Where the transaction at 
issue was one that would ordinarily give rise to a formula in ius concepta, the 
intentio would be framed in relation to the praepositus, while the liability of the 
praeponens was achieved by transposing his or her name into the 
condemnatio. Where the praepositus was a slave, the duty attributed to him in 
the intentio was maintained by means of the fiction that he was a free person 
(si liber esset).76 The result of this manoeuvre was that the exercitor became 
the defender to an action predicated on an obligation that had been incurred 
 
74 On the whole question, Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 168–76; also, William W. 
Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery: The Condition of the Slave in Private Law from 
Augustus to Justinian (Cambridge: The University Press, 1908), 706–12. For a 
comprehensive bibliography, Miceli, Sulla struttura formulare, 7, note 1. 
75 Friedrich Ludwig von Keller, Über Litis Contestation und Urtheil nach classischem 
römischem Recht (Zurich, 1827), 420; Lenel, EP3, 264–70. 
76 Gradenwitz suggested that the fiction was that the slave had been manumitted at the time 
of the transaction (i.e., ‘si… manumissus esset’): ‘Zwei Bemerkungen zur Actio de peculio’, 
ZSS 27 (1906): 231–32. 
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either actually or notionally by his or her magister navis. If this account is 
correct, the formula probably ran as follows:77 
C. Aquilius iudex esto. Quod As As de L. Titio, cum is a No No magister navi 
praepositus esset, eius rei nomine decem pondo olei emit, q.d.r.a., 
quidquid ob eam rem L. Titium Ao Ao dare facere oportet ex fide bona, eius 
iudex Nm Nm Ao Ao c.s.n.p.a. 
An alternative account was provided by Mandry and Brinz.78 According to 
these authors, the notion that a slave could have been named as the source 
of an obligation to give or do something ex iure civile was an insurmountable 
difficulty. Consequently, it was their view that the formula must have been 
framed in factum concepta; that is, in such a way as to instruct the judge to 
condemn or absolve the defender according to a set of facts, rather than with 
reference to what he ought to give or do (e.g., si paret Am Am de L. Titio decem 
pondo olei emisse, etc.). This thesis appears to conform quite closely to the 
texts – at least in relation to the actio exercitoria – for the formula would only 
have required that the facts of the situation at issue fall within the scope of the 
edict, on the sole basis of which the praeponens was obliged (i.e., propter 
honorariam obligationem).79 On the other hand, as Huvelin noted, the 
argument encounters several difficulties. First, the evidence in relation to the 
other actiones adiecticiae qualitatis suggests the use of fictions (especially in 
relation to the actio de peculio), which would not have been necessary in an 
actio in factum.80 Second, and most significantly for our purposes, a formula in 
factum concepta would have instructed the judge to condemn or absolve on 
the strength of the facts alone. However, if the transaction was one that 
 
77 Cf. Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 170. The transposition thesis is followed by Mantovani 
in his reconstructions of the formulae of the actiones adiecticiae qualitatis: Le formule del 
processo privato romano. Per la didattica delle istituzioni di diritto romano (Como: New 
Press, 1992), 70–72, nos. 95-99. 
78 Mandry, Das gemeine Familiengüterrecht, 2:259–63; Aloys von Brinz, Lehrbuch der 
Pandekten, vol. 2 Aufl., 2.1 (Erlangen: A. Deichert, 1879), 204; also, ‘Gutachten für die 
königliche Akademie in München’, ZSS 4 (1883): 166–67. 
79 D.14.1.1.24 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). 
80 E.g., in relation to the actio de peculio, D.45.2.12.1 (Ven. 2 stipul.). With respect to the actio 
institoria, Huvelin cites D.14.3.11.8 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.) and D.14.3.12 (Iul. 11 dig.), in which 
scenario Julian proposed that an actio utilis ought to be granted. The scholar remarks that, 
if the actiones adiecticiae qualitatis were actiones in factum as Mandry suggests, there 
would have been no need to grant an action utilis in the situation described: Droit 
commercial romain, 170–73. 
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ordinarily gave rise to an actio bonae fidei, this would mean that the judge was 
instructed only to establish whether, for example, a sale had taken place, 
without inquiring into what the parties owed to one another ex fide bona. For 
this reason, Miceli considers it inconceivable that contractual relationships – 
and especially contractual relationships involving good faith – could have been 
adjudicated differently depending on whether the bargain had been struck with 
a praepositus or not.81 
The final account is that of Baron and Miceli.82 According to these scholars, 
the actiones adiecticiae qualitatis consisted of modified formulae in ius (as 
Keller and Lenel), though their intentiones expressed a duty in the praeponens 
(or the person in whose power he or she was) rather than in the praepositus:83 
C. Aquilius iudex esto. Quod As As de L. Titio, cum is a No No magister navi 
praepositus esset, eius rei nomine decem pondo olei emit, q.d.r.a., 
quidquid ob eam rem Nm Nm Ao Ao dare facere oportet ex fide bona, eius 
iudex Nm Nm Ao Ao c.s.n.p.a. 
The main objection to this thesis has been that although it was within the power 
of the magistrate to grant and refuse remedies and to extend existing ones by 
means of fictions, the transposition of subjects, etc., he was not competent to 
create a civil obligation ex novo; sc., by instructing a judge to condemn or 
absolve according to what it was proper for the defender to give or do (dare 
facere oportere). As Miceli has argued, however, this objection rests on the 
proposition that the distinction between civil and praetorian actions was drawn 
just as sharply at the time the actiones adiecticiae qualitatis were introduced 
as during the classical period of Roman jurisprudence. If, as the author 
suggests, this was not the case, and it was possible for the praetor to 
implement the promises contained in his edict by issuing formulae on the 
model of those later referred to as in ius conceptae, then, so the argument 
runs, one of the main obstacles to the naming of the praeponens in the intentio 
is removed.84 
 
81 Miceli, Sulla struttura formulare, 26. 
82 Julius Baron, Abhandlungen aus dem römischen Civilprozess, vol. 2. Die Adjecticischen 
Klagen (Berlin, 1882), 136; Miceli, Sulla struttura formulare, 35. 
83 See, for example, the formulae suggested by Miceli: Sulla struttura formulare, 360–63. 
84 Miceli, 344–50. 
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The practical differences between the accounts offered by Keller and Lenel on 
the one hand, and Baron and Miceli on the other, are not very great, since in 
both versions the actio exercitoria is conceived as a modification of formulae 
in ius. In contrast, the difference between these accounts and that of Mandry 
and Brinz is very great indeed. This is because if the formula was framed in 
factum, the judge would not be able to assess the duties of the parties 
according to good faith.85 I do not think it is impossible, as Miceli contends, that 
this divergence can have been tolerated.86 If the actio exercitoria was one of 
the earliest of the actiones adiecticiae qualitatis – and especially if it was 
introduced earlier than the actio institoria – it may well have been the praetor’s 
intention to grant relief only in the narrow circumstances described by the edict 
and not to hold the praeponens liable in solidum with reference to the bona 
fides of the son or slave. It is hard to see, however, how this state of affairs 
can have persisted for very long. The operation of the lex Rhodia, for example, 
which had been at least partially interpreted into the framework of Roman law 
by the second half of the first century BCE at the latest, was achieved by 
making contributio a matter of good faith between the parties to a locatio 
conductio. If the actio exercitoria was in factum, there does not appear to be 
any way in which a person whose cargo had been jettisoned could sue an 
exercitor for contribution on the basis of a contract of letting and hiring 
concluded with his or her magister navis. In effect, a praepositus would only 
be bound to act in good faith on his own account, and not on behalf of the 
praeponens. For this and other reasons, either of the theses advanced by 
Keller/ Lenel and Baron/ Miceli are to be preferred. 
With these possibilities in mind, it remains to consider some of the action’s 
procedural aspects. According to Ulpian, it was up to the third party whether to 
sue the exercitor or the magister navis.87 If the shipmaster was the exercitor’s 
dependant, Gaius was clear that the actio exercitoria was to be preferred over 
 
85 The actio in factum civilis mentioned by Labeo in D.19.5.1.1 (Pap. 8 quaest.) does not pose 
a problem in this respect, as its intentio was most likely incerta ex fide bona (i.e., quidquid… 
dare facere oportet ex fide bona): on which, infra, 169 et seq. 
86 Miceli, Sulla struttura formulare, 26. 
87 D.14.1.1.17 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). 
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the actiones de peculio and de in rem verso for the reason that the former was 
in solidum and less onerous in terms of proof.88 Conversely, if he was not in 
the power of the exercitor, the third party would only have the actio exercitoria 
to rely on with respect to the praeponens, though he could choose to sue the 
magister using a standard contractual remedy.89 These options were 
alternative because a suit joined against one consumed the obligation of the 
other (at the moment of litis contestatio); for, as Ulpian explained, the action 
against the exercitor was given ex persona magistri.90 In addition, payments 
made toward the reduction of the obligation of one would simultaneously 
reduce what was owed by the other. It is not clear how a third party who had 
struck a bargain with an exercitor in potestate (as per Julian’s opinion in 
D.14.1.1.23) could go about suing the father or master: if the actio exercitoria 
was in factum then this presents little difficulty; if a modification of a formula in 
ius concepta, then, as Pugliese suggested, an actio utilis is likely to have been 
given.91 Finally, although the exercitor could not sue a third party who had dealt 
with a magister extraneus directly, he could recover from the shipmaster on 
the contract of hire or mandate for losses he had incurred on his account.92 
Paul emphasised that the edictal liability of the person who had appointed a 
shipmaster lay notwithstanding any other civilian or praetorian relationship 
between the actors involved. This meant, for example, that if a master let the 
services of his slave to a third party who subsequently appointed him as a 
magister, any bargains struck between the master and the slave in his capacity 
as shipmaster would give rise to exercitorian liability on the part of the 
praeponens.93 In the institorian context, Julian stated that the appropriate 
action for the master to use in this scenario was an actio utilis, though this level 
 
88 G.4.74; also, J.Inst.4.7.5. 
89 D.14.1.5.1 (Paul. 29 ad ed.): ‘…hoc enim edicto non transfertur actio, sed adicitur’. 
90 D.14.1.1.24 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). In relation to the actio institoria, Ulpian appears to suggest that 
bringing a suit on this account would not bar the actio tributoria: D.14.3.11.7 (Ulp. 28 ad 
ed.). Buckland considered this an issue for the exercitorian action as well: The Roman Law 
of Slavery, 712. However, if it was Ulpian’s view that the actio tributoria did not lie alongside 
the actio exercitoria, then the problem does not arise: D.14.1.1.20 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). 
91 Pugliese, ‘In tema’, 334–35. 
92 D.14.1.1.18 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). 
93 D.14.1.5 pr. (Paul. 29 ad ed.). 
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of detail is not forthcoming from Paul.94 In the other direction, the praeponens 
could sue the master ex conducto to compel him to transfer any actions 
acquired on account of his power over the magister.95 In addition, Ulpian noted 
that, with respect to the second part of the edict, a master who alienated a 
slave who had been exploiting a ship voluntate domini remained liable despite 
the transfer.96 
If there were multiple exercitores, each was jointly and severally liable in 
solidum for bargains struck with the praepositus.97 This appears to have been 
the case at least from the time of Julian, who stated that this rule would apply 
in the institorian context exemplo exercitorum.98 The justification provided by 
Gaius was that it avoided the necessity for third parties to split up their suit 
between defenders.99 Paul continued that, if the exercitores were partners, the 
balance could be redressed by their suing one another pro socio (or communi 
dividundo).100 On the other hand, if several exercitores were exploiting the ship 
personally without having appointed a magister navis, each would only be 
liable to the extent of their share in the enterprise.101 As soon as they appointed 
a shipmaster from among them, however, the normal rules would apply, and 
each would be jointly and severally liable in solidum for dealings with the 
praepositus.102 Ulpian extended this reasoning to the second part of the edict, 
so that a servile exercitor who exploited a ship according to the will of his 
owners in common made them all jointly and severally liable in full.103 Further, 
it was his view that even if only one of the owners in common was volens, all 
 
94 D.14.3.11.8 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.) and D.14.3.12 (Iul. 11 dig.). 
95 D.14.1.5 pr. (Paul. 29 ad ed.). 
96 D.14.1.4.3 (Ulp. 29[28?] ad ed.). Aubert is right to query whether this passage has been 
wrongly attributed to book 29 of Ulpian’s commentary ad edictum: Business Managers, 63, 
note 102. 
97 D.14.1.1.25 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.). On collective liability in the context of the actio exercitoria: Di 
Porto, Impresa collettiva, 175; Feliciano Serrao, Impresa e responsabilità a Roma nell’età 
commerciale: forme giuridiche di un’economia-mondo (Pisa: Pacini, 2002), 76; Aubert, 
Business Managers, 63; Földi, ‘Remarks’, 198–205; Cerami and Petrucci, Diritto 
commerciale romano, 239–45. 
98 D.14.3.13.2 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.): on which, Solazzi, ‘L’età dell’actio exercitoria’, 1963, 249–50. 
99 D.14.1.2 (Gai. 9 ad ed. provinc.). 
100 D.14.1.3 (Paul. 29 ad ed.). 
101 D.14.1.4 pr. (Ulp. 29[28?] ad ed.). 
102 D.14.1.4.1 (Ulp. 29[28?] ad ed.). 
103 D.14.1.4.2 (Ulp. 29[28?] ad ed.); also, D.14.1.6.1 (Paul. 6 brev.): on both of which, Cerami 
and Petrucci, Diritto commerciale romano, 244–45. 
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would be liable in solidum. The exercitorian action, unlike the actio de peculio, 
was perpetual (i.e., not time barred), and was not extinguished by the death of 
either the exercitor or the shipmaster.104 
4.1.3 Conclusion. 
The actio exercitoria lay in solidum (i.e., without limit) against a person who 
had appointed a shipmaster (magister navis) for contracts entered into with 
him in connection with the matters for which he was appointed. By the time of 
the classical period the edict consisted of two parts, which enabled the 
aggrieved party to proceed against both the exercitor and the person in whose 
potestas he or she was. In both cases the edict applied irrespective of the 
status of the magister and even if he was an extraneus (i.e., not in the power 
of the exercitor or his paterfamilias); though whether this was the case from 
the start or a later innovation is uncertain. In this and other respects the action 
was similar to the actio institoria, which introduced a remedy for transactions 
entered into with the managers of land-based enterprises (institores), and for 
this reason the two are usually considered together. As de Ligt has pointed 
out, Plautus’ exclusive references to peculia where praepositiones might 
otherwise have been mentioned suggests that both actions were probably 
unknown to the playwright, and therefore likely introduced after his death in 
184 BCE.105 This argument, however, is far from definitive. 
The first attestation of these actions in the juristic sources can be attributed to 
Servius and Ofilius respectively.106 In the text in which Servius’ view is 
reported, however, we are told that his observations were made as a comment 
upon the writings of M. Iunius Brutus (pr. c. 140 BCE), who Aubert has 
cautiously connected with the introduction of the actio institoria.107 This is 
supported by the most likely structure of the formula of these actions – 
according to which the name of the principal was transposed into the 
 
104 D.14.1.4.4 (Ulp. 29[28?] ad ed.): on which, Aubert, Business Managers, 63. 
105 Luuk de Ligt, ‘Legal History and Economic History: The Case of the Actiones Adiecticiae 
Qualitatis’, TvR 67 (1999): 225–26. 
106 For the actio institoria, D.14.3.5.1 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.); and for the actio exercitoria, D.14.1.1.9 
(Ulp. 28 ad ed.): on which, Siro Solazzi, ‘L’età dell’actio exercitoria’, Rivista di diritto della 
navigazione 7 (1941): 259. 
107 Aubert, Business Managers, 76–77. 
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condemnatio for that of the praepositus, against whom the claim was made in 
the intentio – which is analogous to that of another remedy (the formula 
Rutiliana), thought to have been introduced by 118 BCE at the latest.108 It is 
usually conceded that the actio exercitoria was introduced earlier than the actio 
institoria, though Aubert has recently contested this view.109 It is unlikely, 
however, that they were introduced far apart from one another, and for this 
reason I agree with Aubert that both actions were introduced in the late second 
century BCE.110 This is consistent with the view of those scholars who date the 
development of the so-called actiones adiecticiae qualitatis to the second 
century BCE more generally.111 
The evidence also provides some insights into how the wording and 
interpretation of the edict changed over time. With respect to the first part, the 
distinction made by Ofilius indicates that the expression eius rei nomine, cui 
ibi praepositus fuerit – or at least a phrase with the same substantive content 
– constituted part of the edict’s phrasing from at least the second half of the 
first century BCE. It is possible that before this time the first part of edict 
specified that it only applied if the praepositus was in the power of the exercitor; 
but even if this was the case, this restriction is likely to have been removed by 
the late Republic. It is also possible, as Földi has argued, that changes in the 
meaning of certain words led to changes in the wording of the edict (though 
not necessarily to its substantive content). So far as the interpretation of this 
part of the edict was concerned, the evidence suggests that before the time of 
Julian the sub-appointment of a shipmaster by another magister navis only 
made the exercitor liable if he or she was volens. In addition, the circumstances 
 
108 Aubert, 77–78. 
109 Aubert, 90–91, with bibliography at 84, note 182; also, Jean-Jacques Aubert, ‘The 
Republican Economy and Roman Law: Regulation, Promotion, or Reflection?’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic, ed. Harriet I. Flower, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 171–72. De Ligt prefers the priority of the actio 
exercitoria: ‘Actiones Adiecticiae Qualitatis’, 219–20. 
110 Aubert, Business Managers, 77; also, Emilio Valiño del Río, ‘Las “actiones adiecticiae 
qualitatis” y sus relaciones básicas en Derecho Romano’, Anuario de Historia del Derecho 
Español 37 (1967): 382. 
111 For a bibliography of scholars taking this view, de Ligt, ‘Actiones Adiecticiae Qualitatis’, 
222, note 60. De Ligt himself argues for the introduction of the earliest actiones adiecticiae 




in which borrowing money counted as an activity in connection with the matters 
for which a shipmaster had been appointed appears to have been a topic of 
discussion across several centuries. Whether, therefore, this was always the 
case is doubtful, though the earliest evidence is supplied by Ofilius, who 
suggested that borrowing money could count for these purposes in certain 
limited circumstances. 
Turning to the second part of the edict, the first direct evidence for its existence 
is provided by Ulpian, though his treatment of the topic ad edictum and citation 
of earlier jurists indicates that it was in existence by the middle of the second 
century CE. This does not preclude, however, the possibility that it was 
introduced earlier; sc., at some point between the introduction of the first part 
of the edict and the time of Julian and Pomponius. It is possible, as Földi has 
suggested, that the edict was originally restricted to slaves embarking on a 
maritime venture with the consent of their master, and later also to sons-in-
power. This, however, is largely conjectural. If the edict was introduced earlier 
than the middle of the second century, then, as in the first part, there are likely 
to have been terminological changes over time. With respect to the edict’s 
interpretation, whether the actio tributoria could be brought in the exercitorian 
context was not a settled matter, even by the time of Ulpian and Paul. In 
addition, it was only after about the middle of the second century CE that a 
father or master could be held liable for contracts entered into by a son or slave 
who was acting in his capacity as an exercitor. Finally, the procedural 
mechanism by which both parts of the edict were realised is likely to have 
consisted of a modification to formulae in ius conceptae. 
 
Section 4.2: The actiones locati and conducti. 
4.2.1 Shipping Contracts and locatio conductio. 
The merchant’s objective was to transport goods to their intended market so 
that he could exchange them for money or for some other property. If he did 
not possess the means to achieve this himself, he needed to engage an 
exercitor, either by hiring a ship or the services of someone in control of a ship. 
153 
 
Contracts that involved one party putting his ship or services under the control 
of another in return for money fell within the ambit of the only long-term bilateral 
contract known to the Romans: locatio conductio (letting and hiring). Although 
the verbs locare (‘to rent/ let out’) and conducere (‘to hire/ accept something 
on hire’) appear in the sources from the fifth century BCE onwards, the use of 
these words probably bears little resemblance to their technical use in the 
context of the consensual contract.112 The first explicit reference to bonae fidei 
character of the agreement is provided by Cicero, but there is little doubt that 
it was characterised by good faith significantly before the advent of the first 
century BCE. Several hypotheses have been advanced in this respect, the 
most convincing of which locate the creation of the consensual contract at 
some point between the mid-third and mid-second centuries BCE.113 The 
absence of any reference to stipulations by Cato in some passages concerning 
hiring arrangements indicates that the contract was consensual by c. 160 BCE, 
and several scenes in Plautus tend to suggest an earlier date.114 At any rate, 
it has been suggested that the introduction of the bilateral form of the 
agreement simply granted legal recognition to an already-existing state of 
affairs and involved little more than the conceptual reorganisation of the earlier 
forms of letting and hiring into a bonae fidei iudicium.115 
 
112 Paul J. du Plessis, Letting and Hiring in Roman Legal Thought 27 BCE-284 CE (Leiden 
and Boston: Brill, 2012), 9–10; also, Theo Mayer-Maly, ‘Römische Grundlagen des 
modernen Arbeitsrecht’, Recht der Arbeit 8–9 (1967): 283; and Roberto Fiori, La definizione 
della ‘locatio conductio’: giurisprudenza romana e tradizione romanistica (Naples: Jovene, 
1999), 13–14, 18, 21. 
113 According to El Bouzidi, for example, the contract arose out of the socio-economic 
conditions of agricultural production on the Italian peninsula during the transformation of 
the second century BCE: ‘Les formes de negotiations des contrats. Une évolution 
institutionelle dans le monde rural au Ilême s. av. J.C.’, Gerión. Revista de Historia Antigua 
18 (2000): 147–58. For the hypothesis, following Kaser, that the contract was developed 
as early as the mid-third century BCE, Armando José Torrent Ruiz, ‘La polémica sobre la 
tricotomía “res”, “operae”, “opus” y los origenes de la “locatio-conductio”’, Teoria e storia 
del diritto privato 4 (2011): 9 and 36. 
114 Cato, Agr. 144-45: on which, Watson, Obligations, 101. Mayer-Maly cited several scenes 
in Plautus’ Aulularia in support of the proposition that the contract was consensual by the 
time of the play’s composition (Plaut., Aul. 280-82; 448; and 455-59): Locatio conductio: 
eine untersuchung zum klassischen römischen Recht (Vienna: Herold, 1956), 81; though 
cf. Watson, Obligations, 100–101. 
115 Horst Kaufmann, Die altrömische Miete, ihre Zusammenhänge mit Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft 
und staatlicher Vermögensverwaltung (Cologne and Graz: Böhlau-Verlag, 1964), § 7; 
Barend C. Stoop, ‘Werkers en werk in die Klassieke Romeinse Reg’ (University of South 
Africa, 1994), 197. 
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If one of the parties wished to sue the other for breach of the agreement, he 
could rely (at least initially) on one of two remedies: the actio locati, if he 
qualified as the locator, and the actio conducti, if he qualified as the conductor. 
In the second and third editions of Lenel’s edictum perpetuum, the author gave 
the following reconstruction of the classical formulae:116 
Actio locati/ conducti: 
Quod Aulus Agerius Numerio Negidio fundum (opus faciendum, operas) 
quo de agitur locavit/ conduxit, quidquid ob eam rem Numerium Negidium 
Aulo Agerio dare facere oportet ex fide bona, eius iudex Numerium 
Negidium Aulo Agerio condemnato, si non paret, absolvito. 
Whereas Aulus Agerius let/ hired the land (task to be done, tasks) which 
is the subject of this action to Numerius Negidius, which matter is the 
subject of this suit, whatever on that account Numerius Negidius ought in 
good faith to give or do for Aulus Agerius, for the value of that let the judge 
condemn Numerius Negidius to Aulus Agerius; if it does not appear let him 
absolve (trans. Birks 2014, 97). 
Lenel’s reconstruction is controversial on account of the suggestion that the 
obligation arising from a contract of letting and hiring had three possible 
permutations: sc., the letting/ hiring of a res, of a task to be done, or of operae. 
This was different from the formula of the actio locati proposed in Lenel’s first 
edition, which followed Rudorff’s earlier reconstruction by differentiating solely 
between the letting and hiring of res or operae.117 The trichotomy adopted by 
Lenel in the later editions was likely a response to Pandectist scholarship at 
the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which was informed by the 
anachronistic notion that an obligation consisted of its ‘contents’ and had 
certain permissible ‘objects’.118 Rather, as Fiori has demonstrated, the Roman 
jurists themselves had a unitary conception of the contract as an agreement 
 
116 Otto Lenel, Das Edictum perpetuum: ein Versuch zu dessen Wiederherstellung, 2nd ed. 
(Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1907), 290; EP3, 299–300. 
117 Otto Lenel, Das Edictum perpetuum: ein Versuch zu dessen Wiederherstellung, 1st ed. 
(Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1883), 240; also, Adolfus F. Rudorff, De iuris dictione edictum. Edicti 
perpetui quae reliqua sunt (Lipsiae: Hirzelium, 1869), 125. On the whole question, Fiori, La 
definizione, 313. 
118 Fiori, La definizione, 7–10; Attila P. Kovács, ‘Quelques observations sur la division de la 
locatio conductio’, in Iura Antiqua - Iura Moderna: Festschrift für Ferenc Benedek zum 75. 
Geburtstag (Pécs: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2001), 217–30; also, Armando José Torrent 
Ruiz, ‘The Controversy on the Trichotomy “Res, Operae, Opus” and the Origin of the 




founded on a reciprocal obligation (synallagma) created by consent.119 In the 
context of letting and hiring, the jurists understood this obligation to consist of 
the exchange of rent (merces) for either the permissible use and enjoyment 
(uti frui) of a res, or for the tasks (operae) of a person (homo).120 In light of the 
work of Fiori and others, the versions of the formulae put forward by Rudorff 
and in Lenel’s first edition are therefore the ones preferred here, since they 
only differentiate between the letting and hiring of res or operae.121 
Although there is no direct evidence that the actiones locati and conducti 
remained the same from the time of their introduction to their inclusion in the 
edictum perpetuum, the continuity between the jurisprudence of the late 
Republican and Augustan jurists and that of the jurists of the second and third 
centuries CE strongly suggests that the formulae were in their classical form 
from at least the first half of the first century BCE.122 
The formulae of the actiones locati and conducti gave rise to two questions: 
first, the interpretation of what the parties had agreed (id quod actum est); and 
second, the duties arising ex fide bona in light of that agreement. As early as 
the time of Servius, interpreting the actum had widened beyond the formulation 
of the agreement (the dictum) to involve a consideration of the transaction as 
a whole, which included both its formulation and any accompanying 
circumstances or negotiations.123 In the context of letting and hiring 
agreements, the interpretation of the actum was a primary concern because it 
determined which of the parties was to be considered the locator and which 
the conductor, and therefore the duties that they owed toward one another in 
good faith. Like sale, the designation of the parties was important because 
their duties were asymmetrical, and so what each of them ought to give or do 
for the other ex fide bona differed according to their role in the transaction. 
 
119 Fiori, La definizione, 286–90; also, du Plessis, Letting and Hiring, 13–14. 
120 Fiori, La definizione, 289; du Plessis, Letting and Hiring, 14. 
121 That is, ‘Quod Aulus Agerius Numerio Negidio fundum (operas) locavit/ conduxit’, etc. In 
any case, Kaser is probably correct that the edictal formula simply reported an example, 
such as in connection with a fundus Cornelianus or the like: ‘Review of Amirante L., 
Ricerche in tema di locazione (1959)’, IURA 11 (1960): 234. 
122 Fiori, La definizione, 180. 
123 David Daube, ‘Slightly Different’, IURA 12 (1961): 113; also, Fritz Pringsheim, ‘Id quod 
actum est’, ZSS 78 (1961): 17. 
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However, unlike sale, the direction in which the money passed was not 
determinative.124 Consequently, the legal qualification of the relationship 
rested on the interpretation of what the parties had agreed in each case, which 
was unavoidably a question of fact.125 Only once this had been established 
could the duties of the parties – a matter for the intentio – be sensibly 
discussed. 
One of the earliest juristic discussions of locatio conductio in connection with 
sea transport occurs in a text which contains contributions by Servius, Alfenus, 
and Paul.126 Beyond the juristic sources, the earliest references to private 
contracts involving Roman sea transport appear in the plays of Plautus and 
Terence. In the prologue to Plautus’ Rudens, which was probably first 
performed in the last decade of the third century BCE, a pimp (leno) hires a 
ship (navis clanculum conducitur) for the purpose of sailing to Sicily.127 The 
same language is employed by Terence in the Adelphi (c. 160 BCE), in which 
a character charters a vessel (navem conductam) with the intention of shipping 
a cargo to Cyprus.128 Two further references to private transport contracts can 
also be found elsewhere in Plautus: the first in the Asinaria (c. 211 BCE), in 
which a transport charge (vectura) for a cargo of oil is due;129 and the second 
in the Mostellaria (perhaps first decade of the second century), in which a 
character states that he paid three minas for two doorposts, besides the 
 
124 Peter Birks, The Roman Law of Obligations, ed. Eric Descheemaeker (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 98–99. 
125 Pringsheim, ‘Id quod’, 11–17; also, generally, Ulrike Babusiaux, Id quod actum est: zur 
Ermittlung des Parteiwillens im klassischen römischen Zivilprozess (Munich: C.H. Beck, 
2006). 
126 D.19.2.31 (Alf. 5 dig. a Paulo epit.): on which, infra, 190 et seq. 
127 Plaut., Rud. 57-9: on which, Léon R. Ménager, ‘Naulum et receptum rem salvam fore. 
Contribution à l’étude de la responsabilité contractuelle dans les transports maritimes, en 
droit romain’, RHD 38 (1960): 186–87; Nicole Charbonnel, ‘Aux sources du droit maritime 
à Rome: Le «Rudens» de Plaute et le droit d’épaves’, RHD 73 (1995): 311–12. For the 
dating of the play, Erich Woytek, ‘Sprach- und Kontextbeobachtung im Dienste der 
Prioritätsbestimmung bei Plautus: Zur Datierung von Rudens, Mercator und Persa’, Wiener 
Studien 114 (2001): 119–42.  
128 Ter., Ad. 225-26. 
129 Plaut., Asin. 433. 
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transport fee (praeter vecturam; this latter example probably refers to carriage 
by land).130 
It is significant to note that the vocabulary used by both Plautus and Terence 
demonstrates an awareness of the alternative contractual configurations that 
could distinguish different kinds of shipping arrangement.131 Generally, it was 
the Roman conception that a person who ‘placed out’ a thing (res) or task 
(opus) for hire was the locator, and that the person who either took control of 
the thing or undertook to perform the task was the conductor.132 In the first two 
examples, the use of conducere indicates that the charterers had hired a ship 
with a view to operating the vessel themselves. According to this model the 
person letting out the ship (or space on board) was designed as the locator, 
the charterer the conductor.133 In contrast, the references to payments of 
vectura suggest that the characters involved in these latter transactions had 
paid other people to perform the task (opus) of transporting the goods for them 
(similar to a modern contract of carriage). Under this arrangement, the shipper 
was designed the locator, the person undertaking to perform the task (i.e., the 
carrier) the conductor.134 It was therefore possible, for example, that an 
exercitor could be hiring a vessel as conductor from a shipowner at the same 
time as acting as either locator or conductor in relation to a shipper, depending 
upon the configuration of their arrangement. 
 
130 Plaut., Mostell. 823: on which, J. A. C. Thomas, ‘Juridical Aspects of Carriage by Sea and 
Warehousing in Roman Law’, in Les grandes escales: I, Antiquité et moyen-age (Brussels: 
Librairie encyclopédique, 1974), 122, note 31. 
131 See, e.g., Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 91; J. A. C. Thomas, ‘Carriage by Sea’, RIDA 
7 (1960): 496–97; also, ‘Juridical Aspects’, 118–20; and, more recently, Dominique 
Gaurier, Le droit maritime romain (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2004), 64–
65. 
132 Birks, Obligations, 98. 
133 The sources refer to the letting and hiring of ships per aversionem (D.14.1.1.15 (Ulp. 28 ad 
ed.); D.14.2.10.2 (Lab. 1 pith. a Paulo epit.)) or totam navem (D.4.9.3.1 (Ulp. 14 ad ed.); 
D.14.2.2 pr. (Paul. 34 ad ed.)), as well as to the hiring of spaces on board as conductio 
loca in navem (D.14.2.2 pr.). For these examples, Cerami and Petrucci, Diritto commerciale 
romano, 249–50; and further, Thomas, ‘Juridical Aspects’, 118–20. 
134 The sources speak of locare and conducere res perferendas (D.4.9.3.1 (Ulp. 14 ad ed.)); 
mancipia vehendas (D.14.2.10 pr. (Lab. 1 pith. a Paulo epit.)); onus vehendum 
(D.19.2.13.1 (Ulp. 32 ad ed.)); and merces vehendas (D.14.2.2 pr. (Paul. 34 ad ed.); 
D.19.5.1.1 (Pap. 8 quaest.)). 
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In practice, however, shipping contracts could involve complex agreements 
that required greater specification than the dichotomy between res and operae 
allowed. As Fiori has shown, both the juridical sources and the evidence for 
the contents of shipping contracts provided by the Greco-Egyptian papyri 
reveals that there were, broadly speaking, four different ways in which the 
parties could structure their agreement.135 In short, these loosely 
corresponded with the modern categories of bareboat charters, voyage 
charters, time charters, and contracts of carriage. In Fiori’s view the overriding 
concerns of the parties were economic, so that the structure of the 
arrangements varied according to the extent to which each was willing to take 
responsibility for the conduct of the enterprise, and by extension the risk 
(periculum) should things go wrong. 
Given the potential complexity of shipping contracts, the jurists were faced with 
two immediate problems: first, they needed to be able to interpret what the 
parties had agreed and design them as locator and conductor respectively; 
and second, in light of the configuration of the agreement, they needed to 
interpret what each of the parties owed one another ex fide bona. This sets the 
context for the three further parts in which this section will unfold. These will 
concern: first, Labeo’s interpretation of the actiones locati and conducti from 
the perspective of shipping contracts; second, the interpretation of the intentio 
from the perspective of the lex Rhodia de iactu; and third, an excursus on 
D.19.2.31 (Alf. 5 dig. a Paulo epit.). 
4.2.2  Labeo and the Interpretation of the actiones locati and conducti from the 
Perspective of Shipping Contracts. 
Three excerpts derived from Paul’s epitome of a work attributed to Labeo 
provide an insight into the latter’s approach to the interpretation of shipping 
contracts. All three belonged to a work referred to as a collection of pithana, 
which means ‘probabilities’ or ‘plausible views’ and shares a name with a genre 
 
135 Roberto Fiori, ‘L’allocazione del rischio nei contratti relativi al trasporto’, in Diritto romano e 
economia. Due modi di pensare e organizzare il mondo (nei primi tre secoli dell’Impero), 
ed. Elio Lo Cascio and Dario Mantovani (Pavia: Pavia University Press, 2018), 560–61. 
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of Stoic philosophical literature.136 There is some doubt about the extent to 
which Labeo’s views have been accurately reported by Paul. Although it is 
possible that the pithana was an independent work published during Labeo’s 
lifetime, it cannot be ruled out that it was in fact a collection of decisions 
excerpted from his Posteriora and brought together by an unknown editor after 
the jurist’s death.137 This would explain their casuistic style, despite the 
philosophical genre to which the work apparently belonged.138 The polemical 
style of Paul’s epitome also raises questions about the extent to which he may 
have modified Labeo’s views, in the words of Thomas, to ‘score points off the 
great jurist of the past’.139 Several scholars, however, have argued that Paul 
set out his predecessor’s words mostly as they appeared in the original.140 In 
my opinion this latter position is correct. 
The key to understanding these texts is to reconstruct the context from which 
Labeo’s views were drawn. Two other fragments, both of which derive from an 




136 Fritz Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 
226–27; Ulrike Babusiaux, ‘Legal Writing and Legal Reasoning’, in The Oxford Handbook 
of Roman Law and Society, ed. Paul J. du Plessis, Clifford Ando, and Kaius Tuori (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), 181–82. 
137 For this hypothesis, J. A. C. Thomas, ‘Pithanon Labeonis a Paulo Epitomatorum Libri VIII’, 
in Daube Noster. Essays in Legal History for David Daube, ed. Alan Watson (Edinburgh 
and London: Scottish Academic Press, 1974), 319; cf. Franz Wieacker, Textstufen 
klassischer Juristen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960), 144. Whatever the case, 
the texts composing the pithana were likely among Labeo’s later productions, since they 
include a reference to the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus of 18 BCE: Mario Bretone, 
‘Ricerche labeoniane: ΠΙΘΑΝΑ’, La Parola del Passato 28 (1973): 170. 
138 Remarking on the casuistic style of the work: Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 227; Bretone, 
‘Ricerche labeoniana’, 176–77; Mario Talamanca, ‘I “Pithana” di Labeone e la logica 
stoica’, IURA 26 (1975): 35; Bruno Schmidlin, ‘Horoi, pithana und regulae - Zum Einfluß 
der Rhetorik und Kialektik auf die juristische Regelbildung’, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der 
römischen Welt, ed. Hildegard Temporini and Wolfgang Haase, vol. II:15 (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 1976), 115. 
139 Thomas, ‘Pithanon Labeonis’, 323. Babusiaux describes the format as a ‘sequence of two 
opposing legal opinions [that] can be interpreted as an imitation of a dialogue, the first 
speaker being Labeo, the second being Paul, posthumously criticising the first’: ‘Legal 
Writing’, 182. 
140 Talamanca, ‘I “Pithana” di Labeone’, 3–5. According to Babusiaux, ‘Paul often cites Labeo’s 
opinion verbatim’: ‘Legal Writing’, 182. 
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D.18.1.80.2 (Lab. 5 post. a Iav. epit.): 
Silva caedua in quinquennium venierat: quaerebatur, cum glans 
decidisset, utrius esset. scio Servium respondisse, primum sequendum 
esse quod appareret actum esse: quod si in obscuro esset, quaecumque 
glans ex his arboribus quae caesae non essent cecidisset, venditoris esse, 
eam autem, quae in arboribus fuisset eo tempore cum haec caederentur, 
emptoris. 
D.18.1.77 (Iav. 4 ex post. Labeonis):  
In lege fundi vendundi lapidicinae in eo fundo ubique essent exceptae 
erant, et post multum temporis in eo fundo repertae erant lapidicinae. eas 
quoque venditoris esse Tubero respondit: Labeo referre quid actum sit: si 
non appareat, non videri eas lapidicinas esse exceptas: neminem enim 
nec vendere nec excipere quod non sit, et lapidicinas nullas esse, nisi 
quae apparent et caedantur: aliter interpretantibus totum fundum 
lapidicinarum fore, si forte toto eo sub terra esset lapis. hoc probo. 
In the first text, the right to fell timber in a wood was sold for five years, and it 
was asked which of the parties was entitled to any fruits that fell from the 
trees.141 Labeo approved Servius’ view that the first consideration was what 
the parties appeared to have intended (quod appareret actum esse). However, 
if this was not forthcoming (in obscuro), Labeo’s position was that the fruits 
that had fallen from trees that had not yet been felled belonged to the vendor, 
but that those on the trees at the time of their felling belonged to the purchaser. 
In the second text, a contract for the sale of a plot of land included a term that 
quarries were excluded from the bargain. Some time after the sale quarries 
were established by the purchaser, which the late Republican jurist Q. Aelius 
Tubero held belonged to the vendor. In contrast, Labeo stated that one had 
first to refer to what the parties had agreed (quid actum sit), and if this was not 
apparent, then only those quarries that were active at the time of the sale were 
excluded from the agreement. 
In both texts Labeo’s reasoning follows the same pattern: when confronted 
with uncertainty over the interpretation of an agreement, the first consideration 
was the actum, and if this was not apparent, then it was possible to put forward 
 
141 According to Gaius, Javolenus used the word glandis (literally ‘acorns’) to refer to all fruits: 
D.50.16.236 (Gai. 4 ad l. XII tab.). 
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a solution based on what the parties’ intentions were likely to have been.142 In 
each case, the plausible view presupposes that the actum was in obscuro. It 
is therefore submitted that the ‘plausible views’ epitomised by Paul were 
decisions similar to those in the texts epitomised by Javolenus, which were put 
forward by Labeo as the most likely interpretation of the parties’ intentions in 
circumstances where they were not immediately apparent.143 
D.14.2.10 pr. (Lab. 1 pith. a Paulo epit.):144 
Si vehenda mancipia conduxisti, pro eo mancipio, quod in nave mortuum 
est, vectura tibi non debetur. Paulus: immo quaeritur, quid actum est, 
utrum ut pro his qui impositi an pro his qui deportati essent, merces 
daretur: quod si hoc apparere non poterit, satis erit pro nauta, si probaverit 
impositum esse mancipium. 
In light of the above, it is my view that Labeo’s opinion can be expanded as 
follows: 
If you have undertaken to transport slaves [and the actum is not apparent, 
then the plausible view is that] you are not owed vectura for any who die 
in transit. 
It is clear from the terminology employed that the Augustan jurist was referring 
to a locatio mercium vehendarum in which one party had undertaken the task 
(opus) of transporting a consignment of slaves (as conductor) in return for a 
reward.145 Furthermore, given that he indicates that the death of a slave would 
lead to a reduction of the merces, without any mention of damages besides, it 
must be assumed that he was envisaging losses that were attributable to vis 
maior.146 Labeo’s view therefore appears to have been that, if the precise 
 
142 Labeo used verisimile elsewhere as a tool to discern the likely intention of a testator: 
D.32.30.4 (Lab. 2 post. a Iav. epit.). On verisimile as a means of reaching juridical solutions: 
Tomasz Giaro, ‘Knowledge of Law as Knowledge of Facts. The Roman Experience’, in 
Roman Law and Legal Knowledge. Studies in Memory of Henryk Kupiszewski, ed. Tomasz 
Giaro (Warsaw: University of Warsaw, 2011), 220–22. 
143 One could also consider D.18.4.25 (Lab. 2 pith.), which follows precisely the same pattern 
as D.14.2.10 pr. and 2. 
144 For a comprehensive bibliography of authors who have treated this text, Gianpiero 
Mancinetti, L’emersione dei doveri ‘accessori’ nella ‘locatio conductio’ (Milan: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2017), 338, note 42. 
145 In D.19.5.1.1 (Pap. 8 quaest.), in which Labeo is cited, the same configuration is given as 
locare merces vehendas: Fiori, La definizione, 133. 
146 Fiori, 133; also, ‘Forme e regole dei contratti di trasporto marittimo nel diritto romano’, RDN 
39, no. 1 (2010): 155. 
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content of the actum was in obscuro, the reward in a locatio mercium 
vehendarum was only owed for those goods that the conductor successfully 
transported to their destination; or, to put it another way, that the locator’s duty 
to pay the merces was reciprocal to the conductor’s obligation to successfully 
complete the task he had undertaken.147 
Turning to Paul, although some authors have cast doubt on the authenticity of 
his response, most treat this part of the text as substantially genuine.148 This 
being accepted, the severan jurist’s contribution was to point out that the 
attempt to discern the actum had not yet been exhausted: rather, the question 
was whether payment was due in relation to the number of slaves loaded on 
departure (pro his qui impositi… essent) or the number unloaded on arrival 
(pro his qui deportati… essent). Moreover, if this was not apparent, it would be 
enough for the nauta to show that the slave in question was on board at the 
time of departure. 
Paul’s discussion can be treated in two parts (immo quaeritur… merces 
daretur and quod si… fin.). With respect to the first part, the first question that 
arises is precisely what he was suggesting could be inferred from the method 
by which the merces was calculated. The implication of the second section, in 
which the author indicated that it would favour the nauta to show that the slaves 
were put on board, is that under the first method of calculation (i.e., by number 
of slaves loaded) the vectura would still be owing, while under the second 
method the reverse would be true. According to Fiori and Babusiaux, Paul 
 
147 The underlying idea appears to have been that of mutuality, which was described by 
Erskine in terms that ‘No party in a mutual contract, where the obligations on the parties 
are the causes of one another, can demand performance from the other, if he himself either 
cannot or will not perform the counter-part’: An Institute of the Law of Scotland, 1st ed. 
(Edinburgh, 1773), ¶ III.3.86. This position is consistent with that adopted by jurists 
belonging to the Servian school in, among other texts, D.19.2.15.2 (Ulp. 32 ad ed.): on 
which, Fiori, La definizione, 133–34. As Fiori has noted, it is also significant that slaves are 
non-fungible: if the property had been fungible, Alfenus’ observation in D.19.2.31 (Alf. 5 
dig. a Paulo epit.) – that a nauta who undertook the task of transporting goods in bulk 
became their owner during transit – would have been a relevant consideration: 
‘L’allocazione del rischio’, 519. 
148 Haymann argued that the whole of Paul’s response was interpolated: ‘Textkritische Studien 
zum römischen Obligationenrecht. II. Periculum est emptoris’, ZSS 41 (1920): 155–56; ‘Zur 
Klassizität des periculum emptoris’, ZSS 48 (1928): 407, note 3. Cf. Daube, who suspected 
the phrasing from satis onwards: ‘Slightly Different’, 113. In favour of its authenticity, see, 
e.g., Fiori, La definizione, 131. 
163 
 
interpreted an agreement to pay the merces on slaves loaded as evidence that 
the parties intended a conductio navis (or loci in nave), so that the nauta’s 
obligation to furnish the vessel (or, indeed, spaces on board) was fulfilled as 
soon as the slaves were installed.149 In contrast, a clause stating that the 
vectura would be calculated according to the number of slaves unloaded 
implied that the parties had intended to conclude a locatio mercium 
vehendarum, so that the nauta’s obligation only became fulfilled on completion 
of the task. On this reading, Paul did not so much contradict Labeo’s position 
as nuance it, by introducing a criterion (the method by which the merces had 
been calculated) as a means of interpreting the actum with a greater degree 
of sensitivity than the Augustan jurist’s view allowed. 
In the second section, however, Paul departs from Labeo by suggesting that, 
if the method by which the vectura was arrived at was not apparent, it would 
be enough for the nauta to show that the slaves had been loaded to ground an 
inference (coniectura) that he had fulfilled his duties under the contract.150 In 
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, Paul was therefore willing to 
presume in favour of the position that was least onerous for the nauta, so that 
if he could prove that he had fulfilled his duties under a conductio navis (or loci 
in nave) he would be able to claim the vectura in return.151 
D.14.2.10.2 (Lab. 1 pith. a Paulo epit.): 
Si conduxisti navem amphorarum duo milium et ibi amphoras portasti, pro 
duobus milibus amphorarum pretium debes. Paulus: immo si aversione 
navis conducta est, pro duobus milibus debetur merces: si pro numero 
impositarum amphorarum merces constituta est, contra se habet: nam pro 




149 Fiori, La definizione, 137–38;  ‘Forme e regole’, 158–59; also, Babusiaux, Id quod actum 
est, 231–32. For the alternative theories and their refutation, Fiori, La definizione, 135–37; 
also, ‘Forme e regole’, 156–59; and now, Mancinetti, L’emersione, 339–41. 
150 Babusiaux, Id quod actum est, 232. 
151 In Fiori’s opinion, Paul’s reasoning can be explained with reference to the papyrological 
evidence, which indicates that, as a rule, naukleroi usually undertook to provide the means 
of conducting the enterprise in private transactions, whereas they normally undertook to 
deliver a result in those with a public dimension: ‘L’allocazione del rischio’, 521. 
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Again, it is my submission that Labeo’s view can be reconstructed as follows: 
If you have hired a ship of a capacity of two thousand amphorae and have 
loaded amphorae on board [and the actum is not apparent, then the 
plausible view is that] you owe vectura for two thousand amphorae. 
The Augustan jurist’s reference to a conductio navis has led most scholars to 
conclude that the arrangement described by the jurist was akin to a bareboat 
charter.152 Fiori, however, has recently drawn attention to the fact that the 
person hiring the vessel was also loading goods on board (ibi amphoras 
portasti), which indicates that the jurist probably had a contract between an 
exercitor and a shipper in mind.153 In these circumstances, the person hiring 
the vessel was the shipper, who paid the merces to the exercitor with reference 
to its capacity and therefore regardless of the number of goods actually put on 
board. Labeo’s plausible view therefore appears to have been that, if the 
parties’ intentions were not apparent, a person who had both hired a ship and 
loaded goods on board owed for the hire of the whole vessel. 
Again, Paul’s critique was that it was not necessary to fall back on a plausible 
view if the actum could be discerned from the method by which payment had 
been calculated. Thus, if the ship had been hired per aversionem (i.e., as a 
whole) then Labeo’s view would hold; but if the merces had been calculated 
with reference to the number of amphorae loaded (pro numero impositarum 
amphorarum) it would be due in proportion to the latter.154 This distinction has 
been variously interpreted as relating to the distinction between a bareboat 
charter and the hiring of spaces on board, or alternatively, between a bareboat 
charter and a contract of carriage.155 However, Fiori’s observation that Labeo 
had a contract between a shipper and exercitor in mind makes it more likely 
that Paul was seeking to differentiate between arrangements similar to modern 
time and voyage charters. On this reading, Paul had already distinguished 
between voyage charters and contracts of carriage in the principium, on the 
 
152 This was the position originally taken by Fiori: La definizione, 139–40; also, ‘Forme e 
regole’, 158–60. 
153 Fiori, ‘L’allocazione del rischio’, 534. 
154 On the sale and hire of property per aversionem, Nicola De Marco, ‘L’aversio: una clausola 
dell’emptio venditio e della locatio conductio’, Index 28 (2000): 355–78. 
155 For a summary, Cerami and Petrucci, Diritto commerciale romano, 253. 
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basis that the former involved the calculation of the merces in relation to the 
quantity of goods loaded (impositae) and the latter in relation to the quantity 
unloaded. Now, it was also necessary to differentiate between voyage and 
time charters, since both kinds of arrangement involved the hiring of the vessel 
and were therefore not easily distinguishable. Thus, according to Paul, where 
the shipper had paid the merces with reference to the ship’s capacity, a time 
charter was meant, whereas if it had been figured with reference to the number 
of goods loaded, a voyage charter was intended.156 
D.14.2.10.1 (Lab. 1 pith. a Paulo epit.): 
Si ea condicione navem conduxisti, ut ea merces tuae portarentur easque 
merces nulla nauta necessitate coactus in navem deteriorem, cum id sciret 
te fieri nolle, transtulit et merces tuae cum ea nave perierunt, in qua 
novissime vectae sunt, habes ex conducto locato cum priore nauta 
actionem. Paulus: immo contra, si modo ea navigatione utraque navis 
periit, cum id sine dolo et culpa nautarum factum esset. idem iuris erit, si 
prior nauta publice retentus navigare cum tuis mercibus prohibitus fuerit. 
idem iuris erit, cum ea condicione a te conduxisset, ut certam poenam tibi 
praestaret, nisi ante constitutum diem merces tuas eo loci exposuisset, in 
quem devehendas eas merces locasse<s>[t],157 nec per eum staret, quo 
minus remissa sibi ea poena spectaret.158 idem iuris in eodem genere 
cogitationis observabimus, si probatum fuerit nautam morbo impeditum 
navigare non potuisse. idem dicemus, si navis eius vitium fecerit sine dolo 
malo et culpa eius. 
In this text, Labeo begins by describing an agreement in which a shipper hired 
a vessel on condition that it was used to transport his goods. If the nauta 
unnecessarily transferred the merchandise to a worse ship against the wishes 
of the shipper, the jurist held that an actio ex conducto locato would lie if the 
goods subsequently became lost. 
The first question that arises concerns the legal qualification of the relationship. 
The terminology (navem conduxisti) indicates that the arrangement involved 
 
156 Fiori, ‘L’allocazione del rischio’, 535. 
157 The Florentine has locasset, but for various reasons most scholars agree that locasses is 
more likely: Jean-François Gerkens, ‘Aeque perituris...’: une approche de la causalité 
dépassante en droit romain classique (Liège: Collection Scientifique de la Faculté de Droit 
de Liège, 1997), 239–42; Fiori, La definizione, 151, note 78. 
158 The Vaticanus has exspectaret, but spectaret is retained. For discussion, Gerkens, Aeque 
perituris..., 234–39; Fiori, La definizione, 151, note 80. 
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the hiring of the vessel by the shipper. However, as Fiori has observed, the 
condition that the shipper’s goods would be carried in the vessel introduces an 
obligation on the nauta to perform a task, which was interpreted in the 
Accursian Gloss as a duty to deliver the merchandise ‘ad aliquem locum’.159 
The mixed character of the relationship is further indicated by the jurist’s 
assertion that in certain circumstances an actio ex conducto locato would lie 
against the nauta. Some scholars have suggested that this expression is the 
result of an interpolation, or else has no special meaning.160 However, as Fiori 
has argued, it is more likely that it results from the fact that Labeo conceived 
the arrangement as a unitary relationship which gave rise to two separate 
actions, each of which could be relied upon by either party depending upon 
which part of the agreement they wanted to enforce.161 Fiori’s view is therefore 
that the arrangement was akin to a voyage charter, in the sense that the nauta 
(as locator) had put a specific vessel at the disposal of the shipper and also 
undertaken the task (as conductor) of transporting the goods to their intended 
destination.162 
If Fiori is right, then Labeo’s ‘plausible view’ was that under this arrangement 
– in which the designation of the parties was uncertain – the shipper could 
proceed both ex conducto and ex locato against the nauta if he unnecessarily 
transferred the merchandise to a worse vessel against his wishes.163 On the 
one hand, the nauta’s liability ex conducto arose from having transferred the 
goods against the shipper’s wishes, since the transfer itself constituted a 
failure to furnish the use and enjoyment of the vessel. On the other hand, the 
actio ex locato lay against the nauta on the basis that the loss of the goods 
constituted a failure to successfully transport them. In this case, however, it is 
significant that the transfer was unnecessary and to a worse ship, since the 
basis of the nauta’s liability was his culpable conduct (i.e., culpa), not the fact 
of the transfer itself. 
 
159 Fiori, La definizione, 143; ‘Forme e regole’, 163. 
160 For a summary of these views, Fiori, La definizione, 143–44, notes 49 and 50. 
161 Fiori, 144–45; ‘Forme e regole’, 164–65. 
162 Fiori, ‘L’allocazione del rischio’, 536–39. 
163 Fiori, La definizione, 147–48; ‘Forme e regole’, 167–69. 
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This interpretation is consistent with another opinion attributed to Labeo, this 
time reported by Ulpian in D.19.2.13.1 (Ulp. 32 ad ed.): 
Si navicularius onus Minturnas vehendum conduxerit et, cum flumen 
Minturnense navis ea subire non posset, in aliam navem merces 
transtulerit eaque navis in ostio fluminis perierit, tenetur primus 
navicularius? Labeo, si culpa caret, non teneri ait: ceterum si vel invito 
domino fecit vel quo non debuit tempore aut si minus idoneae navi, tunc 
ex locato agendum. 
In this text, which does not indicate the source of Labeo’s opinion, a 
navicularius who had undertaken the task of carrying merchandise to 
Minturnae transferred the goods from one vessel to another because the first 
was incapable of navigating upstream.164 In the event that the goods were lost 
with the second vessel, Labeo held that the navicularius would not be liable if 
he was free from culpa, but that the actio ex locato would lie if he had 
transferred the goods against the shipper’s wishes, to a less suitable vessel, 
or at an improper time. 
The text has frequently been held interpolated, sometimes with a view to 
arguing that the navicularius’ liability was originally considered to have arisen 
ex recepto.165 However, as Robaye has pointed out, even if we doubt the 
authenticity of the words si culpa caret, the discussion remains founded on the 
navicularius’ liability ex locato for conduct falling short of that expected from a 
professional carrier.166 Thus, in Labeo’s view, where a navicularius had 
undertaken to deliver a consignment of goods to a certain destination (here, 
Minturnae), he would be liable if their loss could be attributed to his fault. In 
this case, transferring the goods from one ship to another for a good reason 
did not constitute culpa by itself, but moving them against the wishes of the 
 
164 For a comprehensive bibliography, Mancinetti, L’emersione, 187, note 55; also, Riccardo 
Fercia, Responsabilità per fatto di ausiliari nel diritto romano (Padua: CEDAM, 2008), 66, 
note 81. 
165 E.g., by Thomas: ‘Carriage by Sea’, 502–3; cf. Julius C. van Oven, ‘Actio de recepto et 
actio locati’, TvR 24 (1956): 148. For a comprehensive bibliography of those scholars 
holding the text interpolated, Fiori, La definizione, 148, note 69. 
166 René Robaye, L’obligation de garde: essai sur la responsabilité contractuelle en droit 
romain (Brussels: Publications des Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 1987), 90; also, 
Geoffrey MacCormack, ‘Custodia and Culpa’, ZSS 89 (1972): 201, note 148; Rolf Knütel, 
‘Die Haftung für Hilfspersonen im römischen Recht’, ZSS 100 (1983): 417; Riccardo 
Cardilli, L’obbligazione di ‘praestare’ e la responsabilità contrattuale in diritto romano (II 
sec. a.C.-II sec. d.C.) (Milan: Giuffrè, 1995), 353–57. 
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shipper, to a less suitable vessel, or at an improper time, would provide 
grounds for the shipper to proceed against him ex locato. 
Returning to D.14.2.10.1, Paul’s response moves through five different 
situations in which the jurist held that the nauta would escape liability for 
transferring the goods despite their subsequent loss.167 In the first case, Paul 
held that the nauta would not be liable for the transfer if both ships were 
wrecked during the same voyage. The reasoning here appears to be that an 
occurrence of vis maior that overwhelmed both vessels would break the 
connection between the nauta’s culpa and the ultimate loss of the 
merchandise. The same reasoning applied (idem iuris erit) if the first nauta 
transferred the goods to a second because he had been held back by a public 
authority (i.e., the transfer of the merchandise had been made for a reason 
beyond his control); and also if the nauta had agreed to pay a penalty for failure 
to deliver the goods to a certain place by a specified time, provided there was 
an understanding that the penalty would be remitted if he was not at fault for 
any delay.168 More straightforwardly, the nauta was also excused if the transfer 
had been made because he was incapacitated by illness or because his ship 
was unseaworthy through no fault of his own. 
To conclude, in D.14.2.10.1 Labeo held that both the actiones locati and 
conducti could lie against the nauta if the merchandise was lost following a 
transfer that was both unnecessary and culpable. In D.19.2.13.1 he excluded 
the liability of the navicularius for making necessary transfers, unless his 
conduct was also culpable. Paul, meanwhile, excluded the nauta’s liability if 
the effect of his culpa was negated by the intervention of vis maior; and 
extended this reasoning to excuse him for transfers that were both necessary 
and free from culpa. 
 
 
167 Gerkens, Aeque perituris..., 233. 
168 The section ‘idem iuris erit, cum ea condicione… spectaret’ has given rise to several 
interpretations. Fiori’s is preferred, not least because it does not require any modification 
of the text: La definizione, 151–52. Cf., e.g., Gerkens, who has proposed inserting ‘nisi’ 
before the words ‘remissa sibi ea poena’: Aeque perituris..., 239; also, Huvelin, Droit 
commercial romain, 92. 
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D.19.5.1.1 (Pap. 8 quaest.): 
Domino mercium in magistrum navis, si sit incertum, utrum navem 
conduxerit an merces vehendas locaverit, civilem actionem in factum esse 
dandam Labeo scribit. 
One final text reporting the views of Labeo provides an insight into the 
procedural aspects of enforcing shipping contracts. As Fiori has shown, 
shipping contracts were all simply examples of letting and hiring agreements 
that were shaped by the commercial needs of the parties.169 For the purpose 
of bringing an action, however, there was a need to establish which of the 
parties qualified as the locator and which the conductor, so that the judge could 
assess what they ought to do for one another in good faith. In most cases this 
was relatively straightforward: in a bareboat charter the person with legal 
entitlement to the ship was the locator and the person hiring it the conductor; 
in a time charter, too, the person placing out the vessel and its crew was the 
locator and the shipper the conductor; and in contracts of carriage the reverse 
was true, since the shipper was conceived as the locator, placing out a task 
for the carrier to undertake as the conductor. 
In certain cases, however, the contract could defy simple categorisation 
because it gave rise to obligations both in relation to the use and enjoyment of 
a thing (res) and with respect to the undertaking of a task (opus). Labeo’s 
observation, which was approved by Papinian, was that if it was uncertain 
(incertum) whether the agreement qualified as a conductio navis or a locatio 
mercium vehendarum, then an actio civilis in factum would lie.170 According to 
some scholars, the notion that an action could be civilian and in factum at the 
same time is unclassical and must therefore be the result of an interpolation.171 
However, although some degree of epitomisation cannot be excluded, none of 
the arguments against the text’s authenticity are persuasive.172 These being 
 
169 Fiori, ‘L’allocazione del rischio’, 540. 
170 According to Fiori, the generic terminology conceals the fact that Labeo was referring 
specifically to time and voyage charters: 542. 
171 For a comprehensive bibliography of scholars taking this view, Fiori, La definizione, 129, 
note 5; ‘Forme e regole’, 176–77, note 84. 
172 In favour of the text’s authenticity, Filippo Gallo, ‘Eredità di giuristi romani in materia 
contrattuale’, in Le teorie contrattualistiche romane nella storiografia contemporanea. Atti 
del Convegno (Siena, 14-15 aprile 1989), ed. Nicla Bellocci (Naples: Jovene, 1991), 36; 
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rejected, the actio to which Labeo referred was probably decretal in character 
(i.e., granted by the praetor on an ad hoc basis without reference to an edict) 
and involved the insertion of praescripta verba at the head of the formula.173 In 
this way, the determination of the role of the parties was deferred apud 
iudicem, so that the judge was free to assess what the parties owed to one 
another ex fide bona directly with reference to the agreement and without being 
bound to identify them with any particular role.174 If the action was indeed 
decretal, then this procedural innovation is unlikely to have been resorted to 
before the middle part of the first century BCE. 
Conclusion: 
Several texts attributed to Labeo on the subject of the interpretation of shipping 
contracts have survived. In all three texts epitomised by Paul, the Augustan 
jurist put forward ‘plausible views’ concerning the duties owed by the parties 
ex fide bona in cases where he considered the actum obscure. In D.14.2.10 
pr. and 2, the discussion focused on those duties owed by the nauta that were 
understood to be reciprocal to the shipper’s payment of vectura. Paul’s 
contribution in both cases was to draw attention to the way in which the merces 
had been calculated as a guide to interpreting the actum, which negated the 
need to fall back on a plausible view. In D.14.2.10.1 and D.19.2.13.1, Labeo 
considered the circumstances in which a nauta would be held liable for the loss 
of the goods: if his actions demonstrated culpa and were not compelled by 
necessitas, liability would ensue. Finally, Labeo’s opinion was that if it was 
 
Synallagma e conventio nel contratto. Ricerca degli archetipi della categoria contrattuale e 
spunti per la revisione di ipostazioni moderne, vol. 1 (Turin: Giappichelli, 1992), 235; Fiori, 
La definizione, 129; ‘Forme e regole’, 176–77; Lihong Zhang, ‘Studies on Actio in Factum 
Civilis’, in Aus der Werkstatt römischer Juristen. Vorträge der Europäisch-Ostasiatischen 
Tagung 2013 in Fukuoka, ed. Ulrich Manthe, Shigeo Nishimura, and Mariko Igimi (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 2016), 492–93. 
173 Mario Talamanca, ‘La tipicità dei contratti romani fra “conventio” e “stipulatio” fino a 
Labeone’, in Contractus e Pactum: Tipicità e libertà negoziale nell’esperienza tardo-
repubblicana (Atti Copanello, 1988), ed. Francesco Milazzo (Rome and Naples: Ed. 
Scientifiche Italiane, 1990), 100, note 250; Peter Gröschler, Actiones in factum: eine 
Untersuchung zur Klage-Neuschöpfung im nichtvertraglichen Bereich (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 2002), 13–14; Roberto Fiori, ‘Rise and Fall of the Specificity of Contracts’, in Nova 
Ratione: Change of Paradigms in Roman Law, ed. Adriaan J. B. Sirks (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz Verlag, 2014), 36–37. According to Zhang, the use of the word ‘dandam’ 
indicates the decretal character of the action: ‘Studies’, 492–93. 
174 Fiori, ‘Rise and Fall’, 37. 
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uncertain whether the agreement qualified as a conductio navis or a locatio 
mercium vehendarum, then an actio civilis in factum would lie. 
4.2.3 The lex Rhodia de iactu. 
4.2.3.1 The lex Rhodia and Roman Law. 
Any attempt to date the introduction of the application of the lex Rhodia within 
the framework of Roman law must necessarily address three questions: first, 
its origins; second, its legal basis; and third, its place within the Roman legal 
order. The Rhodian origins of the lex are attested by three main sources. The 
first consists of two complementary fragments, both attributed to the second 
book of the Pauli Sententiae: 
D.14.2.1 (Paul. 2 sent.): 
Lege Rodia cavetur, ut si levandae navis gratia iactus mercium factus est, 
omnium contributione sarciatur quod pro omnibus datum est. 
PS.2.7.1: 
Levandae navis gratia iactus cum mercium factus est, omnium intributione 
sarciatur, quod pro omnibus iactum est. 
The authorial history of the Sententiae is somewhat complicated.175 As Liebs 
has shown, the work was most likely composed by an unknown author in 
Numidia during the latter stages of the third century CE.176 An epitome was 
then appended to the Breviary of Alaric in 506 and selected texts included in 
the Digest some thirty years later. With respect to the fragments presented 
above, the main discrepancy consists in the inclusion of the words ‘Lege 
Rodia… ut si’ in the Justinianic version, which are absent from the text 
transmitted through the Breviary. This could be explained as an 
interpolation;177 except that, as Badoud has argued, the recent discovery of an 
 
175 A useful overview is given by Iolanda Ruggiero, ‘Immagini di ius receptum nelle Pauli 
Sententiae’, in Studi in onore di Remo Martini, ed. Pietro Rossi, vol. 3 (Milan: Giuffrè, 2009), 
270–76. 
176 Detlef Liebs, ‘Römische Jurisprudenz in Africa’, ZSS 106 (1989): 233–40; also, Römische 
Jurisprudenz in Africa: mit Studien zu den pseudopaulinischen Sentenzen (Berlin: Duncker 
& Humblot, 1993), 28–43. 
177 So, for example, Hans Kreller, ‘Lex Rhodia. Untersuchungen zur Quellengeschichte des 




inscription at the site of the ancient port of Rhodes (our second source) 
appears to corroborate the authenticity of the version presented in the 
Digest.178 The inscription, which was originally published by Marcou in 1995, 
reads as follows:179 
Lex Rodia de yactu: | si levandae navis gratia | yactu<s> mercium factus 
est, | omnium contributione sarcitur | quod pro omnibus | datum est. 
Although it was initially considered possible that the inscription had been 
produced at the time of the Italian administration of the Dodecanese (1912-
1943) and temporarily lost after the bombing of the port in 1944, there are 
powerful arguments to suggest that it dates to the second or third century 
CE.180 This being accepted, the almost exact replication of the wording of the 
inscription by the author of the Sententiae (including the unusual spelling of 
‘Rodia’) suggests that the Digest text was excerpted directly from the original 
work of Pseudo-Paul, which itself was a faithful reproduction of (part of) the lex 
Rhodia as it was represented, for example, in the inscription at the port of 
Rhodes. 
The third source comprises a second Digest text, this time attributed to a 






178 Nathan Badoud, ‘Une inscription du port de Rhodes mentionnant la lex rhodia de iactu’, in 
XIV Congressus Internationalis Epigraphiae Graecae et Latinae. 27.-31. Augusti MMXII. 
Akten, ed. Werner Eck and Peter Funke (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 450–52. 
179 A photo is provided in Marcou’s original publication: ‘Nomos Rhodion Nautikos e la scoperta 
a Rodi di una colonna di marmo con l’iscrizione di Paolo (D.14.2)’, in Studi in onore di 
Antonio Lefebvre d’Ovidio in occasione dei cinquant’anni del diritto della navigazione, ed. 
Elda T. Bulgherini, vol. 1 (Milan: Giuffrè, 1995), 651. The text given here is provided by 
Badoud: ‘Une inscription du port de Rhodes’, 451. 
180 For these, Badoud, ‘Une inscription du port de Rhodes’, 451; also, Gianfranco Purpura, 
‘«Ius naufragii», «sylai» e «lex Rhodia»: genesi delle consuetudini marittime mediterranee’, 
AUPA 47 (2002): 288–90; Emmanuelle Chevreau, ‘La lex Rhodia de iactu: un exemple de 
la réception d’une institution étrangère dans le droit romain’, TvR 73 (2005): 71–72. 
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D.14.2.9 (Maec. ex l. Rhodia):181 
Ἀξίωσις Εὐδαίμονος Νικομηδέως πρὸς Ἀντωνῖνον βασιλέα· Κύριε βασιλεῦ 
Ἀντωνῖνε, ναυφράγιον ποιήσαντες ἐν τῇ <Ἰκαρίᾳ> διηρπάγημεν ὑπὸ τῶν 
δημοσίων <δημοσίωνῷn> τῶν τὰς Κυκλάδας νήσους οἰκούντων. 
Ἀντωνῖνος εἶπεν Εὐδαίμονι· ἐγὼ μὲν τοῦ κόσμου κύριος, ὁ δὲ νόμος τῆς 
θαλάσσης τῷ νόμῳ τῶν Ῥοδίων κρινέσθω τῷ ναυτικῷ ἐν οἷς μήτις τῶν 
ἡμετέρων αὐτῷ νόμος ἐναντιοῦται. τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ θειότατος 
Αὔγουστος ἔκρινεν. 
Petition of Eudaemon of Nicomedia to the emperor Antoninus: “My lord 
the emperor Antoninus, after having suffered shipwreck in the Icarian sea, 
we were robbed of our property by the public officials resident in the 
Cyclades Islands. Antoninus replied to Eudaemon: “I indeed am master of 
the whole earth, but the law of the sea is to be decided by the maritime 
law of the Rhodians in matters in which our own law does not oppose it.” 
And Divus Augustus made the same decision (trans. Atkinson 1974, 48). 
The text itself reports a case in which a provincial named Eudaimon of 
Nicomedia sought clarification of the law from a certain emperor Antoninus 
(most likely Pius or Marcus Aurelius) with respect to his alleged maltreatment 
by the local authorities on an island in the Cyclades near which his ship had 
been wrecked. More specifically, Eudaimon’s complaint concerned the status 
of his shipwrecked goods, which he claimed had been seized by public officials 
on the island. The emperor’s response was that the matter ought to be decided 
with reference to the maritime law of the Rhodians, provided it was not in 
conflict Roman law. The text ends with the observation that this ruling was 
consistent with a similar decision reached by an earlier Augustus, probably 
Octavian.182 
 
181 The text provided here is supplied by Atkinson: ‘Rome and the Rhodian Sea-Law’, IURA 
25 (1974): 47–48; see, also, Gianfranco Purpura, ‘Il regolamento doganale di Cauno e la 
Lex Rhodia in D.14,2,9’, AUPA 38 (1985): 303. It differs from the Mommsen edition by the 
removal of two bits of punctuation: i) the full stop after τῆς θαλάσσης; and ii) the comma 
after κρινέσθω τῷ ναυτικῷ. The translation is based upon this emended version. The 
emendation of Ἰκαρίᾳ for Ἰταλίᾳ, first suggested by Gothofredus, is widely accepted. Some 
authors have followed Salmasius by reading δημοσίωνῷn (i.e., publicani) for δημοσίων 
(local public officials). The latter is preferred here: Atkinson, ‘Rhodian Sea-Law’, 58–59; 
also, Aubert, ‘Dealing with the Abyss’, 166, note 30. 
182 For the identity of the emperors in this text, Arrigo Diego Manfredini, ‘Il naufragio di 
Eudemone (D.14,2,9)’, SDHI 49 (1983): 376, note 4, with bibliography. The use of the 
definite article (ὁ θειότατος Αὔγουστος) and the title make Octavian the most likely source 
(I am grateful to Thomas Kruse for this observation). 
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Although the authenticity of the text has been impugned, most scholars now 
agree that it is substantially genuine, though sometimes with the caveat that it 
reached the compilers by means of a postclassical paraphrase.183 Maecianus’ 
production of a monograph dedicated to the lex Rhodia is unsurprising in light 
of his service at Ostia as prefect of the corn supply and patron of the 
lenuncularii tabularii auxiliarii ('boatmen for the service of checking and 
control') in 152.184 Further, he later served as secretary a libellis under 
Antoninus Pius and as a leading advisor on the consilium of Marcus Aurelius 
and Verus, in both of which capacities he will have been intimately involved in 
the production of imperial constitutions. This being the case, these three 
sources together stand as good evidence that the Rhodian origins of the lex 
were acknowledged by the second half of the second century CE at the latest. 
The second question that arises concerns the legal basis of the lex, which was 
evidently not a conventionally promulgated Roman statute.185 As several 
scholars have pointed out, the decision reported by Maecianus indicates that 
the law had a broader scope of application than the singular provision 
concerning contribution for jettison presented in both the inscription and the 
Sententiae.186 According to Purpura, there are good reasons to believe that 
the lex Rhodia was initially a customs law applied in the port at Rhodes that 
regulated, inter alia, the payment of duties, the formalities for entering and 
 
183 The substantial authenticity of the text has been defended by, inter alios, Francesco M. de 
Robertis, ‘Lex Rhodia: critica e anticritica su D.14.2.9’, in Studi in onore di Vincenzo 
Arangio-Ruiz nel XLV anno del suo insegnamento, ed. Achille Vogliano, Amalia Cinotti, 
and Anna Maria Colombo, vol. 3 (Naples: Jovene, 1953), 173; Jean Rougé, Recherches 
sur l’organisation du commerce maritime en Méditerranée sous l’Empire romain (Paris: 
S.E.V.P.E.N., 1966), 409–11; Atkinson, ‘Rhodian Sea-Law’, 64; Gianfranco Purpura, ‘Relitti 
di navi e diritti di fisco. Una congettura sulla lex Rhodia’, AUPA 36 (1976): 74; Manfredini, 
‘Il naufragio di Eudemone’, 381. Both De Robertis and Manfredini acknowledged the 
possibility of a postclassical paraphrase, as Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 255. 
184 For Maecianus’ career: Kunkel, Die römischen Juristen, 174–76. According to Casson, the 
lenuncularii tabularii auxiliarii were 'boatmen for the service of checking and control'. He 
concluded that ‘the tugboat skippers, being the first to greet a new arrival, were a natural 
choice to charge with making a preliminary check of a ship's papers and assigning it a 
provisional berth’: Ships and Seamanship, 337. 
185 Cf. Ludwig Mitteis, Römisches Privatrecht bis auf die Zeit Diokletians, vol. 1: Grundbegriffe 
und Lehre von den juristischen Personen (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1908), 18. 
186 Wacław Osuchowski, ‘Appunti sul problema del “iactus” in diritto romano’, IURA 1 (1950): 
297; Atkinson, ‘Rhodian Sea-Law’, 51–52; Purpura, ‘Relitti di navi’, 84; Chevreau, ‘La lex 
Rhodia de iactu’, 73; Aubert, ‘Dealing with the Abyss’, 166. 
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leaving port, and the terms and conditions surrounding the loading and 
unloading of merchandise.187 This interpretation is also consistent with 
Cicero’s reference to a Rhodian law that any beaked (i.e., military) ships 
discovered in the port would be confiscated by the authorities.188 If Cicero was 
referring to the same lex as that treated in the legal sources, then the law was 
already familiar to a Roman audience by the first half of the first century BCE. 
The assertion that the lex Rhodia originally consisted of specific legislation is 
further supported by its treatment in the juristic literature. First, with reference 
to the iactus provision, its presentation in both the inscription and the 
Sententiae is consistent with the way in which the terms of other leges are 
reported. So, for example, the first chapter of the lex Aquilia: 
D.9.2.2 pr. (Gai. 7 ad ed. provinc.): 
Lege Aquilia capite primo cavetur: ‘ut qui servum servamve alienum 
alienamve quadrupedem vel pecudem iniuria occiderit, quanti id in eo 
anno plurimi fuit, tantum aes dare domino damnas esto’. 
Second, the juristic texts contained within the title (almost all of which predate 
the Sententiae) typically raise questions that refer to the provision as reported 
by Pseudo-Paul, which – together with the inscription – suggests that there 
was a stable, authoritative text that acted as a common point of reference. 
Finally, Julian’s treatment of the lex in the 86th book of his Digesta – that is, 
alongside other leges and in that part of the work traditionally dedicated to the 
treatment of leges – indicates that the iactus provision could reasonably be 
considered both in the context of locatio conductio (through which it was given 
effect) or as part of a lex in the more conventional sense.189 
 
187 Purpura reaches this conclusion by comparing the fragmentary evidence for the scope of 
the lex Rhodia with the provisions set out in a customs law in force at the port of Caunus 
in the first century CE: ‘Relitti di navi’, 85; also, generally, ‘Il regolamento’; and ‘«Ius 
naufragii»’, 272 and 292; also, Dietmar Schanbacher, ‘Zur Rezeption und Entwicklung des 
rhodischen Seewurfrechts in Rom’, in Humaniora: Medizin - Recht - Geschichte. Festschrift 
für Adolf Laufs zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Bernd-Rüdiger Kern et al. (Berlin and Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2006), 261; cf. Chevreau, ‘La lex Rhodia de iactu’, 68 and 79; and note Aubert’s 
scepticism: ‘Dealing with the Abyss’, 170, note 39. 
188 Cic. De inv. 2.32.98. 
189 D.14.2.6 (Iul. 86 dig.). For the surrounding texts attributed to book 86, which is entirely 
dedicated to a systematic treatment of several leges, Otto Lenel, Palingenesia iuris civilis, 
vol. 1 (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1889), 480–84. Aubert suspects that the attribution is a mistake: 
‘Dealing with the Abyss’, 165, note 28. However, the placement of the text is entirely 
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The third and final question concerns the relationship of the lex Rhodia to 
Roman law. It is clear from the texts contained in D.14.2 that the iactus 
provision was given effect within the framework of Roman law by the 
Republican jurists, who, in Thomas’ words, ‘simply incorporated the substance 
of the Rhodian custom into their conception of what was due ex fide bona as 
between the parties to locationes conductiones which had a sea venture as 
their object’.190 The decision reported by Maecianus, however, also indicates 
that the lex Rhodia consisted of more than the contribution principle alone and 
was regarded as a body of rules that operated alongside, but subordinate to, 
Roman law. In my view, the way in which the law was conceived can be seen 
in the analogous case of the lex Hieronica. According to Cicero, the lex 
Hieronica was a law introduced by King Hiero II of Syracuse (d. 216 BCE) that 
regulated the process by which the right to collect taxes was sold.191 In his 
monograph on the law, Carcopino argued that the its provisions were 
preserved after the Romans had reduced Sicily to a province in 241 by their 
inclusion (either directly or by reference) in the edicts issued by governors from 
one year to the next.192 Once the province had been formally organised by P. 
Rupilius in 132, the law’s provisions were given a more permanent footing by 
their inclusion (again, either directly or by reference) in the lex Rupilia of that 
year.193 Finally, Carcopino argued that the lex Hieronica was at last fully 
assimilated into the Roman legal order when in 75 BCE the consuls Terentius 
 
consistent with the systematic and customary ordering of digesta, which Schulz says – at 
least from the time of Celsus and Julian – began with a treatment of the Edict before moving 
on to a series of leges, senatus consulta, and imperial constitutions: Roman Legal Science, 
226. 
190 Servius, Alfenus, and Ofilius are all cited in connection with the lex, as are Labeo and 
Sabinus; Thomas, ‘Juridical Aspects’, 155. 
191 Cic. II Verr. 3.14-5. According to Pritchard, the law was likely first introduced after about 
265–64 BCE: ‘Cicero and the “Lex Hieronica”’, Historia 19, no. 3 (1970): 367. 
192 Jérôme Carcopino, La loi de Hiéron et les Romains (Paris: De Boccard, 1914), 71. The 
best dedicated account of the law remains Carcopino’s; though see Helmut Berve, König 
Hieron II (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1959), 51–55 
and 66–69; Antonio Pinzone, ‘Maiorum sapientia e lex Hieronica: Roma e l’organizzazione 
della provincia Sicilia da Gaio Flaminio a Cicerone’, in Provincia Sicilia. Ricerche di storia 
della Sicilia romana da Gaio Flaminio a Gregorio Magno (Catania: Edizioni del Prisma, 
1999), 1–37; and Malcolm Bell, III, ‘An Archaeologist’s Perspective on the Lex Hieronica’, 
in La Sicile de Cicéron: lecture des Verrines. Actes du colloque de Paris (19-20 mai 2006), 
ed. Julien Dubouloz and Sylvie Pittia (Besançon: Presses Universitaires de Franche-
Comté, 2007), 187–204. 
193 Carcopino, La loi de Hiéron, 71–73. 
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and Cassius, as well as the provincial governor L. Metellus (the successor of 
Verres in Sicily), announced their intention to affirm the method of tax-
collection in the province according to the lex.194 
If Carcopino’s account is correct, the status of the lex Hieronica provides a 
useful analogy for the lex Rhodia. Cicero’s account demonstrates that the lex 
Hieronica was not a conventionally promulgated statute, but rather an existing 
legal framework of foreign origin that was adopted by the Romans for 
pragmatic reasons. In the case of the lex Rhodia, Antoninus (and reportedly 
also Octavian) apparently saw no need to impose Roman law in a situation 
that was already adequately dealt with by a pre-existing body of rules that 
posed no challenge to Roman authority. It is therefore likely that the lex Rhodia 
was of a similar character to the lex Hieronica: that is, a pre-existing body of 
rules that was adopted by the Romans in as far as its provisions did not conflict 
with Roman law. 
4.2.3.2 Exegesis of D.14.2. 
Digest title 14.2 consists of ten fragments of varying length authored by Julian, 
Volusius Maecianus, Papinian, Paul, Callistratus, and Hermogenian; some of 
whom cite earlier interventions by jurists such as Servius, Ofilius, Alfenus, 
Labeo, Sabinus, and Papirius Fronto. As several scholars have remarked, the 
placement of the title between D.14.1 (de exercitoria actione) and D.14.3 (de 
institoria actione) appears an odd choice: in the Sententiae, the Codex, and 
the Institutes of both Gaius and Justinian, the exercitorian and institorian 
actions are treated in sequence.195 An explanation, however, has been 
provided by Aubert, who has argued that the compilers conceived the lex 
Rhodia as part of the certa lex of the magister navis; that is, the contractual 
framework governing his relationship with both the exercitor and those with 
whom he transacted within the scope of his appointment.196 
 
194 Carcopino, 74. 
195 Osuchowski, ‘Appunti’, 299. 
196 Aubert, ‘Dealing with the Abyss’, 269–70; cf. Thomas, ‘Juridical Aspects’, 154–55. 
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The title opens with the statement of a provision in the lex Rhodia, which 
provided that if goods had been jettisoned to lighten a ship, the sacrifice made 
for the benefit of all ought to be made good by the contribution of all.197 One of 
the reasons adduced earlier for believing that this provision was a stable text 
was that most of the questions addressed by fragments later in the title in some 
way refer back to issues of interpretation arising from its wording. In my view, 
the most sensible way to proceed is therefore to address each of these issues 
in turn and the opinions given by various jurists on the matter. 
The first question that arises concerns the procedural mechanism by which the 
provision was given effect. The most significant passage in this connection 
derives from the 34th book of Paul’s commentary ad edictum, which was 
dedicated to the treatment of locatio conductio: 
D.14.2.2 pr. (Paul. 34 ad ed.): 
Si laborante nave iactus factus est, amissarum mercium domini, si merces 
vehendas locaverant, ex locato cum magistro navis agere debent: is 
deinde cum reliquis, quorum merces salvae sunt, ex conducto, ut 
detrimentum pro portione communicetur, agere potest. Servius quidem 
respondit ex locato agere cum magistro navis debere, ut ceterorum 
vectorum merces retineat, donec portionem damni praestent. immo etsi 
^non^198 retineat merces magister, ultro ex locato habiturus est actionem 
cum vectoribus: quid enim si vectores sint, qui nullas sarcinas habeant? 
plane commodius est, si sint, retinere eas. at si non totam navem 
conduxerit, ex conducto aget, sicut vectores, qui loca in navem 
conduxerunt: aequissimum enim est commune detrimentum fieri eorum, 
qui propter amissas res aliorum consecuti sunt, ut merces suas salvas 
haberent. 
The fragment begins with the view of Paul, that if goods had been jettisoned 
from a vessel in distress, then the owners of the lost goods were entitled to 
proceed ex locato against the person who had undertaken the task of 
transporting them. The carrier could then raise an action ex conducto against 
the shippers whose goods had been saved, so that the losses could be 
distributed proportionately. This, it appears, was an elaboration of the view of 
 
197 D.14.2.1 (Paul 2 sent.); cf. PS.2.7.1.  
198 As Mommsen indicates, the sense of the passage demands the insertion of non in the 
phrase immo etsi <non> retineat merces magister etc. For the manuscript tradition, 
Schanbacher, ‘Zur Rezeption und Entwicklung’, 268–69. 
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Servius, who Paul reports gave a responsum to the effect that the magister 
navis, once he had been sued ex locato, was entitled to retain the merchandise 
of the more fortunate shippers until the damage (damnum) had been made 
good. The fragment concludes with the severan jurist’s view that the 
shipmaster could also proceed ex locato against any passengers on board 
(since they might not have any goods to retain); and equally that both 
passengers and traders who had hired space on the ship could proceed ex 
conducto against the magister, provided that they had not hired the whole 
vessel. 
Although the genuineness of the principium – and particularly parts of the 
section immo… salvas haberent – has been doubted, I agree with those 
scholars who have maintained its substantial authenticity, even if its form may 
have been altered.199 This being accepted, several questions arise. With 
respect to Servius’ opinion, different interpretations have been offered 
concerning the magister’s right to retain goods pending contribution. On one 
view, the whole procedure was founded on pacts concluded by the parties.200 
To accommodate this argument, it has been supposed that the text was 
reorganised and altered by the compilers, who derived the shipmaster’s 
contractual position from aequitas instead. A more convincing interpretation, 
however, has been put forward by Wieacker and Cardilli, who have argued 
that the magister navis was granted an exceptio ex iure tertii as a defence 
against those shippers who raised an action against him without having paid 
their share of the contribution.201 In other words, having been sued ex locato, 
 
199 For a history of the textual criticism of the fragment, Mancinetti, L’emersione, 137–38, notes 
50 and 51. Among those scholars maintaining the substantial authenticity of the fragment, 
though casting doubt on the order in which its various parts are presented, Matteo Marrone, 
‘D. 14. 2. 2 pr.: “retentio” e “iudicia bonae fidei”’, IURA 6 (1955): 172–75; also, Maria 
Gabriella Zoz, ‘Il ruolo della buona fede nel contratto di trasporto marittimo’, in Il ruolo della 
buona fede oggettiva nell’esperienza giuridica storica e contemporanea: Atti del Convegno 
internazionale di studi in onore di Alberto Burdese (Padova - Venezia - Treviso, 14-15-16 
giugno 2001), ed. Luigi Garofalo, vol. 4 (Padova: CEDAM, 2003), 561–62. 
200 Francesco De Martino, ‘Lex Rhodia. Note di diritto romano marittimo’, RDN 4, no. 1–2 
(1938): 22 and 210-11; Siro Solazzi, ‘Su C. I. 11. 6 “De Naufragiis”’, RDN 5, no. 3 (1939): 
253. 
201 Franz Wieacker, ‘Iactus in tributum nave salva venit (D. 14, 2, 4 pr.): Exegesen zur lex 
Rhodia de iactu’, ed. Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz and Giuseppe Lavaggi, Studi in memoria di 
Emilio Albertario 1 (1953): 517; also, Ingo Reichard, Die Frage des Drittschadenersatzes 
im klassischen römischen Recht (Cologne: Böhlau, 1994), 135–36; Cardilli, L’obbligazione 
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the carrier could repel claims by the more fortunate shippers for so long as 
their contribution remained outstanding. 
By the time of Paul, this indirect method of giving effect to the iactus provision 
had been refined so that it was possible for the carrier to proceed ex conducto 
directly against shippers who had failed to pay their share. The question that 
arises is whether, during the late Republic, the application of the iactus 
provision was confined to locationes mercium vehendarum (i.e., contracts of 
carriage). Servius’ opinion – reported though it is – only speaks of proceeding 
against the shipmaster ex locato, while the latter part of the text appears to 
indicate that the ability of passengers and traders to give effect to the iactus 
provision ex conducto, and shipmasters ex locato, was a later innovation. 
The likelihood that this was in fact the case is strengthened by the substantive 
content of Paul’s commentary. In short, it was his view that the iactus provision 
could be given effect through the actions on letting and hiring if: i) a locatio 
mercium vehendarum had been concluded; and ii) the arrangement was one 
in which the passengers and traders had hired space on board. Conversely, 
no recourse was available to a person who had hired the whole ship. These 
conclusions accord with the obligations owed by the parties in each of these 
contractual arrangements. Where a contract of carriage had been concluded, 
the carrier was obliged to transport the merchandise to its destination, so that 
his contractual relationship with the shipper was already concerned with the 
goods’ survival. In contrast, for those arrangements in which a passenger or 
trader had hired space on board, Paul relied on aequitas (aequissimum enim 
est…) to justify the provision’s extension because the obligation of the 
shipmaster to perform was not connected with the fate of any property being 
transported. He was not, however, willing to go so far as to say that the 
exercitor of a vessel should be liable for the loss of jettisoned goods by a 
person who had hired the whole ship. 
 




The application of the iactus provision therefore appears to have been 
extended over time: from its limited application between the parties to 
contracts of carriage concluded with the same magister to almost every 
contract of letting and hiring which had a sea venture as its object. All this may 
explain the inclusion of D.14.2.10 in the title, because reaching conclusions 
about what the parties had agreed (i.e., id quod actum est) would have had a 
bearing on whether they were entitled to participate in the distribution.202 
Having set out the substance of the process in the principium, Paul elaborated 
on some of its finer points. Later in the same passage he confirms that the 
iactus provision could be given effect by passengers and traders ex 
conducto.203 If any of the contributors was insolvent, however, the magister 
would not be expected to bear the loss.204 Finally, if jettisoned property 
resurfaced and contribution had already been paid, the process could be 
unwound by bring the appropriate actions against the shipmaster and the 
owners of the jettisoned goods respectively.205 On this latter point, the 
implication was that no contribution was due because no sacrifice had been 
made. 
levandae navis gratia iactus mercium factus est… 
The interpretation of this clause involves several connected issues. One 
question that arose concerned the scope of the word ‘merces’: that is, whether 
there were circumstances in which the owner of the vessel could claim 
contribution for damage to the ship’s gear. In both Paul and Julian’s view, a 
distinction could be drawn between damage incurred in the ordinary course of 
this vessel’s operations (for example, if the ship’s mast had been struck by 
lightning and the magister was forced put in for repairs) and the destruction of 
equipment either on the express orders of the passengers or arising from their 
fearful reaction to a common danger.206 In the latter sets of circumstances, 
 
202 Supra, 161 et seq. 
203 D.14.2.2.2 (Paul. 34 ad ed.). 
204 D.14.2.2.6 (Paul. 34 ad ed.). 
205 D.14.2.2.7 (Paul. 34 ad ed.). 
206 D.14.2.2.1 (Paul. 34 ad ed.); D.14.2.6 (Iul. 86 dig.). 
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both Papinian and Hermogenian agreed that contribution would be due if the 
jettison of the equipment was intended to avert a common calamity.207 
A second question concerned the interpretation of the word ‘iactus’ and the 
circumstances in which it could be said to have achieved the purpose of 
lightening the ship (levandae navis). In this connection, Paul cited the jointly 
held views of Servius, Ofilius, and Labeo: 
D.14.2.2.3 (Paul. 34 ad ed.):208 
Si navis a piratis redempta sit, Servius Ofilius Labeo omnes conferre 
debere aiunt: quod vero praedones abstulerint, eum perdere cuius fuerint, 
nec conferendum ei, qui suas merces redemerit. 
According to Paul’s three predecessors, contribution would be due if a ship 
had been ransomed from pirates, but not for goods that had been stolen by 
the bandits or for money paid by individuals to ransom their own property back. 
Several scholars have reached different conclusions about the circumstances 
underpinning the opinion. According to Honsell, the situation giving rise to the 
distinction was one in which a shipper had paid to ransom the ship and the 
whole cargo, only for the pirates to hold back some of the goods and demand 
further ransoms from individual owners.209 However, as Stolfi has pointed out 
(drawing inspiration from Cujas), it is more likely that the distinction arose from 
two kinds of ransom payment: first, one made toward the safety of the whole 
ship (and possibly also the lives of those on board), notwithstanding that the 
pirates may still have intended to remove the cargo; and second, toward the 
retention of merchandise by individual owners, which might otherwise be taken 
 
207 D.14.2.3 (Pap. 19 resp.); D.14.2.5.1 (Hermog. 2 iuris epit.). 
208 For a comprehensive bibliography, Mancinetti, L’emersione, 141, note 62. See, also, Anna 
Tarwacka, Romans and Pirates. Legal Perspective (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Kardynala Stefana Wyszyńskiego, 2009), 157–58; Sebastiano Tafaro, ‘Roma e la pirateria’, 
in Nuove piraterie e ordinamenti giuridici interni e internazionali: atti del Convegno tenuto 
a Taranto il 16 e 17 giugno 2009, ed. Antonio Uricchio, Corrado Petrocelli, and Antonio 
Tajani (Bari: Cacucci, 2010), 61; and Mancinetti, L’emersione, 210–15. 
209 Heinrich Honsell, ‘Ut omnium contributione sarciatur quod pro omnibus datum est: die 
Kontribution nach der Lex Rhodia de iactu’, in Ars boni et aequi. Festschrift für Wolfgang 
Waldstein zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Martin J. Schermaier and Zoltán Végh (Stuttgart: 
Steiner, 1993), 148; cf. Herbert Wagner, ‘Die Lex Rhodia de iactu’, RIDA 44 (1997): 368. 
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away.210 In the first case contribution was due, because it constituted a 
sacrifice made for the common good; in the second it was not, because the 
payment was made for the benefit of the cargo-owner alone.211 
Whatever the case, the opinion clearly demonstrates that by the period of the 
late Republic and early Principate several leading jurists were agreed that 
ransom payments could fall within the meaning of iactus, provided that the 
other requirements of the provision were met.212 A second passage, attributed 
to Callistratus, is also relevant in this connection. In an extended discourse at 
the end of the excerpt, the severan jurist approved the view of Papirius Fronto 
(official under the divi fratres) that damage sustained by cargo on board a 
vessel while other goods were being jettisoned also qualified for 
contribution.213 Earlier in the same passage, Callistratus cited a responsum 
given by Sabinus (cos. suff. 69 CE):214 
D.14.2.4 pr. (Call. 2 quaest.):215 
Navis onustae levandae causa, quia intrare flumen vel portum non 
potuerat cum onere, si quaedam merces in scapham traiectae sunt, ne aut 
extra flumen periclitetur aut in ipso ostio vel portu, eaque scapha 
summersa est, ratio haberi debet inter eos, qui in nave merces salvas 
habent, cum his qui in scapha perdiderunt, proinde tamquam si iactura 
facta esset: idque Sabinus quoque libro secundo responsorum probat. 
contra si scapha cum parte mercium salva est, navis periit, ratio haberi 
non debet eorum, qui in nave perdiderunt, quia iactus in tributum nave 
salva venit. 
 
210 Emanuele Stolfi, ‘Quaestiones iuris. Casistica e insegnamento giuridico in romanisti e 
civilisti napoletani di fine ottocento’, Teoría e storia del diritto privato 1 (2008): 1251; cf. 
Mancinetti, L’emersione, 210–15. 
211 Cf. Cardilli, L’obbligazione di ‘praestare’, 268. 
212 As Aubert notes, this may not have been an extension, as one cannot rule out that the legal 
arrangement developed simultaneously in connection with both piracy and shipwreck: 
‘Dealing with the Abyss’, 163. 
213 D.14.2.4.2 (Call. 2 quaest.). The passage has been considered heavily interpolated: cf. 
Mitteis, Levy, and Rabel, Index, 1:237; also, Wieacker, ‘Iactus’, 528–29. For Papirius 
Iustus, Kunkel, Die römischen Juristen, 216–17. 
214 For Sabinus, who exercised considerable influence under Vespasian, Kunkel, Die 
römischen Juristen, 131–33. 
215 Cf. PS.2.7.4. The Digest text is substantially genuine. Only the last phrase – quia iactus in 
tributum nave salva venit – has been doubted: Gerhard Beseler, ‘Miscellanea’, ZSS 44 
(1924): 389; cf. Wieacker, ‘Iactus’, 518–22; and Christoph Krampe, ‘Lex Rhodia de iactu: 
contributio nave salva’, in Festschrift für Rolf Knütel zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Holger 




In the first part of the text (Navis onustae… responsorum probat) Callistratus 
held that if merchandise had been offloaded into a lighter (scapha) to 
disburden a ship, the draught of which was too low to enter a river or harbour, 
contribution would be due to the owners of the disembarked goods if the lighter 
became submerged ‘as if the merchandise had been thrown overboard’. The 
reasoning is transparent: the goods had been removed to ensure the safe 
passage of the ship, and their loss was analogous to the sacrifice of jettison. 
This view, he reported, was approved by Sabinus, who had given a responsum 
to this effect.216 In the latter part of the fragment (contra… salva venit), the 
severan jurist elaborated on this position by clarifying that if, on the other hand, 
the vessel had sunk and the lighter had survived, no contribution would be due 
to those who lost their goods with the ship, ‘because jettison leads to 
contribution only if the ship is saved’. 
Altogether, these texts show that by the time of the early Principate the iactus 
provision had been extended to cover ransom paid to pirates and losses 
resulting from the transfer of merchandise to lighters for the purpose of 
increasing the navigability of a vessel. Again, by the second half of the second 
century CE, damage inflicted to a ship either at the behest of the passengers, 
or as a result of their spontaneous reaction to a perilous situation, and to cargo 
while other goods were being jettisoned, also came within the scope of the 
provision. 
…omnium contributione sarciatur quod pro omnibus datum est. 
The terms of the iactus provision were that a sacrifice made for the benefit of 
all had to be made good by the contribution of all. One question that arose was 
whether goods that had been saved or salvaged by their owner fell to be 
included in the distribution. The earliest jurist to address this issue was Alfenus: 
D.14.2.7 (Alf. 3 dig. a Paulo epit.): 
Cum depressa navis aut deiecta esset, quod quisque ex ea suum 
servasset, sibi servare respondit, tamquam ex incendio. 
 




The fragment, which is drawn from the third book of Paul’s epitome of the 
republican jurist’s Digest, begins with a subordinate clause in which a ship is 
described as depressa aut deiecta.217 For deiecta Mommsen suggested 
disiecta (i.e., dashed to pieces), though there are several instances in the 
literary sources in which the word deiecta is used in connection with ships that 
were driven off course and sometimes stranded.218 Depressa navis, on the 
other hand, invariably carries the meaning of a ship that had sunk to the 
bottom.219 
With this in mind, Alfenus’ opinion was that if a ship sank or was driven off 
course (and possibly stranded), each person could keep what he saved of his 
own property, just as in a fire. In the context of a situation in which jettison had 
occurred, this opinion amounted to the view that property rescued by its owner 
either during or after a wreck did not count as having been saved by an act of 
jettison. For the purpose of the iactus provision, then, it was Alfenus’ view that 
only goods that had been saved as a result of an act of jettison fell to be 
included in the distribution, and therefore not property rescued by other 
means.220 




217 The third book of Alfenus’ Digesta was dedicated, among other things, to locatio conductio: 
Hans-Jörg Roth, Alfeni Digesta. Eine spätrepublikanische Juristenschrift (Berlin: Duncker 
& Humblot, 1999), 194. 
218 Livy, 23.34.16 and 40.6; Caes. BGall. 4.28.2. Cf. Krampe, who argues that deiecta here 
means ‘stranded’: ‘Lex Rhodia de iactu’, 595. While it is true that in some of the cited 
examples the ships end up becoming stranded, the participle deiecta only refers to that 
part of the action in which the vessel gets driven off course. 
219 In this connection, Caes. BCiv. 1.58, 2.6-7 and 43; Ov. Met. 14.185; Tac. Hist. 4.79. I agree 
with Mommsen’s suggestion that the word depressa in D.14.2.6 (Iul. 86 dig.) ought to be 
read deprensa, which in a nautical context usually indicates that the subject has been 
caught or overtaken by a storm: e.g., Lucr. 6.429; Catull. 25.14; Ov. Met. 11.663; also, Her. 
7.66; Verg. Aen. 5.52; also, G. 4.421. Cf. Krampe, 595. 
220 Cf. Eike Ullmann, ‘Der Verlust von Fracht und Schiff. Lex Rhodia de iactu und die große 
Haverei. Exegese zu Hermog.D.14.2.5.pr.-1. Ein Beitrag zur Kontinuität des Rechts’, in 
Festschrift für Henning Piper, ed. Willi Erdmann, Wolfgang Gloy, and Rolf Herber (Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 1996), 1054–55. 
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D.14.2.4.1 (Call. 2 quaest.):221 
Sed si navis, quae in tempestate iactu mercium unius mercatoris levata 
est, in alio loco summersa est et aliquorum mercatorum merces per 
urinatores extractae sunt data mercede, rationem haberi debere eius, 
cuius merces in navigatione levandae navis causa iactae sunt, ab his, qui 
postea sua per urinatores servaverunt, Sabinus aeque respondit. eorum 
vero, qui ita servaverunt, invicem rationem haberi non debere ab eo, qui 
in navigatione iactum fecit, si quaedam ex his mercibus per urinatores 
extractae sunt: eorum enim merces non possunt videri servandae navis 
causa iactae esse, quae perit. 
According to Callistratus, Sabinus had advised on a case in which 
merchandise had been jettisoned to save a ship that had been caught in a 
storm (in tempestate) only for the goods that had been saved to become 
wrecked at another place (in alio loco). If, Sabinus held, the goods that had 
been lost in the wreck were recovered by hired divers (per urinatores 
servaverunt), they would have to account to the owner of the jettisoned goods 
for contribution. Conversely, if some of the jettisoned goods had been 
recovered by divers, no contribution would be due by their owner to those of 
the merchandise lost in the wreck, because their property had not been thrown 
overboard for the purpose of saving the ship. 
There are good reasons to believe that Sabinus was aware of Alfenus’ reply 
when crafting his response. Though it is not stated explicitly, the question was 
whether owners who had salvaged their own cargoes had to share in the 
distribution if their goods had been saved by an act of jettison earlier in the 
same voyage. Alfenus’ view was that goods that had been saved by their 
owner did not fall to be included in the distribution. The underlying principle, 
however, was that contribution was only due from property that had been 
saved by an act of jettison. In the case considered by Sabinus, several owners 
had salvaged their own goods by paying divers. If, on the one hand, the act of 
jettison and the loss of the goods had occurred as part of the same event, 
Alfenus’ opinion would hold. If, however, the goods had been saved by an act 
of jettison earlier in the same voyage, Sabinus’ view was that contribution was 
due because the jettison had succeeded in saving the property in the first 
 
221 Cf. PS.2.7.3. 
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instance, so that the ultimate survival of the salvaged merchandise could be 
traced back to the sacrificing act. On the other hand, it is implied that no 
contribution was due from goods that remained on the seabed, because it 
could not be said that they had survived as a result of the earlier jettison. A 
person was therefore liable to pay contribution for goods that had been saved, 
lost, and then recovered; but not for goods that had been saved and then lost. 
Turning to the second part of the fragment (eorum vero… quae perit), it is not 
clear whether this section represents the views of Callistratus alone, or a 
continuation of Sabinus’ response.222 There are also several textual issues, 
though none that go to the heart of the decision.223 This being the case, the 
reasoning is unobjectionable: goods lost by accident at sea did not qualify for 
contribution, because they had not been sacrificed for the purpose of saving 
the ship. 
The outstanding issue that remains is the development of the so-called ‘navis 
salva principle’. According to Wieacker, the rule that contributio only became 
due if the ship was saved can be traced back at least as early as Sabinus, if 
not to Alfenus.224 As Krampe has shown, however, the principle was not a hard 
and fast condition for the application of the iactus provision, but rather a 
casuistic development that emerged from the juristic interpretation of what was 
owed ex fide bona between the parties to a contract of letting and hiring.225 
Certainly, by the end of the third century CE, both Hermogenian and the author 
of the Sententiae took the view that contribution was only due if the act of 
jettison led to the salvation of the ship.226 As Kreller argued, this development 
can probably be traced back to Callistratus, who was likely the author of the 
 
222 Krampe suggests that the whole section ought to be attributed to Callistratus alone: 
Krampe, ‘Lex Rhodia de iactu’, 591; cf. Wieacker, ‘Iactus’, 523–24. 
223 Wieacker has defended the fragment’s substantial authenticity: ‘Iactus’, 523. Mommsen 
suggested the insertion of a negative in the clause qui ita <non> servaverunt to preserve 
the sense of the passage; but cf. Krampe, ‘Lex Rhodia de iactu’, 591. The closing words 
quae perit have also been doubted: Mitteis, Levy, and Rabel, Index, 1:237; but cf. 
Wieacker, ‘Iactus’, 523–24. 
224 Wieacker, ‘Iactus’, 528. 
225 Krampe, ‘Lex Rhodia de iactu’, 597. 
226 D.14.2.5 pr. (Hermog. 2 iuris epit.); PS.2.7.5: on which, generally, Ullmann, ‘Der Verlust’. 
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observation that iactus in tributum nave salva venit.227 In my view, however, 
this was not a principle that was familiar to Sabinus. With respect to the first of 
Sabinus’ responsa (reported in D.14.2.4 pr.), it is possible – as Callistratus 
appears to have done – to interpret Sabinus’ reasoning to have been that 
contribution was only due if there was a connection between the act of jettison 
and the survival of the ship. As the next responsum shows (D.14.2.4.1), 
however, the relevant connection for Sabinus was between the sacrificial act 
and the property thus saved. If the interpretations I have offered above are 
accepted, then this was a principle that had been elaborated by Alfenus and 
applied in both the responsa given by Sabinus. The so-called navis salva 
principle was therefore a product of severan jurisprudence at the earliest. 
Finally, the questions concerning when contribution would be due, to whom, 
and in what proportion, were also raised by Paul in his commentary ad 
edictum. In one elaborate passage the severan jurist identified several issues 
arising out of a situation in which goods had been jettisoned from a ship that 
was carrying both a plurality of traders with different cargoes and passengers 
who were both slave and free.228 The jurist held that: 
i) Everyone who benefited from the jettison by the preservation of their 
property was obliged to contribute, including the shipowner; 
ii) The loss was to be apportioned in relation to the market value of the 
property that had been saved. In a later excerpt Paul explained that the 
jettisoned goods ought to be valued at their purchase price; the preserved 
property at the price at which it would sell.229 
iii) Except for food brought on board for consumption – which in times of 
shortage was considered common fare – all property was to be taken into 
account, including items that did not add to the weight of the ship (such 
as clothes and jewellery) and, by implication, unfree passengers.230 In 
 
227 Kreller, ‘Lex Rhodia’, 297–98; cf. Wieacker, ‘Iactus’, 521–22. 
228 D.14.2.2.2 (Paul. 34 ad ed.). 
229 D.14.2.2.4 (Paul. 34 ad ed.). 
230 See, in this connection, Philogelos 80. In this joke, a scholastikos who was holding a 
chirograph recording a debt of one-and-a-half million drachmae on board a storm-tossed 
ship crossed out half a million and declared that he had made the vessel that much lighter. 
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this latter connection, Paul made the humane observation later in his 
commentary that slaves who perished at sea did not qualify for 
contributio: no doubt to remove the incentive to throw human beings to 
their death;231 
iv) Finally, the owners of the property that had been lost could proceed 
against the nauta ex conducto. 
4.2.3.3 Conclusion. 
The lex Rhodia likely consisted of a customs law first introduced at the port of 
Rhodes during the time of the island state’s thalassocracy during the third and 
early second centuries BCE.232 Although there is no evidence that the lex was 
ever provided with a formal legal footing (e.g., by the incorporation of its terms 
into a provincial Edict or the like), the decision reported by Maecianus indicates 
that it was conceived in a way analogous to the lex Hieronica. The most 
enduring provision of the lex for the purposes of maritime trade was that 
concerning contribution for jettison. However, because the law was not a 
conventionally promulgated Roman statute, its terms could not be directly 
relied upon as part of the ius civile. This was solved by means of juristic 
interpretatio, which gave effect to the substance of the provision through the 
actiones locati and conducti: institutions of the ius gentium and constituent 
elements of the praetor’s Edict. The process was certainly complete by the 
time of Servius and was probably underway by the turn of the second and first 
centuries BCE.233 The application of the law’s other provisions (at least in 
cases involving peregrini) was later confirmed by the authority of the emperor 
 
I agree with Rougé that the document probably recorded a debt, possibly in the form of a 
maritime loan: ‘Le Philogélôs et la navigation’, Journal des Savants, no. 1–2 (1987): 10–
11. For the interpretation of this joke from a legal perspective, Anna Tarwacka, European 
Legal Culture through the Prism of Jokes. The Example of the Philogelos (Wrocław: Europe 
of Nations and Freedom, 2018), 124–28. 
231 D.14.2.2.5 (Paul. 34 ad ed.). For the reality of throwing slaves overboard, supra, 54.  
232 For a brief summary of the Rhodian ascendancy in the Eastern Mediterranean, Atkinson, 
‘Rhodian Sea-Law’, 74–76. 
233 Chevreau, ‘La lex Rhodia de iactu’, 72–73; also, Stanisław Plodzień, Lex Rhodia de iactu. 
Studium historycznoprawne z zakresu rzymskiego prawa handlowomorskiego (Lublin: 
Widawnictwo Kul, 2010) (with English summary at 163-69). 
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in response to petitions, first Augustus and later Antoninus Pius or Marcus 
Aurelius. 
In terms of juristic interpretation, it is my view that the application of the iactus 
provision was originally confined to contracts of carriage, and only later 
extended to almost all contracts of letting and hiring which had a sea venture 
as their object. Further, the jurists extended the meaning of the provision by 
analogy to include (in certain circumstances) the jettison of the ship’s gear; the 
ransoming of merchandise from pirates; the loss of goods that had been 
offloaded to lighten a vessel; and damage caused to goods on board while the 
act of jettison was taking place. Finally, for the duration of the late Republic 
and classical period, it was accepted that contribution was only due for those 
goods whose survival could be directly attributed to the act of jettison. The so-
called navis salva principle was therefore a severan development at the 
earliest. 
4.2.4 Excursus on D.19.2.31 (Alf. 5 dig. a Paulo epit.). 
The reason for treating this text here is that it provides some important insights 
into the Republican conception of locatio conductio in the context of shipping 
contracts. At the same time, it is my submission that the fragment is evidence 
for the practice of granting decretal actions to merchants in the form of so-
called actiones oneris aversi. 
In navem Saufeii cum complures frumentum confuderant, Saufeius uni ex 
his frumentum reddiderat de communi et navis perierat: quaesitum est, an 
ceteri pro sua parte frumenti cum nauta agere possunt oneris aversi 
actione. respondit rerum locatarum duo genera esse, ut aut idem 
redderetur (sicuti cum vestimenta fulloni curanda locarentur) aut eiusdem 
generis redderetur (veluti cum argentum pusulatum fabro daretur, ut vasa 
fierent, aut aurum, ut anuli): ex superiore causa rem domini manere, ex 
posteriore in creditum iri. idem iuris esse in deposito: nam si quis pecuniam 
numeratam ita deposuisset, ut neque clusam neque obsignatam traderet, 
sed adnumeraret, nihil alius eum debere apud quem deposita esset, nisi 
tantundem pecuniae solveret. secundum quae videri triticum factum 
Saufeii et recte datum. quod si separatim tabulis aut heronibus aut in alia 
cupa clusum uniuscuiusque triticum fuisset, ita ut internosci posset quid 
cuiusque esset, non potuisse nos permutationem facere, sed tum posse 
eum cuius fuisset triticum quod nauta solvisset vindicare. et ideo se 
improbare actiones oneris aversi: quia sive eius generis essent merces, 
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quae nautae traderentur, ut continuo eius fierent et mercator in creditum 
iret, non videretur onus esse aversum, quippe quod nautae fuisset: sive 
eadem res, quae tradita esset, reddi deberet, furti esse actionem locatori 
et ideo supervacuum esse iudicium oneris aversi. sed si ita datum esset, 
ut in simili re solvi possit, conductorem culpam dumtaxat debere (nam in 
re, quae utriusque causa contraheretur, culpam deberi) neque omnimodo 
culpam esse, quod uni reddidisset ex frumento, quoniam alicui primum 
reddere eum necesse fuisset, tametsi meliorem eius condicionem faceret 
quam ceterorum. 
The text has given rise to an extensive secondary literature and a range of 
competing interpretations.234 The inscription indicates that the fragment 
originally belonged to Paul’s epitome of the fifth book of Alfenus’ Digesta.235 
According to Lenel, Paul included the text under the heading de furtis et onere 
averso, though the compilers altered this context by including it under the 
rubric of letting and hiring (D.19.2).236 
The fragment begins with a brief exposition of the facts (the casus) and the 
quaestio. Several complures had shot their grain loose into Saufeius’ ship, and 
after he had returned a share of the grain to one of them out of the common 
store, the ship was lost. The question was whether the other complures could 
proceed against the nauta for their share of the grain by raising an action for 
onus aversum. 
Although the configuration of the contractual relationship between the parties 
is not made explicit, the references to the nauta as conductor and the 
complures as locatores later in the fragment indicate that the parties had in 
each case agreed a locatio mercium vehendarum in which Saufeius had 
undertaken the task of transporting grain to a certain location.237 Saufeius and 
 
234 For a comprehensive bibliography, Ivan Siklosi, ‘Remarks on the Problems of Actio Oneris 
Aversi’, Acta Facultatis Politico-Iuridicae Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de 
Rolando Eotvos Nominatae 51 (2014): 7, note 2; and for a thorough literature review, 
Andreas Bessenyõ, ‘Das Rätsel der actio oneris aversi. Eine Exegese von D. 19, 2, 31’, 
Studia Iuridica Auctoritate Universitatis Pecs 127 (2001): 23–55. 
235 For the time being, Alfenus will be treated as the principal author. On the attribution of parts 
of the text to different authors, Fiori, La definizione, 66, note 3; Benedikt Forschner, ‘Das 
Schiff des Saufeius. Anmerkungen zu D.19.2.31’, Forum Historiae Iuris, 2011, ¶ 22-5, 
http://www.forhistiur.de/zitat/1111forschner.htm. 
236 Lenel, Palingenesia, 1889, 1:52; cf. Roth, Alfeni Digesta, 194. 
237 Siro Solazzi, ‘Appunti di diritto romano marittimo: L’actio oneris aversi’, in Scritti di diritto 
romano, vol. 3 (Naples: Jovene, 1960), 519; J. A. C. Thomas, ‘Trasporto marittimo, 
locazione ed «actio oneris aversi»’, in Antologia giuridica romanistica ed antiquaria, vol. 1 
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the complures were therefore carrier and shippers respectively, and it is likely 
that the situation Alfenus had in mind was one in which, for example, the ship 
had arrived at its destination, but sank while the cargo was being discharged 
to the shippers or their agents in port.238 
The responsum: 
Alfenus began the response by making two distinctions. The first distinction 
concerned the legal status of each of the parties in relation to two different 
kinds of property handed over in virtue of a contract of letting and hiring (duo 
genera rerum locatarum).239 If the same (idem) piece of property was expected 
in return, the person handing it over remained the owner (rem domini manere), 
whereas if performance was expected in kind (eiusdem generis), he became 
a creditor (in creditum iri). The second distinction concerned the status of each 
of the parties in relation to property handed over as a deposit according to the 
manner of the datio and the way in which it was stored. According to Alfenus, 
the same principle applied (idem iuris esse): if the money had been deliberately 
enclosed in some way, then the exact same coins were expected in return and 
the depositor remained their owner; whereas if the coins had been counted out 
(the typical method of making a loan), only an equal sum was due and the 
depositor became a creditor.240 
 
(Milan: Giuffrè, 1968), 229–30; ‘Juridical Aspects’, 144; also, Nicola De Marco, ‘L’actio 
oneris aversi—appunti su un equivoco riconstruttivo’, Labeo 99 (2003): 154. 
238 Cardilli, L’obbligazione di ‘praestare’, 271; Roth, Alfeni Digesta, 134–35; Éva Jakab, 
‘Vertragsformulare im Imperium Romanum’, ZSS 123 (2006): 101; Gianfranco Purpura, ‘Il 
χειρέμβολον e il caso di Saufeio: responsabilità e documentazione nel trasporto marittimo 
romano’, AUPA 57 (2014): 139. 
239 Fiori, La definizione, 70. 
240 On sealed and unsealed deposits, Jean Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman 





Frescoes of cupids engaged as fullers (treading the clothes in vats, carding, inspecting, and 
folding the clean garments) and goldsmiths (operating a furnace, shaping a bowl, hammering 
upon an anvil and using scales for weighing) from the oecus of the House of the Vettii, Pompeii, 
62 – 79 CE. Source: Scholars Research Collection. 
Turning to the case in hand, Alfenus stated that the grain appeared to have 
passed to Saufeius and that there had been an appropriate datio (secundum 
quae… recte datum). More precisely, the indication is that, in light of the 
foregoing distinctions, the grain handed to Saufeius both belonged to the 
category of res locatae to be returned eiusdem generis and had been handed 
over in a manner analogous to money counted out as a deposit. This, in turn, 
sets up the answer to the quaestio. If, the jurist wrote, the shippers’ grain had 
been stored separately, then each would have retained ownership of his 
respective merchandise and would have a vindicatio for its return. Turning to 
the duo genera rerum locatarum, he continued that actions for onus aversum 
did not appear to be appropriate here either. On the one hand, because the 
grain belonged to the category of res locatae to be returned in kind, so that the 
nauta became its owner and the shipper a creditor, it did not appear that onus 
aversum could occur; and on the other, if it had been the case that the same 
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property (eadem res) was expected in return, the locator would have an action 
for theft. Alfenus therefore concluded that since conduct amounting to onus 
aversum was already covered by existing actions in every possible 
combination, granting a special iudicium was over and above what was 
necessary. 
 
Fresco depicting the Isis Geminiana (first half of the third century CE), from the Ostiense 
Necropolis on the Via Laurentina, columbarium 31, now preserved in the Vatican Museum. 
Abascantus supervises a person emptying produce (res – possibly grain) into a modius. At the 
fore, a person sits besides another modius marked with the word ‘feci’ as more produce is 
brought up the gangplank. The whole scene is overseen by the magister navis, Farnaces. 
Source: Navis II database (photo: Vatican Museum). 
It will be immediately apparent that I have not included the final section of the 
text (sed si… fin.) as part of the original responsum. The reason for this is that 





241 According to Fiori, the part of the text quod si… fin. is organised as a ‘complex chiasmus’ 
comprised of four elements combining the two kinds of res locatae with penal and 
reipersecutory remedies: La definizione, 77–78; also, Purpura, ‘Il χειρέμβολον’, 141. 




(A) respondit rerum locatarum duo genera esse, ut aut idem redderetur (sicuti 
cum vestimenta fulloni curanda locarentur) 
(B) aut eiusdem generis redderetur (veluti cum argentum pusulatum fabro 
daretur, ut vasa fierent, aut aurum, ut anuli): ex superiore causa rem 
domini manere, ex posteriore in creditum iri. 
(C) idem iuris esse in deposito: nam si quis pecuniam numeratam ita 
deposuisset, ut neque clusam neque obsignatam traderet, sed 
adnumeraret, nihil alius eum debere apud quem deposita esset, nisi 
tantundem pecuniae solveret. 
(D) secundum quae videri triticum factum Saufeii et recte datum. 
(C’) quod si separatim tabulis aut heronibus aut in alia cupa clusum 
uniuscuiusque triticum fuisset, ita ut internosci posset quid cuiusque esset, 
non potuisse nos permutationem facere, sed tum posse eum cuius fuisset 
triticum quod nauta solvisset vindicare. 
(B’) et ideo se improbare actiones oneris aversi: quia sive eius generis essent 
merces, quae nautae traderentur, ut continuo eius fierent et mercator in 
creditum iret, non videretur onus esse aversum, quippe quod nautae 
fuisset: 
(A’) sive eadem res, quae tradita esset, reddi deberet, furti esse actionem 
locatori et ideo supervacuum esse iudicium oneris aversi. 
Engel has described Chiasmus as:242 
… a form of inverted parallelism… that presents subjects in the order A, 
B, C and then discusses them C, B, A, sometimes using exact repetition, 
sometimes displaying the successive clauses by means of parallel syntax. 
The seed of chiasmus is to be found wherever framing devices, cyclic 
form, or symmetry are used. 
The technique may be thought of as ‘the use of bilateral symmetry about a 
central axis’,243 though subject to the caveat that symmetry, to the ancient 
mind, was just one aspect of the broader concept of symmetria, which related 
to the commensurability of parts to one another and the whole.244 As Thomas 
has noted, a chiasmus does not require an exact mirror image (e.g., ABBA, 
ABCBA), but rather an inverted parallelism between pairs of elements in a sort 
 
242 William E. Engel, Chiastic Designs in English Literature from Sidney to Shakespeare 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), 5. 
243 Ralf Norman, Samuel Butler and the Meaning of Chiasmus (London: Macmillan, 1986), 
276. 
244 Edmund V. Thomas, ‘Chiasmus in Art and Text’, Greece and Rome 60 (2013): 56. 
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of ‘criss-cross’ relation (e.g., ABB’A’, ABCB’A’).245 In Thomson’s view, the 
formation is therefore said to occur: 
…if the text exhibits bilateral symmetry of four or more elements about a 
central axis, which may itself lie between two elements, or be a unique 
central element, the symmetry consisting of any combination of verbal, 
grammatical or syntactical elements, or, indeed, of ideas and concepts in 
a given pattern.246 
To the Roman, a successful chiasmus was indicative of the author’s good 
rhetorical style.247 The technique was a mainstay of an education in the liberal 
arts and its use was advocated by both Quintilian and Lucian, the latter of 
whom argued that passages ought to be ‘mixed and tied together by their 
ends’.248 The form was used extensively by authors such as Cicero, Vergil, 
and Livy, and was also employed by the practitioners of technical disciplines 
such as architecture and land surveying.249 
As Welch has pointed out, however, not every occurrence of repetition, 
balance, inclusion, or symmetry amounts to a chiasmus; and even if such 
characteristics are apparent, the degree to which the structure was intended 
by the author may be obscure.250 Objectively, he suggests, ‘the reader must 
be able to identify significant, balanced repetitions in an inverted parallel order 
with a focus or shift at the centre’.251 Welch goes on to outline fifteen criteria 
according to which the ‘chiasticity’ of a passage can be assessed.252 These 
include, inter alia: the purpose to which the technique is employed; the length 
of the formation; the reasonableness of its start and end points; the centrality 
 
245 Thomas, 57. 
246 Ian H. Thomson, Chiasmus in the Pauline Letters (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1995), 25–26. 
247 Thomas, ‘Chiasmus’, 69. 
248 Lucian, Hist. conscr. 55; also, Quint. Inst. 9.3.85, 10.3.9-10. 
249 Steele noted that the chiastic technique was used by Cicero, Seneca, Pliny, and Fronto in 
about 850 passages (though almost always as shorter instances): ‘Chiasmus in the 
Epistles of Cicero, Seneca, Pliny, and Fronto’, in Studies in Honor of Basil L. Gildersleev 
(Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1902), 339; also, John W. Welch, 
‘Chiasmus in Ancient Greek and Latin Literatures’, in Chiasmus in Antiquity: Structures, 
Analyses, Exegesis, ed. John W. Welch (Provo, UT.: Maxwell, 1998), 259. For the use of 
chiasmus by Vitruvius and the land surveyors, Thomas, ‘Chiasmus’, 70–71 and 78-9. 
250 John W. Welch, ‘Criteria for Identifying and Evaluating the Presence of Chiasmus’, Journal 
of Book of Mormon Studies 4, no. 2 (1995): 4 and 10-13. 
251 Welch, 2. 
252 Welch, 4–10. 
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of the turning point; the balance between the two halves; the density of the 
formation (i.e., the extent to which it contains unrelated material); and its 
aesthetic effect. 
In our text, the build-up to the ‘central axis’ (secundum quae… recte datum) 
consists of a distinction between the relationship of locatores to the two 
different kinds of res locatae: first, property handed over on terms that eadem 
res would be returned (A); and second, property handed over on terms that 
the conductor was allowed to return eiusdem generis (B). This is followed by 
the observation that the manner in which the datio was made was also a 
relevant factor (C). The discussion turns on the application of these principles 
to the case in hand (D). The respondent then follows through the analysis in 
reverse order. He affirms: first, the availability of a vindicatio for property stored 
separately (C’); second, the inapplicability of onus aversum where grain was 
to be returned eiusdem generis (B’); and third, the availability of an action for 
theft if eadem res was expected in return (A’). At this point the jurist had 
returned to his point of departure and concluded that a special iudicium for 
onus aversum was therefore unnecessary. 
It is submitted, on Welch’s criteria, that the part of the passage respondit… 
iudicium oneris aversi is an objectively identifiable chiasmus. The author 
presents his interpretation of the law and the application of the law to the facts 
within the framework of an inverted parallel structure (ABCDC’B’A’). The 
formation is lengthy by Roman standards but maintains its density 
throughout.253 The two halves are balanced (the ratio, by word count, is 76:90) 
as are each of the paired elements within each half. Most significantly, the 
chiastic structure places emphasis on the central axis, which acts as the point 
of convergence between the jurist’s abstract legal reasoning and the 
application of those principles to the quaestio at hand. The effect, as Hofmann 
observed of the technique generally, is to place the emphasis on decisive 
points in the passage and to give the argument a sense of continuity and 
 
253 An example of a lengthier chiasmus may be found in Verg. G. 4.453-527: on which, Gilbert 
Norwood, ‘Vergil, Georgics IV, 453-527’, The Classical Journal 36, no. 6 (1941): 354; also, 
Welch, ‘Chiasmus’, 262–63. 
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completeness.254  Altogether, the chiasmus increases the persuasiveness of 
the jurist’s reply by providing it with the structure, balance, and harmony 
characteristic of symmetria. 
In addition to the chiastic structure of the responsum, the legal argument is 
constructed in such a way as to generate movement within the text. The key 
to this, as Jakab has pointed out, is to see that the examples of materials 
handed over for various reasons correspond with the standard juristic category 
of property quae pondere numero mensura constant (i.e., dealt by weight, 
number, or measure).255 With this in mind, the legal ‘spine’ of the text comes 
into view. The movement is from metal to money to grain: that is, following the 
trichotomy of res dealt with by weight, number, and measure. The treatment of 
specific items bookends this movement and contains the motion it generates 
within the scaffolding of the chiastic structure. 
For simplicity, the structure of the responsum may therefore be presented as 
follows: 
(A) Eadem res: locator remains the owner. 
PONDERE (B) Eiusdem generis: locator becomes in creditum. 
NUMERO (C) Manner of datio: if stored separately, as (A); if counted out, as (B). 
MENSURA (D) Interpretation of the case in hand in light of these 
principles. 
(C’) Manner of datio: if stored separately, locator owner, therefore 
availability of vindicatio. 
(B’) Eiusdem generis (if not stored separately): locator creditor, 
therefore onus aversum impossible. 
(A’) Eadem res: locator owner, therefore availability of an action for theft. 
Conclusion: special iudicium for onus aversum unnecessary. 
 
 
254 Johann B. Hofmann, Lateinische Umgangssprache (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1951), 123. 




The recognition that the responsum has a chiastic structure provides a basis 
upon which to ground arguments concerning the composition and 
interpretation of the text more generally. First, it has already been suggested 
that the text has a complex authorial history, and could reasonably be 
considered to consist of republican, Pauline, and Justinianic elements. The 
chiastic structure of the responsum, however, indicates that the section 
respondit… iudicium oneris aversi is genuinely republican in its entirety.256 
Servius, for instance, studied the liberal arts with Cicero at Rhodes and was 
praised by the latter as one of the foremost rhetoricians of his generation.257 
Moreover, the whole section in navem… iudicium oneris aversi is typical of the 
‘casus – quaestio – responsum’ structure employed by Servius elsewhere.258 
In my view,  these considerations point to Servius as the most likely author. 
The distinctive boundaries of the responsum also raise questions about the 
latter part of the text (sed si… fin.), which is likely to have been a later 
addition.259 If, as several scholars have argued, the parenthesis nam in re… 
culpam deberi was a post-classical (though pre-Justinianic gloss), then the 
final section was probably authored by Paul.260 On the face of it, Paul’s addition 
of material concerning locatio conductio to a text that he placed in a title de 
furtis appears problematic. However, the other texts attributable to the same 
book of his epitome show that they were all generally concerned with theft in 
the context of other contractual arrangements (i.e., commodatum, pignus, and 
locatio conductio), which reduces the significance of this tension.261 In sum, it 
 
256 Among those upholding the authenticity of this part of the text, Watson, Obligations, 121; 
Fiori, La definizione, 67; Roth, Alfeni Digesta, 144; Jakab, ‘Vertragsformulare’, 87–100; and 
Purpura, ‘Il χειρέμβολον’, 139. 
257 Cic. Brut. 41.151. 
258 Massimo Miglietta, ‘Servius respondit’. Studi intorno a metodo e interpretazione nella 
scuola giuridica serviana. Prolegomena I (Trento: Universita degli Studi di Trento, 2010), 
216–26. 
259 Cf. Cardilli, L’obbligazione di ‘praestare’, 273–74. 
260 Nikolaus Benke, ‘Zum Eigentumserwerb des Unternehmers bei der “locatio conductio 
irregularis”’, ZSS 104 (1987): 206; Roth, Alfeni Digesta, 143–44; also, Fiori, La definizione, 
78. 
261 The three texts attributable to the fifth book of Paul’s epitome are: D.12.6.36 (Paul. 5 epit. 
Alf. dig.); D.13.7.30 (Paul. 5 epit. Alf. dig.); and D.19.2.31: Lenel, Palingenesia, 1889, 1:52. 
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is my view that the text can be attributed to the hands of three principal authors: 
i) Servius (reported by Alfenus) (in navem… iudicium oneris aversi); and ii) 
Paul (sed si… fin.). 
A second issue concerns the possibility of transferring ownership within locatio 
conductio and deposit. Strictly, Servius does not say that ownership passed to 
the conductor in the examples given, but only that the locator became in 
creditum. I agree with Fiori, however, that the implication is that ownership did 
pass, which position is consistent with the course of the jurist’s reasoning in 
the remainder of the reply.262 This being accepted, the responsum provides 
good evidence that the republican view was that ownership could transfer 
within contracts of letting and hiring. As several scholars have pointed out, this 
position is corroborated by a second text reporting the opinions of Q. Mucius 
Scaevola, in which the jurist held that gold handed over to a goldsmith for work 
became the property of the conductor.263 The same observation can also be 
made in relation to deposit: Servius (and Alfenus) acknowledged that, provided 
the datio was made in a certain way, money left as a deposit would become 
the property of the depositee. 
A third and related issue concerns the legal significance of the expression ‘in 
creditum iri’. The expression occurs twice in the text – at B and B’ – first as an 
alternative to the retention of ownership by the person handing the property 
over; and second, as part of the explanation for the impossibility of onus 
aversum where the property that had been handed over was not stored 
separately and property eiusdem generis was expected in return. Elsewhere, 
the term appears in the rubric of D.12.1 (de rebus creditis si certum petetur et 
de condictione) in connection with condictiones and mutuum. According to 
Paul, a person who gave property as a mutuum did not expect the exact same 
material in return, but property of the same kind (idem genus).264 Further, if 
 
262 Fiori, La definizione, 79–80; cf. Benke, ‘Zum Eigentumserwerb’, 202–7; Jakab, 
‘Vertragsformulare’, 99. 
263 D.34.2.34 pr. (Pomp. 9 ad Q. Muc.): on which, Watson, Obligations, 107–8; Benke, ‘Zum 
Eigentumserwerb’, 222–23; Fiori, La definizione, 70–72; Roth, Alfeni Digesta, 135–36; 
Jean-Louis Ferrary, Aldo Schiavone, and Emanuele Stolfi, Quintus Mucius Scaevola. 
Opera (Rome: L’ERMA di Bretschneider, 2018), 252–57. 
264 D.12.1.2 pr. (Paul. 28 ad ed.). 
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property of a different kind were given in return (for example, wine for grain), 
the transaction would not count as a mutuum. Significantly, the severan jurist 
states that a person stood in creditum ire where property quae pondere 
numero mensura constant (i.e., dealt by weight, number, or measure) had 
been handed over as a mutuum, because the purpose of the transaction 
demanded that performance could be made in kind.265 
As Cannata has observed, however, a person could become in creditum for 
reasons other than a mutuum.266 In his view, the expression generally covered 
any person who had a condictio on the basis that he had handed over property 
for a causa (e.g., locatio conductio, commodatum, deposit, etc.). On this 
interpretation, Servius’ position was that if property expected to be returned 
eiusdem generis was handed over for a causa and not stored separately, the 
person receiving the property was obliged to restore the same quantity of the 
same material in kind on the strength of the datio alone. The consequence of 
this position is that, for example, a nauta who had received grain in the 
circumstances described above and failed to return the same quantity would 
be liable: i) to a condictio for the grain that he had failed to restore; and ii) to 
the actio locati for id quod interest if the failure to return the grain could be 
attributed to his culpa or worse.267 There is, however, nothing in this text to 
suggest that a condictio lay for the locator or depositor who became a creditor, 
and so whether the expression was intended to carry such a meaning in this 
case is far from certain. 
A fourth and final issue concerns the legal significance of the expression ‘actio 
oneris aversi’. Two questions arise in sequence. First, it is disputed whether a 
specific actio ever existed at all. On the one hand, most scholars have 
interpreted the quaestio to refer to an (otherwise unattested) action that was 
contained in the praetor’s Edict but that had fallen out by the completion of 
 
265 D.12.1.2.1 (Paul. 28 ad ed.). 
266 Carlo A. Cannata, ‘“Creditum” e “obligationes”’, Labeo 20 (1974): 115; also, Jakab, 
‘Vertragsformulare’, 98. 
267 On the consequences of these permutations for risk allocation, Ralph Backhaus, ‘Die 
Gefahrtragung bei gemeinsamen Unternehmungen und ihre Modifikation durch 
Parteiabsprachen im klassischen römischen Recht’, ZSS 121 (2004): 252–59. 
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Julian’s redaction.268 On the other, De Marco has argued that the question was 
not whether a specific action known as the actio oneris aversi lay in the 
shippers’ favour, but rather whether an already existing action lay for conduct 
amounting to onus aversum on the facts presented.269 In my view, neither of 
these interpretations is sufficiently sensitive to the correspondence between 
the quaestio and the reply. Since, as I have argued, the responsum has a 
chiastic structure and therefore ends with the statement supervacuum esse 
iudicium oneris aversi, the question and reply can be briefly stated as follows: 
quaesitum est, an ceteri pro sua parte frumenti cum nauta agere possunt 
oneris aversi actione. 
respondit… supervacuum esse iudicium oneris aversi. 
The question is, can the remaining shippers proceed against the nauta for 
their share of the grain by means of an action for onus aversum? 
He responded: …a (special) iudicium for onus aversum is unnecessary. 
It is my submission that the shippers were inquiring about the availability of a 
decretal action (i.e., granted by the praetor on an ad hoc basis without 
reference to an edict) for conduct amounting to onus aversum. This explains 
the use of the plural (actiones oneris aversi) later in the passage, since it is 
perfectly possible that the praetor was – at the time of the reply’s composition 
– in the habit of granting actions for onus aversum on a case-by-case basis. 
Further, it produces a direct correspondence between the question and 
response, which is to the effect that granting an iudicium for onus aversum was 
unnecessary because: i) the owner of merchandise already had sufficient 
protection; and ii) it was not possible for a conductor who had become the 
owner of the goods to be responsible for onus aversum in the first place. 
Whether Servius/ Alfenus’ disapproval (improbare) put an end to the practice 
is unknown. 
 
268 This is the view preferred by the majority of commentators, with the exception of those in 
the following note. 
269 De Marco, ‘Labeo’, 154–58; also, Purpura, ‘Il χειρέμβολον’, 139–40. Solazzi argued that 
the remedy referred to by Alfenus as the actio oneris aversi was identical with the actio furti 
in factum adversus nautas: ‘L’actio oneris aversi’, 526–27. 
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The second question concerns the meaning of the expression ‘onus aversum’. 
The context supplied by the text – sc., the delivery of grain to one shipper 
ahead of the others – and the later assertion that a vindicatio could be brought 
to retrieve grain that had been stored separately and delivered to someone 
other than the owner (C’), indicates that the expression was likely intended to 
carry the meaning of ‘misdelivery’ or ‘misallocation’ (i.e., to the wrong person). 
In the first place, this is consistent with the literal meaning of the adjective 
‘aversum’, which Cicero used to describe how Verres had turned an 
incalculable quantity of grain away from the res publica (innumerabilem 
frumenti numerum per triennium aversum ab re publica).270 Second, it is easy 
to see how, in the discharge of cargo carried in bulk, a nauta might restore the 
wrong quantity to one of the shippers early in the process, leaving the final 
recipients with less than they had handed over. It is therefore submitted that, 
in this context, the expression ‘onus aversum’ meant ‘the turning away of the 
cargo from its proper or lawful destination’, or, more succinctly, ‘misdelivery (or 
misallocation) of the goods’. 
Conclusion: 
The recognition that the responsum at the heart of the text is structured as a 
chiasmus enables several conclusions to be drawn. Most significantly, the 
integrity of the formation indicates that the passage is genuinely republican in 
its entirety and is therefore good evidence of the state of jurisprudence at the 
time. In this connection, it enables us to say with some confidence that it was 
Alfenus’ (and probably also Servius’) view that ownership could pass within 
locatio conductio and deposit.271 Separately, it is my view that although the 
praetor’s Edict never contained a remedy known as the actio oneris aversi, 
occupants of the magistracy were in the habit of granting iudicia on a case-by-
case basis for onus aversum at the request of litigants. Whether this continued 
into the early Principate, despite the disapproval of Servius and Alfenus, 
 
270 Cic. 2 Verr. 69.163. 
271 By the time of the classical period this view no longer prevailed: Watson, Obligations, 108. 
In Fiori’s opinion, the text has the character of a ‘fossil’ preserved in the corpus iuris of a 
doctrine long-since abandoned: La definizione, 74; also, Francesco M. de Robertis, ‘D. 
19,2,31 e il regime dei trasporti marittimi nell’ultima età repubblicana’, SDHI 31 (1965): 103. 
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cannot be ascertained. Onus aversum likely meant the misdelivery or 
misallocation of goods, though it is not clear whether this had to be deliberate 
for the nauta to be held liable. 
 
Section 4.3: The actiones in factum. 
4.3.1 Actio in factum de recepto. 
The principal sources for the existence of the receptum nautarum are the 
juristic texts contained within the Digest. Beyond these, several studies have 
examined the Graeco-Egyptian papyri with a view to discovering whether the 
institution found expression in the contractual documentation from Ptolemaic 
and Roman Egypt.272  Only one document – P. Grenf. II 108 (dated to 167 CE) 
– which contains the verb recipere in the form recipisse on two occasions, has 
been considered a possible candidate in this respect.273 Strictly, however, the 
most that can be said is that the fragment appears to be part of a receipt issued 
by the owner of goods to the person restoring them to his possession.274 
Although it is therefore possible that the acknowledgment was delivered to a 
nauta following the restoration of merchandise to a consignor, the absence of 
any firm evidence in this direction makes any conclusions necessarily 






272 Christoph H. Brecht, Zur Haftung der Schiffer im antiken Recht (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1962); 
also, Meyer-Termeer, Die Haftung der Schiffer. 
273 The document, first published by Grenfell and Hunt, and later by Mitteis, has been faithfully 
reproduced by Brecht: Zur Haftung der Schiffer, 76–77. The most suggestive clause is that 
contained in ll. 7-8: ‘…quas has res intra scriptas meas salbas sanas recipisse scripsi’ etc. 
For a review of the literature, Patricio-Ignacio Carvajal, ‘El “Receptum Nautarum” y el 
Papiro Grenf. II 108’, Revista de Estudios Histórico-Jurídicos 28 (2006): 147–50. 
274 In this connection, e.g., Meyer-Termeer, Die Haftung der Schiffer, 174, note 1; also, 
Edoardo Carelli, ‘Responsabilità ex recepto del nauta e legittimazione ad agire di danno’, 




4.3.1.1 Edict and formula. 
Ulpian reports the wording of the edict as follows:275 
Ait praetor: ‘nautae caupones stabularii quod cuiusque salvum fore 
receperint nisi restituent, in eos iudicium dabo’. 
The praetor says: ‘unless seamen, innkeepers, and stablekeepers restore 
what they have undertaken to keep safe, I will give an action against them’. 
As for the formula, both Rudorff (first) and Lenel (second) provide similar 
reconstructions:276 
Iudex esto. Si paret Num Num (servum, filium, institorem Ni Ni voluntate 
eius), cum navem (cauponam, stabulum) exerceret, Ni Ni res, quibus de 
agitur, salvas fore recepisse neque restituisse, quanti ea res erit, tantam 
pecuniam iudex Num Num Ao Ao condemna, si n. p. a. 
S. p. Nm Nm, cum navem exerceret, Ai Ai res q. d. a. salvas fore recepisse, 
nisi restituet, q. e. r. e., t. p. iudex Nm Nm Ao Ao c. s. n. p. a. 
Mantovani, whose reconstruction is substantially the same as Lenel’s, gives 
the following for the so-called exceptio Labeoniana: ‘si naufragium aut per vim 
piratarum non perierint’.277 
4.3.1.2 Interpretation of the Edict. 
As in the case of the exercitorian edict, the compilers included a central text 
drawn from Ulpian’s commentary ad edictum (book 14), together with 
contributions by Gaius and Paul. Again, Ulpian’s commentary proceeds in a 
systematic fashion: first, the praetor’s declaration; second, a laudatio; third, a 
sequential interpretation of the edict’s clauses; and fourth, observations ad 
 
275 D.4.9.1 pr. (Ulp. 14 ad ed.). Both Rudorff and Lenel retained this wording in their 
reconstructions of the edict: Rudorff, Edicti perpetui, 65; also, Lenel, EP3, 131. Cf. Ménager, 
who proposed cuique for cuiusque on grammatical grounds: ‘Naulum et receptum’, 193. As 
Robaye has pointed out, the correction does not substantially alter the sense of the text: 
L’obligation de garde, 82. 
276 Rudorff, Edicti perpetui, 65; Lenel, EP3, 131; cf. Jean Paris, ‘La responsabilité de la custodia 
en droit romain’ (Université de Nancy, 1926), 14, note 5. For a discussion of the differences 
(e.g., Rudorff’s salvas fore recepisse neque restituisse for salvas fore recepisse, nisi 
restituet in Lenel), Martín Serrano-Vicente, Custodiam praestare: la prestación de custodia 
en el derecho romano (Madrid: Tebar, 2007), 325, note 1034. 
277 Mantovani’s reconstruction is the same as Lenel’s, except that he gives ‘neque restituisse’ 
for ‘nisi restituet’: Le formule, 60–61, no. 68 and note 259. 
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formulam.278 Thus, having stated the terms of the edict, Ulpian praised it for its 
maxima utilitas: 
D.4.9.1.1 (Ulp. 14 ad ed.): 
Maxima utilitas est huius edicti, quia necesse est plerumque eorum fidem 
sequi et res custodiae eorum committere. ne quisquam putet graviter hoc 
adversus eos constitutum: nam est in ipsorum arbitrio, ne quem recipiant, 
et nisi hoc esset statutum, materia daretur cum furibus adversus eos quos 
recipiunt coeundi, cum ne nunc quidem abstineant huiusmodi fraudibus. 
According to Ulpian, the edict was of the greatest utility because it was very 
often necessary to rely on the fides and commit property into the safekeeping 
(custodia) of those to whom the declaration applied.279 Further, he defended 
the burden placed on nautae etc. as a result, for it was at their discretion 
whether to undertake and/ or receive goods under the edict (ne quem 
recipiant); and without the provision they would have the means to conspire 
with thieves against their customers, which still occurred in spite of the 
praetor’s declaration. 
Although the authenticity of parts of the fragment have been doubted,280 the 
severan jurist’s attitude toward the tradespeople affected by the edict is typical 
of the prejudice displayed by other classical authors.281 Moreover, this attitude 
 
278 This is reflected by Lenel: Palingenesia iuris civilis, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1889), 490–
91. 
279 Cf. Ulpian’s very similar justification for the actio exercitoria, which was premised on the 
necessity of contracting with persons whose character and status were unknown: D.14.1.1 
pr. (Ulp. 28 ad ed.): on which, supra, 123.  
280 According to Schulz, the section ‘et nisi… fin.’ was ‘a silly post-classical attempt to justify 
the severe liability’: Classical Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 565. De 
Robertis argued that the same section was originally written in connection with the actio 
furti in factum adversus nautas and interpolated by the compilers: Receptum nautarum. 
Studio sulla responsabilità dell’ armatore in diritto romano, con riferimento alla disciplina 
particolare concernente il caupo e lo stabularius (Bari: Cressati, 1952), 136–40; cf. Julius 
C. van Oven, ‘Rev. de Robertis, “Receptum Nautarum”, Bari, 1952’, RIDA 3 (1955): 425–
26. 
281 E.g., Hor. Sat. 1.5.3-4 and 1.1.29; cf. Mart. Epigrams, 3.57. The point has been developed 
by Van den Bergh: ‘Custodiam Praestare: Custodia-Liability or Liability for Failing 
Custodia’, TvR 43 (1975): 67; also, James Mackintosh, ‘Nautae Caupones Stabularii: 
Special Liabilities of Shipmasters, Innkeepers and Stablers’, Juridical Review 47 (1935): 
65; and Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
Tradition (Cape Town: Juta, 1990), 515–16.  On Roman attitudes to trades generally, Sarah 
Bond, Trade and Taboo: Disreputable Professions in the Roman Mediterranean (Ann 
Arbor, MI.: University of Michigan Press, 2016). Cf. Schulz, who maintained that neither 
nautae nor stabularii were regarded as disreputable: Classical Roman Law, 565. 
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is consistent with Pomponius’s reported comment later in the same passage 
that one of the reasons for the promulgation of the edict was the praetor’s 
desire to repress the dishonesty (improbitas) of ‘these kinds of people’ (hoc 
genus hominus).282 Nor is it unsurprising that the prospect of collusion with 
thieves features so prominently: if comparative evidence is anything to go by, 
cargo theft by longshoremen and stevedores was a perennial problem for the 
modern shipping industry until the advent of containerisation in the 1950s.283 
Ait praetor ‘nautae’… 
D.4.9.1.2-4 (Ulp. 14 ad ed.): 
[2] Qui sunt igitur, qui teneantur, videndum est. ait praetor "nautae". 
nautam accipere debemus eum qui navem exercet: quamvis nautae 
appellantur omnes, qui navis navigandae causa in nave sint: sed de 
exercitore solummodo praetor sentit. nec enim debet, inquit Pomponius, 
per remigem aut mesonautam obligari, sed per se vel per navis magistrum: 
quamquam si ipse alicui e nautis committi iussit, sine dubio debeat 
obligari. [3] Et sunt quidam in navibus, qui custodiae gratia navibus 
praeponuntur, ut ναυφύλακες et diaetarii. si quis igitur ex his receperit, 
puto in exercitorem dandam actionem, quia is, qui eos huiusmodi officio 
praeponit, committi eis permittit, quamquam ipse navicularius vel magister 
id faciat, quod χειρέμβολον appellant. sed et si hoc non exercet, tamen de 
recepto navicularius tenebitur. [4] De exercitoribus ratium, item lyntrariis 
nihil cavetur: sed idem constitui oportere Labeo scribit, et hoc iure utimur. 
Ulpian’s interpretation of the edict begins with a consideration of the scope of 
the word ‘nauta’. In the first place, he observed that although the word usually 
referred to anyone who was on board a vessel for the purpose of its navigation, 
the praetor’s intention was that the edict should only apply to those qui navem 
exercet (i.e., the exercitor).284 In line with the exercitorian edict, Ulpian 
approved Pomponius’ view that the exercitor would be bound by the acts of 
 
282 D.4.9.3.1 (Ulp. 14 ad ed.). This point has been well made by Zimmermann: The Law of 
Obligations, 515–16. 
283 Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the 
World Economy Bigger (Princeton, N.J. and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), 36–
37 and 109-110. According to one Leith docker, longshoremen prided themselves on their 
ability to tap whiskey from sealed casks stowed in the ship’s hold: Ian MacDougall, Voices 
of Leith Dockers: Personal Recollections of Working Lives (Edinburgh: Mercat Press, 
2001), 115. 
284 The expression qui navem exercet purposefully invokes the terms of the exercitorian edict. 
For Ulpian’s use of the word ‘nauta’, cf. D.47.5.1.1 (Ulp. 38 ad ed.). 
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his or her magister navis; and also by those of anyone to whom they had 
directed (iussit) goods to be committed. Moreover, any appointments whose 
duties included safeguarding goods on board the vessel – such as 
nauphylakes (ship’s guards) and diaetarii (valets) – were also capable of 
binding the exercitor, on the basis that he had authorised goods to be entrusted 
to them.285 Paul added that a receptum could arise between two nautae; which 
raises the prospect of contractual relations between two exercitorian 
hierarchies.286 Whether or not the exercitor was bound, however, was separate 
from the performance of a ‘cheirembolon’, which may have consisted of a 
symbolic gesture,287 a receipt given to the person handing over the 
merchandise,288 a stamp affixed to the contract or related documents,289 or, as 
 
285 Nauphylakes were ship’s guards, charged with overseeing the safety of the goods and 
passengers on board: Rougé, Recherches, 218; also, Casson, Ships and Seamanship, 
320. The identity of the diaetarius is more obscure. The word is etymologically derived from 
‘diaeta’, or ‘dwelling-room’, and elsewhere Ulpian used it to refer to a valet-de-chambre 
working as part of an urban household (urbana familia): D.33.7.12.42 (Ulp. 20 ad Sab.). 
According to Casson, his role was restricted to tending the cabin of his superior officer: 
319; cf. Claude Alzon, Problèmes relatifs à la location des entrepôts en droit romain (Paris: 
Éditions Cujas, 1966), 196, note 907. I agree with Robaye, however, that, since Ulpian 
refers to the diaetarius directly in connection with the receptum, he was probably closer to 
a valet on deck charged with tending to the needs of the passengers: L’obligation de garde, 
83. 
286 D.4.9.4.1 (Paul. 13 ad ed.): on which, María Salazar Revuelta, La responsibilidad objetiva 
en al transporte marítimo y terrestre en Roma. Estudio sobre el receptum nautarum, 
cauponum et stabulariorum: entre la utilitas contrahentium y el desarrollo comercial 
(Madrid: Dykinson, 2007), 131–32; also, ‘Responsables sine culpa en el contrato de 
transporte y alojamiento en la Roma de la época comercial’, RIDA 55 (2008): 466. 
287 Paris, ‘La responsabilité’, 33; De Martino, ‘Lex Rhodia (1938)’, 209; de Robertis, Receptum 
nautarum, 72–73; Aldo Petrucci, Per una storia della protezione dei contraenti con gli 
imprenditori, vol. 1 (Turin: Giappichelli, 2007), 143; though cf. Julia Vélissaropoulos-
Karakostas, ‘Xειρέμβολον. En marge de l’histoire du droit maritime’, in Byzantine Law. 
Proceedings of the International Symposium of Jurists (Thessaloniki, 10-13 december 
1998) (Thessaloniki: Bar Association of Thessaloniki, 2001), 212. Martini has argued that 
the man sitting on the bow of the Isis Geminiana (supra, 194) was raising his hand to signify 
that he undertook legal responsibility for the sack of grain marked ‘feci’: ‘Χειρέμβολον 
(Noterella in margine al “receptum nautarum”)’, in Studi in onore di Edoardo Volterra, ed. 
Luigi Aru and Guido Astuti, vol. 4 (Milan: Giuffrè, 1971), 197–207. 
288 Álvaro D’Ors, ‘ΧΕΙΡΕΜΒΟΛΟΝ’, Humanitas 2 (1948): 254–60; followed by, e.g., Robaye, 
L’obligation de garde, 83–84. 
289 Nicola De Marco, ‘Un problema minimo: il χειρέμβολον’, SDHI 65 (1999): 355–62. Cf. Bove, 
who has argued that TPSulp. 80 is part of a letter conferring a mandate for the collection 
of goods by the consignee: ‘TPSulp. 80 (= Tab. Pomp. 47): un mandatum per epistulam 
(con χειρέμβολον: Ulp. D. 4.9.1.3)?’, in Studi in onore di Francesco Grelle, ed. Marina 
Silvestrini, Tullio Spagnuolo Vigorita, and Giuliano Volpe (Bari: Edipuglia, 2006), 21–25. 
Cf., however, Rougé, Recherches, 368; and, more convincingly, Giuseppe Camodeca, 
Tabulae Pompeianae Sulpiciorum (TPSulp.). Edizione critica dell’archivio puteolano dei 
Sulpicii, vol. 2 (Rome: Quasar, 1999), 184. 
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Purpura has argued, the act of marking containers to identify the owner of the 
goods inside.290 Finally, Ulpian confirmed Labeo’s opinion that the edict also 
applied to those who operated rafts (impliedly, fluvial transport) and harbour 
craft, which in any case was the present practice.291 
Ait praetor: ‘quod cuiusque salvum fore receperint…’ 
D.4.9.1.6-8 (Ulp. 14 ad ed.): 
Ait praetor: ‘quod cuiusque salvum fore receperint’: hoc est quamcumque 
rem sive mercem receperint. inde apud Vivianum relatum est ad eas 
quoque res hoc edictum pertinere, quae mercibus accederent, veluti 
vestimenta quibus in navibus uterentur et cetera quae ad cottidianum 
usum habemus. [7] Item Pomponius libro trigensimo quarto scribit parvi 
referre, res nostras an alienas intulerimus, si tamen nostra intersit salvas 
esse: etenim nobis magis, quam quorum sunt, debent solvi. et ideo si 
pignori merces accepero ob pecuniam nauticam, mihi magis quam debitori 
nauta tenebitur, si [ante] <a me>292 eas suscepit. [8] Recipit autem salvum 
fore utrum si in navem res missae ei adsignatae sunt: an et si non sint 
adsignatae, hoc tamen ipso, quod in navem missae sunt, receptae 
videntur? et puto omnium eum recipere custodiam, quae in navem illatae 
sunt, et factum non solum nautarum praestare debere, sed et vectorum… 
D.4.9.3 pr. (Ulp 14 ad ed.): 
…Et ita de facto vectorum etiam Pomponius libro trigensimo quarto scribit. 
idem ait, etiamsi nondum sint res in navem receptae, sed in litore perierint, 
quas semel recepit, periculum ad eum pertinere. 
According to Ulpian, the expression ‘what they have undertaken to keep safe’ 
referred to property (res) and merchandise (merces) received by the nauta. In 
this connection, he cited the view of Vivianus (end of the first and start of the 
second centuries CE) that the edict also covered property additional to the 
cargo such as passengers’ clothes and everyday items.293 The same opinion 
was reported by Paul, with the extra detail that Vivianus held this position for 
property brought onto the ship after the contract (locatio) had been concluded 
 
290 Purpura, ‘Il χειρέμβολον’. 
291 Salazar Revuelta, La responsibilidad objetiva, 124. For lyntrarii, Lionel Casson, ‘Harbour 
and River Boats of Ancient Rome’, JRS 55 (1965): 34; also, Ships and Seamanship, 335. 
292 On this emendation, Salazar Revuelta, La responsibilidad objetiva, 130–31; also, 
‘Responsables sine culpa’, 466. 
293 Cerami and Petrucci, Diritto commerciale romano, 264–65. For Vivianus, Kunkel, Die 
römischen Juristen, 146; also, generally, Carmela Russo Ruggeri, Viviano giurista minore? 
(Milan: Giuffrè, 1997). 
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and the cargo installed, because even though no vectura was owed, these 
items were still to be regarded as part of the agreement: 
D.4.9.4.2 (Paul. 13 ad ed.):294 
Vivianus dixit etiam ad eas res hoc edictum pertinere, quae post impositas 
merces in navem locatasque inferentur, etsi earum vectura non debetur, 
ut vestimentorum, penoris cottidiani, quia haec ipsa ceterarum rerum 
locationi accedunt. 
As several scholars have pointed out, these two texts indicate that before 
Vivianus the edict was only considered to cover those goods with which the 
contract was directly concerned.295 
In the next fragment, Ulpian approved Pomponius’ comment that it did not 
matter for the purpose of the edict whether the person was the owner of the 
goods, provided that they had an interest in their restoration. So, for example, 
if a person brought property held as a pledge against a maritime loan (pecunia 
nautica) on board, the nauta would be responsible to him, because he both 
had an interest in the goods as a creditor and was the person from whom the 
property had been taken on (susceperit).296 
The final question that arose in connection with this clause was precisely when 
goods counted as ‘received’.297 For Ulpian it was not enough that the property 
had been sent to the ship; it had to have been committed to the care of the 
nauta (adsignatae), which occurred when the goods were brought on board (in 
navem illatae sunt). The severan jurist also reported Pomponius’ opinion that 
once responsibility for the goods had been taken, the nauta would bear the 
risk (periculum) for them even if they were lost on shore. Lastly, both jurists 
agreed that from the point at which the goods had been taken over the nauta 
 
294 On which, Mancinetti, L’emersione, 333–35, with bibliography at 333, note 37. 
295 Cerami and Petrucci, Diritto commerciale romano, 265, with bibliography at note 35; also, 
Salazar Revuelta, La responsibilidad objetiva, 111–12. Cf. Brecht’s thesis that the actio in 
factum de recepto was originally introduced to cover the personal items of travellers: Zur 
Haftung der Schiffer, 99–112. 
296 Salazar Revuelta, La responsibilidad objetiva, 130–31; also, Fercia, Responsabilità per 
fatto di ausiliari nel diritto romano, 297. 
297 Cerami and Petrucci, Diritto commerciale romano, 266. 
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would be responsible not only for the acts of his crew, but also for those of any 
passengers. 
Ait praetor: ‘nisi restituent, in eos iudicium dabo’. 
D.4.9.3.1 (Ulp. 14 ad ed.):298 
Ait praetor: ‘nisi restituent, in eos iudicium dabo’. ex hoc edicto in factum 
actio proficiscitur. sed an sit necessaria, videndum, quia agi civili actione 
ex hac causa poterit: si quidem merces intervenerit, ex locato vel 
conducto: [sed] <scl.> si tota navis locata sit, qui conduxit ex conducto 
etiam de rebus quae desunt agere potest: si vero res perferendas nauta 
conduxit, ex locato convenietur: sed si gratis res susceptae sint, ait 
Pomponius depositi agi potuisse. miratur igitur, cur honoraria actio sit 
inducta, cum sint civiles: nisi forte, inquit, ideo, ut innotesceret praetor 
curam agere reprimendae improbitatis hoc genus hominum: et quia in 
locato conducto culpa, in deposito dolus dumtaxat praestatur, at hoc 
edicto omnimodo qui receperit tenetur, etiam si sine culpa eius res periit 
vel damnum datum est, [nisi si quid damno fatali contingit]. inde Labeo 
scribit, si quid naufragio aut per vim piratarum perierit, non esse iniquum 
exceptionem ei dari. idem erit dicendum et si in stabulo aut in caupona vis 
maior contigerit. 
With respect to the final part of the edict, Ulpian observed that the action given 
by the praetor was in factum. In practical terms, this meant that the action’s 
formula simply stated that the judge ought to condemn the defender if he had 
failed to restore what he had undertaken to keep safe, without reference to any 
external considerations (such as good faith).299 The question that arose was 
whether this remedy was necessary, given that civil law actions also lay 
against the nauta on the same grounds. Thus, if the nauta had let out the whole 
ship for a financial reward, the actio conducti would lie for goods that went 
missing (de rebus quae desunt); and equally, the actio locati if he had 
undertaken the task of transporting the merchandise.300 Again, if the goods 
 
298 For an up-to-date bibliography of scholars who have treated this text, Mancinetti, 
L’emersione, 192, note 63; and for a literature review, Maria Casola, ‘Le regole della 
navigazione: la responsabilità dell’armatore nell’età dei Severi’, Civitas et Lex 3 (2014): 57–
70. 
299 Meyer-Termeer, Die Haftung der Schiffer, 197; also, Maximilien Philonenko, ‘“Intentio” dans 
le Formules “in Factum conceptae”’, RIDA 3 (1949): 243–46. 
300 Lenel pointed out that the section si quidem… convenietur is structured as a chiasmus 
according to the pattern ABB’A’: ‘Kritisches und Antikritisches’, ZSS 49 (1929): 2; also, 
Ménager, ‘Naulum et receptum’, 400, note 146. 
212 
 
had been taken on for free (gratis res susceptae sint), it was Pomponius’ view 
that the action on deposit would be available. 
Despite Lenel’s argument that the opinions expressed in the next section were 
Ulpian’s (miratur igitur… contingit), a plain reading of the text suggests that the 
severan jurist continued to report those of Pomponius.301 This being accepted, 
Pomponius is reported to have expressed surprise (miratur igitur…) at the 
introduction of the honorary action when civil law actions were available. This 
could be explained, however, if it had been the praetor’s intention to check the 
dishonesty of the persons affected by the edict. In addition, he continued, the 
edict made the nauta responsible for everything he received (omnimodo qui 
reciperit tenetur), even if the property had been lost or damaged through no 
fault of his own (sine culpa), whereas in locatio conductio and deposit he only 
answered for culpa and dolus respectively.302 The fragment concludes with the 
view of Labeo, who is reported to have held that it was not inequitable for the 
praetor to grant a defence if the property had been lost to shipwreck or 
piracy.303 As Magdelain has pointed out, it is not possible to say whether the 
exceptio recommended by Labeo was included in the praetor’s Album or 
granted on an ad hoc basis.304 
 
301 Lenel, ‘Kritisches und Antikritisches’, 4–5; cf. Brecht, Zur Haftung der Schiffer, 94–95. 
302 For a detailed bibliography of scholars expressing views as to the text’s integrity, Mancinetti, 
L’emersione, 201, note 88. I agree with, inter alios, MacCormack, that the text is 
substantially genuine: ‘Custodia and Culpa’, 163, note 47. The only clause that raises 
legitimate suspicions is that comprising ‘nisi… contingit’: see, e.g., Alfredo De Medio, ‘Caso 
fortuito e forza maggiore in diritto romano’, BIDR 20 (1908): 193; Paris, ‘La responsabilité’, 
284; Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz, Responsabilità contrattuale in diritto romano, 2nd ed. (Naples: 
Jovene, 1958), 106, note 2; Giuseppe I. Luzzatto, Caso fortuito e forza maggiore come 
limite alla responsabilità contrattuale (Milan: Giuffrè, 1938), 176–77; de Robertis, 
Receptum nautarum, 85; Manlio Sargenti, ‘Problemi della responsabilità contrattuale’, 
SDHI 20 (1954): 133; André Magdelain, Le consensualisme dans l’édit du prêteur (Paris: 
Recueil Sirey, 1958), 145, notes 322 and 323; and Ménager, ‘Naulum et receptum’, 407, 
note 165. 
303 The exceptio Labeoniana, which has been considered inauthentic by a handful of scholars, 
is now widely thought to be genuine: cf. Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 150–51; also, 
Gerhard Beseler, ‘Romanistische Studien’, in Studi in onore di Salvatore Riccobono nel XL 
anno del suo insegnamento, vol. I (Palermo: Arti Grafiche, 1936), 306; and Franz 
Haymann, ‘Textkritische Studien zum römischen Obligationenreht’, ZSS 40 (1919): 205–9; 
though note Schulz’s remark that ‘F. Haymann’s unmethodical and misleading paper 
should be ignored’: Classical Roman Law, 517. Cf., also, De Martino, ‘Lex Rhodia (1938)’, 
189–93. 
304 Magdelain, Le consensualisme, 146. Ménager conjectured that the defence was given on 
an ad hoc basis and therefore not included in the Album: ‘Naulum et receptum’, 140. 
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Ulpian’s final observations were made ad formulam. Thus, if a son or slave 
received goods in accordance with the voluntas of their father or master, the 
latter would be liable in solidum under the exercitorian edict; and, conversely, 
if the goods had been received sine voluntate, the action would be given de 
peculio.305 Again, if a slave of the exercitor stole or damaged property that had 
been received, a noxal action was not available because the slave’s owner 
could already be sued directly under the edict.306 As to whether it was possible 
to bring the actiones de recepto and furti in respect of the same object, Ulpian 
went beyond the doubt expressed by Pomponius to say that if the pursuer 
attempted to bring both suits, one could be repelled either by application to the 
judge (officio iudicis) or by means of the exceptio doli.307 Finally, as Pomponius 
observed, because the action was reipersecutory in character it was allowed 
against the defender’s heirs and without limitation of time.308 
4.3.1.3 Several Issues. 
4.3.1.3.1 The Meaning of ‘recipere’. 
The first issue that arises concerns the edictal meaning of the word ‘recipere’. 
The debate in modern scholarship has tended to set up a binary between two 
alternative meanings, in the sense that the word could be used to refer to either 
an express undertaking or to the physical receipt of the property itself.309 As a 
result, several scholars have argued for a narrative of historical change 
whereby the necessity of providing an express undertaking was superseded 
by an implied term in contracts of letting and hiring.310 At this point, the focus 
 
305 D.4.9.3.3 (Ulp. 14 ad ed.); also, PS.2.6: on which, Riccardo Fercia, Criterî di responsabilità 
dell’exercitor: modelli culturali dell’attribuzione di rischio e ‘regime’ della nossalità nelle 
azioni penali in factum contra nautas, caupones et stabularios (Turin: Giappichelli, 2002), 
231–32. 
306 Fercia, 128–30. 
307 D.4.9.3.5 (Ulp. 14 ad ed.). 
308 D.4.9.3.4 (Ulp. 14 ad ed.). 
309 Cf. Carvajal, ‘El “Receptum Nautarum”’, 145–48; also, ‘La persistencia de “recipere” en su 
acepción de “prometer” y de la desvinculación entre vis maior y la exceptio labeonis en 
época postclásica: “salvum recipere obligare” y “suscipere in fidem suam”’, in Studi in onore 
di Antonino Metro, ed. Carmela Russo Ruggeri (Milan: Giuffrè, 2009), 409–15; van Oven, 
‘Actio de recepto et actio locati’, 149; Robaye, L’obligation de garde, 80–82. 
310 E.g., Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, 519–20; also, David S. Bogen, ‘Ignoring 
History: The Liability of Ships’ Masters, Innkeepers and Stablekeepers under Roman Law’, 
The American Journal of Legal History 36, no. 3 (1992): 349–52. For a comprehensive 
bibliography, András Földi, ‘Anmerkungen zum Zusammenhang zwischen der Haftung «ex 
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turns to when this change took place, some holding that it had already occurred 
by the time of Ulpian; others that it was a post-classical or Justinianic 
innovation.311 
In my view, this approach has not been sufficiently sensitive to the meaning of 
the word in its juristic context. First, it is important to note that the labelling of 
the various recepta (argentarii, arbitri, nautae etc.) as pacta praetoria is a 
modern development.312 The classical jurists never discussed recepta in 
connection with pacts, and so to try to comprehend them through that lens only 
serves to distort an already complex picture. 
The meaning of the word must therefore be understood on its own terms. In 
general, ‘recipere’ means ‘to take to oneself’, or ‘to take upon oneself’, and is 
used in a range of contexts from the receipt or retention of an object (in the 
sense of taking a piece of property to oneself) to the giving of an undertaking 
(in the sense of taking a task upon oneself).313 In its juridical context, however, 
it stands in contrast to the verb ‘suscipere’, which has the same general 
meaning (i.e., ‘to take to or upon oneself’), but with the inflection that the action 
was performed voluntarily or as a favour.314 Heumann and Seckel attributed 
both words with the same general meaning, but did not distinguish between 
them at a juridical level.315 Beginning with D.4.9, however, the verb ‘suscipere’ 
appears twice: first, in D.4.9.3.1, where the goods are said to have been taken 
on for free as a deposit (gratis res susceptae sint); and second, in D.4.9.1.7, 
where the goods the nauta took on (susceptae) were not those for which 
 
recepto nautarum cauponum stabuliorum» und der Haftung für «custodia»’, RIDA 40 
(1993): 267, note 9. 
311 For a bibliography of scholars taking a position on the matter, Mancinetti, L’emersione, 194, 
note 65.  
312 E.g., E. Ude, ‘Das receptum nautarum, ein pactum praetorium’, ZSS 12 (1891): 66–74. 
Textbook treatments frequently employ this categorisation: e.g., Cerami and Petrucci, 
Diritto commerciale romano, 262. For the observation that the categorisation is unclassical: 
Schulz, Classical Roman Law, 564; Magdelain, Le consensualisme, 175; Salazar Revuelta, 
La responsibilidad objetiva, 134. 
313 ‘Recipio’, in Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary: Founded on Andrews’ 
Edition of Freund’s Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1879). 
314 ‘Suscipio’, in Lewis and Short. Carvajal has explored the contrast in relation to the 
undertakings given by navicularii: ‘La persistencia de “recipere”’, 441–50. 
315 According to the authors, recipere meant ‘auf sich nehmen, übernehmen = suscipere, 
excipere’: ‘Recipere’, in Hermann G. Heumann and Emil Seckel, Handlexicon zu den 
Quellen des römischen Rechts (Jena: G. Fischer, 1891). 
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vectura had been paid and belonged to someone else. Again, in D.4.8 – the 
title concerning the receptum arbitri, which applied where a person had agreed 
to preside over a dispute in return for a reward – the verb appears several 
times in connection with arbiters who occupied public positions and therefore 
took up their position without remuneration.316 This is consistent with the use 
of the word throughout the Digest, where it is typically associated with actions 
performed in connection with gratuitous contracts (such as commodatum, 
deposit, and mandate).317 
In light of the general meaning of both words and their contrasting use in the 
juristic sources, it is submitted that while suscipere was typically used where a 
person was acting in connection with a gratuitous arrangement, recipere was 
the appropriate word when he or she was acting for profit.318 This interpretation 
is consistent with Vivianus’ discussion of the scope of the word’s meaning in 
D.4.9.1.6 and D.4.9.4.2. As Paul reported, the jurist’s view was that property 
accessory to a contract of letting and hiring also counted as having been taken 
on by the nauta, even though no vectura was owed for its transport. Vivianus’ 
contribution was therefore to extend the word’s edictal meaning beyond those 
goods for which freight was due, which until that point was impliedly the only 
property covered by the edict as a matter of course. 
Further, the distinction between the meaning of the two verbs explains the 
tenor of Ulpian’s treatment of the clause ‘quod cuiusque salvum fore 
receperint’. Having explained that the property covered by the edict included 
some items for which no vectura had been paid, the severan jurist focused 
upon the moment at which the nauta would be regarded as having taken the 
goods on. This, he stated, would only happen once they had been committed 
to his care (adsignatae); that is, when they were put on board, and even if no 
cheirembolon had been performed (D.4.9.1.3). All this presupposed the 
existence of a locatio conductio between the nauta and the consignor; and 
 
316 D.4.8.3.2 (Ulp. 13 ad ed.): ‘Ait praetor: “qui arbitrium pecunia compromissa receperit”’. In 
connection with magistracies: D.4.8.3.3 (Ulp. 13 ad ed.) and D.4.8.4 pr. (Paul. 13 ad ed.); 
and with priesthoods, D.4.8.32.4 (Paul. 13 ad ed.). 
317 ‘Suscipere’, in Heumann and Seckel, Handlexicon. 
318 Cf. Van den Bergh, ‘Custodiam Praestare’, 67. 
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given that there is never any mention of an express undertaking in this 
connection, it is my view that the edict automatically applied to property that 
had been committed to the care of a nauta in virtue of an agreement in which 
the payment of the merces was reciprocal to the restoration of the goods (e.g., 
a locatio conductio mercium vehendarum), and became operative from the 
moment the committal took place.319 
This interpretation is strengthened by a text concerning the question as to 
whether, a letter having been stolen, the actio furti lay in favour of the missive’s 
owner or the messenger (nuntius): 
D.47.2.14.17 (Ulp. 29 ad Sab.): 
… quis ergo furti aget? is cuius interfuit eam non subripi, id est ad cuius 
utilitatem pertinebant ea quae scripta sunt. et ideo quaeri potest, an etiam 
is, cui data est perferenda, furti agere possit. et si custodia eius ad eum 
pertineat, potest: sed et si interfuit eius epistulam reddere, furti habebit 
actionem. finge eam epistulam fuisse, quae continebat, ut ei quid 
redderetur fieretve: potest habere furti actionem: vel si custodiam eius rei 
recepit vel mercedem perferendae accipit. et erit in hunc casum similis 
causa eius et cauponis aut magistri navis: nam his damus furti actionem, 
si sint solvendo, quoniam periculum rerum ad eos pertinet. 
After an initial section in which the ownership of the letter was explored, Ulpian 
stated that the actio furti lay for the person who had an interest in the missive 
not being stolen. If, among other things, the nuntius was responsible for 
custodia; or again, if he had undertaken to furnish custodia or accepted a 
reward for carrying the letter, then the action was his. In this sense, Ulpian 
concluded that the messenger’s case was similar to those of the caupo or 
magister navis, who were both granted the actio furti (provided they were 
solvent) because the risk for the goods pertained to them. 
Although the text has been considered interpolated by several scholars, I 
agree with Buckland that the core is essentially classical.320 For our purposes, 
 
319 Cf. Ménager, ‘Naulum et receptum’, 390. 
320 William W. Buckland, ‘Digest XLVII. 2 (De Furtis) and the Methods of the Compilers’, TvR 
10 (1930): 135–36; also, MacCormack, ‘Custodia and Culpa’, 165, note 52. For a 
bibliography of scholars who have treated the text, Hans-Peter Benöhr, ‘Der Brief. 
Korrespondenz, menschlich und rechtlich gesehen. Ciceros Briefe an Atticus und die 
Rechte an Briefen in Rom’, ZSS 115 (1998): 131, note 116. 
217 
 
the text indicates that the messenger’s obligation to furnish custodia could 
arise either because he took it upon himself (custodiam eius rei recepit) or 
because he had accepted a reward in return for carrying the letter (mercedem 
perferendae accipit). Further, the relation of this clause to the next suggests 
that the caupo and the shipmaster were similar with respect to the provision of 
the undertaking and the receipt of merces for carriage respectively.321 The 
implication is that the physical receipt of the goods by the nauta was enough 
for him to bear the risk if he had undertaken to transport them for a reward. 
Finally, this reading accords with the legal position set out by Servius/ Alfenus 
in D.19.2.31.322 In that text, Saufeius became the owner of grain that had been 
shot loose into the hold and was therefore liable to the consignors (who stood 
in creditum) for the return of an equivalent quantity come what may. Under the 
edict de recepto, a nauta who received res locatae of the first type – sc., 
property handed over in virtue of a contract of letting and hiring where the same 
item (eadem res) was expected to be returned – was also liable to restore it in 
all circumstances. The edict and the Republican responsum were therefore 
complementary (at least before the time of Labeo), in the sense that together 
they accounted for both types of res locatae and generated an equivalent risk 
regime for each. 
In light of the above, it is my submission that the edict initially applied in two 
circumstances: first, if property had been committed to the care of a nauta in 
virtue of an agreement in which the payment of the merces was reciprocal to 
the restoration of the goods; and second, if this was not the case, if an express 
undertaking to furnish custodia had been given. At the turn of the first and 
second centuries CE, Vivianus extended the edict’s automatic application to 
property accessory to a contract in which vectura had been paid. By the third 
quarter of the second century CE, the requirement for there to be a connection 
between the merces and the property covered by the edict was dropped 
 
321 According to Robaye, the risk assumed by the caupo and magister navis was a result of 
the edict de recepto, in contrast to the nuntius’ obligation to furnish custodia, which arose 
ex conducto: L’obligation de garde, 204. 
322 D.19.2.31 (Alf. 5 dig. a Paulo epit.): on which, supra, 190 et seq. 
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altogether by analogy with the obligation to furnish custodia in contract. This 
latter development can be detected in a series of texts concerned, again, with 
the availability of the actio furti: 
D.19.2.40 (Gai. 5 ad ed. provinc.): 
Qui mercedem accipit pro custodia alicuius rei, is huius periculum 
custodiae praestat. 
D.4.9.5 pr.-1 (Gai. 5 ad ed provinc.): 
[pr.] Nauta et caupo et stabularius mercedem accipiunt non pro custodia, 
sed nauta ut traiciat vectores, caupo ut viatores manere in caupona 
patiatur, stabularius ut permittat iumenta apud eum stabulari: et tamen 
custodiae nomine tenentur. nam et fullo et sarcinator non pro custodia, 
sed pro arte mercedem accipiunt, et tamen custodiae nomine ex locato 
tenentur. [1] Quaecumque de furto diximus, eadem et de damno debent 
intellegi: non enim dubitari oportet, quin is, qui salvum fore recipit, non 
solum a furto, sed etiam a damno recipere323 videatur. 
Despite the inclusion of D.19.2.40 in the Digest title on letting and hiring, both 
fragments were excerpted from Gaius’ treatment of the edict de recepto in the 
fifth book of his commentary on the Provincial Edict.324 According to Lenel, the 
texts originally formed a continuous passage, though some scholars have 
argued that they were separated by an intermediate section.325 Certainly some 
of the context is missing: at the beginning of D.4.9.5.1, Gaius states that what 
he has said about the availability of the actio furti applies equally to damnum 
iniuria datum; but whatever was said about furtum has not survived. Despite 
this excision, I agree with Feenstra that the sense and order of the ideas 
contained in both fragments has been transmitted intact.326 Again, the section 
‘nam et fullo… ex locato tenentur’ has been considered a gloss.327 In my view, 
however, the sense of the passage counts in favour of its authenticity. 
 
323 The Florentine has ‘recedere’ for ‘recipere’. 
324 For a bibliography of scholars who have defended the authenticity of D.19.2.40, Robert 
Feenstra, ‘Deux textes de Gaius sur la responsabilité contractuelle: D. 19, 2, 40 et D. 4, 9, 
5’, in Droits de l’Antiquité et sociologie juridique: mélanges Henri Lévy-Bruhl (Paris: Sirey, 
1959), 106, note 4. 
325 Lenel, Palingenesia, 1889, 1:198. Arguing for an intermediate section, Carl F. Lehmann, 
‘Die Haftung des conductor operis für custodia’, ZSS 9 (1888): 114; also, van Oven, ‘Actio 
de recepto et actio locati’, 155. 
326 Feenstra, ‘Deux textes de Gaius’, 108; also, Cardilli, L’obbligazione di ‘praestare’, 490. 
327 Cf. Feenstra, ‘Deux textes de Gaius’, 118. 
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In the first fragment, Gaius states that a person who accepts payment for 
safekeeping (pro custodia) shoulders the attendant risk (periculum custodiae). 
In D.4.9.5 pr., – probably after a short comment concerning the duty of such a 
person to prevent theft328 – he continued that just as fullers and tailors were 
liable ex locato for custodia even though they received merces for their skill 
(pro arte), and not to keep the goods safe (non pro custodia); so too nautae 
etc. were under the same obligation, even though they did not receive payment 
for safekeeping, but rather to transport passengers, provide accommodation, 
and stable animals. Finally, Gaius put forward his view that a person who 
undertook to keep property safe (salvum fore recipit) was obliged not only to 
prevent theft but also damage caused by third parties. 
In my view, the key to interpreting this passage is to recall that D.19.2.40, 
though included by the compilers in the title on locatio conductio, was originally 
composed in the context of the edict de recepto. Gaius therefore reasoned as 
follows: i) just as in the context of the edict a person who accepted merces in 
return for furnishing custodia shouldered the risk; ii) so too nautae etc. who did 
not receive payment pro custodia, but for the provision of transport, 
accommodation, and stabling, were liable by analogy with the responsibility of 
fullers and tailors ex locato; iii) they were therefore obliged to prevent both theft 
and damage to the property in their charge. If this interpretation is accepted, 
the passage indicates that by the time of Gaius the requirement for there to be 
a direct connection between the merces and the safety of the goods for the 
edict to apply without the need for an express undertaking had been further 
relaxed. More specifically, Gaius used the analogy of the obligation custodiam 
praestare imposed on fullers and tailors ex locato to justify the automatic 
application of the edict to nautae etc. who acted as conductores. 
4.3.1.3.2 The Relationship between the Edict de recepto and the Obligation to 
Furnish custodia in Contract. 
This is a complicated and vexing problem, which requires to draw together the 
history of the development of the edict de recepto with that of the obligation to 
 
328 Cf. Cardilli, L’obbligazione di ‘praestare’, 490. 
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furnish custodia in the bonae fidei iudicia. Besides bringing these two strands 
together, it is also necessary to differentiate between the range of legal 
relationships to which each was applicable, and the extent of the defender’s 
liability under the edict and in contract respectively. 
According to Cannata, the expression ‘custodiam praestare’ referred to the 
existence of a contractual obligation;329 so that, as MacCormack has argued, 
it carried the meaning of ‘to show, furnish custodia’, in the sense that persons 
in particular legal relationships were required to keep some object safe.330 The 
earliest use of the expression was by Labeo, who used it in relation to contracts 
of letting and hiring in which the reward was reciprocal to the activity of keeping 
some property safe (e.g., warehousing arrangements).331 As Serrano-Vicente 
has shown, the custodial obligation that arose in these arrangements was 
extended to other legal relationships through the medium of good faith, in line 
with the idea that a person who was obliged to hand over or return an object 
(tradere/ reddere) ought to prevent it from being lost or damaged while it was 
in his care (e.g., fullers and tailors).332 Although the content of the obligation 
was fluid and depended upon the context of the transaction at issue, it 
generally involved a duty to prevent harm to the object by third parties, whether 
by theft or damnum iniuria.333 As a rule, the most onerous duties were 
preserved for those who kept the property for the purpose of making a profit, 
and in particular small shopkeepers and tradesmen.334 
In light of this course of development and the changes in the interpretation of 
the edict described above, it is my submission that the edict de recepto and 
the obligation to furnish custodia were both expressions of the same basic 
principle: namely, that if a person had been paid to restore property at a later 
time, that person ought to answer for any harm done to the goods in the 
 
329 Carlo A. Cannata, Ricerche sulla responsabilità contrattuale nel diritto romano (Milan: 
Giuffrè, 1966), 128. 
330 MacCormack, ‘Custodia and Culpa’, 155 and 158. 
331 Serrano-Vicente, Custodiam praestare, 120. 
332 Serrano-Vicente, 371–72. 
333 MacCormack, ‘Custodia and Culpa’, 216 and 179; also, in this connection, Levin 
Goldschmidt, ‘Das receptum nautarum, cauponum, stabulariorum’, Zeitschrift für das 
gesamte Handelsrecht 3 (1860): 58 and 71-2. 
334 Van den Bergh, ‘Custodiam Praestare’, 67. 
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intervening period, even if that harm was inflicted by a third party. The 
qualitative difference between the nauta’s liability under the edict and in 
contract were, on this view, simply a consequence of the different procedural 
means by which this principle was given effect. Thus, whereas the scope of 
the edict depended upon the direct interpretation of its terms, the content of 
the obligation to furnish custodia was dependent upon the interpretation of 
what the defender ought to give or do for the pursuer ex fide bona. Over time, 
the concept of good faith proved more susceptible to interpretation than the 
static terms of the edict: even if, as Cannata has suggested, the latter originally 
served as a model for the development of the former.335 
In general, the interpretation of the edict lagged behind, but was pegged to, 
changes in the interpretation of the obligation to furnish custodia in the bonae 
fidei iudicia. With respect to the extent of the defender’s liability, the obligation 
to furnish custodia – first discussed by Labeo – was already conditioned by the 
proposition established by Servius and his school, that a party to a contract of 
letting and hiring who shouldered the risk ought not to bear it if the property 
was lost due to an external and irresistible force.336 Since this equitable inroad 
was given effect through the prism of good faith, and therefore had no bearing 
on the actio in factum de recepto, it fell to Labeo to propose a mechanism by 
which liability under the edict could be made consistent with the obligation 
custodiam praestare.337 This was achieved by the recommendation of an 
exceptio, which lay if the goods had been lost due to shipwreck or piracy. 
Turning to the range of relationships to which each of the edict and the 
obligation to furnish custodia were applicable, again the latter set the standard. 
Although the obligation custodiam praestare initially arose as a component of 
 
335 Cannata, Ricerche, 109; also, Alfred Pernice, Marcus Antistius Labeo. Das römische 
Privatrecht im ersten Jahrhunderte der Kaiserzeit, vol. 2:1 (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1878), 
347–49. 
336 The relevant text is D.19.2.15.2 (Ulp. 32 ad ed.): on which, Cardilli, L’obbligazione di 
‘praestare’, 233–57; Fiori, La definizione, 85–91. 
337 Cf. the outlandish suggestion made by González Romanillos, that the reason why the 
praetor did not initially exclude shipwreck and piracy was that at the time of the edict’s 
introduction seafaring was restricted to rivers and cabotage: ‘Evolución de la 
responsabilidad del nauta en el Derecho romano’, Foro. Revista de Ciencias Jurídicas y 
Sociales, Nueva Época 3 (2006): 487. 
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synallagmatic agreements in which the safekeeping of the property was 
reciprocal to the reward (e.g., warehousing), it was quickly extended to all 
those relationships in which restoration of the property was expected, even if, 
for example, the merces had been paid non pro custodia, sed pro arte (e.g., 
as was the case for fullers and tailors).338 The extension of the edict to the 
whole spectrum of relationships entered into by nautae etc. was a much slower 
affair: since the praetor’s declaration was that he would only grant an action if 
the property had been received salvum fore, its application was confined to 
those cases in which the synallagma involved the restoration of the property 
or an express undertaking to furnish custodia had been given. Extending the 
range of relationships automatically covered by the edict therefore required 
various tricks of interpretation: Vivianus, for example, relied upon the concept 
of accessio to argue that property brought on board for which no vectura had 
been paid should be regarded as the accessory of those goods for which the 
reward was due; and Gaius invoked the analogy of the fuller and tailor’s 
obligation to furnish custodia, ex locato, as a template according to which 
nautae etc. who provided transport, accommodation, and stabling, could be 
held automatically responsible ex recepto. By the third quarter of the second 
century CE the edict de recepto and the obligation custodiam praestare were, 
for all intents and purposes, coextensive.339 
4.3.2 The actiones furti and damni in factum adversus nautas etc. 
These were two actiones in factum that lay against an exercitor for theft or 
damage to property that had been committed on board the vessel by members 
of the ship’s crew.340 According to Gaius, the justification for both actions was 
that, even though the exercitor had not committed a maleficium himself, he 
was held liable as if he had committed a delict (quasi ex maleficio) because he 
carried the blame for using the services of mali homines.341 Although each 
 
338 For a list of tradespeople who were obliged to furnish custodia, Van den Bergh, ‘Custodiam 
Praestare’, 67. 
339 Cannata, Ricerche, 110. 
340 The name of the actio damni in factum is a modern invention, created by Huvelin for the 
sake of convenience: Droit commercial romain, 127. 
341 D.44.7.5.6 (Gai. 3 aur.). Ulpian gave the same justification for the actio damni etc. in 
D.4.9.7.4 (Ulp. 18 ad ed.). Whether the notion of culpa in eligendo was of classical or 
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action was distinct, their obvious similarities generated a significant degree of 
overlap, so that in many respects the conclusions drawn by the jurists with 
respect to one applied equally to the other. For the purpose of this exegesis 
the actions will therefore be treated together, though the context in which each 
juristic observation was made will be indicated where appropriate. 
4.3.2.1 Edict and formulae. 
The actio furti in factum had an edictal foundation, the terms of which were 
reported by Ulpian in D.47.5.1 pr. (Ulp. 38 ad ed.): 
In eos, qui naves cauponas stabula exercebunt, si quid a quoquo eorum 
quosve ibi habebunt furtum factum esse dicetur, iudicium datur, sive 
furtum ope consilio exercitoris factum sit, sive eorum cuius, qui in ea navi 
navigandi causa esset. 
An action is given against those who operate ships, inns, and stables, if a 
theft is alleged to have been committed by them or by anyone they have 
on their ship or premises; whether the theft was committed with the aid 
and counsel of the exercitor or those who were on board the vessel for the 
purpose of sailing it. 
As Lenel pointed out, although the first half of the fragment (In eos… iudicium 
datur) appears to quote the words of the praetor’s declaration verbatim, the 
second part (sive furtum…fin.) is incongruent in several respects.342 This has 
led several scholars, including Lenel, to regard the second section as 
interpolated: though with the caveat that the words themselves were derived 
from a classical source.343 Thus, according to Lenel, the section was drawn 
from the action’s formula and was included for the purpose of clarifying that 
the edict would also apply if a theft had been committed with the aid and 
encouragement of the exercitor or his crew.344 For de Robertis, on the other 
 
Byzantine origin will not detain us here, for in either case the exercitor’s liability according 
to the formulae of both actions remained strict: Geoffrey MacCormack, ‘Culpa in Eligendo’, 
RIDA 18 (1971): 549–50. 
342 The two principal objections are that: i) the sequence ‘factum esse… factum sit’ is 
grammatically suspect; and ii) the first section names all three categories of tradespeople 
affected by the edict, whereas the latter section is confined to exercitores: Lenel, EP3, 333–
34; also, de Robertis, Receptum nautarum, 134–36. 
343 Lenel, EP3, 333–34; Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 120–22; Siro Solazzi, ‘Appunti di 
diritto romano marittimo: le azioni contro il nauta’, in Scritti di diritto romano, vol. 3 (Naples: 
Jovene, 1960), 506–7; de Robertis, Receptum nautarum, 134–36; see, also, Fercia, Criterî 
di responsabilità, 122–23; Responsabilità per fatto, 338–44. 
344 Lenel, Palingenesia, 1889, 2:682, note 1; also, EP3, 334. 
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hand, the first and second sections originally comprised separate edicts that 
were amalgamated into one by the compilers.345 
The formula of the action, which was based upon the formula of the actio furti 
nec manifesti, has been reconstructed by several authors, though Huvelin’s 
adheres most closely to the evidence:346 
Si paret Ao Ao ope consilio Ni Ni eorumve cuius qui in ea navi navigandi 
causa erant, furtum factum esse paterae aureae, quanti ea res fuit, cum 
furtum factum est, tantam pecuniam duplam iudex Nm Nm Ao Ao c. s. n. p. 
a. 
Turning to the actio damni etc., there are several indications that the action did 
not possess an edictal foundation. Thus, unlike the actio furti in factum, which 
commanded its own Digest title (47.5) and was treated by Ulpian in book 38 of 
his commentary alongside the other edicts de furtis, the texts concerning the 
actio damni in factum were inserted by the compilers in the title on the 
receptum nautarum (D.4.9) and were derived from commentaries dedicated to 
the lex Aquilia more broadly.347 The action was therefore probably decretal, 
with a formula modelled on that of the actio legis Aquiliae. The following 
reconstruction has been suggested by Lenel:348 
Si paret in nave, quam Ns Ns tum exercebat, Nm Nm eumve, quem Ns Ns 
eius navis navigandae causa ibi tum habuit, Ao Ao damnum iniuria dedisse, 
q. d. r. a., quanti ea res in eo anno plurimi fuit, tantam pecuniam duplam 
iudex Nm Nm Ao Ao c. s. n. p. a. 
As Huvelin noted, the formula could be adapted depending upon whether the 
pursuer wished to rely upon the first or third chapter of the lex.349 
 
345 de Robertis, Receptum nautarum, 136. 
346 Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 127. Lenel’s reconstruction is substantially the same, 
though differs on some points of style: EP3, 334 (intentio) and 328 (condemnatio). Cf. 
Rudorff, Edicti perpetui, 137, no. 139. 
347 Namely, D.4.9.6 (Paul. 22 ad ed.) and D.4.9.7 (Ulp. 18 ad ed.): on which, Lenel, 
Palingenesia, 1889, 1:1012, no. 374; and Palingenesia, 1889, 2:682, nos. 1068-69. For 
these arguments, Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 127–28. Cf. Rudorff, who proposed 
that the action was based upon the following edict: ‘in eos qui naves cauponas stabula 
exercebunt si quid a quoque eorum quosve ibi habebunt damnum iniuria datum factumve 
esse dicetur in duplum iudicium dabo’: Edicti perpetui, 84. 
348 Lenel, EP3, 205–6; cf. Rudorff, Edicti perpetui, 84; Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 129–
30; and Mantovani, Le formule, 65, no. 81. For a detailed discussion, Fercia, Responsabilità 
per fatto, 341, note 30. 
349 Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 129–30. 
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4.3.2.2 Interpretation of the actiones furti and damni in factum. 
Both formulae were framed so as to make the exercitor liable for theft or 
damage to property committed by those who were on board the vessel 
navigandae causa.350 In relation to the actio furti in factum, Ulpian stated that 
the expression referred to those involved in the ship’s navigation (i.e., 
nautae).351 Correspondingly, although the edict provided an action against the 
exercitor for thefts committed by members of his crew, it did not make him 
liable for those committed by passengers.352 The severan jurist provided 
further detail in relation to the scope of the actio damni in factum. Thus, it did 
not matter for the purpose of bringing the action whether the nauta was free or 
slave.353 Moreover, if the damage had been caused by the slave of a nauta, 
though the slave himself was not a seaman, Ulpian recommended that an actio 
utilis be given.354 These actions, however, would only lie against the exercitor 
if the damage had been inflicted on board.355 Conversely, if the exercitor had 
issued a disclaimer with the passengers’ assent, that each should look after 
his own belongings and that the exercitor was to be free from all liability for 
damage or loss, then no action would lie.356 Again, the exercitor was not to be 
held to account for damage inflicted by crewmembers to one another’s 
property. In the case of nautae who were also mercatores, however, they 
would be allowed to sue; as would so-called ‘nautepibatai’ (persons working 
their passage), for whose acts the exercitor was also held liable, since they 
counted as both nautae and passengers.357 
The remaining points of interpretation were predominantly technical in 
character. In the context of the actio furti in factum, Ulpian discussed the 
 
350 See, e.g., D.14.1.1.2 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.): ‘…Sed si cum quolibet nautarum sit contractum, non 
datur actio in exercitorem, quamquam ex delicto cuiusvis eorum, qui navis navigandae 
causa in nave sint, detur actio in exercitorem’. 
351 D.47.5.1.1 (Ulp. 38 ad ed.). Fercia suspects that the phrase ‘hoc est nautae’ is a gloss: 
Criterî di responsabilità, 127. 
352 D.47.5.1.6 (Ulp. 38 ad ed.); also, in connection with caupones, D.4.9.6.3 (Paul. 22 ad ed.). 
353 D.4.9.7 pr. (Ulp. 18 ad ed.): on which, Fercia, Criterî di responsabilità, 105–6. 
354 D.4.9.7.3 (Ulp. 18 ad ed.). 
355 D.4.9.7 pr. (Ulp. 18 ad ed.). 
356 D.4.9.7 pr. (Ulp. 18 ad ed.). 
357 D.4.9.7.2 (Ulp. 18 ad ed.). For ναυτεπιβάται, Rougé, Recherches, 217–18. 
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position of the parties with respect to the civil law action on theft.358 Thus, if 
property had been lost on a ship, the pursuer could bring either the actio in 
factum against the exercitor or the actio furti against the actual thief.359 As Paul 
noted in relation to both actions, however, a person who chose the latter option 
had to be able to demonstrate that a particular person had committed the 
act.360 Returning to theft, it was Ulpian’s view that if the exercitor had received 
the goods salvum fore, the actio furti lay for him and not the owner, because 
by his receipt of the goods he came under the risk of custodia.361 Whichever 
course the pursuer chose, the civil and praetorian remedies were 
alternative.362 If he brought the actio in factum successfully against the 
exercitor, then he ought to make over his rights of action to him; conversely, if 
either the exercitor or the alleged perpetrator were absolved on the first 
attempt, the person who remained nominally liable would be granted a 
defence, ostensibly to prevent the same matter being investigated repeatedly. 
Whether Ulpian considered the actiones in factum to be noxal has been 
contested. In two fragments concerning the actiones furti and damni in factum 
respectively, the severan jurist reportedly took the view that an exercitor who 
was sued for the act of his own slave could surrender him to the pursuer to 
avoid condemnation.363 Both fragments, however, have been suspected of 
interpolation, most recently by Fercia, whose detailed study of the problem has 
yielded the conclusion that the noxae deditio in these actions was a novelty 
introduced by the compilers.364 If this is correct, then the classical position was 
that the exercitor could not escape condemnation on the basis that the 
perpetrator was a slave owned by him. 
 
358 In the literature, the issue is frequently referred under the heading of ‘active legitimation’; 
i.e., the capacity of a person to assume the position of the pursuer for the purpose of 
bringing a suit. 
359 D.47.5.1.3 (Ulp. 38 ad ed.). 
360 D.4.9.6.4 (Paul. 22 ad ed.). 
361 D.47.5.1.4 (Ulp. 38 ad ed.). See, also, D.47.2.14.17 (Ulp. 29 ad Sab.): on which supra, 216 
et seq. 
362 D.4.9.6.4 (Paul. 22 ad ed.). 
363 D.47.5.1.5 (Ulp. 38 ad ed.) and D.4.9.7.4 (Ulp. 18 ad ed.). 
364 Fercia, Criterî di responsabilità, 121; also, Responsabilità per fatto, 330; cf. Serrao, 
Impresa, 152 and 170. 
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Both actions lay for double,365 and it did not matter whether the contractual 
relationship between the pursuer and the exercitor was lucrative or 
gratuitous.366 Since the actions were in factum, the exercitor was liable even if 
the perpetrator was the slave of the pursuer.367 If there were multiple 
exercitores, each was liable in proportion to his share in the enterprise;368 and 
if the exercitor was acting with the voluntas of his father or master, he too would 
be liable in line with the second part of the exercitorian edict.369 If the 
perpetrator died, the action would continue to lie.370 On the other hand, if the 
exercitor died, the action would not lie against the heirs.371 Finally, the action 
was perpetual, and therefore without limitation of time. 
4.3.3 The Relationship between the Actions bearing on the Liability of the nauta 
and their Chronology. 
The lack of any citations of Republican jurists in connection with all three of 
these actions makes any attempt to suggest a date for their introduction 
necessarily tentative.372 In terms of pure chronology, the edict de recepto was 
known to Labeo, so that – excepting Thomas’ suggestion that the Augustan 
jurist was responsible for its introduction – it was probably first issued during 
the Republic.373 Turning to the two delictual actions, The actio furti in factum 
was likely the first to be introduced, since it appears to have belonged to the 
class of actions (like the actio Serviana) that were initially granted by the 
praetor without recourse to an edict, but which, once stabilised, came to be 
included in the annual Edict.374 A relatively early date is therefore possible: if it 
 
365 D.47.5.1.2 (Ulp. 38 ad ed.); D.4.9.7.1 (Ulp. 18 ad ed.). 
366 D.4.9.6 pr. (Paul. 22 ad ed.). 
367 D.4.9.6.1 (Paul. 22 ad ed.). This position is consistent with that taken by the same jurist in 
relation to the actio exercitoria: D.14.1.5 pr. (Paul. 29 ad ed.). 
368 D.4.9.7.5 (Ulp. 18 ad ed.). 
369 D.4.9.7.6 (Ulp. 18 ad ed.). 
370 D.4.9.7.4 (Ulp. 18 ad ed.). 
371 D.4.9.7.6 (Ulp. 18 ad ed.). 
372 According to Thomas, the absence of any mention of the actio in factum de recepto in 
D.19.2.31 indicates that the edict was not in existence by the time of Alfenus: ‘Juridical 
Aspects’, 146; but cf. Solazzi, ‘le azioni contro il nauta’, 515; and Watson, Obligations, 122. 
373 Thomas, ‘Carriage by Sea’, 504–5. 
374 Alan Watson, Law Making in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1974), 54; also, Manlio Sargenti, ‘Osservazioni sulla responsabilità dell’exercitor navis in 
diritto romano’, in Studi in memoria di Emilio Albertario, ed. Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz and 
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was coeval with several other actiones sharing the same qualities, a date in 
the second half of the second century BCE is plausible.375 On the other hand, 
if its formula was in fact edictal in origin, a date in the first half of the first century 
BCE would be more likely.376 Turning to the actio damni in factum, it has 
occasionally been doubted whether it was a praetorian creation at all.377 The 
most convincing arguments, however, fall in favour of its classicity.378 Since 
the action initially appears to have been decretal it was probably in existence 
no earlier than the time of Servius.379 
The question that arises is whether it is possible to narrow down the period 
during which the actio in factum de recepto was introduced by looking to its 
relationship with other remedies. The problem has given rise to a number of 
different theories concerning the reason for the introduction of the edict, some 
more plausible than others.380 In my view, the best approach is to explore the 
relationship between the actio in factum and the other relevant actions in turn. 
Beginning with the bonae fidei iudicium of letting and hiring, it has already been 
said that the actiones locati and conducti were first granted at some point 
between the middle of the third and second centuries BCE. Recalling 
D.14.2.10 pr., the text stands as good evidence for the proposition that, up to 
and including the time of Labeo, the shipper’s payment of the merces in a 
contract of carriage was conceived as reciprocal to the carrier’s obligation to 
 
Giuseppe Lavaggi (Milan: Giuffrè, 1953), 555–56; Salazar Revuelta, La responsibilidad 
objetiva, 172. 
375 Aubert, Business Managers, 76. 
376 Huvelin preferred a date before 77 BCE; i.e., the year in which the praetor M. Terentius 
Lucullus published the edict concerning rapina: Droit commercial romain, 134. 
377 M. Pampaloni, ‘Sopra alcune azioni attinenti al delitto di furto (actiones furti utiles)’, Studi 
Senesi 17 (1900): 149–75 and 253–69; Sargenti, ‘Osservazioni’, 558–67. 
378 Arguing for its classicity, Filippo Messina Vitrano, Note intorno alle azioni ‘in factum’ di 
danno e furto contro il ‘nauta’, il ‘caupo’ e lo ‘stabularius’ (Palermo: Alberto Reber, 1909); 
Teresa Giménez-Candela, Los llamados cuasidelitos (Madrid: Trivium, 1990), 139; Serrao, 
Impresa, 157; Fercia, Criterî di responsabilità, 100–101, note 2; Salazar Revuelta, La 
responsibilidad objetiva, 172–74. 
379 Watson, Law Making, 54–55 and 92; also, Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 133–35. 
380 These have recently been surveyed by Kordasiewicz, and so will not be reiterated here: 
‘Receptum Nautarum and Custodiam Praestare Revisited’, RIDA 58 (2011): 194–97; also, 
Maria F. Cursi, ‘Actio de recepto e actio furti (damni) in factum adversus nautas, caupones, 
stabularios: logiche differenziali di un sistema composito’, in Studi per Giovanni Nicosia, 
ed. Eleonora Nicosia, vol. 3 (Milan: Giuffrè, 2007), 118–27. 
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deliver the goods to their destination.381 However, although the shipper was 
not obliged to pay vectura for any goods that the carrier failed to deliver – 
whatever the cause – the good faith character of the actions meant that the 
latter could only be pursued for id quod interest if he was at fault for the loss. 
The carrier was therefore not contractually obliged to prevent, for example, 
theft and damage by third parties; that is, to furnish custodia.382 
This being accepted, the edict de recepto and the actiones locati and conducti 
complemented one another in several important respects. Earlier, I put forward 
the view that the edict automatically applied if a carrier received goods having 
accepted vectura for their transport. Since the actio in factum did not contain 
a clause ex fide bona, the nauta could be sued for quanti ea res fuit if he failed 
to restore the merchandise with or without fault. In effect, because the edict 
applied irrespective of culpa, it made the carrier liable for both acts of God and 
those of third parties where the bonae fidei iudicium did not. Moreover, the 
combined application of the edict and locatio conductio with respect to goods 
that were non-fungible and/ or stored separately was consistent with the 
treatment of fungible goods shot loose into the hold, for which the nauta 
shouldered the risk as their owner. 
In truth, none of this helps very much toward disentangling the chronological 
relationship between the two remedies. If, however, Ulpian’s statement that 
the edict was useful partly because it deterred nautae from conspiring with 
thieves is taken at face value, then it is possible to interpret the edict as a 
response to the limitations of the bonae fidei iudicium. The requirement for the 
pursuer to show fault or dolus would have been a difficult threshold to meet if 
goods that had been left with a nauta subsequently disappeared. On balance, 
my view is that the actions on letting and hiring were likely earlier than the edict 
de recepto.383 
 
381 Cf. Thomas, ‘Carriage by Sea’, 500–501. For the text, supra, 161 et seq. 
382 Robaye, L’obligation de garde, 204 and 86-8; also, Cannata, Ricerche, 107–10; Fercia, 
Criterî di responsabilità, 189–94; Cursi, ‘Actio de recepto’, 135–38; Cerami and Petrucci, 
Diritto commerciale romano, 293–94; cf. Kordasiewicz, ‘Receptum Nautarum’, 208–10. 
383 Schulz, Classical Roman Law, 565; de Robertis, Receptum nautarum, 39–41; Brecht, Zur 
Haftung der Schiffer, 99–100; Thomas, ‘Carriage by Sea’; Meyer-Termeer, Die Haftung der 
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The next action, which will only be considered briefly, is the actio exercitoria. 
The edict was probably issued during the second half of the second century 
BCE. According to Solazzi, the action was likely introduced before the edict de 
recepto, because the latter contained the word ‘exercere’ in its formula.384 In 
contrast, Földi has taken the opposite view, on the basis that the praetor’s use 
of the word ‘nauta’ indicates that the edict de recepto was an earlier creation.385 
Although, in my view, Földi’s argument is more persuasive, neither is decisive. 
Finally, despite the obvious overlap between the actio in factum de recepto 
and the two (quasi-)delictual remedies, each had its own characteristics.386 
The delictual actiones in factum were penal actions that lay for double. As Paul 
indicated, their utility was mainly probative: whereas the civil actions on which 
they were modelled required the precise identification of the culprit, the 
actiones in factum could be brought against the exercitor and only required 
that the act had been committed by a member of his or her crew.387 In this 
sense their scope was somewhat limited, because the exercitor bore no 
responsibility for theft or damage caused by anyone who was not a 
crewmember; and in any case, he could waive his liability with his customers’ 
agreement. On the other hand, the actions made the exercitor potentially liable 
for all the goods on board, irrespective of his contractual relationship with the 
owners. 
In contrast, the actio in factum de recepto lay for simple damages (i.e., for 
quanti ea res erit, and no more). In one sense, the action was wider in scope 
than its delictual counterparts, because the nauta was held responsible for a 
failure to restore the property in his care, no matter the cause of the loss 
 
Schiffer, 185; and, Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, 518; cf. van Oven, ‘Actio de 
recepto et actio locati’; Földi, ‘Anmerkungen’, 276–80. 
384 Solazzi, ‘L’età dell’actio exercitoria’, 1941, 212; also, Huvelin, Droit commercial romain, 
157–58. 
385 Földi, ‘Anmerkungen’, 279–80; also, de Robertis, Receptum nautarum, 39, note 2 and 40, 
note 3. 
386 For comparisons between the actions, Cerami and Petrucci, Diritto commerciale romano, 
292–93; also, Hartmut Wicke, Respondeat Superior: Haftung für Verrichtungsgehilfen im 
römischen, römisch-holländischen, englischen und südafrikanischen Recht (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 2000), 91. 




(Labeo’s exceptio notwithstanding). On the other hand, the edict only applied 
to those goods for which the nauta shouldered the risk of custodia, whether 
that was because he was being paid for this purpose or he had expressly 
undertaken to keep the property safe. 
The main difference between the actiones in factum can therefore be 
summarised as follows: whereas the delictual actions made the exercitor 
potentially liable for all the goods on board, but only for the specific acts of 
members of his crew; the edict de recepto only applied to property committed 
to his care, but for all acts and whomsoever was responsible. For so long as 
the edict did not automatically apply to all property brought on board in virtue 
of any contract concluded with the nauta – which appears to have been the 
case until at least the late-classical period – the delictual actiones in factum 
will have been important remedies in their own right. A person whose goods 
had not been committed to the nauta’s care, but whose property was stolen or 
damaged by a member of his crew, could rely upon the actions despite not 
being able to prove the precise identity of the culprit. Moreover, even if the 
nauta had assumed the risk of custodia, the delictual actions lay for double the 
value of the claim.388 
In light of the foregoing, my view is that the liability of the nauta for property 
brought onto his vessel developed in the following way. The earliest innovation 
was the bonae fidei iudicium of letting and hiring. In the first instance, the 
content of the obligation binding the parties depended upon what they had 
agreed. If, however, a nauta had undertaken the task of transporting goods for 
a reward, then he could be sued using the actio locati for what he ought to give 
or do for the defender in good faith. In these circumstances, since the vectura 
was viewed as reciprocal to delivery of the merchandise, the carrier was only 
owed the merces for those goods that he delivered. On the other hand, if any 
goods were lost or damaged in transit, he was only liable for the pursuer’s 
interest in the property if the harm could be attributed to his fault. 
 
388 For Wicke, the principal difference was that the delictual actions lay for double, the actio in 
factum de recepto only for simple damages: Respondeat Superior, 91. 
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This left a gap which, as Ulpian indicated, more unscrupulous nautae were 
willing to exploit. Since they were only liable for fault, and therefore not for acts 
committed by third parties, it was straightforward for them to conspire with 
thieves who would steal the goods and share the profits. The solution was for 
the praetor to declare that if a nauta failed to restore the goods entrusted to 
him, he would be liable come what may. In my view, the declaration 
automatically covered all goods for which vectura had been paid. If, on the 
other hand, the nauta had furnished a ship or space on board (as locator), the 
counterparty would have to secure an express undertaking for the edict to 
apply. 
So far, apart from property that the nauta expressly undertook to keep safe, 
his only legal responsibility was for merchandise that he had been contracted 
to transport. This, however, did not represent all the property brought on board 
(e.g., by passengers), that was vulnerable to theft or damage caused by 
members of the crew. If this occurred, the only remedies that were available 
were the actiones furti and legis Aquiliae, both of which required the precise 
identification of the culprit. The praetor therefore declared that, if a person 
suffered theft and, later, damage to property at the hands of the crew once the 
goods had been embarked, they could sue the exercitor for double the value 
of the claim. The underlying idea was simply that the exercitor ought to answer 
for the acts of those he was responsible for appointing. Although the principle 
was later designed as culpa in eligendo, the exercitor’s quasi-delictual liability 
in this instance was close in substance to his contractual liability under the 
exercitorian edict. 
Altogether, it is therefore my submission that these remedies were introduced 
in the following order: i) the bonae fidei iudicium of locatio conductio (between 
the middle of the third and second centuries BCE); ii) the edict de recepto (after 
locatio conductio, and probably during the second century BCE);389 iii) the actio 
 
389 In favour of a second century date, Josef Partsch, ‘Der ediktale Garantievertrag durch 
receptum’, ZSS 29 (1908): 422; Robaye, L’obligation de garde, 72; Cerami and Petrucci, 
Diritto commerciale romano, 261–62; also, de Robertis, who canvassed the possibility that 
the edict was introduced as early as the third century: ‘La responsibilità del “nauta”’, Labeo 
11 (1965): 386. Cf. Solazzi and Thomas, who both preferred a date toward the end of the 
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furti in factum adversus nautas (after the edict de recepto, and before about 
the middle of the first century BCE); iv) the actio damni in factum adversus 
nautas (probably no earlier than the middle of the first century BCE). Finally, 
the edict de recepto was used as a model for the obligation custodiam 
praestare by Labeo, after which time the interpretation of the former was 
pegged to changes in the interpretation of the latter. This necessarily changed 
the relationship between the remedies as the classical period drew on. 
 
Republic or (in the case of Thomas) at the beginning of the Principate: Solazzi, ‘le azioni 
contro il nauta’, 515; Thomas, ‘Juridical Aspects’, 138. González Romanillos prefers a date 





Section 5.1: Parallel Developments in Roman Law and Maritime Trade during 
the Late Republic and Early Principate. 
This thesis began with an analysis of the shipwreck evidence collated by 
Wilson and Strauss. Taking account of the problems that arise out of the 
presentation of the data as a chronological distribution, the graph nevertheless 
shows that long-distance trading activity in the (western) Mediterranean 
intensified greatly between the end of the Second Punic War and the first 
century CE. Further, I adduced evidence to suggest that this trend was at least 
partly driven by the rapid increase in the volume of trade conducted between 
the Italian peninsula and Gaul in the second and first centuries BCE. I therefore 
used this route as a case study from which to construct a model of a typical 
Roman long-distance trading enterprise. It is hardly surprising that, since 
merchants took it upon themselves to make a profit by connecting producers 
with consumers, they were the characters whose activities drove the process. 
In short, a typical long-distance trading enterprise involved the acquisition of 
goods by a merchant from a producer; the creation of legal relationships with 
financiers, warehousemen, and exercitores; and the sale of the merchandise 
to consumers at the intended destination. Of course, it goes without saying 
that every individual enterprise will have had its own features and 
characteristics: but it is submitted that most enterprises tended toward the 
model presented. 
In the third and fourth chapters, I examined the historical development of the 
Roman legal institutions that governed two of the relationships that merchants 
typically entered into in the conduct of long-distance trading enterprises. With 
respect to the relationship between merchants and financiers, the main 
institution that found expression in the sources was the maritime loan. Turning 
to the relationship between merchants and exercitores, several institutions are 
of note: the actio exercitoria; the bonae fidei iudicium of letting and hiring; the 
lex Rhodia de iactu; decretal actions (such as the actiones oneris aversi); the 
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actio in factum de recepto; and the actiones furti and damni in factum adversus 
nautas. These represent some of the main Roman legal innovations relevant 
to the conduct of long-distance trade. This, however, is not a comprehensive 
list, and a handful of laws, edicts, and other actions could also have been 
discussed. For the sake of completeness, it serves to briefly deal with the 
chronology of these ‘sundries’ here. 
The leges Claudia (c. 218 BCE) and Iulia de repetundis (59 BCE), which 
initially prohibited senators and their sons from possessing seagoing ships with 
a capacity of more than 300 amphorae and later from profiting from seagoing 
vessels, have already been discussed in chapter 2.1 
Besides locatio conductio, the other consensual bonae fidei contracts were all 
relied upon by merchants engaging in maritime trading enterprises. Chief 
among these was the contract of sale (emptio venditio), which gave rise to two 
actions (the actiones empti and venditi) for the purchaser and the seller 
respectively. A number of texts belonging to Cato’s de agri cultura (c. 160 BCE) 
indicate that the contract was consensual by this date.2 Beyond this, there is 
little agreement as to the origins of the bonae fidei iudicium and the date at 
which it first became consensual.3 Few scholars, however, have proposed a 
date earlier than about the middle of the third century BCE.4 
Another important early innovation was the introduction of the good faith actio 
pro socio, which enabled partners to enforce the duties they owed toward one 
another under a contract of societas. It is likely that the action was first granted 
by an unknown urban praetor in the second half of the third century BCE, but 
originally in connection with arrangements in which the partners had agreed to 
pool all their assets (societas omnium bonorum).5 The earliest attestation of 
 
1 Supra, 28. 
2 Cato, Agr. 144-50: on which, Alan Watson, The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman 
Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 40–41. 
3 For a review of the different theories, Herbert F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study 
of Roman Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 288–91. 
4 See, e.g., Alan Watson, ‘The Orgins of Consensual Sale: A Hypothesis’, TvR 32 (1964): 253; 
also, Obligations, 40. 
5 Generally, Franz-Stefan Meissel, Societas. Struktur und Typenvielfalt des römischen 




the use of partnerships in the context of Roman maritime trade comes from 
Plutarch, who described an arrangement between Cato the Elder and fifty 
traders to whom he was extending credit.6 Again, the jurist A. Cascellius 
(quaestor by 73 BCE) is reported to have made a joke about the partners to a 
shipping enterprise.7 The ‘one-purpose partnership’ (societas unius 
negotiationis/ rei), of which Cato’s arrangement is an example, was therefore 
almost certainly in existence by the second quarter of the second century BCE. 
The final consensual good faith action was the actio mandati, which lay when 
one person agreed to act gratuitously on behalf of another in the performance 
of a task. In the context of a maritime enterprise, the contract governed the 
relationship between a shipmaster and the person responsible for his 
appointment if the former was both a free person and acting gratuitously.8 The 
action was certainly introduced before 123 BCE, because the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium records the decision of a certain Sex. Iulius Caesar on the subject, 
who was urban praetor in that year.9 The earliest plausible date for the action’s 
introduction, however, is a matter of controversy. Watson preferred a date 
between the passage of the lex Aebutia (which he placed around the middle 
of the second century) and 123, and later remarked that ‘few scholars, if any, 
would suggest a date before 140’.10 Others, however, have connected the 
actio mandati with the intensification of Roman commercial activity and the rise 
of the peregrine praetor’s jurisdiction during the late third and second centuries 
BCE.11 If Watson’s critique of these arguments is accepted, however, it is 
 
6 Plut., Cat. mai. 21.6. 
7 According to Macrobius, when a merchant asked Cascellius how he ought to divide a ship 
with his partner (socius), he replied ‘navem si dividis, nec tu nec socius habebitis’: Sat. 2.6.2. 
Quintilian put the exchange differently, Cascellius simply replying ‘perdes’: Inst. 6.3.87. 
8 Both Ulpian and Paul refer to this situation: D.14.1.1.18 (Ulp. 28 ad ed.); D.14.1.5 pr. (Paul. 
29 ad ed.). Q. Cervidius Scaevola mentioned the possibility that the agent of the lender of 
a maritime loan could be contracted as a mandatory: D.45.1.122.1 (Scaev. 28 dig.). 
9 Rhet. Her. 2.13.19: on which, Alan Watson, The Contract of Mandate in Roman Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1961), 22; also, Salvo Randazzo, Mandare. Radici della doverosità e 
percorsi consensualistici nell’evoluzione del mandato romano (Milan: Giuffrè, 2005), 117–
18. 
10 Watson, Mandate, 22–23; and for the later remark, Law Making in the Later Roman Republic 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 43. 
11 Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz, Il mandato in diritto romano (Naples: Jovene, 1965), 44–46; cf. 
Randazzo, Mandare, 136–37. 
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unlikely that the action was first granted any earlier than the middle part of the 
second century.12 
One delictual and two contractual remedies remain. The two contractual 
remedies, which both principally bear upon the relationship between 
merchants and financiers, are the so-called condictio triticaria and actio de eo 
quod certo loco.13 The condictio triticaria, the name of which was probably a 
postclassical creation, was originally a species of condictio certae rei (i.e., 
claim for a specific thing) that enabled the recovery of a quantity of fungibles 
other than money.14 In the context of long-distance trade the action is likely to 
have been of some utility to traders who were dealing in bulk goods, such as 
wine, oil, and grain (that is, the three staples mentioned by Gaius, which also 
happen to constitute the ‘Mediterranean triad’).15 According to Lenel, the 
formula was included under the more general rubric ‘si certum petetur’ in the 
praetor’s album.16 Ulpian’s report of an opinion given by Servius in connection 
with the time at which the valuation of the goods ought to be made indicates 
that the remedy was already in existence by the middle part of the first century 
BCE at the latest.17 
The second contractual remedy was the so-called actio de eo quod certo loco, 
which addressed the problems that arose when the parties to a transaction 
wanted to transact in one place and expect performance in another. This was 
legally problematic for two reasons. First, the default rule was that a party 
wishing to bring a suit could only do so at the defender’s domicile or in the 
specified place of performance (in other words, at the locus solutionis); an 
 
12 Watson, Mandate, 16–21. 
13 For the condictio triticaria, D.13.3 (de condictione triticaria); and for the actio de eo quod 
certo loco, D.13.4 (de eo quod certo loco dari oportet): on both of which, Otto Lenel, Das 
Edictum perpetuum: ein Versuch zu dessen Wiederherstellung, 3rd ed. (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 
1927), 239–47. 
14 William W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, ed. Peter G. 
Stein, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 676–77. Cf, Schol. on Bas. 
24.8.7, in which Stephanus commented that the name condictio triticaria was derived from 
the old formula. 
15 D.13.3.4 (Gai. 9 ad ed. provinc.): on which, Alfons Bürge, ‘Der Witz im antiken 
Seefrachtvertrag: Beobachtungen zur Vertragspraxis im antiken Mittelmeerraum’, Index 22 
(1994): 398. 
16 Lenel, EP3, 239–40. 
17 D.13.3.3 (Ulp. 27 ad ed.). 
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obvious problem if his counterpart could not be reached in those places.18 
Second, if the obligation to perform was not bonae fidei (for example, if money 
had been lent on the strength of a mutuum or stipulatio), the orthodox actions 
for its enforcement could not take account of the interesse that either party had 
in performance at the promised place. To address these issues the praetor 
granted an actio utilis with certain special features.19 First, the action could be 
brought anywhere, and so was free from the ordinary constraints on the 
location at which an action could be raised. Second, although the action’s 
intentio was for a certain sum (certum) and did not contain a clause ex fide 
bona, the judge could exercise his discretion (arbitrium) to adjust the sum in 
the condemnatio to take account of either parties’ interesse in performance 
being made at the designated place.20 As Ulpian explained, these features 
were important for traders who were frequently engaged in complex 
transactions with different parties across multiple locations.21 In this 
connection, a citation of Labeo, who Ulpian reports was followed by Julian on 
the topic of the interesse that a pursuer could have in performance at a specific 
place, indicates that the edict was in place by the time of Augustus.22 
This leaves the delictual edictum de incendio ruina naufragio rate nave 
expugnata, which gave an action for a fourfold penalty against a person who 
had either committed robbery or wrongfully received goods obtained during 
the course of various catastrophic situations, including shipwreck and the 
forcible boarding of vessels.23 Two citations of Labeo by Ulpian indicate that 
the edict was in existence by the time of Augustus.24 According to Balzarini, it 
 
18 D.13.4.1 (Gai. 9 ad ed. provinc.); also, D.5.1.19.4 (Ulp. 60 ad ed.): on which, Francesca 
Pulitanò, De eo quod certo loco (Milan: Giuffrè, 2009), 27–41. 
19 D.13.4.1 (Gai. 9 ad ed. provinc.): on which, Max Kaser and Karl Hackl, Das römische 
Zivilprozessrecht, 2nd ed. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1996), ¶ 47.II.2. 
20 D.13.4.2 pr. (Ulp. 27 ad ed.). 
21 D.13.4.2.8 (Ulp. 27 ad ed.). 
22 Lenel suggested that Labeo had treated the action in his commentary ad edictum praetoris: 
Palingenesia iuris civilis, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1889), 510–11; also, generally, EP3, 
240–47; and in agreement, Auguste Dumas, ‘L’action de eo quod certo loco dari oportet 
en droit classique’, RHD 34 (1910): 630–31; cf. Pulitanò, De eo, 25. 
23 Generally, D.47.9 (de incendio ruina naufragio rate nave expugnata): on which, Lenel, EP3, 
396–97. 
24 D.47.9.3.2, 7 (Ulp. 56 ad ed.). Several authors have considered the latter of the two texts to 
be interpolated, though none have sought to expunge the citation of Labeo entirely: Jean-
François Gerkens, ‘Aeque perituris...’: une approche de la causalité dépassante en droit 
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was introduced shortly after the passage of the lex Iulia de vi (17 BCE), some 
of the provisions of which created penalties for activities similar to those 
penalised by the edict.25 However, as both Mataix-Ferrándiz and Tarwacka 
have argued, the similarity of the edict with several other praetorian remedies 
that were introduced to combat violence between 80 – 60 BCE makes it likely 
that it was first promulgated during this period.26 
Conclusion: 
The correlation between the increase in the volume of Roman maritime traffic 
and the introduction of legal innovations relevant to the conduct of long-
distance trade can be illustrated visually. The image at the end of this thesis 
(Appendix: Fig. 7) consists of the distribution of known Mediterranean wrecks 
(distributed into 25-year periods: Fig. 1) overlaid by the likely chronological 
range within which legal innovations relevant to the conduct of long-distance 
trade were introduced. The outer limits of the date ranges have been indicated 
by plotting a red dot for the earliest plausible date and a green dot for the latest 
plausible date for each innovation’s introduction (so far as this can be 
reasonably established). Within this range, it is possible in some cases to 
suggest a narrower period within which an innovation was introduced. This has 
been indicated by plotting a yellow dot for the time before which an innovation 
was probably not in existence, and a blue dot for the time by which an 
innovation had probably been introduced. The arguments used to define the 
scope of these narrower ranges, however, are often made on the basis of 
certain assumptions and evidence that is seldom more than circumstantial. 
They therefore ought to be treated with caution. 
Nevertheless, the graphic enables one simple conclusion to be drawn: sc., that 
the volume of maritime traffic in the (western) Mediterranean increased at the 
 
romain classique (Liège: Collection Scientifique de la Faculté de Droit de Liège, 1997), 98–
103. 
25 Marco Balzarini, Ricerche in tema di danno violento e rapina nel diritto romano (Padova: 
CEDAM, 1969), 213–15, note 85. 
26 Emilia Mataix Ferrándiz, ‘El edicto de incendio ruina naufragio rate nave expugnata (D. 47, 
9, 1). Responsabilidad penal por cuestión de naufragio’ (Universitat de València, 2016), 
37–38; also, Anna Tarwacka, Romans and Pirates. Legal Perspective (Warsaw: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kardynala Stefana Wyszyńskiego, 2009), 159–62. 
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same time as legal institutions useful for the conduct of long-distance trade 
were introduced and refined at Rome. On its own, the observation that Roman 
law developed more or less pari passu with the intensification of long-distance 
trading activity provides nothing more than a nihil obstat to the view that the 
two developments were connected.27 Since we are permitted to hold this view 
(the statement bearing no recognisable marks of being untrue), the question 
that arises concerns the nature of the relationship. Here, as Johnston put it, a 
general methodological problem has to be confronted: did economic activity 
stimulate legal change? And/ or, did legal change furnish the conditions for the 
intensification of economic activity?28 The second question is, in effect, a 
restatement of the ‘big question’ posed at the beginning of this study (sc., the 
role played by legal development in Roman economic history). Though it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to tackle this problem (it involves answering 
many other questions which have yet to be addressed), the results presented 
here are consistent with the argument put forward by Douglass North in his 
debut article, that the intensification of commercial traffic across the Atlantic 
during the period 1600 – 1850 CE owed more to the decline in piracy and the 
development of markets and international trade (i.e., institutional change) than 
to any other factor.29 Whatever the case, any solutions to these issues must 
be sensitive to the shifting picture provided by the evidence. Both the 
quantitative changes in the intensity of shipping activity and the qualitative 
changes to the institutional environment are subject to significant chronological 





27 For a similar conclusion, Luuk de Ligt, ‘Law-Making and Economic Change during the 
Republic and Early Empire’, in Roman Law and Economics, ed. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci 
and Dennis P. Kehoe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming). 
28 For the framing of these questions, David Johnston, ‘Law and Commercial Life of Rome’, 
The Cambridge Classical Journal 43 (1998): 53–54. 
29 Douglass C. North, ‘Sources of Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping, 1600-1850’, Journal 
of Political Economy 76, no. 5 (1968): 953–70. 
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Section 5.2: The Development of Roman ‘Merchant Law’. 
The first question – did economic activity stimulate legal change? – is perhaps 
easier to answer. My immediate conclusion is that the intensification of long-
distance trade and the process by which it was carried out provided both the 
stimulus and the framework for the development of Roman legal institutions 
relevant to its conduct. In my view, this occurred in the following manner. At 
the beginning of our period, the Roman understanding of their own legal 
landscape was dominated by the distinction between citizens and non-citizens. 
The law that pertained exclusively to citizens was the ius civile, which 
consisted of a combination of mores and leges, all given effect through the 
archaic legis actiones.30 The Roman conception of law, however, was not 
positivistic.31 Thus, alongside the ius civile, the Romans also conceived of the 
ius gentium, which (among other things) expressed their belief in the existence 
of a common law, beyond the law of any particular citizen body, that was 
observed by all peoples.32 Moreover, this common law could be ascertained 
from the customs and practices that were common to all people.33 According 
to Fiori, the conception was Roman in origin and can be traced back through 
the sources to the second century BCE, if not earlier. Its connection from the 
time of Cicero with the Stoic (and, by extension, Aristotelian) idea of natural 
law was a later development that began in the last half of the second century 
BCE at the earliest.34 
From our perspective, the two outstanding developments of the last few 
centuries of the Republic were the willingness of the praetors to adapt civil 
procedure to give legal protection to transactions involving non-citizens and 
 
30 Cic. Rosc. Am. 49.143: on which, Roberto Fiori, ‘La nozione di ius gentium nelle fonti di età 
repubblicana’, in Scritti per Alessandro Corbino, ed. Isabella Piro, vol. 3 (Tricase (LE): 
Libellula, 2016), 121. 
31 See, e.g., Roberto Fiori, ‘Ius civile, ius gentium, ius honorarium: il problema della “recezione” 
dei iudicia bonae fidei’, BIDR 101–102 (1998–1999): 165–97. 
32 Fiori, ‘La nozione di ius gentium’, 127–29; cf. Max Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, vol. 1 
(Munich: C.H. Beck, 1971), 202–5; also, generally, Ius gentium (Cologne: Böhlau, 1993). 
33 According to Maine, the ius gentium was ‘generalised from a comparison of various 
customs’: Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and Its Relation to 
Modern Ideas (London: John Murray, 1861), 59. 
34 Fiori, ‘La nozione di ius gentium’, 120. More or less the same thesis was advanced by Maine: 
Ancient Law, 58–61. 
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the secularisation of jurisprudence. To begin with the praetor, this was 
primarily achieved by their exercise of imperium to grant new actions.35 First, 
there were those actions (such as the bonae fidei iudicia) that were understood 
as having their roots in the ius gentium, but which were also considered part 
of the ius civile. Second, the praetor also began to grant actions (such as 
actiones in factum) for which there was no source of obligation save for the 
fact that he, as a magistrate with iurisdictio, was willing to recognise the 
transaction as deserving of protection.36 Finally, from about the time of Servius, 
the praetor was sufficiently emboldened to grant remedies on an ad hoc basis 
for which there was no foundation either in the Edict or in ius (so-called decretal 
actions); and likewise, to refuse actions even though they had such a 
foundation.37 Together, as Fiori has argued, the stabilisation of the first and 
second type of action contributed to the development of the formulary 
procedure, which was capable of producing civil effects by about the middle 
part of the second century BCE.38 Its availability to citizens and non-citizens 
alike, and its reliance on pleadings per concepta verba, makes it likely that the 
new procedure had surpassed the legis actiones in popularity – even among 
citizens – long before the latter’s eventual abolition toward the end of the first 
century BCE. 
Despite the novelty of the actions themselves, they were often conceived, to 
paraphrase Cicero, as giving effect to certain customary principles established 
by common consent and lapse of time.39 In this way, the praetor’s Edict, which 
was the vehicle for the introduction and long-term survival of these actions, 
was the chief medium through which legal custom (whether Roman or 
 
35 For the methods by which the praetors manipulated procedure to accomplish new legal 
effects, Watson, Law Making, 88. 
36 These formed the basis of the ius honorarium: Roberto Fiori, ‘Contracts, Commerce and 
Roman Society’, in The Oxford Handbook of Roman Law and Society, ed. Paul J. du 
Plessis, Clifford Ando, and Kaius Tuori (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 584–85. 
37 Watson, Law Making, 88 and 92. 
38 Generally, Roberto Fiori, Ea res agatur: i due modelli del processo formulare repubblicano 
(Milan: Giuffrè, 2003); also, ‘Rise and Fall of the Specificity of Contracts’, in Nova Ratione: 
Change of Paradigms in Roman Law, ed. Adriaan J. B. Sirks (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 
Verlag, 2014), 34. 
39 Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.22.67. 
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otherwise) was recognised and expressed.40 With respect to the Edict’s 
development, I therefore agree with Schiller that ‘customary usage, and 
particularly business practice, played a most significant part’.41 
The second outstanding development, which shall only be outlined briefly, was 
the secularisation of jurisprudence. One of the chief ways in which jurists could 
influence legal development was by means of the interpretations they offered 
in response to questions put to them. In the early period, juristic interpretatio 
had been bound up closely with religious authority in the person of the pontiffs. 
The extent to which a response was considered persuasive depended largely 
upon the auctoritas of the respondent, which was initially largely a measure his 
social and political standing in the community.42 By the turn of the second and 
first centuries BCE, however, a jurist’s auctoritas came to depend more closely 
on the extent to which his opinions had gained general acceptance.43 This, in 
turn, was accompanied by a change in the Roman intellectual environment, 
that resulted in a greater emphasis being placed upon, for example, the 
rhetorical and dialectical persuasiveness of legal interpretations, rather than 
the traditional authority upon which they rested.44 Together, this opened the 
 
40 Generally, Alfred Pernice, ‘Parerga. Zum römischen Gewohnheitsrechte’, ZSS 20 (1899): 
127–71; also, Abel H. J. Greenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero’s Time (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1901), 91–93; and A. Arthur Schiller, ‘Custom in Classical Roman Law’, 
in Folk Law: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Lex Non Scripta, ed. Alison Dundes 
Renteln and Alan Dundes, vol. 1 (Madison, WI.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 38–
39. 
41 Schiller, ‘Custom’, 38–39. For the historical development of the praetor’s Edict: John M. 
Kelly, ‘The Growth-Pattern of the Praetor’s Edict’, Irish Jurist 1, no. 2 (1966): 341–55; 
Watson, Law Making, 31–62; and Feliciano Serrao, Impresa e responsabilità a Roma 
nell’età commerciale: forme giuridiche di un’economia-mondo (Pisa: Pacini, 2002), 283–
308. The first significant attempt to reconstruct the pattern of the Edict’s development was 
made by Dernburg: ‘Untersuchungen über das Alter der einzelnen Satzungen des 
prätorischen Edicts’, in Festgaben für August Wilhelm Heffter zum III. August 
MDCCCLXXIII, ed. Ludwig Heydemann et al. (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 
1873), 91–132. Dernburg’s method, however, which involved dating individual provisions 
of the Edict by analysing the style of language employed, has been shown to be flawed by, 
inter alios, Max Kaser, ‘Zum Ediktsstil’, in Festschrift Fritz Schulz, vol. 2 (Weimar: Hermann 
Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1951), 24–25; and (for different reasons), Watson, Law Making, 33–
34. 
42 Generally, Richard A. Bauman, Lawyers in Roman Republican Politics: A Study of the 
Roman Jurists in Their Political Setting, 316-82 BC (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1983), 1–6. 
43 A. Arthur Schiller, Roman Law: Mechanisms of Development (The Hague, Paris and New 
York: Walter de Gruyter, 1978), 276–77. 
44 Claudia Moatti, The Birth of Critical Thinking in Republican Rome, trans. Janet Lloyd 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 205. 
244 
 
way for a juristic discourse that situated auctoritas in argument rather than 
tradition. 
All this sets the context for the development depicted here, which at the same 
time constitutes part of the evidence for the changes described above. To 
begin with the praetor, among the earliest of the new form of remedies were 
the consensual bonae fidei iudicia, including locatio conductio, which were 
introduced between about the midpoints of the third and second centuries 
BCE. Although there is no evidence to suggest that they were introduced 
specifically to address disputes arising out of long-distance trade, they were 
certainly relevant to its conduct. Slightly later – between about the first half of 
the second century BCE and the end of the Republic – actiones in factum 
began to be introduced. The actio in factum de recepto, for example, amounted 
to a praetorian recognition of customary usage.45 On the other hand, the 
actiones furti and damni in factum were refinements of existing remedies 
designed to meet the exigencies of maritime trade. Equally, the actio 
exercitoria (which likely consisted of a modification to formulae in ius 
conceptae) was introduced to ameliorate the civilian contractual framework to 
the realities of commercial practice. Finally, by the end of our period, the 
praetor was also granting decretal actions, such as the actiones oneris aversi, 
which were intended to address disputes arising directly out of the trading 
environment. 
Turning to the jurists, they applied their skills of interpretation to the edicts and 
formulae described immediately above, developing a detailed body of 
substantive law in the process. Labeo, for example, relied on his knowledge of 
contractual practice to produce interpretations about the parties’ intentions with 
respect to the actiones locati and conducti. In addition, customary principles, 
such as the iactus provision contained in the lex Rhodia, were given legal effect 
in Roman courts by their interpretation as an aspect of good faith. Finally, in 
the event that there was no special remedy that dealt with a commercial 
institution – such as loans of pecunia traiecticia – the jurists treated contractual 
 
45 Pernice, ‘Parerga’, 132–33; also, Schiller, ‘Custom’, 38–39. 
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practice directly through the lens of orthodox actions such as the condictio and 
actio ex stipulatu. 
The question that arises is how we are to characterise this development. In 
Roman legal scholarship, the issue crystallises around the contention as to 
whether the Romans can be said to have developed their own ‘commercial 
law’ (i.e., in the words of Aubert, ‘a set of legal rules originating with merchants, 
designed for merchants, and enforced – partly, at least – by merchants’).46 
According to Kaser, the answer is negative: ‘Ein besonderes Handelsrecht 
haben die Römer daneben nicht ausgebildet’ (‘the Romans did not develop a 
specific, autonomous commercial law’).47 Moreover, in Sirks’ view, the concept 
of ancient commercial law is anachronistic, since the idea can only be traced 
back as far as the Middle Ages.48 On the other hand, there is no shortage of 
works structured on the premise that Roman legal institutions lend themselves 
to conceptual organisation in these terms.49 
In my view, the crucial point, which has been extensively elaborated in this 
thesis, is that wherever merchants typically entered into relationships with 
other commercial actors (be it financiers, warehousemen, or exercitores), legal 
remedies were introduced and refined to address the issues that arose (see 
Appendix: Fig. 8). The conceptual coherence of these remedies as a body of 
law depends upon their common origins in the process by which long-distance 
trade was conducted. The evidence therefore tends strongly to the conclusion 
that the legal developments depicted here were a response to mercantile 
 
46 Jean-Jacques Aubert, ‘Commerce’, in The Cambridge Companion to Roman Law, ed. David 
Johnston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 213. For a discussion, Gérard 
Minaud, Les gens de commerce et le droit à Rome (Aix-en-Provence: Presses 
universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2011), 372–79. 
47 Kaser, RP, 1:474–75; also, Mario Bretone, Storia del diritto romano, 10th ed. (Bari and 
Rome: Laterza, 2004), 127. 
48 Adriaan J. B. Sirks, ‘Law, Commerce, and Finance in the Roman Empire’, in Trade, 
Commerce, and the State in the Roman World, ed. Andrew I. Wilson and Alan K. Bowman 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 53. 
49 Most notably, Levin Goldschmidt, Handbuch des Handelsrechts (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1891), 
52–94; Paul Huvelin, Études d’histoire du droit commercial romain (histoire externe-droit 
maritime) (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1929); Pietro Cerami and Aldo Petrucci, Diritto 
commerciale romano: profilo storico, 3rd ed. (Turin: G. Giappichelli, 2010). Also, e.g., Carlo 
Fadda, Istituti commerciali del diritto romano. Introduzione (Naples: Jovene, 1903); and 
Serrao, Impresa. For a review of the literature, Aubert, ‘Commerce’, 237, note 4. 
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activity and introduced with mercantile relationships in mind.50 In this way, 
economic activity stimulated legal activity, as magistrates and jurists sought to 
provide juridical solutions to practical problems.51 
At the very least, these conclusions satisfy two of the three criteria that 
constitute Aubert’s definition of ‘commercial law’. With respect to the third – 
sc., the existence of special courts reserved for traders – Aubert’s observations 
are that there is no evidence for: i) a Roman equivalent of the Athenian 
emporikai dikai; and ii) special courts presided over by merchants. As Harris 
has argued, however, the emporikai dikai was not a special court, but rather 
an expedited form of procedure that was open to citizens and foreigners alike, 
albeit only for disputes arising out of maritime trade.52 From this perspective, 
the formulary procedure – which partly developed out of remedies granted for 
the purpose of facilitating long-distance trade – performed the same basic 
function as the emporikai dikai, though with a much more expansive breadth 
of application.53 Moreover, though Aubert is right that there is no evidence for 
Roman courts exclusively presided over by businessmen, there is ample 
evidence to suggest that, insofar as there was a desire for specialist dispute 
resolution, arbitration played an important part in ancient commercial life.54 It 
is therefore my submission that the Romans did possess – if not a fully-fledged 
‘commercial law’ – a ‘merchant law’ that found expression and was given 
substance by the Edicts of the praetors. 
Understood on its own terms, Roman merchant law was in the first instance a 
body of remedies that gave shape to an expedited form of procedure, and in 
 
50 This is consistent with the conclusions reached by Di Salvo: ‘Ius gentium e lex mercatoria’, 
SDHI 80 (2014): 356–57. 
51 In this connection, de Ligt, ‘Law-Making and Economic Change’. 
52 Edward Harris, ‘The Meaning of the Legal Term Symbolaion, the Law about Dikai Emporikai 
and the Role of the Paragraphe Procedure’, Dike 18 (2015): 7–36; cf. Edward E. Cohen, 
Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973). 
53 Cf. Baker’s view that ‘the medieval law merchant was not so much a corpus of mercantile 
practice or commercial law as an expeditious procedure especially adapted for the needs 
of men who could not tarry for the common law’: ‘The Law Merchant and the Common Law 
before 1700’, The Cambridge Law Journal 38, no. 2 (1979): 301. 
54 See, generally, Leanne Bablitz, ‘Roman Courts and Private Arbitration’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Roman Law and Society, ed. Paul J. du Plessis, Clifford Ando, and Kaius 
Tuori (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 234–44. 
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the second a corpus of substantive rules generated by the interpretative 
activity of the jurists. Moreover, the sensitivity of the legal authorities to the 
process by which trade was carried out, and the Roman conception of law as 
arising from multiple sources, including the ius gentium, laid the foundations 
for a fusion that enabled the customary practices of maritime trade to find 
expression in Roman legal forms. A century and a half ago it was Maine’s 
observation that ‘substantive law has at first the look of being gradually 
secreted in the interstices of procedure’.55 It is my conclusion that the remedies 
that gave substance to the procedure, and by extension the substantive law, 
emerged partly out of the interstices of long-distance trade. 
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